

Tiworo in the Seascape of the Spice Wars

Jennifer L. GAYNOR

Résumé

Encadré par deux conflits du XVII^e siècle, la Grande Guerre d'Ambon et la Guerre de Makassar, cet article montre comment les populations maritimes de l'Asie du Sud-Est, au sein des États archipélagiques ou en alliance avec eux, ont joué des rôles plus importants qu'on ne l'avait démontré auparavant. Les chefs des Sama occupaient des postes importants à Makassar, tandis que les systèmes politiques amphibies du détroit de Tiworo, un centre maritime non urbain, constituaient un pivot dans l'espace maritime des guerres des épices. Bien que les forces de la VOC et leurs alliés de Ternate l'aient défait en 1655, Tiworo s'est reconstruit en une douzaine d'années. La résurgence de Tiworo, étroitement allié à Makassar, est liée à la nouvelle campagne d'expansion de cet État dans l'archipel oriental. Cette menace pour les intérêts néerlandais a de nouveau placé Tiworo dans la ligne de mire de la VOC en 1667, ce qui a amené sa population à s'enfuir. Elle fut ainsi sauvée du massacre et de la capture ; Arung Palakka conserva ses bateaux et promut soixante hommes de Tiworo dans sa Garde des Grands Commandants. En plus d'expliquer les fonctions effectives de Tiworo dans la dynamique maritime, son importance pour le sultan Hasanuddin de Makassar et sa désignation comme « pirate » par la VOC, l'article souligne que le transfert d'allégeance du contingent de Tiworo de Makassar à Boné a précédé de peu l'essor du port de Boné, Bajoé, en tant que centre cosmopolite.

Mots-clés : Sama ; Bajo ; Tiworo ; Sulawesi ; Makassar ; Boné ; Moluques ; guerre des épices ; espaces maritimes ; pirates.

Abstract

Framed by two seventeenth-century conflicts, the Great Ambon War and the Makassar War, this article shows how Southeast Asian maritime-oriented people played more extensive roles in archipelagic states, and in alliance with them, than has previously been demonstrated. Sama leaders held important posts in Makassar, while the amphibious polity at the Straits of Tiworo, a non-urban maritime hub, formed a fulcrum in the seascape of the spice wars. Although trounced by VOC forces and their Ternatan allies in 1655, over the next dozen years Tiworo rebuilt. Closely allied with Makassar, Tiworo's resurgence was linked to Makassar's campaign of re-expansion in the eastern archipelago. This threat to Dutch interests again brought Tiworo into the VOC's sights in 1667, causing it to disband. Its people thus saved, this time, from slaughter and capture, Arung Palakka preserved their boats

and elevated sixty of Tiworo's men to his Guard of Prime Commanders. In addition to elaborating on Tiworo's practical functions in maritime dynamics, its importance to Makassar's Sultan Hasanuddin, and its designation as piratical by the VOC, the article points out that the Tiworo contingent's shift of allegiance from Makassar to Boné shortly preceded the rise of the latter's harbour, Bajoé, as a cosmopolitan center.

Keywords: Sama; Bajo; Tiworo; Sulawesi; Makassar; Boné; Moluccas; spice wars; seascape; pirates.

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
Trading systems, interregional cultural exchange, migrations, and diasporic communities have received substantial consideration in studies of Southeast Asia and its surrounding seas. Yet, Southeast Asia's mariners, and the political and social systems they were part of, still seem so opaque. This article examines specific connections and interactions along and between coasts, as well as a shift in the relations between maritime-oriented people and particular powers in Sulawesi (Celebes), to contribute to a clearer understanding of how seventeenth-century maritime dynamics in Southeast Asia interfaced with politics and society above the high-water mark.

During the seventeenth century, networks of Southeast Asian maritime-oriented people – “sea people” – were intimately allied with the ruling families of land-based realms. They held positions of rank in those realms, and also led more amphibious polities focused on the littoral. For instance, during the 1660's and 1670's, Sama leaders, or *papug*, at times held the prominent post of Harbormaster or Chief-of-Port (Mak. *sabannaraq*, Malay *syahbandar*) in Makassar. Just prior to the attack on Makassar in 1667 by the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its allies, the famous Bugis prince from Boné who led those allies, Arung Palakka, armed and elevated sixty men from Tiworo to comprise half his Guard of Prime Commanders. Tiworo, with its boats and skilled mariners, had previously been a staunch ally of Makassar. Located in the Straits of Tiworo's protected waters and along their perimeter, this fortified non-urban maritime hub provided a haven for fleets sailing under Makassar, and a staging area for conflicts further east. These positions of rank and alliance show that although Southeast Asia's sea people have often been considered stateless, they took a more direct part in the concerns of states than just provisioning ports, patrons, and rulers with the bounty of the seas and the booty of coastal raiding (map 1).¹

Through positions of maritime leadership and the control of key geographic sites in the littoral, such as Tiworo, sea people also played a vital

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1. Other studies have also pointed out that such links existed. For instance, Andaya, L. 1984 and Warren 2007. New work goes farther in substantiating such claims and explaining the depth of the political connections. For instance, no previous work explores Tiworo's close relations with Makassar. Nor had we any substantive knowledge about the Sama leaders known as *papug*, until recently thought to be little more than a figure of Sama legend. Yet, three different Sama *Papug* also held rank as Makassar's harbormaster (*sabannaraq*). See below and Gaynor 2016.



Map 1 — Indonesian archipelago map. (Credit: Bill Nelson.)

role in opposing European efforts to dominate the spice trade. Based on VOC archives and Sulawesi manuscripts, this new understanding of sea people in regional dynamics adds to the revision of a world history narrative that portrays the spice wars as a conflict between competing European mercantile empires. Yet the view of the maritime past presented here does more than alter a Eurocentric narrative. Both here and in my book, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture*, I show how under-utilized European and Southeast Asian sources open a window onto Southeast Asia's maritime past, offering a view that demonstrates the pivotal place of sea people in the dynamics of politics, trade, littoral society, and military cooperation. On the one hand, this helps to integrate the archipelagic past in wider frameworks of Asian maritime history along with the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. On the other hand, by examining sea people's involvement in archipelagic networks of politics and kinship, this work shows that littoral society was emphatically not just based in cities.²

Scholarship on early modern Southeast Asia places less stress on the spice wars as a competition between mercantile empires, and more emphasis on examining how agents of European companies formed alliances with regional polities to obtain spices cheaply, especially cloves and

2. It therefore differs from Michael Pearson's view of the littoral, centered on urban interconnectedness (see Pearson 2006). Also see Gaynor 2016: 201–205.

nutmeg, and to subjugate those who opposed these aims. Non-European maritime aspects of the spice wars have received little attention, with the exception of Gerrit Knaap's examination of *hongi* expeditions in the Moluccas, at the far eastern end of what is now Indonesia. He explains how European overlords, first the Portuguese and then the Dutch, incorporated the practice of *hongi* maritime raids, previously carried out by federations of Moluccan chiefdoms, into the colonial arsenal of punitive attacks on spice growers. Knaap has also presented data from Dutch sources on how much support, in manpower and munitions, Moluccan spice growers received from Makassar during the conflicts of the mid-1650's known as the Great Ambon War.³

The present article brings within a single frame both the Great Ambon War and the later Makassar War, to show how the Straits of Tiworo formed a fulcrum in the seascape of the spice wars. Although trounced with much luck by VOC forces and their Ternatan allies in 1655, over the next dozen years Tiworo rebuilt. Its resurgence was linked to Makassar's campaign of re-expansion in the eastern archipelago. A threat to Dutch interests, Makassar's re-expansion contributed to the decision by the VOC's Admiral Cornelis Speelman to attack the port of Makassar itself, yet only after subduing Tiworo a second time in 1667.

Makassar's Sultan Hasanuddin justified the actions of his fleet during the inter-war years by explaining that his need to maintain his claims over the lands in question was the result of Ternate's attack on the Makassar territory of "Pancana". Pancana, also known in the sources by the variants "Pantsiano" and "Pangesane" is now known as the island of Muna. Ternate and Makassar had a longstanding rivalry. Since 1580, when Ternate conducted a campaign that swept through the Muna and Buton region, Ternate's local influence had waned. Allying with the VOC during the Great Ambon War presented Ternate with the opportunity to press its claims over polities in the area, including Tiworo. However, until 1667, the amphibious realm in the Straits of Tiworo remained closely allied with Makassar, which had gone through an expansionist phase earlier in the century.⁴ The discussion below clarifies why Sultan Hasanuddin's bringing up Pancana was a reference not to the whole of Muna, but instead to Tiworo, which included the northwest part of the island. The area's most prominent and most fortified polity at the time, Tiworo was attacked in 1655 by Ternate together with the VOC. This article situates Tiworo in the seascape of the spice wars, and examines why "that nasty pirates' nest", as Admiral Speelman called it, mattered so much to Sultan Hasanuddin that his rationale for re-expansion lay in avenging it.⁵

3. Knaap 2003.

4. For more details on the background and context see Gaynor 2016, especially pp. 66–71.

5. Or "vile": "*dat leelijke roofnest Tiboore*". Cornelis Speelman, "Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt, en tot naeder last van de Hooge Regeringe op Batavia, tot naerrichtinge voor den ondercoopman Jan van Opijnen bij provisie gestelt, tot Opperhooft en Commandant int Casteel Rotterdam op Maccassar, en van den Capitain Jan France als hooft over de melitie mitsgaders die van den Raede", VOC 1276 (1669), f. 684v.

Littoral society

The colonial labeling of sea people as “pirates”, an epithet that disavowed them of legitimacy, also located them discursively beyond the bounds of states. Their portrayal as sea nomads or sea gypsies, both in colonial and in scholarly literatures, has similarly situated them as mobile and deterritorialized, supposedly beyond the reach of political authorities. Yet, as touched on above, sources show that during the seventeenth century, maritime-oriented Southeast Asians, such as the Sama (called by others the “Bajo” or “Bajau”), were part of a vibrant, politically interconnected, and socially complex seascape.⁶ Their appearance in period sources therefore departs from the usual portrayal of sea people as peripheral. During the early modern period they were not peripheral to states, politics, or war. Rather, what they were peripheral to was simply the land.

Much scholarship, even in maritime history, labors under what the Atlanticist Marcus Rediker has called a *terracentric* bias, that is, a land-based set of assumptions about place.⁷ Similarly – with some notable exceptions – much scholarship on maritime Southeast Asia has literally missed the boats.⁸ My approach, merely one of many possible ways to address this terracentrism, is to depart not from the land, but instead to launch, as people actually did, from the intertidal zone itself – the area between the high-water mark and the lowest low tide. This approach contributes to an expanding body of work on Southeast Asia interested in how maritime-oriented people maintained interconnections, among themselves and with others, at varying scales, to both non-urban littorals and to urban centers.⁹ It thus has parallels with some recent work on the region’s upland areas, yet is similarly plagued by tensions between enduring romantic idealizations and contrasting facts supported by the sources.¹⁰

Launching from the littoral brings into focus interactions that unfolded along coastlines, as well as between distant shores. Bennet Bronson’s well-known model of upstream-downstream relations in Southeast Asian political systems is useful here. While it emphasizes how trade and polity formations were structured spatially along the branches of a river, such political systems were also structured socially by alliances among different segments of descent group lineages. Pierre-Yves Manguin has elegantly shown through an examination of literary and epigraphic sources, how amorphous coastal polities used terms for riverine geography to position themselves socially and spatially in relation to supposedly subordinate

6. Gaynor 2016.


7. Rediker 2004.

8. More notable exceptions exist than can be cited here on Southeast Asian mariners, regional maritime history, and their interregional connections. For early modern island and peninsular Southeast Asia, see, *inter alia*, work by Kenneth R. Hall (2006, 2008), Pierre-Yves Manguin (1980, 1993, 1996), Gerrit Knaap (2003), Heather Sutherland (2007, 2015), and Knaap & Sutherland (2004).

9. Hall 2004: 252–253; Hall 2011; Velthoen 2012; Andaya, L. 1991; Ota 2010; Ellen 2003.

10. Van Schendel 2002; and Scott 2009; both are central to the burgeoning field of “Zomia” studies about the upland border areas of mainland Southeast Asia.

Figure 1 — Adaptation of Bronson’s model to parallel river systems linked by coastal trade. (Credit: Martin McClellan. Used by permission: American Historical Association. From: Wheeler n.d.)



upstream polities. Charles Wheeler and Li Tana have each discussed how parallel watersheds in Vietnam were linked and sometimes unified by coastal routes (fig. 1).¹¹ What I propose simply builds on this work, extending it further into the maritime realm.

Because similarly structured relations did not just stop at the downstream port, I suggest transposing this riparian structure to understand the organization of political relations that ran along and between the region’s coasts. In other words, take that dendritic form of a river and its branches, previously used to describe inland relations in Southeast Asia, and pivot it from its riparian geographic context so that it now reaches out across maritime space to touch other intertidal zones. Transposing this dendritic structure of political and social alliances from a riverine to an intertidal geography provides a model for grasping the connections, and the continuity of relations, across maritime space between a variety of littoral places.

Doing so also equips one analytically to weigh anchor and follow the boats for a view of archipelagic history from the sea. Yet, to really take account of what boats connected, historically, entails refocusing attention on nautical matters in the sources. What the sources show about the complexity of such intertidal social interactions calls for recognizing multi-ethnic formations where one might not expect to find them, and refining the picture of how they worked in practice.¹² Such analysis is not without precedent, for instance, the fine examples set by Heather Sutherland, and by

11. Bronson 1977; Manguin 2002; Li 2006; Wheeler 2006.

12. For further discussion of the concept of intertidal history, see Gaynor 2016: 6, 9, 29.

James Warren and his student Esther Velthoen, who waded through murky historical waters in order to figure out what some of the region's maritime people actually did.¹³

In the following look at Tiworo's connections with Makassar and Boné, adversarial polities in seventeenth-century south Sulawesi, I draw on three kinds of sources: Makassar-language sources, especially the published annals and chronicles of Makassar's dual realms, Gowa and Talloq; Bugis-language sources handed down through elite Sama lineages; and the archives of the VOC, the Dutch East India Company. The Makassar sources show that Sama people formed part of Makassar's inner social circle, holding positions of authority under its rulers, while serving, sometimes simultaneously, in Sama positions of leadership. The archival sources offer new evidence that illustrates why Tiworo was called a "nasty pirate's nest", and twice targeted by the VOC and its allies during the seventeenth century. They also show that Tiworo had been Makassar's close ally, and moreover suggest that the historically close ties between Sama and Bugis people have their roots in the incorporation of a large group of Tiworo's men into the top ranks of Boné's military. Bugis-language sources, inherited through Sama lineages, offer evidence of the long legacy of those close ties and how they have been recalled in historical memory.

What made Tiworo important enough to be targeted by the VOC and its allies during these two seventeenth-century wars over control of the spice trade: the Great Ambon War and the Makassar War, especially given that it lay so far from the main areas of conflict in each? To answer this question, it may help to put Makassar's alliance with Tiworo in perspective by first understanding Makassar's connections with the maritime-oriented Sama closer to home and how they were vital to its nautical efforts (map 2).

The Papuq was no myth

Prominent Sama people were deeply involved in Makassar's politics and society. As with elsewhere in early modern Sulawesi and in the wider region, intra- and inter-polity ties were commonly formed or reinforced through marriage politics. While Tiworo's significance and how it linked these wars can be shown without demonstrating familial relations, kin ties probably existed between these allied ruling families, and would add to the other reasons why Sultan Hasanuddin offered his rationale for re-expansion in terms of responding to the 1655 assault on Tiworo during the Great Ambon War. It is difficult to prove direct kin ties from the royal genealogies, since "Tiworo", often rendered "*Tibore*" in the seventeenth-century Dutch sources, was essentially represented orthographically the same way as "*timboroq*", which means "east". Hence, "*ri Tiworo*" in regional languages could easily be (mis)interpreted as "in the east", rather than "in Tiworo". Nevertheless, Dutch sources on the 1655 assault portray the closeness of Tiworo's and Makassar's ruling

13. Warren 2002, 2007; Velthoen 2002, 2012; Sutherland 2015.



Map 2 — The central and eastern archipelago. (Credit: Bill Nelson and Jennifer L. Gaynor.)

families, and close high-ranking families typically had kin connections. For instance, it was common during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the rulers or chiefs of Ternate's outlying districts to provide daughters to Ternate's court to become royal wives. Similarly, in Makassar, the transfer of control over outlying districts was often legitimized by marriage between a subjugated king's daughter and the king of Gowa or one of his sons. As with elsewhere in the archipelago, daughters and sisters of rank were married to men of similar rank from neighboring polities to secure alliances with them.¹⁴

The existence of kin ties between prominent Sama and Makassar lineages in Makassar itself would also lead one to expect to find similar relations between Tiworo's top mariners and Makassar's ruling families. Just how prominent the Sama in Makassar were comes as something of a surprise. Remarkably, the figure of the "Papuq", or I should say, "figures", for we are talking about more than one of them, turns out not to be a chimera of myth and legend, but the stuff of actual history. The term *papuq*, a Sama-language title for a Sama leader, has appeared rarely and with dubious historicity in the scholarly literature to date.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the *Makassar Annals*, which scholars regard as a fairly reliable source, lists by name three Papuq who lived during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It is not that these people were entirely unknown, however, it seems their position as Sama leaders was not noticed by contemporaneous observers. Mention of them in the *Annals* indicates that they were in the top echelons

14. See Andaya, L. 1993: 37; Andaya, B. 1993: 419; Gaynor 2016: 81–82.

15. See Gaynor 2016: 87–97.

of Makassar's political structure. Also considered to be part of Makassar's inner social circle, the *Annals* noted major events in their lives or those of their children, such as the marriage of a daughter, I Saenaq, to I Daeng Manassaq, and the birth of their child. However, the inclusion of these Papuq in the *Makassar Annals* does not necessarily mean that they were chosen to be Papuq by Makassar's rulers. On the contrary, the *Annals* record that after the death on March 12, 1703, of Papuq Daeng Numalo, I Daeng Makkulle Ahmad was "installed as Papuq by his family" on June 12, 1703.¹⁶ This implies that he did not come from the same kin group as the writer. Hence, it appears that these maritime-oriented Sama people at the polity's center had the relative independence to choose their leaders from among their own kin networks, as was often the case with Makassar's tributaries on land.

In addition to Daeng Numalo and Daeng Makkulle Ahmad, the third Papuq mentioned in the *Annals* was Daeng Manggappa, born in 1688, and also known as "Mommq". Like Daeng Makkulle Ahmad, who was installed in 1710 as Makassar's *sabannaraq*, Daeng Manggappa had also served as Makassar's harbormaster. *Sabannaraq* did more than watch the comings and goings at port. The position carried with it some authority to punish transgressors within Makassar itself, and to lead military expeditions.¹⁷ For instance, a previous *sabannaraq* named Daeng Makkulle, presumably the father of Papuq Daeng Makkulle Ahmad (his namesake), was important to Makassar's inter-war expansionary campaign under Sultan Hasanuddin.¹⁸ The elder Daeng Makkulle may also have had Sama descent, like his son, or, possibly, the son's Sama lineage came solely through his mother. Dutch sources mention this older Daeng Makkulle returning home in 1666 after a two-month mission to Buton, which followed a major expedition by Makassar's fleet to Banggai and Tobungku on Sulawesi's east coast, as well as to the Sula Islands, to force them to accept Gowa's suzerainty.¹⁹ En route to and from these expeditions, Daeng Makkulle would almost certainly have passed through Tiworo with the fleet, as Makassar's fleet had done during the Great Ambon War the previous decade, on its way to the eastern archipelago. Similarly, the younger Daeng Makkulle (Papuq Daeng Makkulle Ahmad), while harbormaster, jointly led a military expedition with his son-in-law, Daeng Manassaq, to advance against Toring in Flores. Part of a series of such expeditions across the Flores Sea to the south, they

16. Cummings 2010: 7, 176, 233, 236. For a discussion of positions and titles in early modern Makassar, see Cummings 2007: 5–6.

17. Cummings 2010: 156, 196, 203, 233, 268 note 669 (Cummings notes that this was probably but not necessarily the same Daeng Manggappa as the *sabannaraq*), 278, 292, 301 note 756.

18. "Presumably his father" and "presumably the son and successor" according to Cummings 2010: 139 (note 358), 176, 196. This first Daeng Makkulle was apparently also called "I Daeng Makkulle I Mappaq" (p. 234).

19. Andaya, L. 1981: 60, 65, 126; "Report of Commissioner van Wesenhagen on mission to Makassar and Ternate", VOC 1257, 511. The *sabannaraq* Daeng Makkulle also distinguished himself in battle on land: "Goa [sic]'s successful campaigns in the interior were a marked contrast to the difficulties it faced against Arung Palakka and the Dutch in the west. The Makassar forces under Syahbandar Daeng Makkulle, joined by a thousand men from Wajo and Lamuru, marched through Soppeng burning as they went..." (Andaya, L. 1981: 126).

show that Makassar's seventeenth-century defeat in the Makassar War did not keep it from launching military campaigns well into the 18th century.²⁰

The relevance of the above is fourfold. First, it demonstrates the social and political importance of Sama leaders in Makassar. Second, it shows the marriage of the Papuq's daughter to a Makassar son of distinction. While this resembles patterns of alliance in this region and elsewhere in the archipelago, it also supports the suggestion that Tiworo's leaders were similarly likely to have kin connections cementing their ties to Makassar. Third, the *Makassar Annals* offer evidence of the military significance of the Papuq's leadership. And fourth, it suggests the importance of Sama followers to these endeavors, for, one has to ask, whom would the Papuq be leading at sea – in other words, who manned the fleets – if not Sama sea people? Corroborating the *Makassar Annals'* evidence suggesting the importance of Sama people to Makassar's fleets, a Dutch report of 1733 remarks that the Sama were the “muscles and sinews” of Makassar.²¹

Tiworo and the Great Ambon War

The Great Ambon War was fought from 1651 to 1656, largely in battles on islands in the vicinity of Ambon. The VOC forces, led by Arnold de Vlaming, were joined by local allies mostly under Ternate's Sultan Mandarsyah, who claimed numerous islands in the region as his dependencies. At the time, Makassar formed the primary transshipment point for goods from the eastern archipelago, including cloves and nutmeg. Makassar, ruled by the dual realms of Gowa and Talloq, was a cosmopolitan port whose diverse merchant communities swelled after 1641, when the Portuguese lost Malacca to the Dutch, leading Portuguese and other merchants to move to Makassar.²² Makassar thus had major stakes in the Great Ambon War and it actively supported eastern archipelago clove-growing regions in their struggle against the VOC. Makassar and its supporters provided fighting men and weapons to places such as Asahudi on the Hoamoal peninsula, a sail from Makassar of over 1,000 km.²³ Scholars usually treat the Makassar War separately, as it came a dozen years after the Great Ambon War and took place in Sulawesi. However, these wars were linked by more than just a shared concern with spices, for like the route often sailed between Makassar and Maluku, the chain of events that connected these wars ran through Tiworo.

Although the main sites of conflict in the Great Ambon War lay some 650 km distant, Tiworo nevertheless supported the interests of its ally Makassar with a number of nautical strengths. First, Tiworo gave Makassar a geographic advantage: it offered a shorter route to the eastern archipelago that, as archival documents show, bypassed rivals such as Buton. Second,

20. Cummings 2010: 164 note 445, 169, 179, 233, 237, 238, 265, 266, 268.

21. “Makassar to Batavia”, May 21, 1733, VOC 2285, 119; Andaya, L. 1984: 39.

22. See Gaynor 2016: 66–69.

23. Knaap 2003: 178–181; Bor 1663: 236–241, 288–298, 301–303.

Tiworo provided fleets sailing under Makassar a safe haven. Third, it also served as a nautical staging area for trade and engagements further east. Finally, Tiworo's own boats and mariners supported Makassar's endeavors. Dutch sources characterize Tiworo as subject to Makassar, yet also portray their leaders as close friends. This fits with a picture of political organization common to precolonial Southeast Asia, in which subordinate polities, organized around lineage segments, demonstrated their allegiance within center-weighted political structures.²⁴

The assault by Ternate and the VOC on Tiworo in 1655 had a dramatic outcome, which may in part explain Sultan Hasanuddin's framing his rationale as payback. When the VOC and Ternatan forces attacked, they expected to meet with Makassar's fleet in Tiworo. Indeed, when Ternates' forces advanced five or six miles ahead of the VOC, this motivated de Vlaming, who led the VOC forces, to advise Vice Admiral Roos to take eleven "row yachts" and three hundred Dutchmen into Tiworo to find and join Mandarsyah, in order to look for the Makassar fleet together. He also advised Roos, if it were not too dangerous, to undertake something violent on Tiworo.²⁵

However, neither Makassar's fleet, nor most of Tiworo's own fighting men, were present at the time. Three-hundred of Tiworo's men had been sent off with their weapons to subdue neighboring regions, while a second contingent, around one-hundred fifty strong, had gone off to hunt buffalo. The Dutch and their allies thus encountered scant resistance. They killed two hundred people at five different places in Tiworo. They also found a vast store of provisions including rice, plus quality merchandise such as clothing and other goods, which lay ready to be shipped, according to the sources, apparently to Asahudi, a major site of conflict in the Great Ambon War. VOC forces stole, burned or destroyed the provisions and goods, and they incinerated fifty "beautiful ships", including junks, galleys, and *kora-kora*.²⁶

Arnold de Vlaming proclaimed that "the name and weapons of the Company will without doubt gain a reputation in these parts, since the

24. "Originele generale missive", 12 July 1655, VOC 1208, book 4, 538–548, especially 543r; "Letter from the King of Buton to Arnold de Vlamingh and Governor Willem Van der Beecq, Dachregister bij d'Hr. Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn", April 5, 1654, VOC 1205, book 2, 892r–894r; "Letter of January 9, 1655, from Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn aboard the *Erasmus*, delivered express to the Authorities before Tiworo (*Tibore*)", VOC 1211, book 2, 76–77; Bor 1663: 273; "Letter of 17 January 1655, to Simon Cos, Provis. President in Ambon, from Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn in the ship *Erasmus* lying at anchor by the east end of the Buton Straits", VOC 1211, book 2, 89. [The spelling "Arnold de Vlaming" follows standard practice in the secondary literature, while the name's spelling in notes follows the practice in the respective source.]

25. Bor 1663: 259; "Letter of January 9, 1655, de Vlamingh aboard the *Erasmus*, to the Authorities before Tiworo (*Tibore*)", VOC 1211, 76–77. For a visual representation of what the VOC sources called "row yachts", see the cover of Gaynor 2016.

26. Bor 1663: 260–262; "De Vlamingh to Simon Cos", VOC 1211, 88–89; "Letter of January 9, 1655, de Vlamingh aboard the *Erasmus*, to the Authorities before Tiworo", VOC 1211, 76–77; Originele Generale Missieve, 12 July 1655", VOC 1208, 543r; "Letter to Governor Jacob Hustaert and the Council in Malucco, with the Yacht Dromedaris, written on February 2 (1655) from Batoij, signed by Arnold de Vlamingh and Willem Maetsuyker on the chaloup Sumatra, lying at anchor off the coast of Celebes opposite Chassea island", VOC 1211, book 2, 99–100.

oft-mentioned fortress (at Tiworo) was reputed to be very strong and the capital place of Pangesane Island.”²⁷ Here, one may note de Vlaming’s singling out the fortress as both well known to the Dutch, and also the capital place of Pangesane, or what is now called the island of Muna. Among those killed in the attack were Tiworo’s king (*raja*), the greater number of his entourage or notables, as well as his sons.²⁸ De Vlaming remarked that this was a serious blow to Makassar, “to lose their friend, the king, with most of his peers”, as he was “a man on whom a lot was riding and in this region was greatly esteemed.”²⁹ In addition, around three hundred women and children were taken alive.³⁰ Historians might expect they would have been brought to Batavia to be sold as slaves. But this, at least initially, was not their fate.

A familiar feature of early modern warfare in Southeast Asia, the preference for taking captives rather than seizing land is something historians often regard as a result of land’s abundance and the relative scarcity of labor. Particularly in the region’s cities, manpower, rather than fixed capital, was the principal asset to be protected, and a primary object of warfare was to increase the availability of workers.³¹ Yet land, here, was not really part of the equation. Instead, as de Vlaming stated, the captives were given over to the fighters in order to get them off the VOC’s hands, and to please and appease their allies so that they would continue with their work. He elaborated that the captives were granted to their allies as an incentive to boost the fighters’ willingness to undertake further combat.³² It is, however, also possible that the VOC’s allies had carried out this human expropriation, and in his report de Vlaming was simply putting a “good face” on a fait accompli for the eyes of his superiors.

In either case, captures in the context of colonial conflicts built on longstanding practices of raiding endemic to the region.³³ As war spoils go, it must be noted that these captives did not all bear equal social significance. Among the three hundred women and children taken alive at Tiworo were the king’s wives and daughters.³⁴ With the bulk of its fighting men away, its villages and remaining boats torched, and its fortress torn down, Tiworo was politically decapitated, and depopulated by slaughter and capture. Among the stratified and interwoven society of the region’s littorals, these captures would have carried great significance. If Tiworo and Makassar had close kin connections, as seems highly likely, then, in addition to the temporary loss of Tiworo’s strategic functions, and the killing of friends and allies, the significance of these captures would have bolstered Sultan Hasanuddin’s desire to avenge Tiworo.

27. Bor 1663: 260–262; “Letter of January 9, 1655, from Arnold de Vlamingh aboard the *Erasmus*, to the Authorities before Tiworo”, 76–77; and “De Vlamingh to Cos”, VOC 1211, 88–89.

28. “De Vlamingh and Maetsuyker to Jacob Hustaert”, VOC 1211, book 2, 99–100; and “Originele generale missive”, 12 July 1655, VOC 1208, 543r.

29. “De Vlamingh to Cos”, VOC 1211, 89.

30. *Ibid.*, 89; “De Vlamingh and Maetsuyker to Jacob Hustaert”, VOC 1211, 99.

31. Reid 1980: 243.

32. Bor 1663: 236–240; “De Vlamingh and Maetsuyker to Jacob Hustaert”, VOC 1211, 99.

33. Junker 1999.

34. “Originele generale missive”, 24 December 1655, VOC 1209, book 1, 5v–6r.

Only three days after the attack, Makassar's fleet did arrive in Tiworo. Remarking on the VOC's luck, Arnold de Vlaming wrote that had the Makassar fleet come a few days earlier, it would have been impossible for the Dutch "to have been there alone to carry out the job and our people undoubtedly would have perished and been beaten."³⁵ Although the timing of their arrival was unfortunate for Tiworo, the fleet's boats were still able to use Tiworo as a safe haven. The VOC kept a watch in nearby waters for months, until Makassar's fleet finally managed to evade the Dutch patrols by sailing past them – amazingly – in a very dense fog.³⁶

Tiworo and the Makassar War

Between the wars, Makassar's Sultan Hasanuddin undertook a campaign of re-expansion in the eastern archipelago. This campaign threatened both VOC interests and those of Ternate. While the Makassar War was driven primarily by competition for spices, and one can list a number of proximate causes in the lead-up to it (as Leonard Andaya has done³⁷), my aim here is to draw attention to a remark made in 1666, the year before the war, by Sultan Hasanuddin, the Gowa ruler in Makassar. Unpacking this remark and its referents exposes the depth of Tiworo's importance, and that of its maritime-oriented people, to the Sultan and to Makassar's interests.

Sultan Hasanuddin, when discussing his conditions for maintaining the peace, offered a Dutch Commissioner his rationale for Makassar's campaign of re-expansion. He said he "*never would have had to maintain his rights to these lands in question, if Ternate had not attacked the Makassar territory of Pancana*."³⁸ As explained earlier, the realm in the Straits of Tiworo encompassed the northwest coastal margin of the island "Pancana" (Muna). Indeed, Sultan Hasanuddin's remark was a reference to Tiworo, which Ternate and the VOC attacked during the Great Ambon War. The most prominent polity in the vicinity at the time, Tiworo was well known to the Dutch, not least for its impressive fortress, a sturdy stone structure with bulwarks and walls over ten meters high, which the VOC tore down after the 1655 attack.³⁹

Tiworo's demise in the Great Ambon War presents a striking contrast to the outcome of its defeat in connection with the Makassar War twelve years later. In 1655, the VOC and its allies slaughtered two hundred men, captured three hundred women and children, stole merchandise, tore down

35. "De Vlamingh to Cos", VOC 1211, 88; Gaynor 2016: 74–76.

36. "Letter of January 9, 1655, from Arnold de Vlamingh aboard the *Erasmus*, to the Authorities before Tiworo"; Bor 1663: 273–274.

37. Andaya, L. 1981: 45–72.

38. "Report of Commissioner van Wesenhagen on mission to Makassar and Ternate", 16 July 1666, VOC 1257 (1667), 521; Andaya, L. 1981: 65.

39. "Letter of 16 January, 1655, to Marten Doane, Skipper of the *Concordia*, sent with the Post to Het Haesjen, from Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn, in the ship *Erasmus* at anchor by the (fresh) waterplace in the Buton Straits", VOC 1211 (1656), book 2, 79–81; "De Vlamingh to Cos", VOC 1211 (1655), book 2, 87–94, especially p. 88; "De Vlamingh and Maetsuyker to Hustaert and the Council", VOC 1211, pp. 97, 100; Bor 1663, p. 262 states: "reinforced with seven round towers."

its fort, and burned settlements, as well as many boats. Nevertheless, the arrival of Makassar's fleet prevented its enemies from occupying Tiworo. Tiworo rebuilt between the wars, now with two fortresses. In the lead up to the Makassar War, Tiworo's population was forewarned about the impending appearance of the VOC, which had been chasing a detachment of Makassar's fleet under Daeng Mangaga. The chase led to Tiworo with enough of a lead on the VOC to give Tiworo's people the opportunity to flee.⁴⁰ Hence, once again, the Dutch and their allies were fortunate to bring down Tiworo practically without a fight. Such were the circumstances under which Tiworo fell into the hands of the VOC's main ally in the Makassar War, the Bugis man from Boné who bore the title Arung Palakka.⁴¹

When the VOC's Captain Lieutenant David Steijger later joined Arung Palakka to take over the watch, curiously – since most of the area's inhabitants had fled – he found Tiworo's new ruler in his fortress in a wooded area on elevated ground six miles from the main settlement. When negotiations with this *raja* failed, he and his followers were pursued to the other fort, and in the skirmish, Arung Palakka was wounded by an arrow and visibly shaken. Tiworo's *raja* was detained in the fortress, but eventually, after Steijger was called away, the *raja* was allowed to go for a bath, and on this pretext he escaped, despite being pursued by some one thousand men.⁴²

When the combined VOC and allied fleet prepared to depart from its sallying point near Buton for Makassar, the VOC again tore down Tiworo's primary fort, and set fire to Tiworo's main settlement. This time, however, they did not burn Tiworo's boats. Instead, Arung Palakka seized them for himself, explicitly disallowing their appropriation by the Governor General, and he floated them over to where his forces had mustered. Arung Palakka then hand-picked sixty of Tiworo's men, gave each a firearm, and made them half of his Guard of Prime Commanders.⁴³ Such incorporation with rank into the forces of a foe resembles other examples of defeated groups in South Sulawesi conflicts who sometimes took oaths of loyalty to victorious former enemy leaders.⁴⁴

Interestingly, the advent and rapid expansion of Bajoé, the intertidal settlement named for its Sama people that served as Boné's harbor, dates from shortly after this time.⁴⁵ This timing suggests that the figures who left from Tiworo with rank and new allegiances to Boné and the Bugis leader Arung Palakka were Sama people.⁴⁶ Boné also may have had connections

40. For details on the warning, and local people's amusement at Arung Palakka's nautical ineptitude, see Gaynor 2016: 98–101.

41. "Letter from Admiral Cornelis Speelman to Governor General Joan Maetsuijker and the Council of the Indies", 18 August 1667, VOC 1264, book 3, 44–61, here, 46r.

42. "Speelman to Governor General Maetsuijker and the Council", VOC 1264, 51v–52r.

43. *Ibid.*, 52v–53r, 54v–55r.

44. Druce 2009: 26–29; and Omar 2003.

45. Gaynor 2016: 27–28.

46. In addition, other European sources, as well as local oral histories, offer evidence of Sama people's inhabiting Tiworo over subsequent centuries, following a pattern of flight and sometimes repopulation familiar to the history of the Sama and others. See Gaynor 2016: 15–22, 117–125.

with the Sama before Bajoé's rise. Regardless, Boné's political arrangement with Bajoé rested on a structure of cooperation between Boné's rulers and members of an elite Sama lineage. This fruitful cooperation repeated the earlier successful approach of Makassar. Rare Bugis-language manuscripts memorialize the ties between elite Boné and Sama lineages in some detail. Such texts, inherited through Sama lineages, attest to and insist on the long history of interconnections between the Bugis polity of Boné and Sama people.⁴⁷ While often living at some distance from Bajoé, these Sama, their descendants, and followers, nevertheless maintained loyalty to it, just as, earlier, Tiworo had been loyal to Makassar. Both provide examples of that dendritic structure mentioned above, reaching along coasts and across waters to connect disparate littorals in an intertidal history.

Although Tiworo is a rather sleepy backwater now, to the Dutch during the 17th century, it was infamous. The role it played as a non-urban maritime hub led the VOC forces under Arnold de Vlaming and their Ternatan allies to attack it during the Great Ambon War. What made Tiworo a maritime hub were: its use as a staging area for conflicts elsewhere; its function as a transshipment point for merchandise, including munitions and rice; the refuge it offered to fleets under Makassar; its own boats, burned in one conflict and preserved in another; as well as its mariners. In addition to being known for its fortification, Tiworo's nautical role gave it fame among the Dutch as a nasty pirates' nest. Although Buton wished to assert power over it, at this time Buton had no claim over Tiworo. Ternate asserted an old claim to it, but even the Dutch did not take that claim seriously. Rather, the sources demonstrate a close alliance between Tiworo and Makassar. A dozen years after the attack on Tiworo during the Great Ambon War, the threat Tiworo posed as an ally of Makassar was neutralized through flight and demolition, the appropriation of its boats, and the incorporation of many of its men into Boné's forces. Tiworo's maritime-oriented population, and Sama people more broadly, were valuable to these polities, with whom they shared interests, because of their nautical knowledge and skills, as well as their intergroup connections and networks. The archaeologist David Bulbeck has a marvelous description of "the landscape of the Makassar War" on Sulawesi's southwestern peninsula.⁴⁸ This article has illustrated the seascape of the spice wars, the role played in them by sea people, and how these conflicts were linked through the maritime hub of Tiworo.

47. *LB Lemobajo*, photocopy of manuscript in possession of the author; A. Djamali, copyist, "Geschiedenis van de Badjo's van Zuid Celebes" [History of the Bajos of South Celebes], KITLV, Or 545/262, March 7, 1940 (previously number 260 in the Matthes Foundation catalog). See Gaynor, "Sama ties to Boné and narrative incorporation", chapter four of Gaynor 2016 (pp. 107–165).

48. Bulbeck 1990.

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