



C. Pelras

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CHRISTIAN PELRAS

## Patron-client ties among the Bugis and Makassarese of South Sulawesi

### *Introduction*

In this article I do not intend to discuss the theoretical concept of patron-client relationships.<sup>1</sup> Its primary aim is to contribute to a better understanding of how such ties have operated and continue to do so in Bugis and Makassarese communities. Much research has already been conducted, and, of course, more still needs to be done on the social rules upon which those societies are based, especially those concerned with the system of social hierarchy, as well as with kinship and marriage. Likewise, much has been published on such focal cultural concepts as *siriq* (honour/shame), *rapang*, *pessé* (and its Makassarese analogue *paccé*, 'compassion'), and others, to which local inhabitants usually refer in orienting and justifying their social conduct, although not always consciously following them. Such concepts have been widely elaborated in the lore of the *lontaraq* (manuscripts) including such renowned works as the *La Toa* (Mattulada 1985), as well as in orally transmitted precepts and aphorisms that are invoked time and again on such public occasions as weddings and formerly at the installations of princes.

However though, ethnographic research concerning how social life is conducted in these societies, especially at the local level, is still needed. What I mean here by 'ethnographic research' is field research conducted by somebody, who, while still having a deep knowledge of local traditions, history, and contemporary conditions, can, nevertheless, cast a detached and almost estranged look on the society under study. Such a researcher should be able

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on a paper that I originally wrote in Indonesian and presented in 1981 at the first South Sulawesi Conference, organized at Monash University, Melbourne, with funding from the New York based Social Science Research Council. A version of it, adapted, but not wholly revised, for Malaysian readers, has been published in the *Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi* (1988, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi). The present version, translated by Greg Acciaioli, was written in 1989. It could thus not refer to later writings on the same topic. When the present tense is used in it, it refers to the situation extant in the 1980s.

to observe keenly what a complete outsider might overlook, and yet be able to express the results of these observations in terms which the indigenous inhabitant might spontaneously never invoke.

Patronage and clientship are among these key terms. A few local scholars have indeed begun to analyse their societies in such terms. After placing the notion of patron-client relationship in a wider historical and ethnographic perspective, this essay reviews some of the earlier research of Dutch colonial scholars who discerned their social workings, although not always using the term. It then presents a preliminary analysis tracing the variations in the operation of such relations in various political and economic fields throughout Sulawesi. These latter sections are based not only upon my own field experience of several years in South Sulawesi, but also on the reports of various trainees of the Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (PLPIIS)<sup>2</sup> at Hasanuddin University, Ujungpandang. I compare former systems of patronage and clientship, as described by these Dutch scholars, with contemporary manifestations and evaluate how these relations compare with analogous systems in other fields. Finally, I make a few concluding remarks, which are intended not so much as a summation, but as an orientation to further research on this topic.

*Patronage defined: a brief historical and ethnographic perspective*

The patron-client relationship can be characterized generally as an unequal (but theoretically nonbinding) relationship between a superior (a patron or leader) and a number of inferiors (clients, retainers, or followers), based on an asymmetric exchange of services, where the de facto dependence on the patron of the clients, whose unpaid services may include economic obligations; paid or unpaid work, armed service, political support and other services, is counterbalanced by the role the patron plays as a leading figure for all the clients and by the assistance, including monetary loans and protection, he or she provides when necessary. I could distinguish several types of clients and refer to examples taken from other countries in order to explore how the range of variation observed in South Sulawesi might be contrasted with similar phenomena in these other regions. What I would like to do here, however, is to show how different cases of patron-client relations that have been described for the Bugis and Makassar societies at different periods, in different locations, and under different social conditions can be seen as

<sup>2</sup> The three Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (PLPIIS or Centre(s) for Field Research Training in the Social Sciences) were established in Aceh in 1973, in Jakarta in 1974, and in Ujungpandang in 1975. The reports published by each PLPIIS during their years of operation represent a wealth of reliable studies and merit wider dissemination.

variations on a general pattern (in accordance with my definition), thus revealing to a striking extent the social coherence and temporal continuity of this phenomenon.

As is well known, the words patronage and clientship derive from a model of social relationships extant in ancient Rome. A *patronus* was a patrician who had a number of citizens of inferior rank, called *clientes*, under his protection. Although these *clientes* were juridically free, they were not really independent. They had close links with the family of their protector, whose family name they would bear and in whose family cult they would take part. The tie between Roman patrons and their clients was established on a basis of reciprocity of rights and duties, which were usually hereditary. The patron had to protect his client from the latter's enemies and protect him also against legal prosecution. As well as assuring the maintenance of his family, often the patron bestowed on his client enough land to provide for the entire family. Conversely, the client had to support his patron when needed, contributing to the ransom of his patron if the latter was captured as a prisoner of war, to the dowry of his patron's daughter upon her marriage, or to the expenses of lawsuits his patron had lost.

Such a model could, of course, be applied in a wide range of societies and historical periods. Examples of it are especially well-known from regions of 'Latin' heritage, such as southern Italy, Latin America (*caciquismo* and *compadrazgo*), and in Asia the Philippines (*padroazgo*). Similar institutions have been reported not only within Southeast Asia, for instance in Burma (Aung Thwin 1983:225-7), Thailand (Terwiel 1983:126-7) and Malaya (Endicott 1983: 225-7), but also for the Middle East, for example in Iraq (Rassam 1977) and in Iran (Bradburd 1983).

#### *Patronage discovered in South Sulawesi*

When I first came to Sulawesi in 1967, I had no knowledge of the phenomenon of patronage and clientship in Indonesia, nor had I been planning to include any inquiries about the topic in my research. Indeed, many students of Indonesian societies did not seem ever to have considered patronage as a theme of research. Koentjaraningrat's *Beberapa metode antropologi dalam penelitian2 masyarakat dan kebudayaan di Indonesia (Sebuah ichtisar)* (1958), the best available summary of anthropological research on Indonesia at the time, does not mention any published work or article that could possibly touch on it, even in passing. This omission could perhaps be linked to the orientation of most pre-war scholars toward discovering what they regarded as the fundamental, ancient principles on which Indonesian cultures, systems of thought, and social structures were established, rather than understanding

the actual processes at work in them (Koentjaraningrat 1975:215).<sup>3</sup> Even studies of leadership, which Koentjaraningrat (1975:238-9) listed among topics of 'urgent anthropology', aimed at coping with some of the important dilemmas of development Indonesia was facing, had ignored patron-client ties as a central phenomenon. When writing on leadership, Koentjaraningrat (1967:181-95) himself relied more on the analysis of 'power' and 'authority' and on their extent and duration than on the nature of links between leaders and followers.

Even the development after World War II of new trends in research on Indonesia more oriented to an understanding of social dynamics did not shed much light on the phenomenon of patronage. The emphasis in these studies was mainly on clearly contemporaneous phenomena, such as changes in cultural values, migration and urbanization, relations among social or ethnic groups, conflicts between ethnic and national loyalties, and others topics more or less linked with exogenous stimuli.

On my own arrival in South Sulawesi, after preliminary contact with Bugis migrants in Malaya, I was thus mainly prepared to investigate such topics as the political organization of local communities, social stratification, and indigenous pre-Islamic literature. And I found my Bugis informants very fond indeed of speaking about hierarchy and genealogies or about the origins of *wanua* or kingdoms and the way these were organized and ruled. They were very keen on having me study local history, and they insisted very much on the force of traditional values, expressed through indigenous concepts, such as *siriq* or *pessé*, found in sayings attributed to ancient wise men or even said to underlie Indonesian notions such as *gotong-royong* (mutual assistance). But when explaining the working of their society to me, no one ever spontaneously invoked patron-client relationships as an operative element. However, my previous research in rural western France had sensitized me to this social phenomenon, and numerous clues cumulatively indicated that such ties played a role in South Sulawesi, and an important one at that.

To begin with, I was myself entangled in bonds of clientship from the time I initiated field research. My first host in Makassar had introduced me to his brother in Sengkang; the latter hastened to present me to the last Ranreng Tua, one of the three former ruling lords of Wajoq, who exercised effective power, as opposed to the primarily symbolic authority of the Arung Matoa, the so-called supreme ruler (Pelras 1971). The Ranreng Tua, Haji Andi Nin-nong, an elderly woman in her seventies was highly respected in Wajoq for

<sup>3</sup> In fact, that trend has continued in the work of many anthropologists working on Indonesia, as exemplified by more recent collections of essays, such as *The flow of life* (Fox 1980) or *Unity in diversity* (De Josselin de Jong 1984).

her leading role during the Indonesian struggle for independence.<sup>4</sup> I was, of course, very interested in having such figures among my first informants, unconscious that at the same time I was becoming a follower within the Ranreng Tua faction. Consequently, I was excluded from the rival group, that of the Ranreng Béttempola, whose aging patriarch, a recognized authority on historical matters, I managed to meet only once, although I was introduced to him by one of his close old friends. Similarly, during my stay in the city of Paré-Paré a few years later, I became unwittingly linked to a group of followers of the former Datu (ruler) of Suppaq. My own 'patron', being of a lower rank and gaining much prestige from his relationship with me, always did his best to prevent me from contacting directly his own 'patron'.

Later on, in 1978 and 1979, when I was the foreign consultant running the PLPIIS fieldwork training program in Ujungpandang, having by now become very sensitive to the issue of patron-client networks, I became increasingly aware through the studies made by the PLPIIS trainees in different parts of the province of the crucial role played by patronage and clientship in social processes in both Bugis and Makassarese societies.

Among the first scholars to recognize and analyse patron-client relationships in South Sulawesi was H.Th. Chabot. In *Verwantschap, stand en sexe in Zuid-Celebes* (1950), Chabot identified what he labelled as the 'follower system', which encompasses the whole network of relations established between a lord or a master (*karaeng*) and a number of subordinates, which he calls 'his children' (*anaqna*) or 'his men' (*taunna*). Although subordinates are controlled by their superiors, both sides in this relationship need each other. According to Chabot, only through such unequal relationships can cooperation be enforced in the region. Relations established between equals can only result in competition or rivalry, because equals, especially those of high rank, always want to defeat or do better than their presumed peers (Chabot 1950:102-12).

In support of his conceptualization, Chabot cited at length P.J. Kooreman's description (1883) of this pattern of behaviour, based on his own experiences as a Dutch civil servant in South Sulawesi in the 1870s. According to Kooreman, somebody who acknowledged a nobleman as his lord (*karaeng*) would always be ready to follow (*minawang*) him and to obey his will, for instance, if summoned by the *karaeng* when the latter wanted to go hunting or travelling. He was always prepared to work on the *karaeng*'s rice fields, and if the *karaeng* organized a celebration, the follower would contribute money or gifts and also assist in tasks at his master's house. Conversely, the master would protect his follower: if the follower was ill treated, the master would defend him; if the follower was offended, the master would consider

<sup>4</sup> Her daughter, Andi Bau Muddariyah, was and still remains one of the best authorities in matters of Bugis *adeq* (*adat* or custom).

himself offended and entitled to take revenge; if the follower had his cattle or horse(s) stolen, the master would endeavour to have the cattle or horse(s) returned and see to it that the robber received due punishment. Many *karaeng* also looked after the welfare of their followers, supplied them with land, cattle, or tools, if necessary, and gave them any help needed to stage domestic celebrations or overcome misfortunes, such as illness, accidents, or death in the family.

The relationship between lord and follower was voluntary and could be ended at any time; the lord could drop his follower if the latter was insufficiently obedient or if he did not comply in his obligations towards him; conversely, a follower could move to another lord if he felt that the previous one did not give him enough protection. Indeed, if a follower of some rank felt himself strong enough to stand on his own without any higher protector, he could detach himself from such a relationship or become himself the protector of his own followers. Not only the high nobility, but the lower nobility as well, and even rich commoners, retained followers. But people who had followers were also themselves often the followers of higher status lords. Many people displayed more loyalty to, as well as more confidence in, their own lord than towards the chief (labelled *karaeng* as well) or *gallarang* of the domain, lordship or kingdom in which they lived, if these two superiors were not the same. Conflicts of authority, sometimes quite difficult to resolve, could thus arise when the obligations to these different authorities were in contradiction to each other. Such a situation, as described by Kooreman for the nineteenth century, corresponds clearly to the classical pattern of patronage and clientship, and thus deserves with good reason to be labelled as such.

According to Chabot (1950), in the 1940s this patronage system, as described by Kooreman (1883), was still prevalent. Many high-ranking people had their followers, who would work their fields, perform various domestic services such as providing drinking water and firewood, run errands, or help their lord to stage ceremonies. Some of those who were still unmarried would voluntarily stay in the houses of their patron as domestic servants without salary; there they received only lodging, food, and clothing. The patron often organized the wedding of such a servant, and, indeed, may have been the one to look for the servant's spouse. In such cases the newly married couple would often live in a house near the patron's house, a pattern of immediate postmarital residence which facilitated their provision of assistance when necessary, although they also had their own fields to work. When there was a celebration at the patron's house, not only would these neighbouring followers be present to provide labour, but even those followers who resided farther away would readily come to be present. Conversely, if they needed such assistance as rice or other commodities, they would receive such assistance from their patron.

Such a relationship was not based on a formal contract, and could be terminated at any time. Most importantly, it should by no means be ended by a resort to conflict. The system benefited both parties. Having many followers enhanced the patron's social status as well as that of his kin group. But if the lord wanted to keep his or her clients loyal, and even perhaps increase their number, he or she had always to fulfil the duties of a good patron and to maintain their sense of security; if this was not maintained, the clients would simply flee.

Chabot (1950) described two primary ways to obtain followers. Inheritance provided one mechanism. Somebody's followers could, at his or her death, transfer their loyalty to one of his or her children, but this process was far from automatic. The other way was to establish new relations of patronage on one's own. Three factors were important in this endeavour: rank, office; and personality. Of course, the higher somebody's rank or office, the higher his chances of obtaining followers, as long as this was supported by the personal qualities which are expected of a good leader: courage, eloquence, the willingness to take initiatives, diligence in his activities, the ability to rouse the spirits of his followers, and above all, the capacity to attract his followers through generosity.

As compared with Kooreman's notes, the picture given by Chabot eighty years later shows no significant changes, except in the field of public order and security brought to the countryside by the Pax Neerlandica, which deprived the lord of part of his role as a protector. And if we try to compare the situation depicted by Chabot with the present time, we will reach a similar conclusion.

More contemporary sources, including PhD theses written by Jacqueline Lineton (1975a) and Hasan Walinono (1979), present a similar picture. In her study of Anabanua in Wajoq, Lineton explains how important the system of clientship is in the process of migration. She demonstrates very clearly the dependence of quite a number of followers upon several noble families (Lineton 1975a:90) in terms not very different from what has been recounted of the situation of slaves in nineteenth-century Bugis society. Quite interesting is her analysis of the role of the nobility in economic exchanges as redistributors of goods they had received either as income linked to their offices or on the occasion of celebrations (Lineton 1975b:91-5). Hasan Walinono's study of the Bugis society of Tanété, a former petty kingdom located on the Strait of Makassar, also parallels Chabot's description. In Hasan Walinono's account, a leader still has to look out for his followers' welfare (Walinono 1979:93) and to 'show them the way to goodness' (*mitang ngi adécéngeng*), especially those followers inherited from parents, be they considered as their 'servants' (*ata*) or their 'family' (Walinono 1979:91). For instance, if the child of a follower wants to come to school in the city where he lives, the leader



will provide room and board and help to pay the child's school fees, or even look for a job for him or her. On the other hand, the followers (*joaq*) will show loyalty and reverence to their leader (*ajjoareng*, 'one who has *joaq*'), especially if this leader occupies a high office that enables him or her to bestow aid and services (Walinono 1979:91). Yet, there are also leaders who are not high officials and who still exert considerable influence, and whose advice is sought by officials before establishing development plans for their villages. One says of them that they are 'looked at' or 'esteemed' (*to riakkitangi*), 'regarded in awe' (*to riasiriq*), 'considered as one's parents' (*to riala to matoa*), especially if they manifest such praiseworthy qualities as bravery, honesty, friendliness, helpfulness, and others (Walinono 1979:94-5).

These sources reveal a striking continuity across three eras, however different their political context. In Kooreman's time, ancient Bugis kingdoms were still extant, and little had changed since the previous century. When Chabot was writing his book, nearly forty years of direct Dutch rule had induced important structural changes. The societies described by Lineton and Hasan Walinono had since the 1940s traversed a succession of events – the Japanese conquest and occupation, the struggle for independence, the years of rebellion against the central government – that had shaken the very bases on which they were founded, followed by the abolition of traditional forms of local government and their replacement by an administrative system common to all Indonesia.

That very continuity invites further research on the topic of patronage and clientship in South Sulawesi societies, all the more so as it appears far from limited to the socio-political field. Studies made by PLPIIS trainees have amply demonstrated that this patronage system has pervaded all aspects of social life, whether in the economic or in the ideological fields, among peasants and fishermen, in trade and in navigation, in the countryside and in the cities.

#### *Ajjoareng and joaq: patron-client ties in the socio-political field*

##### *Patronage in traditional Bugis and Makassarese social organization*

Traditional Bugis and Makassarese social organization encompassed both a system of social stratification, which ordered the position of every member of the society according to birth (Friedericy 1933; Pelras 1971), and a system of government, which distributed all members among a number of territorial units, each with its lord or leader (Pelras 1971). By allocating everybody in permanent categories or subdivisions of the society at large, these two systems aimed to secure social stability. Another system allowed for social mobility and competition among leaders, as well as for co operation among

members of different social strata, and for integration into groups which transcended or ignored territorial units: the system of patronage and clientship.

In that latter system, a patron, generally a noble, usually called in the Bugis region *ajjoareng* or *pappuangeng* and in the Makassarese region *tu nip-inawang* or *karaeng*, retains a number of clients, termed in Bugis *joaq* or *anaq guru* ('pupils' or 'disciples') and in Makassarese *joaq, anaq-anaq* ('children'), or simply *tau* ('people'). Patrons and clients are linked by a number of reciprocal duties and rights. The main duty of a patron toward his clients is to protect them from mistreatment by another nobleman, insecurity, theft, or any other kind of threat, as well as looking after their welfare and sheltering them from poverty (Walinoño 1979:91, 93). Conversely, the duty of clients towards their patron is to be at his service, for instance, by working in his fields or in his house, by acting as his soldier, and a host of other activities.

Although that system results in the subdivision of people into different groups, it differs from the subdivision into ranks or into territorial units or kingdoms in so far as the latter have an absolute character, with membership determined by birth or residence. In contrast, the association with a patron takes place on a voluntary basis, and the continuation of the relationship depends on the willingness of both parties. Despite this theoretical voluntary quality, the economic dependence of clients often limits their freedom of choice, sometimes rendering clientship difficult to differentiate from the formerly mild forms of slavery in the region.

Although Bugis and Makassarese societies traditionally recognized no mobility across ranks, since in theory one's rank was forever determined by birth (Pelras 1971), mobility did indeed occur, especially in the competition for honour, office, or wealth. In that context, for a leader to have followers was an important asset in achieving those goals. The higher the honour, office or wealth achieved by the leader, the greater also the pride, advantage, and profit obtained by his followers.

In the traditional Bugis and Makassarese political systems, political offices were not absolutely hereditary. There were no absolutely determinative rules about who would succeed high ranking persons with titles such as *arung*, *karaeng*, *pabbicara*, *sulléwatang*, *gallarang*, *matoa*, *loqmoq* or to any other position when there was a vacancy. The guidelines that did exist concerned rank: for a particular office, the candidate to be chosen usually had to be one from among the many descendants of a prior holder, and himself or herself of a determined rank. Usually, several candidates had more or less the same right to fill the office in question; the winner was the one with the most numerous, or better, the most influential followers. But the support received from followers is not to be compared with the support obtained by a candidate in a parliamentary election in a modern democracy, which is based (at least theoretically) more on considerations of the latter's platform or approval of his

party's programme, without any appeal to personal relationships (although personal considerations may, indeed, play their part). On the contrary, in South Sulawesi interpersonal relations were the most important factor. There a person of position could only wield influence in so far as he had followers who supported him on the basis of their own self-interest, presuming that if their leader came into a position of authority, then all his or her followers would reap some benefit.

In this context, two kinds of followers may be contrasted. A nobleman could distinguish among his followers commoners who were directly at his service and who could, for instance, serve in his armed forces; he could also have noble followers, perhaps better termed supporters, who themselves controlled followers and supporters. Thus could be formed a kind of pyramidal structure, with several groups of followers united through their own respective leaders to a common leader at a higher level. The highest notabilities in South Sulawesi were, of course, people of high aristocracy, but who were also at the head of such multi-tiered structures of followership.

If a nobleman exiled himself to another place, he was usually accompanied by his closest retainers, who might amount to a sizeable number. For instance, Daéng Mangallé, a Makassarese prince who left Goa in 1661 because he disagreed with the armistice signed a year earlier with the Dutch by Sultan Hasanuddin, was accompanied by about 250 men, women, and children, who followed him, first to East Java and then to Siam, where they established themselves in Ayuthia (Gervaise 1688:61-2; Pelras 1982). Similarly, La Maddukelleng, lord of Séngkang (and later ruler of Wajoq) fled to Pasir in eastern Kalimantan around 1730 with a considerable number of followers (Noorduyn 1972). According to Gervaise (1688:120-1), 'the king of Makassar' could at all times count on 10,000 loyal followers, ready for war. Gervaise declares that these followers received no pay, but were just provided with clothing, arms and ammunition. In ordinary circumstances, they lived in their villages, tilling their fields just like other peasants, but in the event of war they hastened to come to the support of their rajah once summoned. As long as hostilities continued, their maintenance was the responsibility of the rajah. Moreover, they were entitled to one-third of the spoils, while one-third was designated for the rajah and another third for the war leaders. Such a system continued up through the nineteenth century.

At that time, to be at the head of a vast number of followers ready for war was very important. When two candidates for the same office enjoyed similar support from their respective followers, so that neither could win through peaceful choice, they might resort to war. This situation occurred at the time of James Brooke's visit to South Sulawesi (Mundy 1848). Brooke described how the *datu* of Témpé, who was at that time involved in the war over who would inherit the office of *addatuang* of Sidénréng, was surround-

ed by a large number of restless armed followers, who sustained themselves solely by rampaging. The conflict over the succession to the Sidénréng *addatuang* involved two sons from different mothers of the late *addatuang*. Part of the Wajoq nobility (with their followers, of course) had sided with one son, whose mother was a daughter of the *ranreng Talotenréng*, one of the three ruling high officials of Wajoq. Because part of the Wajoq nobility sided with the other aspirant, when the office of *arung matoa* (paramount ruler) within Wajoq itself became vacant, it could not be filled for years, because the Wajoq nobility, themselves split over the support given to the Sidénréng *addatuang* aspirants, could not agree on a candidate within Wajoq itself either.

What linked a client to his patron was not only faithfulness towards a leader and the need for protection in the state of insecurity and troubles which often prevailed at that time. It may have been, above all, the guarantee of food and clothing, as well as the means (including land) necessary for sustenance. And that is just why it sometimes became so difficult for a follower to cut off his relationship with his leader, if too poor to live without a protector or too indebted to leave. In such cases, when a patron died, the ties of dependency were passed on to one or another of his or her heirs. Furthermore, distinguishing between such dependents and real slaves could be difficult, since the situation of the latter, that is, those slaves who depended on a definite master, not those who were continually traded, was usually quite mild (Lineton 1975a:14). Significantly, the word *ata* (most often glossed simply as 'slave') was also used for any kind of dependent and follower, even of noble rank.<sup>5</sup> Debt-slaves, who could be freed only once they repaid their debts, could hardly be distinguished from indebted dependents, who could not sever their links with their patrons as long as they remained in that state, which usually meant forever. There was indeed a legal difference. Indebted dependents, although dependents, were nonetheless 'free' commoners or even nobles and considered as such in matters of customary law, where rank had to be taken into account, such as in the context of marriage. And even if it was difficult to do so, the indebted client still had the right and the freedom to change loyalties. In contrast, a slave had no such right, could be pursued in case of elopement, and could be sold to another master (Chabot 1950:113). In everyday life, however, the difference was not very conspicuous, all the more so as freed slaves would naturally stay the dependents of their former owners. In the 1930s and 1940s Chabot observed that the situation of slave descendants and dependents was almost the same.

A patron could extend his clientele in several ways. One method was to

<sup>5</sup> That usage may be the reason why contemporary notes about slavery in South Sulawesi are often a bit confusing. What some authors, such as Brooke, identified as slaves might in fact have been mere dependents (clients).

manifest generosity and to inspire affection among followers by protecting them and ensuring their welfare better than anybody else. Another way was to appeal to followers' pride and raise their hope of a bright future by obtaining a high office or appearing to have the best chance of obtaining one. Followers would then feel honoured themselves, and expect to take advantage of their leader's office, because holding this office increased their patron's chances of being able to redistribute among them part of the wealth then at his or her disposal. The advantage was reciprocal, since the more followers a leader had, the greater his or her chance eventually to be able to reward them for their support.

A third way to expand clienteles was through 'political' marriage. There is a well-known saying about a nobleman's 'three points' (*tellu cappaq*), the use of which ensures success: the point of his dagger (*kawali*), meaning his ability to wage war; the point of his tongue, meaning his diplomatic proficiency; and the point of his penis, meaning his cleverness in concluding advantageous marriages. Those marriages were not, as formerly in Europe, simply a means to strengthen a peace treaty, to unify two kingdoms or two lordships, or to extend land ownership; they were primarily a means to join client networks to each other. Indeed, inlaws were considered very important members of clienteles. Writing about political power in former times in the Luwuq kingdom, Errington (1977:40-62) has observed that, in order to increase his influence, a nobleman needs a large family. 'His in-laws', she writes (1977:49), 'become a kind of follower, as was the case for his father's and his grandfather's in-laws'. Indeed, marriage could be seen as largely a strategy for acquiring followers. For a nobleman, the choice of a wife takes into account her family; he marries her not only for her own sake, but also in order to increase the number of his followers in the person of his inlaws and their own followers. Even if both parties are of the same rank, there must be one leader who occupies a relatively more powerful leading position who can become a leader's leader. In turn, his supporters will see their position improved through their links with a leading person. If the wife's family is of a lower rank, the honour obtained will be still greater for her family: in such cases marriage is also a means for someone to have, through his daughters, his descendants rise in the social hierarchy and to ensure a bright future for his grandchildren. However, the advantage for the nobleman is not to be discounted: by contracting marriage with a number of wives of a lower rank, whose fathers or brothers exert some influence in their own areas or have their own followers, he can extend his own influence to people who were until then out of his reach. When children are born to those marriages, even if the wife is divorced afterwards, the links usually remain. A prince could thus multiply alliances almost indefinitely through intermarriage.

The relationship between Bugis or Makassarese rulers or lords and their

people is strikingly reminiscent of the patron-client relationship. Reciprocal rights and duties were established between ruler and ruled, with the ruler as protector of her or his people and the people being at the service of the ruler. But if the ruler acted arbitrarily, the people could move to another place, thus severing their ties with her or him. The ruler could also be dismissed, and there are even several historical cases where the ruler was assassinated; as happened to two Boné rulers, La Ica Matinroé ri Addénénna and La Ulio Botéqé Matinroé ri Itterung.

That resemblance is not so very strange, as the vocation of every noble leader of followers was to be a candidate for one or another government office. There were, however, some differences from the usual patron-client relationship. After a nobleman had become a lord or a ruler, the scope of her or his duties as a protector was extended because she or he now also had to protect the people now ruled. These new duties, as well as the duties of new subordinates towards the ruler, were no longer implicit, but were clearly expressed at the installation ceremony in traditional declarations that had to be pronounced by specific officiants, and which renewed what Zainal Abidin Farid (see below) has labelled the 'government contract' between the first ruler and the ruled. For instance, in Wajoq the official who spoke for the people, the Tosora *punggawa*, declared to the new ruler:

Salipuri temmacekkéq keng	Cover us with a blanket that we be not cold
Dongiri temmatippaq keng	Drive the sparrows from us, that we be not picked by them [like rice ears]
Tanréréang keng asalang keng	Support us [even] when we are wrong
Mualang kiq atongeng keng	Take us [with you] when we are right
Aserriang kiq abiasang keng	Strengthen us in our customs

So, the rights and duties existing between ruler and ruled were of the same sort as those between leader and follower: the main difference was that the links between them were not established on a personal basis: as soon as a ruler was replaced by another, those rights and duties were passed down to the successor. That did not exclude, of course, the establishment of personal links between a ruler and some subordinates during his term of office, links which could extend beyond her or his retirement. In fact, being a ruler or having an office was an important source of income, since many material advantages were attached to each function; the redistribution of wealth it occasioned benefited not only the local subordinates of those leaders, but also their personal followers.

#### *Patronage in post-traditional Bugis and Makassarese societies*

After the occupation by the Dutch in 1906 of the previously self-governing areas, South Sulawesi came largely under a system of so-called 'indirect rule'.

Under this system, however, colonial authorities still introduced many changes in order to 'optimize' the efficiency of administration: many previously autonomous territories were united with others; the hierarchy of titles for government offices was systematized; many offices were abolished, while others were given a new allotment of tasks; a new administrative subdivision at a lower level, termed *kampung*, a level which had not previously existed in this region, was created. Although the forms of traditional procedures were maintained for the appointment of rulers and other high officials, their final selection depended, in fact, to a large extent on a decision by the Dutch governor-general. Hence, the importance of followers declined, and, conversely, the role of the patron as protector in case of warfare and other instances of general insecurity was no longer so important.

However, many Memories van Overgave, the end-of-term reports written by out-going Dutch civil servants, concerning the districts of the province of South Sulawesi describe how certain noblemen, often of high status and each with a large number of followers, such as the famed *datu* of Larompong, the son of a former *arung matoa* of Wajoq, were suspected as possible sources of trouble and discontent. As they were no longer in any position to compete for political power, many of these nobles devoted their energies to activities such as forming cattle raiding parties (*rampokpartijen*) on a large scale, which were really not so much intended to increase their wealth as to enhance their prestige as brave and heroic noblemen. Some of these noblemen were arrested and exiled; but such punishment only increased their prestige in the eyes of their followers. Other noblemen chose to become entrepreneurs, a choice that was by no means new for South Sulawesi aristocrats, but which was one of the few remaining fields in which they could apply their talents while avoiding difficulties with the colonial authorities. However, Chabot's observations reveal that in spite of the structural changes brought about by colonization, the system of patronage and clientship had not disappeared: patrons had simply lost a few of their previous functions. But that loss was counterbalanced by the increase in other functions, such as the quest for social prestige, local leadership, and economic success.

The periods of the struggle for independence (1945-1949) and the ensuing rebellions (1950-1965) against the central government of the Republic of Indonesia were characterized by an enormous upheaval in the social system. Many positions of authority were assumed by newcomers who did not originate from the aristocracy or who, though of noble origin, chose not to foreground their nobility any longer or even changed their original aristocratic names for plain Muslim names (as was the case with the present-day General Yusuf). Many *pemuda* (youths performing as fighters for independence), inspired by the spirit of democracy, wished to wipe out all traces of the old order, of what they called *zaman feodal* (feudal times). Those new ideas were

not only founded on democratic aspirations influenced by the West, but also to a large extent on the concepts of modernist Islam, as propagated since the 1920s, for example, by Muhammadiyah. Many of the local *pemuda* leaders were former students of the Muhammadiyah schools that had begun flourishing in South Sulawesi in the 1930s.

In such a situation, a large number of high aristocrats, especially in the ruling class, began to be alarmed that a new social order would appear, no longer founded on those traditional values that they esteemed so much. Even before the beginning of World War II, they had begun to take measures against people they considered a menace to the bases of traditional society. For instance, Kahar Muzakkar, the future leader of the *gerombolan* (rebellion), then active as a youth in the Hizbul Wathan (Muhammadiyah Boy Scouts) movement, had been condemned to exile in Java by the Luwuq *hadat* (Customary Law Council, an indigenous legal body whose name had been coined by the colonial authorities after the Malay word *adat*, 'custom or tradition') for having publicly and strongly criticized what he called the outdated conservatism of the local aristocracy.

After Indonesian independence was proclaimed, this fear drove the majority of the South Sulawesi rulers to side with NICA (the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), and then with NIT (Negara Indonesia Timur, the State of Eastern Indonesia), one of the states created within the framework of the Federal Republic of Indonesia under strong Dutch influence. They believed that under this framework the old forms of government and the bases of their authority could be maintained. In fact, perhaps their very attitude drove away many of their followers who agreed with the Indonesian Republican aspirations, thus causing these nobles to lose most of their former influence.

There were also aristocrats among the Bugis, Makassarese and Mandar who were in favour of a social renovation and thus sided with the Republic of Indonesia. Among them were: Andi Jemma, the Datu of Luwuq; Andi Mappanyukkiq, the Arumponé (Ruler of Boné); Andi Ninnong, the Ranreng Tua of Wajoq, already mentioned above, along with her husband Andi Mallinkang Karaéng ri Buraqné; and Bau Massépé, the Datu of Suppaq, who, along with Andi Mallinkang Karaéng ri Buraqné, was killed by the Dutch. Those individuals voluntarily sacrificed their political and economic situation for the sake of their republican ideals, because, as was their traditional duty as leaders, they spent a large part of their wealth helping their needy followers, who suffered difficulties because of the part they were playing in the revolutionary struggle. What they could receive in return was considerably diminished due to the poor economic situation, and because, having been dismissed from their offices by the Dutch, they had been deprived of all the material advantages attached to their former functions.



After the replacement of the Federal Republic of Indonesia by a unified Republic of Indonesia, previous forms of autonomous local government were abolished to create a new administrative system common to all Indonesia. Thus, traditional rulers and aristocrats who had opposed social renovation, as well as those who had supported it, both lost their former political roles, along with the incomes attached to them. Consequently, they also lost a large number of followers, whom they could no longer reward adequately. Many people then shifted their loyalties to new leaders, mainly chiefs of armed groups who had fought first the Dutch, then the Eastern Indonesian State, and then, in many cases, the Republic of Indonesia itself, the latter in the form of a regional rebellion locally labelled the *gerombolan*, which involved most of these former guerillas and later was affiliated with the Darul Islam movement.

Ironically enough, those new leaders, who at the beginning of their fight had strongly opposed what they called the 'feudal system', that is, the rule exerted by the traditional aristocracy, often themselves behaved like feudal lords, according to a system founded on personal links of loyalty between a supreme leader and subordinate leader/followers, who in turn also maintained the same type of relationship with their own subordinates, and so on down the pyramid. The main difference from the former system, where the choice of the leader was based both on noble birth and on personal qualities, was that birth had now become irrelevant. However, followers still sought the same qualities in their leaders: the patron still had to be brave, clever in discussions, generous to his or her followers, and so forth. In those troubled times, the new leaders were again the protectors of their followers, and the latter were prepared to follow their leaders anywhere, especially in battle. The number of traditional lords may have diminished, but they had been replaced by war lords.<sup>6</sup>

The means used by these new leaders to increase and extend their influence were the same as those of the traditional leaders: displaying appealing personal qualities, giving their followers expectations of partaking in benefits, especially from their looting, and even such 'feudal' traits as concluding 'political' marriages. For instance, the rebel leader Kahar Muzakkar had more official wives than normally permitted by Islamic law, since one of the *ulama* among his followers had uttered a *fatwah* declaring that Kahar was entitled to do so as a 'warrior of the faith', especially when marrying widows of other deceased warriors. Similarly, although he had refused to follow Kahar

<sup>6</sup> This characteristic was apt not only for rebel chiefs, but also for certain military commanders of the national army, including some whose loyalty to the government was a bit dubious, such as Andi Séléq, who was killed in a miscarried ambush against his military superior (though not his personal leader!), General Yusuf.

Muzakkar into his adherence to the Darul Islam ideology, and thus could hardly style himself a 'warrior of the faith', the rebel leader Usman Baloq was always accompanied by a band of armed female fighters said all to be his wives. Other rebel leaders, while not exceeding the authorized number of wives at any one time, engaged in many successive temporary marital unions. Besides enhancing their prestige through this display of manliness, one of their goals was the same as that of traditional leaders, that is securing more followers by marrying daughters or sisters of people of influence, who thus became linked to them with all their own followers.

A novel method of obtaining followers in the period of insurrection was abduction. When somebody had been forced into the bush by the rebels, his family and friends incurred the risk of being continually annoyed by the Indonesian national army, often called the *tentara kota* (city army) in this period, whose leaders automatically concluded that the abducted person had fled voluntarily to join the guerrillas. Therefore, in order to escape such harassment, the families of such abducted individuals often did eventually join the rebel leaders themselves, thus increasing the number of the local rebel chiefs' followers. According to my informants in Paré-Paré, this fate had almost befallen a child of the Datu of Suppaq, whom an armed group under Usman Baloq had attempted to abduct. However, her followers from local villages came in large numbers to prevent this occurrence, because, had the abduction been successful, they would have felt obliged to follow her into the bush, a course of action they did not wish to pursue.

Only after the end of the *gerombolan* (conclusively quelled after the ambush and assassination of Kahar Muzakkar in Southeast Sulawesi in 1965, although security and order had been restored in many areas of South Sulawesi several years before that) was the Indonesian government able to enforce in the rural areas the administrative changes that had up to then merely been articulated on paper.<sup>7</sup> In 1952 the thirty-eight *swapraja* (self-governing domains) of the province had been abolished and converted into seven *daerah otonom* (autonomous jurisdictions), which had a mostly theoretical existence. In 1957 these jurisdictions were again converted into twenty-one *kabupaten* (regencies), the new governmental units directly below the provincial level that really only began in 1960 to receive a true working administration able to fulfil their functions properly and have continued to exist to the present time.

In this new administrative system, noble birth officially has no role to play in the appointment of an official: what was considered as important was the ability to carry out administrative tasks. The elective character of many

<sup>7</sup> Such changes had been implemented to a degree in the cities, the only place where the central government had exercised some real power during the rebellion.

offices has been progressively abolished since 1973: *desa* (village), *kampung* (hamlet) and *rukun tetangga* (RT or neighbourhood) heads, who had formerly been elected, were now appointed by the *bupati* (regent, the head of the *kabupaten* or regency). At the level of *kecamatan* (districts), one tier below the *kapupaten*, a level that had been created with boundaries that usually included several former *wanua* (domains or lordships), heads were never elected. The appointment of the *bupati*, whose jurisdiction largely coincided with former kingdoms (for example, Boné, Wajoq, etc.) had to pass through several phases: the regency representative council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat II, DPRD-II) chose a number of candidates, who had to be approved by the *gubernur* (governor), the representative of the central government at the provincial level; then the DPRD-II chose from among the remaining candidates, although many of those they preferred may have been eliminated by the governor.

One can distinguish two periods in the process of implementation of a modern administration in the area. The first one was a transition period, when many officials, either elected or appointed from above, were for the most part descendants of former lords. For example, in Wajoq, when the thirty former *wanua* left by the Dutch were converted into ten *kecamatan*, all the *camat* (district head) were the former *arung* (lords) of some of these *wanua*; most of them had been appointed, however, in *kecamatan* that did not include their former domains, as if to lessen the traditional aspect of their authority. Those *arung* who had not been appointed as *camat* were given other official tasks.

At the lower levels – village, hamlet, and neighbourhood – where elections were still held for a time, it often turned out that the candidate who was elected was a noble who had a traditional right to be in charge of one of the former offices and whom the people still called *arung* or *karaeng*. If at that moment during this first period, the elective principle had been generalized to all levels, a situation not very dissimilar to that extant in Latin America or the Philippines might have arisen: a new feudalism with 'patrons' also monopolizing elective political functions: Contrary to the views of some foreign observers, the slowness in implementing direct democracy at all levels in Indonesia might ironically have saved the future chances of Indonesian democracy in this region. In that context, the near failure in 1955 to implement the elections to the first national representative council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, DPRRI) due to lack of security may have prevented the restriction of votes to a limited number of 'patrons', which otherwise would almost surely have occurred.

After the transition to the appointment of all new officials from above, clientship functioned in a different manner: having many followers was less important to being appointed than having friends in higher circles. However,

once appointed, an official with followers was more capable of implementing laws and governmental instructions than someone with no personal influence; candidates' relative spheres of influence were thus likely to be taken into consideration when an appointment had to be made. Another of the former criteria, noble descent, had also declined in importance, even if it was still important to be a member of the *élite*. But by now the composition of the *élite* had changed. Mattulada (1974) has distinguished three main groups within that new *élite*: nobles, civil servants and intellectuals, and businessmen. In fact, those groups have interpenetrated, since a nobleman could also be a civil servant, an intellectual, or a businessman. In those three categories, people could also be classified as military or non-military. By Mattulada's count, fifty percent of the highest officials in the province were military men who had been assigned civil functions (*dikaryakan*). The importance of membership in any of the three groups mentioned above was approximately equal, implying that only one third of the highest officials came from the aristocracy.

By the end of the 1970s, all village or hamlet heads had to be recruited from among civil servants or military men, whereas more district heads (*camat*) had graduated from an Academy of Public Administration (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, APDN). According to Endy Djunaedi's (1979:11) research in Soppéng, among 41 village headmen, 14 (almost 40 percent) were noblemen, with only one of them being from the military, which itself still showed a relatively high proportion of aristocrats at that level: 12 village headmen (34 percent) were non-noble military officers. APDN graduates already accounted for 5 (14 percent) of the village headmen, of whom 3 were noble, a new trend at that level, while ordinary people – neither noble nor military men nor APDN graduates – only numbered 7 (20 percent). Since Soppéng, Wajoq, and Boné have all been core areas of strong aristocratic influence, this example may not be representative of the entire province; similar research in Sidénréng near the west coast or in some Makassarese areas might have yielded lower proportions of nobles in office.

Despite the nobility's loss of its privileged position and the advent of new *élites*, some previous forms of behaviour and structures of relationships have been maintained. One persistent aspect is the strong influence of at least part of the nobility. For instance, in the Sabbangparu district of Wajoq, Zainul Biran (1975:37-8) discovered that the village, hamlet, and neighbourhood heads who had been appointed from above, most of them military men, were much less influential than those who had been in office longer, all of whom had been originally elected and all of whom were nobles. I myself had witnessed eight years earlier on the occasion of an election to neighbourhood head in the same district how a commoner, in spite of strong support from above, had been beaten by a noble candidate, 'because', I was told, 'why

should we obey someone who is like us?

Similar observations have been made for the Maniangpajoq district of Wajoq (Lineton 1975a), the Bontomarannu district of Goa (Rumampuk 1975: 9), and even for the urban Bulurokeng district of Ujungpandang (Silaban 1976:64). However, in the latter case, Silaban (1976:26-8) has noted that people did indeed like noble officials who cared about maintaining links of reciprocity with their inferiors and in protecting them, but when nobles lacked such qualities, they preferred commoner officials who did manifest them. Likewise, Zainul Biran (1975:46) has described how a *camat* of *anaq mattola* rank, the highest (princely) aristocratic rank among the Bugis, succeeded in his office not because of his rank alone, but because he knew how to behave towards lower functionaries and village or hamlet heads, that is, in the same way as would have been the case in former times between a Bugis lord and his retainers. Clearly, birth was not enough; in fact, it had never been. What was needed was proper behaviour normally associated with birth (Walinono 1979:95). But people preferred in an official the appropriate behaviour without noble birth to noble birth without the appropriate behaviour (Djunaedy 1979). Hence, among the Bugis, Makassarese, and Mandar, where rank has been so important and where nobility still enjoys high prestige, the exercise of power by commoners has come to be accepted, if not by all at the outset, at least by many.<sup>8</sup>

Commoner officials have, however, encountered problems in coping with their noble subordinates, who at the same time considered themselves as the officials' superiors and who were regarded as such by the commoner officials. These noble subordinates would not obey the commoner officials, would not agree to participate in *gotong royong* activities together with commoner villagers, and presented difficulties in other contexts, as has been reported by Rumampuk (1975) for Goa and by Endy Djunaedy (1979) for Soppéng. One way for a commoner official to overcome this situation was to marry the daughter of an influential local aristocratic family (Rumampuk 1975:94). Another method was by displaying utmost reverence to the noble personages. In public consultations, commoner officials would seek their advice and honour them in order to gain the acceptance of their respective followers (Walinono 1979:94); when some collective activity was to be exe-

<sup>8</sup> This pattern of approval is, in fact, congruent with a remarkable degree of flexibility in the seemingly rigid Bugis and Makassarese tradition concerning rank and power, which is also found in their attitude towards gender; while the differences and division of tasks between genders is clear-cut, there was traditionally no objection to women behaving like men, as in the case of *calalaiq*, or men behaving like women, as in the case of *calabai*. The following Bugis proverb sums up this attitude: *Mau ni naworoané mua, na makkunrai sipaqa, makkunrai mui; mau ni makkunrai, na woroané sipaqa, woroané mui* ('If a man has a womanly nature, he is a woman; if a woman has a manly nature, she is a man').

cuted, the officials might first visit the informal leaders, most of whom were noblemen, to convince them to mobilize their followers, thus recognizing their indispensability (Rumampuk 1975:15).<sup>9</sup>

In short, although it was no longer necessary to have many followers to obtain political office, they were still very useful for carrying out political tasks. If an official did not have followers, he became dependent on informal leaders, thus creating a new kind of link between two persons of power who would be considered as both patron and client to each other, depending on the context. Conversely, it was still considered advantageous for a follower to have his patron occupy a high position in government office, since it was a means to obtain special advantages (Walinono 1979:91). Villagers whose own patron became village head would do their best to help him be successful, and lower officials would do their best to become the *anak buah* (dependents) of a higher official, for instance at the provincial level.

To conclude this section, in spite of the radical changes which have occurred several times during the 19th century in the political field, the pattern of patron-client relationships has been maintained, although under changing manifestations appropriate to contemporary situations. To my mind the only major change in that pattern has concerned the position of the nobility. Indeed, it has been possible since former times for the traditionally recognized categories of *to warani* (the brave), *to sugiq* (the rich), *to acca* (the clever) and *to panrita* (the religious) – the analogues of modern soldiers, businessmen, university graduates and religious teachers (*ulama*) – to be equated with the nobility, especially in regard to marrying high-ranking women. But now they constitute the major part of the new élites; the aristocracy has become just another category, though still an important one. In many ways the role of the new élites has remained the same as that of the old aristocracy: to supply would-be clients with patrons.

### *Patron-client ties in economic endeavours*

#### *Economic aspects in socio-political relationships*

The patron-client system must be regarded not only in its political aspect, but also in its economic aspect. As clearly shown by Lineton (1975a) for the Bugis society of Wajoq, one of the main tasks of traditional leaders has been to redistribute a large part of the wealth and products brought to them by their followers on such occasions as celebrations. The same could be said of traditional leaders in Makassarese and Mandar societies. The patron-client rela-

<sup>9</sup> I even know of such a relationship between a commoner *camat* and a local princely family, of which he had been a follower since his youth.

tionship, always based on an exchange of wealth and services, can be analogized to a pump that drives and enhances the currents of economic exchange in the society at large. In addition, there has also been a link between political power and control over land. Control has not always implied ownership. The South Sulawesi nobility was not to be compared, for instance, to the Western aristocracy of former times, who were generally the owners of vast agricultural tracts, in contrast to a generally landless people, who had to work the lands of these lords, often in a servile status. In South Sulawesi, despite some local variations, some princely families did own large tracts of land, but only a minority of the nobility seems to have owned much more than the average, and landless commoners seem to have been more or less a minority too.

The Memories van Overgave of the 1920s and 1930s for Wajoq usually stress how ownership of large areas of land was rare and few peasants were landless. The results of my own census in 1967 in *desa* Laérung in Wajoq have confirmed these views: from among 240 family heads, 213 (88.75%) owned land. The average of land ownership within the boundaries of the village by noble family heads was 1.74 ha., compared with 1.25 ha. in the case of commoners. However, in the nearby village Anabanua, Lineton (1975a) encountered two years later a very different pattern, perhaps caused by specific local factors. In her sample of 72 families, she discovered that only 33 (45.83%) owned land: one *anaq mattola* (prince) owned 23 ha., and another *andiq* (noble; perhaps an *anaq céraq*, a noble of the middle rank) owned 7 ha. Moreover, nearly half of the *tau décéng* (gentry or petty nobility) owned land of over 1 ha., while only 7.3% of commoners owned land of this extent. Hence, most of the commoners could support their families only by working on the land of others, mainly nobles.<sup>10</sup>

According to impressionistic accounts from other informants, in former times in the Bugis area east of Lake Tépé and of the Walennaé River, most people owned at least enough land to sustain their families, whereas to the west of those boundaries (for example, Sidénréng, Soppéng, the western coast) and in Goa, the nobility owned more land, while more peasants were landless. In that western part, one could also find more *tana arajang* or *tanah pusaka* (regalia land), land which belonged to the kingdom or to the lordship and was leased to farmers, with rent being received by the rulers.<sup>11</sup> Other lands, which were called 'bestowed lands' (*tana pammasé*) or in Sidénréng (*tana awatareng*) or in Boné 'lands of the war banner' (*tana pabaté-baté*), were lands that had been conquered in war and then 'loaned' back by the victori-

<sup>10</sup> Further comparative data of this sort are lacking, since I have found no other census of land ownership which takes into account the rank of the owners.

<sup>11</sup> A large part of the land in the present regencies of Barru and Maros was once of that status.

ous ruler to their original owners at a rent of ten to twenty percent of the harvest.

There were also in these parts many 'privileged lands' (*tana ongko*), fallow land or wooded areas under the direct jurisdiction of the ruler. These lands could be cleared with the permission of the ruler, and their use handed down to the descendants of the clearer. However, if the farmer let the land lie fallow again, it would revert to the ruler. The ruler in charge (or sometimes, one of the noble followers to whom she or he bestowed the privilege) received ten percent of the land's produce as rent (*sima tana*). Although originally these lands did not belong to individual aristocrats, but to the political units over which they presided, sometimes they were passed down to particular princely families, which thus became large land-owning families. Other *ongko* (privileged rights) were attached not to lands, but to forests (*ongko alegg*) or to salt water fishponds (*ongko pangémpang*). Specific persons were authorized to harvest their products in exchange for *ongko* (privileged rights) of ten percent ceded to the owner. In addition, the ruler, the lords and other officials (for example, *sulléwatang*, *pabbicara*, *matoa*, *gallarang*) had a right to the products of one or several pieces of especially affected land (*tana akkarungeng*, *tana panganréang*, *tana amatoangeng*) as a compensation for their use, as long as they were in charge of such land. Those lands were usually entrusted to peasant based on a sharecropping agreement (*tésang* or *téseng*), usually at the rate of fifty percent to each of the two parties.

Other land-based incomes for the lords were the contributions, for example one rice sheaf for each cultivated piece of land, they received as a kind of tribute (*kasuiang*) from each of the peasant family heads under their direct rule, be they landowners or farmers. Labelled the 'fruit of the land' (*bua tana*) or the 'count of the land' (*bilang tana*), this amount varied according to local customs. Incomes of another kind were the shares they received as taxes on all incoming and outgoing goods, whether brought by pack horses' (*sessung pattéké*) or by boat (*sessung binanga*). In addition, they received income from market taxes (*sessung pasaq*), gambling taxes, wedding taxes (for example, when the bridegroom was an outsider), law court taxes, fines, and from other sources.

The ruler's sources of income were thus manifold. Yet, although they did not have to provide their people those services that we now expect from a modern state, their burden was also heavy. Usually, they had to support in their palaces or mansions a large number of people: slaves, servants, pages, ladies-in-waiting, close or distant kin, followers, and other dependents, who had to be provided with food and sometimes even with clothing. They also had to assist their kin with lower incomes, either the non-ruling noble ones, who also had to support their own families and dependents, and lower ranking or non-noble kin, whom they would have been ashamed to see in pover-



ty. They also had to assist their followers and dependents in times of need, for example when the crops had failed. And in case of war, they had to support the armed forces who fought for them.

Many people depended economically on the nobles, including, of course, the real slaves (*ata manaq*, 'inherited slaves' or *ata tai manuq*, literally 'slaves as [worthless as] chicken faeces'), who owned nothing and depended completely on what they received from their masters. Others were given the use of some land to work themselves; such was also the case for free, but poor dependent commoners, who depended on the generosity of their lords for their own living. On the other hand, these noble lords benefited from many unpaid services. They did not have to work their own lands: for ploughing, planting, harvesting and other agricultural tasks, their dependents were summoned (*riolliq*) for collective work sessions, where the only compensation was the provision of meals. These dependents were likewise summoned when the nobles wanted to have a house built or moved and when they were staging a wedding or other large celebration.

With the decline of the nobility's political role, their economic role declined as well, since most of their wealth originated from their governmental functions. With the abolition of the former system of government, the continuous exchange of wealth and services, from the nobility downwards and from commoners upwards, was reduced to a negligible level. The incomes from the land had been progressively reduced. Already in the Dutch colonial period, a large part of the 'regalia lands' (*tana arajang*) and 'privileged lands' (*tana ongko*) had been converted to government land; the former rent paid to the ruler or a delegated representative was replaced by *landrente* of the same amount, but paid to the colonial public treasury. During the period of post-independence rebellion (*gerombolan*), most of the rulers and lords had to take refuge in the cities and were thus cut off from their main sources of income in the countryside; they were forced to live and to sustain the dependents who had followed them on what wealth they had accumulated, which could not be replenished in that troubled time. The establishment of security was, for that matter, of no assistance to them, since the traditional forms of government, as well as the incomes attached to them, had been abolished in the meantime.

Some former lords managed to have certain lands attributed nominally to them, but then, after the 1965 Land Reform Act (*Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*), land owning in excess of a certain extent, the precise limit depending on the region and the classification of the land, was outlawed. Those nobles who had not already been forced to sell their surplus land to compensate their loss of income had to share it out, mainly among family members. However, many of these nobles still talked about owning all this land already divided among kin. Indeed, the local concept of property is not

exactly the same as the legal, Western-inspired one, which is based on individual property, confirmed by title deeds. In contrast, local people still talk about a few aristocrats 'owning' up to 300 hectares of land (Djunaedy 1979:38). In fact, all that land is registered under the names of a large number of legal landowners who are their kin; this 'owning' (*punna*) should be better translated by 'controlling' (which was probably often the case in former times as well).

Generally speaking, 'ownership' of land and control of land by the nobility, which was already far from absolute before World War II, is now very limited. Noble patrons are no longer, as such, in a position to put land at the disposal of their dependents, as was formerly the case. The incomes that many of them received from occupying traditional political offices and which they redistributed in great measure had already ended in the era of regional rebellion. What they had accumulated was also limited by norms of inheritance. Contrary to inheritance patterns among Western nobles, normally favouring the eldest child (in France, the eldest son), in South Sulawesi rights of inheritance were, according to customary law, equal for all male and female children. In addition, nobles had to spend a great deal to maintain their prestige as long as possible. If they still wanted to act as patrons, their high birth was no longer enough; they have had to adopt new strategies, and in doing that they have entered into competition with commoner members of the new élites, both the political élite, comprising military men and graduates, and the economic élite.

The latter élite began to gain momentum in the 1920s. It had its origin in the rich peasants, rice traders, and businessmen, often active in religious movements, such as the modernist Muhammadiyah. Of course, among the latter, there were also aristocrats, since already in the seventeenth century many princely figures had been active in trade; but that new economic élite of the early twentieth century also had a new attitude, putting more stress on personal abilities, instruction and the spirit of enterprise. For them, traditional social structures were outdated. Many nationalist activists originated from that milieu, as well as those who sided with the Darul Islam rebels – in short, those who most contributed to end what they called 'feudal times'.<sup>12</sup> Yet, despite the activities of this new economic élite, patronage structures have persisted in fields of activity where birth is irrelevant: agriculture, fish-pond exploitation, fishing, navigation and shipping, trade, and many other kinds of enterprises.

<sup>12</sup> This new economic élite thus occupied the same position as the French bourgeoisie in regard to the nobility during the French Revolution.

*Patronage in economic enterprises: agriculture, aquaculture, fishing, sea trade, and artisanry*

When the patronage relationship is not primarily set in a political context, but is primarily economic in character, the terms used in South Sulawesi are *punggawa* for the patron and *sawi* for the client. The word *punggawa* was translated by the nineteenth-century missionary linguist Matthes (1874, 1885) as 'military chief' and 'ship's captain', but these are only two possible meanings of the term. A better translation might be 'leader' or 'boss'. The term applies to a wide range of situations of superiority combined with the existence of personal links with inferiors.<sup>13</sup> The term *sawi* was translated by Matthes (1874, 1885) as 'sailor' or 'crew member' (of which he distinguishes many kinds). Again, this is only one of the possible meanings. In fact, it is the complement of *punggawa*, implying both inferiority and personal links with the superior. Precisely because of these personal links, *punggawa* often speak of their *sawi* as their *anaq-anaq* (children), *anaq guru* (pupils or disciples) or *tau* (people).

*Agriculture*

Official statistics presenting the relative proportions of landowners, sharecroppers, farmers on rented land and landless farm labourers among South Sulawesi peasants are very unreliable. Results obtained by those who have conducted research on farmland ownership reveal significant regional variation.<sup>14</sup> Only 11 percent of farmers did not own their own land in Laérung (Wajoq) (Pelras 1971), as compared to 19 percent in Baraé (Soppéng) (Djunædy 1979), 23 percent in Lakatong (Takalar) (Mudiyono 1978), 41 percent in Pattojo (Soppéng) (Rambe 1975), 52 percent in Mattombong (Pinrang) (Mas'ud 1977), 54 percent in Anabanua (Wajoq) (Lineton 1975a), and 66 percent in Bulurokeng (Ujungpandang) (Silaban 1976).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> The same word is used by Malays, Javanese, and Balinese to name various kind of chiefs. Matthes derives *punggawa* from a Sanskrit word meaning 'excellent bull'. Even if he is right in this derivation, a local folk etymology deriving it from *pung* (or *puang*, 'lord') and *gawa* (or *gauq*, 'work'), thus meaning 'master of the work', still illuminates the way in which the term is currently used in South Sulawesi.

<sup>14</sup> These proportions may have changed locally through time. The legal principle of equal sharing among heirs has led to a continuous diminishing of the area possessed by individuals of successive generations. When plots become too small, some owners – especially in troubled or insecure periods – prefer to sell them, whether they wish to go overseas (*lao someq* or *merantau*) or not; others take that occasion once more to increase the area of the land they own. Aslam Sumhudi (1979:43) notes the occurrence of such a process in Sidénréng-Rappang during the *gerombolan*.

<sup>15</sup> The number of proprietors owning those lands rented to landless farmers is not known, although it would be very interesting to see what the proportion of big, middle, and small land-

Aslam Sumhudi's (1979:48) study in Sidénréng calculates that a single peasant, using only traditional tools and techniques, can work at most 0.9 ha. of irrigated rice fields. To work more land, he needs additional labour, which can be provided in several ways: family assistance, mutual or voluntary unpaid assistance, hired seasonal labour, permanent farm labourers, renting to a tenant, or sharecropping. Peasants working middle-sized farms commonly resort to mutual aid arrangements. These farmers keenly differentiate indigenous patterns of mutual aid (*mappalélé*, *situlung-tulung*, or *tolong-menolong*) from the official, government-sponsored *gotong-royong*. The latter, although it is generally aimed at fulfilling community needs or welfare, they often regard simply as compulsory labour, which they regard in much the same light as the corvée labour (*herendienst* or *kerja rodi*) of the Dutch colonial era (Biran 1975:50). *Situlung-tulung* is transacted among fellow peasants, usually working modest holdings, who take turns working one another's fields. They thus constitute medium-sized informal groups, generally comprising neighbouring kin or friends of similar status and income. The inviting peasant has only to provide food (Sumhudi 1979:31). The sharing relationships underlying this indigenous pattern of mutual aid are thus definitely not of the patron-client type.

A very different phenomenon is the field labour 'summoned' (*riolliq*) by a prominent person, involving usually between thirty and one hundred labourers collected to harvest the summoner's fields in return for the provision of meals, which can, however, amount to twenty percent of the value of the harvest. Other tasks, such as planting on this basis, may involve fewer labourers. This system of 'summoning', still in force in the seventies in such regions as Wajoq and Soppéng (Biran 1975), in Maros (Alitu 1976) and around Ujungpandang (Silaban 1976), is based on a relationship similar to that existing formerly between noble patrons (*ajjoareng*) and their clients (*joaq*). However, in this case the patron, labelled simply a *punggawa*, is usual-

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owners was, whether they were cultivators renting surplus land or other professionals, and whether they lived in the countryside or were absentee lords living in the city. Aslam Sumhudi's (1979:45) data reveal that more than sixty percent of the cultivated land in Lancirang was owned by people living outside the village (*desa*). However, he presents data neither on the location of these owners' residences outside the village, whether in neighbouring villages or townships, or in the provinces's main cities, nor on the primary occupations of these absentee landowners. My own impression, based on many informal conversations, is that the category of absentee urban landlords is quite large, since many traders, civil servants, teachers, and other urbanites readily acknowledge owning farm lands in the countryside whence they originate. But these holdings are not necessarily very large. For instance, many pedicab (*becak*) drivers, small peddlers, and ice mongers from Lakatong who are resident in Ujungpandang own farm land in their village of origin. However, because these lands are too small to provide a livelihood, they rent out this land in sharecropping arrangements (*tésang* or *téseng*) to other villagers who are happy to supplement their own insufficient land in this way.

ly not a nobleman, although he might be one, but is simply any leader, whether a notable or a rich peasant with large tracts of ricefields, with sufficient personal influence to be able to call upon a number of regular followers whom he is able to feed. This relationship defines the summoner as a patron, while those summoned are clearly his clients. These clients are ashamed (*masiriq*) not to come when they are called, and are also ashamed if they are not called, as that would mean that they have been cast aside by their patron. In the last few years, voluntary or summoned help has been increasingly replaced by hired seasonal labour (*pasaro*), generally paid in kind (for instance one rice sheaf or one paddy sack for every ten harvested). In some areas, such as Sidénréng-Rappang, where the effects of the Green Revolution on agricultural development have been rapid and intense (Acciaioli n.d.2), a now common sight in harvest times is rows of small bamboo shelters built by the seasonal workers, who come with their families, mostly from such infertile areas of the province as Takalar and Jeneponto. These groups of farm labourers shift from one place to another, following the different harvest seasons through the wet-rice regions of South Sulawesi. Although they do rent their services to regular employers, one can hardly speak of patronage in this case, since the relationship between employers and employees is restricted to this one economic transaction.

An intermediate case is when the hired labour consists of poorer kin, friends, acquaintances, or other familiar persons with whom a relationship of mutual help would not be possible due to their lack of land. The *punggawa* often chooses them for that work specifically to help them increase their incomes. In such cases, for example in Soppéng, a harvester who has harvested less than ten sheaves often receives one sheaf in payment all the same (Rambe 1975:17); in Camba, young girls are permitted to bring back home as much rice as they can harvest (Saefullah 1975); in Maros, in Takalar, and generally in the countryside around Ujungpandang, kin receive twice what should be paid to ordinary hired labour, that is, one share out of five as opposed to the customary one out of ten shares (Saefullah 1975, Silaban 1976). By so doing, the landowner fulfils the duty of benefaction toward fellow Muslims. By acting in this fashion, the landowner also succeeds in becoming a patron; those receiving such larger shares will feel from now on that they are obliged to provide labour, and will voluntarily contribute their help in other circumstances that may arise. Other relatively large landowners, be they farmers themselves or absentee landlords, prefer to let their land to a number of otherwise landless or land-poor peasants, with the same feeling of fulfilling a religious duty, as well as the same consequences in terms of clientship. Many of them are also rice traders and thus their role as *punggawa* usually extends to labour relations in the commercial field (Acciaioli 1994, n.d.2).

At the end of the 1970s, the largest landowners, especially in the newly irrigated areas planted with high-producing rice varieties, began to employ regular farm labourers for an annual compensation that was fixed in advance, such as thirty rice sheaves per year. Some people from poorer areas, who had previously earned their living as itinerant seasonal workers, preferred that kind of employment. It could be expected that more and more landless farmers would be forced into that arrangement, because more and more large landowners were taking back the land that they had previously rented out in order to optimize its yield for maximum profits by making use of modern machinery, techniques, and inputs.<sup>16</sup>

### *Aquaculture*

In contrast with the situation in agriculture, in the field of aquaculture, raising fish in saltwater ponds (*émpang* or *tambak*), patron-client relationships are still playing a vital role. According to Amir Tahawila (1979), the majority of the ponds in Manakku, *kabupaten* Pangkajéné, belonged to only a few people. Most of those owning large areas of ponds, that is 85 percent of those owning 5 to 10 ha. and 95 percent of those owning over 10 ha., were nobles; out of the 20 people owning more than 10 hectares, 8 were civil servants and 12 were considered as social leaders.

None of these owners exploited their ponds directly themselves; all had delegated their powers to a manager chosen for his diligence and reliability from among kin and acquaintances of lower rank and income. By doing so they felt they were rendering assistance to such a person based on a sense of family solidarity, friendship, mutual assistance or a 'sense of humanity'. In spite of that affective factor, these relationships were very unequal; some of the ponds were rented at a rate (*baluq pajaq*) of Rp. 100,000/ha./year for five or ten years, but most were let with a sharecropping arrangement (*tésang* or *téseng*), giving eighty percent of the income to the owner and twenty percent to the manager and his own followers. This manager, a client of the 'big patron' (*punggawa lombo*), was thus himself a 'small patron' (*punggawa caddi*) in regard to the people working for him. These subordinates were not only workers, but subordinate companions or followers (*sawi*), since they were not paid wages, but took an equal share of the benefits left by the owner once five percent had been taken as a supplement by the manager.

Although the income of this manager was not much higher than that of his companions, his role towards them was typically that of a patron. As long as the benefits of pond cultivation had not yet been distributed, he provided

<sup>16</sup> For instance, a farmer alone, using a mini-tractor, could work 1.6 ha. of rice, as compared with the previous maximum of 0.9 ha. using traditional techniques. Aslam Sumhudi (1979:71) calculated that each new mini-tractor thus displaced 1.3 persons.

for their needs in rice, in cash, and in other ways. Conversely, they were obliged to feel grateful towards him and towards the owner for having been given an opportunity to work, so that they were ready to obey their *punggawa* whatever their demands. So, when the local administration needed people for collective tasks, instead of summoning them directly, it did so through the intermediary of the *punggawa* to ensure that the people would come.

This pyramidal structure of patron-client relationships was not limited only to the *sawi*, the *punggawa caddi*, and the *punggawa lompo*. The latter usually depended as well on a higher *punggawa*, a large-scale trader who loaned him the capital he needed on the condition of receiving all the production (for example, shrimp) of his ponds at a lower price (for example, three-quarters) of the current market price. On the other hand, in case the fish crop failed, the pond owner would still obtain new credit for the following year with the same price stipulations. This system was thus a kind of insured loan.

In 1979 the monthly incomes from fish ponds ranged for the owners between Rp. 41,000/ha. for the traditionally exploited variety of milkfish (*bandeng*) and Rp. 840,000/ha. for the intensively exploited shrimp ponds, with an average monthly income of Rp. 226,000/ha. – quite a high figure, considering that the average pond area per owner was 6.5 ha. The manager's portion ranged from Rp. 10,000/ha. to Rp. 210,000/ha., with an average of Rp. 56,000.<sup>17</sup> Although the differences in income between the top and bottom of the pyramid were quite wide, people at the bottom were still relatively satisfied, because their incomes and living conditions were much better than those of neighbouring peasants. Moreover, they enjoyed much better job security, since even in the case of crop failure they knew they would be lent money by their *punggawa*, which further increased their loyalty.<sup>18</sup>

### Fishing

In the fishing industry as described by Zahiri Sara (1979) for Ujung Léro, there are several kinds of *punggawa pakkaja* (fishers' patrons): some of them are simply intermediaries between their *sawi*, called, as in other contexts, their *anaq-anaq* (children) or *anaq guru* (pupils or disciples), the fishers dependent upon them, and the fish *pappalélé* (fish traders); others are fishers themselves as well; another kind finance the fishers who borrow from them to buy their fishing gear; still others own the fishing gear that they let to the

<sup>17</sup> Amir Tahawila (1979) could not determine the earnings of the shrimp traders, but they must have been very high.

<sup>18</sup> However, the large profits obtained in such enterprises have tempted many newcomers, usually high government officials, who have been opening ponds all along the coast. There is some doubt as to whether these newcomers will maintain the traditions of patronage according to which the patron indeed receives high benefits, but must maintain extensive obligations towards his or her *sawi*.

fishers on the basis of an agreement analogous to sharecropping. Besides the *punggawa pakkaja*, other *punggawa* are those who captain the larger boats (*punggawa lopi*) and those who direct the operations with dragnets (*punggawa pajala*) or the activities on the fishing platforms (*punggawa bagang*).

The *punggawa pakkaja* acting as intermediaries usually receive a ten percent commission on the selling price of the fish. The situation was different in Pulau Sembilan, a small archipelago in the Gulf of Boné (Resusun 1978). Fishing platforms (*bagang*) were visited every morning by *pabbilolang*, traders using the boat termed *bilolang*, who gave the fishers half the current price of the fish at the fish auction market. The *punggawa pakkaja* who provided finances to the fishers received their capital back from the fishers in instalments, subtracted from the amount paid for the fish, an amount already lower than the current price at the auction market. The *punggawa pakkaja* who lent the fishing gear received a share of the catch, which usually differed according to the article loaned: fifty percent of the selling price of the fish was obtained for providing a *bagang* (fishing platform); fifteen percent for providing a *rompong* (a kind of floating fishing gear); ten percent for an outboard engine in Ujung Léro, compared with double the share of a single fisher in Ujungpandang for providing the same article. In fact, one *punggawa pakkaja* often provided all such equipment himself.

In Pulau Sembilan, the annual income of a *punggawa pakkaja* owning one fishing platform was Rp. 750,000, although some of them owned up to four *bagang*. If this fishing boss were also a *pabbilolang*, he could also receive an average annual income of Rp. 2,250,000 for the fish from each platform. In comparison, the annual income of a *sawi* working on a fishing platform was only Rp. 150,000. In spite of the large economic difference between these incomes, *sawi* still manifested attitudes of confidence and loyalty on their side, while *punggawa* maintained their sense of responsibility. The relationship was described as the same as between a lord (*arung*) and dependent (*ata*); in fact, many of the *punggawa* in Pulau Sembilan were members of the nobility. But members of the local society largely looked up (Resusun 1978) even to those who were not nobles and accorded them considerable honour (Yardigono 1975). These *punggawa* considered themselves as the 'guides' of their *sawi*, declaring it was their duty to help them.

The *punggawa* can provide many kinds of assistance: while the *sawi* is at sea, he will lend money to his family to buy food or pay his taxes and electricity bill; when the *sawi* is struck by misfortune (illness or death in the family) or when the *sawi* wants to celebrate a birth or to marry off a child, the *punggawa* will cover the costs (indeed, sometimes the *punggawa* arranges the marriages of the children of the *sawi*). The debt incurred is repaid in instalments through subtraction from the selling price of the fish. If the indebted fisher has had bad luck at fishing, the reimbursement may be delayed, and a



new loan may even be made in such circumstances.

In short, the *punggawa pakkaja* does not simply act as a money-lender, but more as a banker and an insurer and at the same time as an elder. The *sawi* are not only his debtors, they are also his obligées, ready to execute any service which he will request from them. In fact, the debts of many *sawi* are so large that it is quite impossible for them to expect that they will ever eventually be able to reimburse their *punggawa*. However, not all *sawi* are hopelessly indebted. In Ujung Léro, twenty-five percent of them owned all of their fishing gear, sometimes bought with the help of their *punggawa*; nevertheless, they remained attached to him all the same, not only out of a sentiment of obligation towards him, but also because he represented a guarantee of security for the future in case of misfortune or other circumstance requiring money. However binding their links with their patron, *sawi* can always, at least theoretically, shift their loyalties to another one. In the case of an indebted *sawi*, the prospective *punggawa* simply has to repay the debts of the *sawi* transferring loyalties to the former one. It may be more difficult when the obligations are only moral, since no repayment can erase them. Such a change of loyalty is more likely to happen in the event of a conflict between a client and his patron.

A *punggawa pakkaja* can also be the *anaq guru* (pupil) or *tau* (person) of a more powerful patron (*punggawa loppo*), usually a fish trader (*punggawa pap-palélé*) in a large city, who, in turn finances him on the condition that he too will obtain all the fish from the *sawi* of the *punggawa pakkaja* at a price lower than the current market price. In that case as well, the repayment is made by subtracting from the amount paid for the fish; even after the reimbursement, however, the *punggawa* continues to ask for a lower amount than the full value of the fish as a token of gratitude towards his own *punggawa*.<sup>19</sup>

#### Sea trade

In South Sulawesi and the larger archipelagic environment of which it is a hub, shipping and navigation are also structured in terms of pyramidal, often four-tiered relationships. At the bottom are the sailor *sawi*, one tier above are the boat captains, above them are the individual shipowners, and sometimes at the very top the capitalists from whom the shipowners have borrowed money in order to have their ships built. In this context the relationships are, once again, not purely economic, but of the usual kind between *punggawa* and their dependents.

Jufrina Rizal's (1978) research in Bira, one of the most important centres of

<sup>19</sup> The situation of those smaller *punggawa* who captain the fishing boats or who direct fishing operations – the rules to calculate their share of income and their relationship to their own *sawi* – is in many respects similar to that of the *juragang* or *nakoda* who captain the trading boats.

traditional sailing in South Sulawesi, highlights the strong personal relations, often reinforced by kinship or marriage, between shipowners and captains, as well as between captains and sailors. The crew of a ship, captain and sailors together, constitute a corporate group called the *kumpulanna lopi*, bound to one another by a strong feeling of community. As a *punggawa*, the captain feels responsible for his *sawi* sailors in the same way as a father for his children; his personal influence over them is great. The *sawi* are not only bound to follow his orders on board concerning navigation and the ship, but also often heed his advice on personal problems. As their incomes are low, they also often have to borrow from him, especially once back home, in order to cover their living expenses and to organize celebrations, such as weddings or propitiatory feasts (*baca doang*) preceding the departure to sea.

The system in force for the remuneration of the different categories of people making their livelihood from sailing is income sharing. In Bira, once the boat has returned from the annual trading voyage, the shipowner (*ompunna lopi* in the local Konjo dialect of Makassarese) receives one-third of the total income. From that amount he pays the ship's maintenance and repair expenses, after which one-sixth of the remaining amount from this share is given to the captain. The other two-thirds, after the maintenance expenses of the crew at sea have been subtracted, is divided into equal parts, including one part for the captain, who has usually also received gifts from the different agents with whom he has had commercial relations at the ports of call during the trading voyage. For example, in the case of one 200-ton ship of the *pinisiq* type, with twenty-five men on board, each *sawi* received Rp. 100,000, the captain Rp. 600,000, and the shipowner Rp. 2,000,000 for the year-long voyage. Most shipowners owned more than one ship; those who owned only one ship usually captained her at the same time.

On shore, while the ship was at sea, the relations of the captain's wife with the sailors' wives parallel those among their husbands. What little money the sailors saved for their wives was sent in a lump sum by the captain to his wife, who then summoned the relevant sailors' wives to receive the shares that belonged to each of them. Usually, those remittances were far from enough to sustain the families. Although the wives usually had their own small incomes from weaving, embroidering, or shore fishing, they often came to the captain's wife to borrow money, which would later be subtracted from the share owed to their husbands. In the case of borrowed items, for example, eggs, oil, coconuts, spices, or salt, no account was kept. Sailors' wives also often came to ask the advice of the captain's wife on personal or family problems. They also maintained a feeling of devotion towards her, disposing them to give her any help needed, such as coming to her house without being summoned to offer their services to collect firewood, to fetch water from the well, and to cook, especially on the occasion of feasts, without being reim-

bursed in cash, but in the form of food and sometimes of clothing.

The indebtedness of many *sawi* and their families makes it difficult for them to break their relationship with one *punggawa* in order to move to another. But even for those who are not indebted, most of the relationships endure, being passed down from generation to generation. In Bira, most of the shipowning or captain *punggawa* and their families are noble, and some shipowners are of the highest rank (*pattola*); such social rank reinforces their authority and influence on the *sawi* and their families, as well as the devotion of the latter towards them. But there exists to some degree the possibility of social mobility within the pyramid, since most shipowners have been captains, and all captains have been *sawi* at one time or another. There are also shipowners who are nobles of middle rank and even those who are commoners. Of course, upward mobility is much easier for a *sawi* from the nobility or from a rich family of shipowners.

#### Artisanry

As exemplified by the ironsmiths in Massépé, *kabupaten* Sidénréng-Rappang (Sidrap) (Isa Sulaiman 1979), patronage relationships in the field of artisanry are somewhat more complicated than in the cases of agriculture, pond cultivation, fishing and sea trading. In 1978 eight main traders (*padangkang*), who had commercialized all production, dominated the iron trade in Massépé. The ironsmith masters (*palanro bessi*) were those owners of a forge in a position to employ a number of workers, their *anaq guru*; here, as elsewhere, these ironsmith masters were called *punggawa*. They numbered 110 in the village, employing an average of three workers each. Some of them used their own capital to buy raw materials, while others received these materials from the iron traders, who at the same time placed orders for the delivery of specific products to be purchased later at a price that takes into account the supplying of raw materials, a system termed *saroang*, glossed locally as the 'fee system'. In that last case, the iron trader was also considered a *punggawa* and the ironsmith his *anaq guru*.

The relationships of the ironsmiths to their workers was not just that of employers to their employees. Workers were paid by the job and according to their level of workmanship, making between Rp. 18,000 and Rp. 36,000 per month, compared to an average of Rp. 180,000 for the master ironsmiths. But the latter were always ready to lend them money or food, whereas the workers readily accepted the burden of working to fulfil urgent orders. These workers usually attended the celebrations organized by the families of their respective *punggawa*. Like the patron-client relationships examined in other fields, this structure was not completely rigid, since most ironsmiths have begun their careers as subordinate workers; some of them, after becoming self-financing, have entered the trade as master ironsmiths.

The products, once delivered to the intermediate traders who had provided the original capital, were then entrusted partly to retail merchants (*pabbaluq*) living in the main cities of South Sulawesi, as well as in Central and Southeast Sulawesi, as well as partly to hawkers selling their goods in the markets. Only when the iron implements had been sold to consumers was their purchase price repaid to the intermediate traders, who then paid the ironsmiths. Thus, as *punggawa loppo* the intermediate traders had two kinds of dependents (*anaq guru*): firstly, the retailers and hawkers, towards whom they were in the classic position of creditors, and, secondly, the ironsmiths, toward whom – in a manner unusual for patrons in other fields – they were often indebted, since the price of the finished products was, of course, more than that of the raw materials they often provided. All the same, both categories of clients depended on these traders as their protectors, to whom they came and borrowed money for their daily needs, as well as for organizing celebrations, such as weddings. For the traders, that situation was a source of prestige and led them to compete with each other by displaying signs of wealth, such as buying cars or luxury goods, building beautiful houses, organizing expensive celebrations, especially at Maulud, and, of course, making the pilgrimage to Mecca, since they were ostentatiously fervent adherents and practitioners of Islam.

In other trades, the pattern often seems to be similar to that in the iron trade. An interesting example is the tobacco industry in Cabéngé, *kabupaten Soppéng* (Soedjono 1978). The tobacco entrepreneurs there, also called *punggawa*, even work without engaging any of their own capital. The local product, *icoq Ugiq* (Bugis tobacco), is a special blend of tobacco leaves and unrefined sugar mixed with a special flavouring, the recipe of which is kept secret by each company, then compressed in a green bamboo tube and roasted. This process produces cylinders that are sold per slice in local markets; the tobacco so treated can also be made into cigarettes, each company having its own trademark.

Entrepreneurs in this field, of whom there were fifty-five in 1977 in Cabéngé, need not only tobacco, but also sugar, bamboo and firewood, all commodities locally produced. The entrepreneurs received these materials on credit from the producers, all modest peasants. For the processing they employed workers, mostly women and children, with an average of fifteen workers per company. These workers were considered their *anaq guru*. The processed tobacco or the cigarettes were entrusted after completion to retailer merchants (*pabbaluq*), who received them on credit as well. Once they had sold them, they paid the purchase price to the entrepreneurs, who only then paid the primary producers of the raw materials. The economic relations of the entrepreneurs to the workers were simple: they paid them very low salaries and gave them one cigarette for every three hours of work. In addi-

tion, as the workers were from very poor families, the entrepreneurs were obliged to assist them in case of need. With the retailers, the relationship was less unequal, since they were often based upon kinship or marital relations. Mutual confidence was essential, since the whole system was based on the honesty of the retailers in paying for the tobacco and cigarettes, all the more so as those products are very sensitive to humidity and mould very easily.

Like the iron traders in relation to the ironsmiths, tobacco entrepreneurs were indebted to the producers. However, these entrepreneurs were still the *punggawa*, because they occupied the key position in the system, since the peasants had no outlet other than them. Contrary to what is the usual behaviour of *punggawa* in other fields, the indebted tobacco *punggawa* displayed tokens of respect towards their (mostly poorer) creditors, whom they sometimes regarded as elders and whose advice they came to ask on personal matters or family problems. But the peasants were bound to the entrepreneurs all the same. As long as they had yet to be paid, they often had difficulties sustaining their livelihood. Sometimes, in order to buy provisions, clothing, or seedlings, or to pay taxes, they had to come and ask the *punggawa* for what was in fact an advance on the repayment of his debt, but which, nevertheless, assumed the form of a loan. Sometimes, crooked entrepreneurs were late in repaying their debts, using the money received from the retailers to build houses, buy cars, or luxury goods, or even make investments with big returns. Only a few of them paid the producers cash at the time of purchase (though at a lower price); these entrepreneurs were, however, the most esteemed. Even in cases of such abuse, the peasants felt that they were beholden to the *punggawa* as the supporters of their livelihood. They were ready to help them in all circumstances, and even contributed if their *punggawa* wanted to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

### *Concluding remarks*

While patron-client relationships pervade all aspects of Bugis and Makassarese societies, they can assume different forms according to circumstances. Such adaptability belies the endeavour of establishing a typology of local variations of patronage in South Sulawesi based on such a limited number of cases. Many questions remain to be answered. For instance, are clientships de facto endogamous structures or, in the case of marriage between members of two different clientships, does one of the spouses become a member of the other spouse's group of followers? On what basis is this decision made? Or does each spouse retain her or his prior membership? In such a case, must their children choose to follow only one parent? If so, on what basis do they make that choice? Or, in the case of logically possible dual

membership, do they become members of both parents' followerships? The possibility, incidence, bases, and conditions of belonging to more than one clientele also require further research. In some cases, such dual membership seems logically excluded, since, for example in the political field, a follower ought not to be a supporter of two rival leaders. In other cases, however, there is no logical incompatibility. Just as in the field of agricultural mutual aid (*situlung-tulung*), a farmer may participate in more than one group, so a person could logically belong to two or more clienteles operating in different fields, for example an agricultural and an artisanal one. But does such multiple participation occur and, if so, with what incidence? Or are such multiple clientship groups linked to each other in some type of super-clientship? Answers to such questions and others are not in the available data, which were collected in response to other research priorities and topics. Specific research on clienteles and patron-client relationships remains necessary.

The era in which the system of patronage began to be in force among the societies of South Sulawesi is difficult to assess. Local inhabitants do not explicitly recognize and articulate this system: hence, there has been no theorizing on it in legal texts. Historical documents provide only indirect clues. A careful analysis of chronicles and, above all, of the old diaries in Bugis and Makassarese script might shed some light on such questions, but such sources do not provide very detailed information prior to the seventeenth century, the period for which the stories of political fugitives who went into exile in the company of a large numbers of retainers are already available.

Although patronage has been a very common and enduring pattern in Bugis and Makassarese societies since at least the end of the seventeenth century, and probably much earlier, it is only, so to speak, a spontaneous pattern, a regular manner in which social actors organize their everyday behaviour. It is not a consciously articulated model, an exemplary mode of social organization which social actors invoke and consciously follow.

Of course, patrons, as well as clients, are very conscious of what their relationships are like and how they must behave in order to maintain, extend, or even terminate these relationships. However, as far as I know, there has been no attempt to formalize those ways of acting textually, be it in oral formulae or written texts. Many texts and sayings which prescribe how people should act, especially in relations between superiors and subordinates, can, of course, be applied in the framework of clientships. But the archetypal model for such texts was, in the case of those relating to pre-Islamic times, the behaviour of the princes of divine descent, the *datu* who performed the roles of heroes in the *La Galigo* epic literature, and, in those emphasizing an Islamic point of view, the righteous sultan whose actions are described in such texts as the *La Toa* (Mattulada 1985). Such texts as the *La Toa* date from the eighteenth century, a period when the patronage pattern certainly already existed.

Thus, the absence of explicit mention of patron-client relationships in the *La Galigo* texts, which purport to describe a much older state of society, should not be seen as proof of the nonexistence of such relationships at an early period, although the seemingly absolute princely power assumed in such texts would appear to have been an unfavourable factor for the development of clientelism. For later periods, the beginnings of truly historical times, the texts recounting the founding of a number of domains ruled by nobles (*wanua* or *kakaraengang*) allude to 'government contracts' between the first noble founder of the local dynasty and representatives of the people, usually styled 'elders' (*matoa*), who might well have been commoner patrons with their own clienteles. In any case, the formulae of these contracts between ruler and ruled, rather unusual in the larger regional context, might just indicate the earlier existence of the kind of relationships uniting a leader and his followers that might be labelled patronage.

Many factors in Bugis and Makassarese societies have favoured the emergence of patron-client relationships. One has been the existence of a bilateral kinship system, which does not result, as unilineal systems do, in discrete, often corporate groups, such as clans and lineages. Clienteles are definitely discrete groups, of which one is a member or not, but the examples examined above do not always clearly depict corporate groups. Some cases, however, clearly fulfil many of the criteria of corporate groups, such as the group constituted by the captain and sailors of a boat and their wives, the *kumpulanna lopi* reported from Bira. In societies with bilateral kinship systems, clienteles might to a certain extent function as a substitute for kinship groups; in some cases, what has earlier been taken to be localized bilateral kin groups may, in fact, be personal clienteles, among whose members kin relations also exist. Certainly, according to data I collected primarily (though not exclusively) in Wajoq, the commoner leaders or prominent persons called *anang* or *inanna tau* (literally, 'mothers of the people') in Bugis regions and *tau toa* (elders) or *anrong tau* (also, 'mothers of the people') in Makassarese regions, whose advice and support was sought even by local lords when they had to make important decisions, were, in fact, such lower-level patrons of local clienteles, mostly comprised of kinsfolk of their leader.

In traditional Bugis and Makassarese societies, there were no such local communities as the Javanese or Balinese *desa*, with their nearly democratic councils. The basic local units in South Sulawesi were domains (*wanua*) or lordships (*akkarungeng*, *kakaraengang*) of variable extent. The larger domains could be subdivided into *limpo* or *loqmoq*, neither of which corresponded to what we would call 'villages'. At a lower level, house groups (*abbanuangeng*, *paqrasangang*) had no specific organization as such. At the head of the domains or lordships were lords (*arung*, *karaeng*); the subdivisions were under *matoa*, *jenniang*, *loqmoq*, *gallarang* and other titled leaders. Territorial

organization was thus hierarchical. As confirmed by the sayings and formulae of oral tradition, those commoner leaders called by such terms as *anang* were essential for the transmission of orders from above and for their execution. Clientship structures being pyramidal, lower-level clienteles were, of course, basic to the system, their support mediated, through their own local patrons, must have been essential to the more important noble-dominated *ajjoareng*, whose scope of action encompassed larger areas.

Much of the research on local authority and leadership in Indonesia since the 1970s has centred on such figures as the village heads (*kepala desa*) and district heads (*camat*), who represent modern governmental institutions. As such research has stressed, a large part of their influence has been based on their ability to gain the support of 'informal leaders'. But these types of 'informal leaders' have varied according to different ethnic traditions and contemporary conditions, as well as the particular context of the transactions under examination. In South Sulawesi, a large proportion of these 'informal leaders' must be seen as patrons playing an active role in political and economic life.

The existence of a hierarchical system is not indispensable to the constitution of clientship networks, since it is not the only possible source of inequality. The strongly hierarchical cast of Bugis and Makassarese societies has, however, obviously been a favourable factor for their emergence. When the role of the nobility declines, economic prominence may take over as the criterion of patronage.

In the agricultural field, the evolution of such patron-client relations can be summed up as follows. In former times, many people who owned no land or whose land was neither extensive nor fertile enough to feed their families and who, for one reason or another, could not or did not want to leave the region in search of land elsewhere, whether because they were the descendants of slaves or were indebted dependents, received as assistance from their (usually) noble patrons the use of some of their surplus lands or from the local lords the use of some of the 'privileged' land (*tana ongko* or *tana arajang*) under their control. Reciprocally, these recipients participated in the collective working of the fields of their patrons, as well as providing other services. The economic decline of the nobility has given to the increasingly important category of rich landowning commoners the opportunity to replace them as 'agricultural patrons' (*punggawa allaonrumang*), either by renting out part of their lands or by having their dependents and followers work in their fields when summoned.

Simply labelling such a system a mechanism for the exploitation of the poor by the mighty or the rich would be erroneous. This system of exchange contributed to the smoothing of economic differences: people whose land was not sufficient to feed their family or which did not produce enough sur-



plus to cope with the possibility of a bad harvest could supplement the production of their own land, either by taking more land as a sharecropper or by helping to harvest the fields of other peasants. At the same time, it helped reinforce social solidarity and cohesion among strata of unequal rank. By contrast, in modern times with the suppression of the local institutions labelled 'feudal' by their critics, the tendency to replace patron-client bonds by employer-employee relationships in agriculture and other fields of enterprise might very well improve the incomes of the rich, but worsen the living conditions of the ever more plentiful landless villagers, who at the same time are losing the advantages which they could expect to receive from their links with a patron.