Contested Coastlines:
Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion
in Eastern Sulawesi 1680-1905

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This thesis is presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of Murdoch University, 2002
I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work, which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.
To my parents

Rena Westra and Andy Velthoen
Abstract

In this study, the small-scale, polycentric polities in eastern Sulawesi are the prism through which political processes at the local and regional levels are explored in the period 1680-1905. Such small-scale polities were the most prevalent mode of political and social formation in the Indonesian archipelago and retained a high degree of autonomy up to the imposition of direct Dutch rule in 1905. The three sections of this study trace the position of these polities as they were integrated into overlapping spheres of regional influence that were dominated, but not controlled, by regional political centres. When the Dutch colonial state started to expand its influence over the seas, intervene in local conflict and suppress raiding in the middle of the nineteenth century, the traditional political system in which eastern Sulawesi participated was increasingly defined as a colonial periphery in relation to the remote centre of Batavia.

Part one hones in on the local level: because of the small-scale of political units, individual leaders played an important role not only at the local level, but also in relations with external allies and traders. The dynamism of the polycentric structure of east coast polities was driven by the rivalry and co-operation between such individual leaders and by their ability to establish relations with regional centres and traders. The second and third parts discuss the historical developments in eastern Sulawesi in the periods 1680-1830 and 1830-1905. The themes of local conflicts and regional tributary relations with the regional centres of Bone, Ternate, and the VOC are discussed in relation to the multi-layered, dynamic system of political and economic relations that existed in these periods. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, economic changes and colonial anti-piracy campaigns started to undermine the regional system, which was based on shifting alliances, decentralised raiding and regional integration through diasporas.
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Introduction: Perspectives, Themes and Sources

As a traveller and researcher in eastern Sulawesi, Indonesia, in the 1990s I found it difficult to escape the widely held view of the region as a backward periphery. Sulawesi, but even more so the east coast, is a blank spot on the mental maps of most Indonesians living on Java, including the government officials who needed to give me permission to carry out my research. They were puzzled about my plans to do research on Sulawesi, since as far as they were concerned ‘there were no historical places there’, and ‘it was all jungle’. If I was interested in ‘history’, I should be in Java. This viewpoint was frequently echoed in eastern Sulawesi itself, when people responded to my purpose for being there with phrases such as: ‘We have no history here, you should look in Bone or Ternate’ or: ‘We used to have history but that is all gone now’. Even those who were enthused about my interest in the history of the east coast of Sulawesi often shared the view that their history was disappearing and that their past somehow had no place within the historical memory of the contemporary state of Indonesia. Having a ‘history’ seemed somehow closely related to one’s current political and economic position within the Indonesian state.

Ironically, it may not be a coincidence that an archivist in the State Archives in The Hague had a similar outlook to the Javanese officials. He replied to my queries about archival sources that ‘there was nothing’ in that part of Sulawesi, and that ‘nobody ever went there’. He was right in the sense that there were no mining companies, rubber plantations, large trading entrepots, no major colonial wars or a massive resistance, in short, nothing much for colonial administrators to be concerned about. In the larger scheme of the colonial and then the Indonesian state, eastern Sulawesi truly disappears between the cracks of history.

In eastern Sulawesi, which is divided between Central and Southeast Sulawesi, I occasionally heard explanations of why their local area was now so peripheral. While walking through Batui, a village in the regency of Luwuk, an older man came to walk
next to me and asked whether I was from the Netherlands. Then he went on to ask if I knew anything about the golden throne of Banggai. He had heard from the elders of Banggai when he was a young man that they had possessed a golden throne in the past, but that it had been taken away by the Dutch. Disappointed that I could not give him any information, he insisted that I look for it when I returned, because the golden throne had to be somewhere in the Netherlands. To me, the lost throne signified the loss of local power and autonomy, and the feeling of marginalisation that was linked to the introduction of colonial rule.

A different story with a similar message was related to me by an elderly woman in the small village of Nambo, south of Luwuk. She told me that in the olden days there was a huge, magnificent tree with leaves that were made of cloth. The leaves on the top branches were made of beautiful silk of all imaginable colours and patterns, but further down the tree the leaves were made of poorer quality cloth, and at the bottom the leaves were made of the cheapest and plainest cloth. One day this tree toppled over, so that the top part with the expensive and colourful cloth fell on the western world and the lower part fell here.\(^1\) That, she said, is why the west is so rich and we are so poor. The imagery of different grades of cloth takes the symbolism further than the political and economic power associated with the golden throne, denoting a graded hierarchy based on wealth and political power. Both gold and cotton cloth also constituted ‘ritual’ wealth, since they were key commodities in exchanges between kinship groups as part of bride-wealth. In both stories the top layer of the social hierarchy was forcefully removed from local society, in the first case appropriated by the Dutch, in the second case power was drained to ‘the west’, leaving the east coast deprived of wealth. Both myths are powerful metaphors for the process of marginalisation that took place as a result of the
incorporation of eastern Sulawesi into the world economy and the colonial state in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The contrast between a power-filled, autonomous past and a present that is marginalised, is very apparent in the reversed fortunes of the polity of Bungku, formerly called Tobungku. A Dutch source from 1749 relates that ‘the tribe of Tobungku is the fiercest of all Malukan peoples’, referring to Tobungku’s reputation as a ‘warring nation’. Writing in the 1830s, Vosmaer depicts Tobungku as the busiest port on the east coast of Sulawesi, controlling coastal trade from Kendari to Banggai, and attracting large numbers of traders from South Sulawesi. However, contemporary Bungku finds itself in the reverse position. Rather than being a centre of trade, it is bypassed by the large ships that travel up and down the east coast. Contemporary Bungku is comprised of a string of small coastal villages, divided into four kecamatan (administrative subdistricts), that depend primarily on agriculture. While located in Central Sulawesi, they are far removed from their own provincial capital Palu on which they are dependant for administrative matters. Kendari, the capital of the neighbouring province of eastern Sulawesi, is closer and more accessible, and it is there that children go to highschool, and from where the local markets are supplied. The roads constructed in the early 1990s were not built to service Bungku, but primarily to service extensive transmigration areas that were being opened at that time. Officially, the people of Bungku were not even a recognised ethnic

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1 A common contrast that was made was that sacred sites used to be powerful and that communication with ancestral or other spirits used to be common, but that in the contemporary situation the power of sacred sites had waned, and communication with spirits was rare.

2 The historical polity of Tobungku is referred to as Tambucco, Tobongko or Tambuku. The contemporary village is named Bungku, as opposed to the ethnonym Tobungku.

3 VOC 2740 f. 393.


5 In 1991, the road between Kolonodale had only been opened a few months, and many bridges had not been completed, so that the only mini-bus that travelled this route, had to drive through rivers. The transmigration sites were still smoking forest clearings. By 1995, there were daily mini-buses plying this route, and the
group, but were subsumed under the label of Tomori, their predominantly Christian, inland neighbours, with whom relations were civil but uneasy.

But for those who know the way, the still visible signs of a different past can be discovered. The ruins of a large fort can be found on a tall hill just outside the contemporary village of Bungku, hidden among fields and patches of secondary jungle. Its name, Fafontofure, means ‘high place crawling with people’, a reminder of a time when Tobungku was a local centre of power, and when most of the population lived away from the coast near fortified hilltops. The first time I visited this spot in 1991, its ruins were overgrown with jungle. Several years later, in 1995, Pak Rone, the official responsible for local culture and education, had made an effort to uncover and expose the remains of the walls and cemeteries, including the grave of the founding king of Tobungku, which had been a focal point in ceremonies in the past. In 1995, he was lobbying to get official government recognition of Fafontofure as an historic site. The intention of my study is, similarly, to excavate and uncover a history that would otherwise be remain buried and hidden from sight.

Small-scale Societies: Concepts and Perspectives
Before the introduction of direct colonial rule in 1905, eastern Sulawesi consisted of a large number of small settlements and kinship groups engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture, connected to each other through kinship allegiances and exchanges, and with
a high degree of local autonomy. Many of these communities were part of larger social-political formations that acknowledged a chief. These associated groups in their turn formed polities that fit the definition of chiefdom, with a council of nobles and usually an elected ruler. The best known and most developed of these polities were those with a strong maritime orientation, namely Buton, Banggai and Tobungku. Their names appear in European sources as early as the sixteenth century. On the other hand, Mori and Konawe, less accessible chiefdoms with a more inland and agricultural orientation, only became known to Europeans in the nineteenth century. These chiefdoms had longstanding relations with various larger external centres such as Ternate in Maluku, Makassar and Bone in South Sulawesi, and to a lesser degree Sulu, Batavia (Jakarta) and Java. They participated in long distance trade, warfare and regional tributary systems while also engaging in political relations with the Dutch.

The historical study of a now peripheral area such as eastern Sulawesi need not only be a journey into a past filled with overgrown ruins and mythical tales. When I first embarked on a study of the history of Kendari in 1988, the Indonesian state was firmly entrenched, and local histories were systematically fashioned to fit the nationalist paradigm. However, since the late 1990s, centre-periphery relations in Indonesia are in flux, and the dominant position of the state is being challenged from all sides. Calls for greater regional autonomy and even independence from the centre of the Indonesian state by various ethnic and communal groups show that the nation state as we now know it may not be the ‘natural’ outcome of a process of state-formation, but rather a historical interlude in a region where small-scale social and political groupings have always been at the centre of historical developments. O. W. Wolters proposes such a continuum when he speaks of ‘mandala history’, a multi-centred and diverse political landscape in which the
nation state might be but a ‘blip on the screen of history’. In the current national debates about the legitimacy of the nation state and regional autonomy, ‘history’ is highly politicised. In the process, the reconstructed heritage of small-scale societies, now filtered through the lens of a century of colonialism and nation-building, is increasingly being used to construct alternative histories that challenge the dominance of the nation state.

Areas such as eastern Sulawesi are now considered peripheries within the Indonesian nation state and even more so within the global economy because there is a perceived lack of dynamism, and communication with the outside world is both difficult and limited. However, the current position of eastern Sulawesi and other such peripheries was only defined in the nineteenth century in the context of colonial expansion and incorporation into the colonial state and subsequently the Indonesian nation state. The historical transformation of eastern Sulawesi into such an economic and political periphery is one of the important themes of this study. As a consequence of this transformation, the history of eastern Sulawesi and other similar areas in Sulawesi and in the archipelago in general, remains largely hidden, excluded from the discourse of mainstream nationalist history and historiography. The tendency in the past of historical research to focus on strong states or major trading centres and the difficulty of historical sources has also further compounded the historical exclusion of what are now peripheral areas.

Crucial in coming to grips with the history of eastern Sulawesi is to approach it utilising concepts that render it ‘visible’, not merely as an amorphous, passive or reactive periphery, but rather as an area that had a dynamism of its own, while also being an integral part of a regional political system and an emergent global economy. Over the past several decades the critique of evolutionary theories of social development and increased engagement with the past of Southeast Asia have given rise to a number of concepts that

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8 O. W. Wolters, “Postscript I”. History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Ithaca, Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Reprint
help illuminate the history of areas like eastern Sulawesi. In the field of archaeology, complex societies and their place in social evolution have been an important focus. The concept of a chiefdom was coined to describe the intermediate stage of development between tribal societies and states. Chiefdoms include a wide range of small-scale, complex societies that were too hierarchical to be called tribes and not institutionalised, centralised or hierarchical enough to be defined as states. They were and still often are seen as precursors of states. Evolutionary theories see a progression of developmental stages with the state and institutionalised structures as the outcome of this process. 9 As White points out, the data from Southeast Asia does not fit this path of unilinear development towards a greater degree complexity, hierarchy and institutionalisation.10

The linear trajectory also does not capture the dynamism of both small-scale as well more complex Southeast Asian polities. Schulte Nordholt points out in the case of Mengwi (Bali) that it was neither static, nor was there a process of evolution from chiefdom towards statehood.11 The fluidity of the ‘flexible hierarchy [...] rather than a permanent and uniform hegemony’ typical of Mengwi, but also resonant of eastern Sulawesi, is better captured by the term ‘heterarchy’, which White proposes as a more appropriate and fruitful concept for insular Southeast Asia where rigidly ascribed social rank are not a prominent characteristic. Heterarchy allows for lateral differentiation and integration of the larger society and a context for flexible ranking and flexible economic and social

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9 Earle states that the interest in chiefdoms is inspired by the conviction that ‘the fundamental dynamics of chiefdoms are essentially the same as those of states, and that the origin of states is to be understood in the emergence and development of chiefdoms’. Timothy Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1997, p. 14-15.  
interrelationships that are not necessarily controlled by a recognised higher power.\textsuperscript{12} The concept of heterarchy is important for understanding the historical position and development of small-scale polities in the regional political system in which they were situated.

Mary Helms, also tries to move away from hierarchical definitions of centre-periphery relations towards a conceptualisation that restores more agency to small-scale, ‘acquisitional’ polities. Rather than a single, all-encompassing political and economic system with a clear centre-periphery dichotomy, in non-industrial, pre-capitalist societies there was often neither functional unity nor exploitative dominance. Instead Helms conceptualises the wider political system as an overlapping of several essentially separate and distinct cosmological realms in which each acquisitional polity or superordinate center basically regards its outside protagonists as either helpful or threatening cosmological elements.\textsuperscript{13} In both cases, small-scale societies can be conceptualised as operating in a layered regional environment in which different kinds of regional and local relations and interests intersect and overlap. Small-scale centres functioned in an environment that was not solely determined by their subordination to an external, larger centre. This has historiographical consequences for understanding the manner in which external centres expanded into their peripheries.

Barbara Watson Andaya and others have pointed to the polycentric nature of Southeast Asian polities that were characterised by cyclical patterns; political cycling took place not only at the level of individual polities, but also in ‘spheres of influence’ associated with larger regional centres. Such spheres of influence consisted of many smaller polities with varying degrees of integration and dependency, but in each case with

\textsuperscript{12} ibid. p. 113.

\textsuperscript{13} Mary W. Helms, \emph{Craft and the Kingly Ideal}, University of Texas Press, Austin 1993, p. 205.
a high degree of autonomy. Tambiah’s notion of a galactic polity applies to the level of regional competition as well. It captures the weak overarching structure that nevertheless encompasses long distances, as well as the dynamism and relentless competition between regional centres that occurred in the eastern archipelago before the expansion of the colonial state in the second half of the nineteenth century.

If small-scale polities in the peripheries of larger centres were not fully controlled by these larger centres, the pattern and role of external influences and external trade also needs to be reconsidered, with greater attention focussed on the way in which different levels of political and economic organisation intersected and influenced each other. One way of conceptualising small-scale polities is to emphasise their agency in the wider political system. Mary Helms focuses on the way in which small-scale polities adapted, or rather, ‘acquired’ outside influence in relation to external trade. She refers to small-scale polities as ‘acquisitional polities’ because of their active role in selecting and adapting outside influences to strengthen the position of local elites. Cross-cultural and external trade is placed in the wider context of the adaptation of foreign influences such as rank titles, clothing, customs, rituals and even language. Helms emphasises the significance of local interests when adapting such outside influences. She places long distance trade, which has been more the domain of historians and economists, in the context of indigenous cosmologies that gave trade objects their specific meaning in local societies. In her view remote and powerful centres from where imported prestige objects originated had a near celestial quality, and in the local world view were associated with ancestral sources of power, thus collapsing the realms of local ancestral power with that of remote,


16 Mary W. Helms, Crafts and the Kingly Ideal: Art, Trade and Power, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1993.
and supernaturally charged political centres. Objects that originated from such powerful places were therefore also imbued with this power. The elites who mustered and controlled the influx of these goods were not just economic brokers who monopolised wealth to secure their interest, but were also powerful because they were also seen to have access to these exogenous sources of supernatural power, which they could manipulate to serve their own interests.

Similarly, Junker argues that not only were cultural and religious influences shaped by local patterns, but that the economic impact of foreign trade was shaped by the pre-existing stratification of indigenous societies at the beginning of the second millennium A.D. 17 The reason why trade could have such an impact on pre-hispanic chiefdoms in the Philippines island world was that of the internal mechanisms that created a need for foreign prestige goods and could administer foreign trade were already in place. Foreign goods were grafted on to already existing patterns of exchange and competition. Competition for status between members of the elite and between polities was the basic mechanism in the political dynamics of small-scale polities. Foreign elements such as prestige goods, new religions concepts and rituals played an important role because they enhanced the status of the chiefly centre and elites. Imported goods were valuable political currency because of the traditional role of gift-giving in cementing both vertical and horizontal alliances. An important example in the Sulawesi context is that of cotton cloth. Schrauwers and Kotilainan both emphasise its ritual importance in the interior of pre-colonial Central Sulawesi, where it was not used to wear, but rather kept as part of the inheritance of corporate kin-groups for bride-price payments and considered to be

spiritually powerful. The more ritual wealth accumulated, the higher the bride-price such a group could pay, and the more prestigious alliances they could form. In the middle of the nineteenth century, cotton cloth was produced in Tobungku and exchanged for inland produce such wax. Coastal elites themselves imported cloth, thus establishing a hierarchy of types of cloth: a tree of cloth with the most beautiful cloth in the highest branches and the plainest cloth at the bottom.

An important aspect of competition at all levels of political organisation was violence. The competition and often violent conflict inherent in such polities led Michael Adas to propose the term ‘contest state’. Such states were characterised by a ‘constant struggle between the ruler and the nobility, between factions of the elites at various levels’. In this study, it is not just the level of the polity that was dominated by these dynamics, but the regional system in which east coast polities were situated as well. A regional system in which competition, violent conflict, trade, and diplomatic exchanges were taking place simultaneously between regional centres, between neighbouring small-scale centres, and within both regional and small-scale polities, best approximates the situation of polities in eastern Sulawesi. In the period between 1680-1905 eastern Sulawesi was located between the Sultanate of Ternate to the east and the kingdom of Bone to the west, each of which sent traders, settlers and ambitious chiefs into their periphery, where they met on the shores of eastern Sulawesi. At the same time, conflict between various polities and within polities was an ongoing process, further complicating regional rivalries.

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Thus far, the focus on small-scale societies in Indonesia and how they relate to the wider regional, national and global context has been largely the domain of anthropologists. Anthropological studies of often remote ethnic groups within Central and South Sulawesi point consistently to the importance of historic relations in the contemporary outlook and construction of identities. In these ethnographic studies, the ‘out-of-the-way’ societies are not cast in a passive or submissive role, but rather they are portrayed as active agents in shaping relations with the historical polities or the colonial and Indonesian state.\(^{21}\) Schrauwers’ study of the ToPomona in Central Sulawesi reconstructs the wider political system of relations with coastal centres starting from the last quarter of the nineteenth century.\(^{22}\) Atkinson’s ethnography of the upland Wana (eastern arm of Sulawesi), which focuses on the political role of shamanism and healing ceremonies also places their contemporary position in the Indonesian state in the historical context of how Wana chiefs were integrated into the coastal polity of Tobungku in the latter part of the nineteenth century. A similarly marginalised group that falls outside of the mainstream of Indonesian society are the tomapparundo communities in the Mandar highlands, studied by George.\(^{23}\) The tomapparundo had so far resisted both Islam and Christianity, and constructed their identity around a modified version of a headhunting ritual in which historic relations with the lowland Mandar people played an important role. Nourse’s ethnography of the Lauje (north Sulawesi) bear a strong similarity to George’s work, in that it focuses on an important communal ritual with

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21 For a discussion of ethnographies of Sulawesi see chapter 2.


particular reference to historical coast-inland political relations. In the different renditions of this ritual, relations with outsiders who had become politically dominant, were cast as desirable or dangerous, depending on the position of the various actors in contemporary Lauje society. Acciaioli’s study, also situated in a remote part of Sulawesi, the shores of the inland Lake Lindu, focuses on a Bugis migrant community who settled on this ‘new frontier’, a process that can he traces back several centuries. Here too, the Bugis soon dominated the local economy as well as reshape mythical geography of the area.

Historical studies have tended to focus on large regional centres, because of their obvious importance and because of the greater availability of sources. However, these studies consistently point to the importance of small-scale political units of which these larger formations were constituted. In his study of Sulu, Warren proposes the notion of a zone, to capture the complex network of relations that emanate from the centre to Sulu’s periphery and beyond. For South Sulawesi, the studies of Leonard Andaya and Willem IJzereef highlight the bewildering complexity of Bone, while Andaya’s study of Maluku analyses not only Ternate and relations with its periphery that included eastern Sulawesi, but also the rivalry and tension that underlay relations with the other main Malukan sultanate of Tidore. These studies of South Sulawesi and Maluku demonstrate how large, more centralised polities such as Bone and Ternate, consisted of a patchwork of


small-scale societies linked together through intricate webs of alliance and kinship connections.

That is not to say that historians have solely limited themselves to major economic and political centres. The result of the combined perspectives and approaches discussed above, as well as a keen awareness of the need for greater knowledge of local histories moved marginal small-scale societies to the centre of historical inquiry. In Sulawesi, the detailed historical studies of Terry Bigalke, Mieke Schouten, Christiaan Heersink, David Henley and Pim Schoorl have filled major gaps, bringing a variety of small-scale societies into sharp focus. The social history of the upland, Christianised Toraja by Terry Bigalke relates developments in the Toraja highlands from the last decades of the nineteenth century, emphasising the themes of internal rivalry and conflict and relations with the lowland area of Luwu that retained an important role into the post-independence period.28 Schouten’s study of Minahasa, north Sulawesi, demonstrates the importance and continuity of local level leadership in a relatively egalitarian society from the colonial period into the late twentieth century.29 The dominant position of the VOC and the colonial state shaped the way in which local factions competed for power and wealth. Christianity and a wide acceptance of the Dutch language created a special relationship between the Minahassans and the coloniser. Henley’s study adds yet another dimension by documenting the transformation of a fragmented tribal society into a unified regional identity of Minahasa within the context of the colonial state.30 Of greater relevance to my

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own study is his second work that examines the environmental conditions and
demographic developments that shaped societies in north and central Sulawesi, including
the northern part of the east coast.\textsuperscript{31} Despite the contrasts with Minahasa, familiar themes
emerge in Heersink’s history of the small coconut island of Selayar, with its Islamic and
maritime orientation. Internal competition for power and trade, as well as co-operation
with and submission to external forces shaped Selayar’s history. Selayar was situated in
the wider, regional political arena influenced by both Bone and the Dutch, and
increasingly, by colonial penetration.\textsuperscript{32} Finally, Schoorl’s work on Buton, so far the only
historical analysis of an east coast polity, presents a richly textured portrait of the internal
relations and the way in which the elite mediated the introduction of Islam, refracting and
impacting it in such a way that it became an instrument of elite power.\textsuperscript{33} In all these
studies, the theme of how internal rivalry shaped relations with external powers is
remarkably consistent, whether it be tributary overlords of such as Bone and Luwu or the
colonial government and the Indonesian nation-state. It is then no surprise that the same
themes feature prominently in my own study of a coastline that was situated at the margin
of two regional spheres of influence.

As the majority of the archipelago consisted of small-scale polities and societies,
developing a better understanding of the dynamic of historical processes at this scale will
contribute to a better comprehension of the wider developments of history in the
Southeast Asian region. This study of the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi
highlights both local and regional relations, and presents a ‘peripheral’ perspective on


how larger centres expanded, intervened and maintained relations with their peripheries. At the same time, by focussing on the east coast, Bone, Ternate and the colonial state become more distant peripheries of eastern Sulawesi and their official representatives important but not always dominant economic and political protagonists in a local context.

**Themes**

The main geographical focus of this study is the polities of Banggai, Tobungku and to a lesser degree Buton, during the two centuries preceding their integration into the Dutch colonial state in 1905. Three levels of political analysis flow into each other; the dynamics within chiefdoms, relations between chiefdoms and finally, the relations with external centres on the other from the late sixteenth century to the late nineteenth century. Consequently, this study is divided into three parts. The first section (chapters 1 and 2) deals with the main actors at the local level, leaders and their sources of power, and the polycentric polities of eastern Sulawesi and their orientation towards outside centres. The second section (chapters 3 and 4) deals with the period 1680-1830 and focuses on tributary relations, conflict, and the complex interplay between regional diasporas and local polities. The third section (chapters 5, 6 and 7) deals with the same themes in the years 1830-1880, a period when the advent of colonial expansion into eastern Sulawesi that challenged Bone’s dominance and affected raiding groups and their allies. The expeditions against Banggai and Tobungku in the 1840s were part of a more general colonial ‘crusade’ against maritime raiding in the archipelago that started to take effect in this period. Despite the greater role of the colonial state, there were unmistakable parallels with events and conflicts from the period preceding 1780. The ‘rebellions’ on the east coast in the 1840s and the way they were crushed by Dutch and Ternaten forces, conformed to the patterns of indigenous polities, but were at the same time part of a concerted reaction against the expanding colonial state. The final chapter deals with the
last two decades of the nineteenth century. In these years, it becomes evident that certain basic patterns of the regional political and economic system had been transformed as a result of increased Dutch maritime power, the suppression of piracy and rapid economic changes.

**Small-scale Polities in a Changing Regional Context**

For want of a better term I use the neutral term ‘polity’ to refer to Banggai, Tobungku and Buton, often preceded by the qualification of ‘small-scale’. I prefer to avoid terms such as ‘kingdom’ and ‘state’ because they conjure up too great a degree of institutionalisation. ‘Chiefdom is possibly the most appropriate term, but I use it sparingly, as it has the connotation of being remote, isolated and ancient, when the polities of eastern Sulawesi were historically no more isolated or remote than areas such as Ternate and Bone. Further, the term chief as I use it in this study can refer to any leader, also those with no formal title or rank. I also use the terms ‘aristocrat’ and ‘noble’ when it is known that the person involved was a member of the local aristocracy. ‘Ruler’ refers to what the Dutch called ‘vorst’, ‘koning’ or ‘raja’, even if it is not always certain that the local population acknowledged him as such.

Before situating these polities in a regional context, I initially attempt to reconstruct their internal dynamics. Wolters and others have focussed attention on the importance of leaders as historical actors whose personalised relations with their peers and followers constituted the fabric of political life.34 The salience of the theme of local leadership in the historical studies mentioned above only further underlines the importance of this level of politics. Chiefdoms were loosely integrated structures made up of clusters of alliances, in which leaders both competed against and co-operated with each other. They formed fluid

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hierarchies and webs of relations based on kinship and exchange. Polities were more than a cluster of local alliance groups. These ‘webs’ of communication and influence extended far beyond the local polity to regional centres and global trading networks. Both small- and large-scale polities were modular in nature. This means that they consisted of smaller units of social organisation that could slot into different political, economic and social formations, and, conversely ‘modules’ from elsewhere could be incorporated into existing structures with relative ease through alliances. Thus, an eastern Sulawesi polity was a political formation where local and regional alliances converged. I distinguish four categories of relations. First, relations between local chiefs who each had their own constituency and formed the core of the polity. Second, relations between these local chiefs and their external allies, often groups from elsewhere that had settled in the area or were itinerant. The place of origin of these outside groups varied from one period to another, with those from South Sulawesi, particularly Bugis, playing an important role in trade and local politics throughout the period under consideration in this study. Third, relations between east coast polities that were dominated by local trade and competition, and could easily become hostile. Finally, there were the formal tributary relations between local centres and regional centres such as Bone, Ternate and the VOC. At all levels, the relations varied in intensity and in form from formalised and ritualised tributary relations to intermittent contact in times of conflict. Buton, Tobungku and Banggai/Mendono exhibited the full range of relationships during the greater part of the period dealt with in this study.

The distinctions between these different types of political and economic relations is necessarily somewhat artificial. For example, were groups of Bugis in eastern Sulawesi a
local ally or did they represent the powerful Bugis kingdom of Bone? It is precisely through such ambiguities that regional spheres of influence were created and maintained. Relations with external centres were often upheld by itinerant groups or local migrant chiefs and traders originating from external centres. It is, however, not always clear to what degree such ‘local’ representatives followed their own agenda or acted on behalf of the centre they claimed to represent. In Konawe for instance, the inland chiefdom in the hinterland of Kendari, relations with external centres and traders were traditionally mediated by coastal Bugis who intermarried with the local elite. This arrangement was complicated by the arrival of new migrants, particularly in the nineteenth century, who were not acculturated to the local societies and were more firmly oriented towards Bone.

Ambiguity also occurred with respect to ‘internal’ relations and relations between polities. In the course of this study several examples of conflict on the east coast will be discussed where this distinction is not always clear. Should Mendono be counted as a separate polity in the late seventeenth century, or as a tributary of Banggai? Was Muna, as contemporary Munanese claim, ‘Buton’s younger sibling’ or was it Buton’s tributary? A solid record of violent conflict between the two polities leaves the matter open to interpretation until the colonial state decided in favour of Buton. But this is primarily a problem of perspective. In the view of local tributaries such as Batui and Mendono, autonomy and the act of paying tribute were not mutually exclusive as political centres rarely impinged on the internal affairs of their ‘tributaries’. The major themes of the interconnection of local leadership and small-scale polities appear throughout this study, but receive most attention in the first two chapters.
**Diasporas and Polities: A Culture of Mobility**

Reid states that ‘[t]he movement of people, along with the movement of goods and ideas was the leitmotiv of the age of commerce’. The mobility of individuals and groups created the fluidity of political formations in maritime Southeast Asia and was a fundamental characteristic of pre-colonial political dynamics. It shaped the way in which power was exerted and political expansion could take place. At the local level, shifting settlements placed limits on the power of leaders. At the regional level, mobility underlay the web-like diasporas and lines of communication that created a dynamic but weakly controlled sphere of cultural, economic and political influence.

The importance of out-migration and diasporic communities has been recognised in the history of South Sulawesi. In his comparison of Makassarese and Bugis diasporas, Andaya traces the dramatic developments after the turmoil and upheaval in South Sulawesi in the second half of the seventeenth century. These diasporas are seen largely as destabilising factors, upsetting the social and political equilibrium in their host societies. While still awaiting Anderson’s historical study of the genesis of the Wajo diaspora, I can only go by the work of the anthropologists Acciaioli and Lineton, who studied Bugis societies in the late twentieth century. Their focus is the ongoing process of out-migration from South Sulawesi, which indeed was intensified during periods of political upheaval or economic crisis. Already established diaspora communities facilitated this process of continuing migration. In the case of Wajo, a Bugis realm to the north of Bone, the diaspora also can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Lineton shows the continuing connections between Wajo communities in diaspora and the Wajo homelands. Acciaioli has documented the process of chain-migration from South

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Sulawesi to the inland area of Lake Lindu in Central Sulawesi, and also traced the presence of Bugis in the Palu area back to the seventeenth century.

In this study of eastern Sulawesi, diasporas are conceived of as an ongoing social-historical process that shaped political, cultural and economic spheres of influence beyond the heartland of a polity; where subjects of that centre were economically and politically active; where the centre holds great prestige and might intervene either on behalf of its subjects’ or its own interests. This is particularly the case in eastern Sulawesi, which was connected to the outside world primarily though diasporas of individuals and groups, some sojourners, others who stayed. The presence of these groups had important economic and political implications for the societies of the east coast. The ‘modular’ nature of polities meant that groups from elsewhere could easily be incorporated as allies. The activities of these diasporic groups ranged from trading to raiding with a some degree overlap between the two, and was often driven by political ambition as well. Rather than large concentrations of people, powerful and influential centres, the regional arena was characterised by far-reaching but dispersed networks that reached across long distances, linking many smaller communities together into a wider world, thus creating pathways for migration, trade and political developments. Even though such centres played an important role in fashioning and integrating such networks, and could employ them to their own advantage, they did not necessarily control them effectively. Smaller scale social and political groupings that were connected in this manner still maintained their own discrete identities, while outside individuals and diasporic groups were integrated and took on new roles within a local context.

Nobles from Ternate, Makassar, Mandar and Bone appeared on the shores of eastern Sulawesi with their followings to wage war, collect tribute, and trade, often settling and marrying local women. Conversely, individuals from eastern Sulawesi were active in
areas far beyond their homelands, such as Ternate, either as followers of Ternaten nobles or taking on prestigious positions themselves. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Butonese nobles were notorious for collecting tribute from Butonese who had moved to Maluku, threatening to trouble relatives who remained behind in Buton if their demands were not met.\footnote{Koloniaal Verslag 1877, p. 25.} Relations with remote but powerful polities, whose presence was felt mainly during wars and in the context of trade, were mediated by mobile leader-follower groups, some of whom settled on the east coast of Sulawesi. Relations with external centres were an important means for local elites to enhance their position vis-à-vis other groups in the polity and vis-à-vis the elites of neighbouring polities. The historical-political pattern of involving (opposed) external parties in local conflicts remained common at least up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

In the late eighteenth century, existing patterns of diaspora and mobility that linked eastern Sulawesi to the rest of the archipelago were intensified because of increased trading and maritime raiding. The most visible factor across the archipelago was the expansion of the maritime raiding networks of Sulu-based groups. Less visible was the expansion of more localised raiding networks. In the case of the eastern archipelago this was closely linked to the war between the Tidorese prince Nuku and the VOC in the last decades of the eighteenth century, which displaced thousands of his followers in Maluku. They took up a wandering existence, forming temporary settlements, while continuing to wage war on their enemies. Some settled on the east coast of Sulawesi, others on small islands near Flores. The diaspora of the notorious, but small-scale, raiding groups of Tobelo and Galela dates from this period, and resulted in new communities that survived up to the middle of the nineteenth century, when anti-piracy measures curtailed their way of life. Slave-raiding, in itself a form of migration, though not voluntary, was an
important driving force behind the expansion of maritime raiding. Though a clear
distinction between trading and raiding groups is somewhat artificial, it does appear that
the Bugis networks were more focussed on trading than on raiding. In this period the
Bugis trading network, which had included the east coast of Sulawesi since the end of the
seventeenth century, expanded under the auspices of the powerful Bugis state of Bone.
New waves of Bugis migrants settled in the Gulf of Tomini and on the east coast of
Sulawesi, with the Togian Islands becoming the principal Bugis trading settlement by the
end of the eighteenth century. These patterns are visible at all social and political levels in
the period between 1600 and 1880.

At a different level, the relative mobility of settlements was also an important factor in
shaping responses to threats of attack, disease and environmental pressures. Settlements
were temporarily abandoned in the face of attacks or moved to a new, more secure
location away from the coast. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century,
surprised VOC officials found on three occasions that the settlement of Banggai had been
abandoned or moved to the mainland because of continuous attacks on the island. By
1830 many small islands had been abandoned, and the east coast appeared largely
depopulated from aboard a ship. After the unsuccessful resistance against Ternate and the
Dutch in the 1840s, the latter imposed relocation of settlements to prevent well-
fortified sites from being used in the future. Epidemics were another reason for abandoning
settlements. Among shifting cultivators, such as the Tolaki, settlements were routinely
moved, but also abandoned after the death of even one person. When encouraged to form

40 Mobility was an important weapon of populations against violence and unwanted domination. In reaction to threats of attacks from Tobungku, the sangaji of
Mondono said in 1700 that ‘neither his ancestors nor he himself had ever been tributary to the king of Tobungku, that he would never want to be that, and that if
attacked by Tobungku he would choose the forest’. VOC 1647 Ternate f. 137.

41 In 1687 a Dutch and Ternate delegation visited Banggai reported the following: ‘On Sunday the sixth we landed at the Fort de Chijn [Kota Jin, Banggai],
where previously the king’s settlement had been, but we did not find a single person, except for two perahu that approached us and informed us that the jugguns
a coastal settlement in the 1820s, the Tolaki ruler Tebau stated that his subjects were reluctance to live close together for fear of disease. This proved only to be too true; in 1840 a smallpox epidemic killed Tebau and many of his subjects, causing this small coastal settlement to be completely abandoned.42 The role of regional diasporas in eastern Sulawesi forms the background of all chapters in this study, but receives most attention in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

**Conflict, Warfare and Raiding**
For Dutch observers who had little knowledge of eastern Sulawesi, warfare and violent conflict were the most visible aspects of the character of these societies, especially if external parties were involved. For this reason conflict was probably over-represented in historical sources compared to other aspects of the nature of local societies. Nevertheless, warfare and maritime raiding played an important part of the political dynamics of small-scale polities until the end of the nineteenth century, when eastern Sulawesi was incorporated into the colonial state. The role of conflict and warfare was closely linked to the way in which both small- and large-scale polities functioned. In societies where territorial conquest was not productive, capturing both people and resources was a more efficient way of building up power and competing with rivals. As mentioned above, Junker traces the emergence of raiding in the pre-hispanic Philippines back to approximately 1000-1300, and argues that it is closely linked to the increase in foreign trade, particularly with China, and that raiding was one of the important strategies employed by chiefs to undermine their competitors.43 The link between raiding and

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42 Vosmaer’s trading post in Kendari Bay had already started to decline after his death in 1836, but the settlement was not fully abandoned during the smallpox epidemic of 1840 which killed Tebau as well as many others. See chapter 5. ANRI Besluit 31/3 1837 No. 3, p. 14.

trading does occur in Banggai and Tobungku at the level of the polity certain times in their history (see chapter 2), but is also part of the regional dynamics of tributary relations.

In the late seventeenth century, when the VOC was trying to get a foothold in eastern Sulawesi, it responded to such local conflict with attempts to mediate, as it wanted to stop any disruption to local trade. This strategy did not lead to any clear political advantage for the VOC and was largely unsuccessful. In the nineteenth century maritime raiding and warfare continued to be a thorn in the side of the colonial state. Increasingly it was, conveniently from a colonial standpoint, viewed as a sign of decadence and deterioration and became one of the major justifications for intervention in the second half of the nineteenth century. After 1850, the Dutch expanded their influence over the seas, and after several decades of campaigns virtually wiped out maritime raiding and warfare.

There were two kinds of violent conflict and raiding that affected the east coast of Sulawesi. The first entailed conflict between actors on the east coast or nearby areas, but even such localised conflict within polities could have a regional dimension. Local conflict within or between polities often involved external allies from regional centres. The amount of information on this type of localised conflict is relatively sparse, though it probably was common. The second type was regional warfare associated with major shifts of regional power that spilled over into eastern Sulawesi, especially because of its location between Maluku and South Sulawesi. In the period covered by this study, there were three major episodes in which such power-shifts associated with regional warfare occurred, first, the wars against Makassar and its demise in 1669; second, the Nuku war in Maluku and the expansion of raiding networks that incorporated eastern Sulawesi between ca. 1780 and 1820; and, finally, the expansion of Dutch influence at the expense of Bone and raiding networks from ca. 1840 to 1880.
The reason why the Dutch reporting on Banggai and to a lesser extent Tobungku becomes more elaborate is precisely because of their involvement in regional conflict, notably the Ternaten rebellion against the VOC in the late 1670s. What became clear through the onset of these closer ties with the east coast was that local networks were still in the process of reorientation and renegotiation, a process that continued for many years after the defeat of Makassar in 1669. The killing of the ruler of Banggai and his entire entourage in 1678 by Ternatens, supposedly because of his continuing involvement with Makassarese traders, is but one example. That is not to say that local conflict could be reduced to a mere appendage of regional warfare. The pattern of implicating external allies in local conflict made it possible for the VOC to get involved, only to find that their mediation rarely led to long-lasting peace.

In the second major episode of regional conflict from ca. 1780 to 1820 reporting on eastern Sulawesi became much sparser because of the withdrawal of the VOC and the increased power of indigenous raiding and trading networks. In the late eighteenth century already existing patterns of raiding took on a new dimension in eastern Sulawesi as the slave-trade provided the labour needed to produce for the export market. Local raiding groups were drawn into regional raiding networks and regional raiding groups create alliances with localised communities. The little surviving evidence suggests that the pattern of local conflict drawing upon the assistance of external allies appears to have continued into this period.

Regional conflict and local warfare are important themes in the second and third sections. The second section deals with the interconnected regional and local conflict and warfare in the periods of 1680-1780 (chapter 3) and 1780-1830 (chapter 4). Despite the contrast between the two periods, there were also continuities: raiding remained an

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44 VOC 1345 f. 214, 215.
integral part of the political system at both the regional and local levels. In the third section (1830-1880) the focus shifts to the early encounters between the colonial state, indigenous polities and raiders in eastern Sulawesi. Suppressing ‘rebellions’ and maritime raiding became an important focus of the colonial state in the first stages of expansion into eastern Sulawesi, and eventually resulted in undermining the regional political system.

**Dutch Intervention and Expansion: the Struggle against Mobility and Raiding**

Starting from the middle of the nineteenth century the parameters of local conflict were increasingly determined by the gradual expansion of the colonial state into the eastern archipelago, and the competition between the colonial state and the Bugis state of Bone. In this period Dutch expansion in eastern Sulawesi took place indirectly through the Ternaten sultanate. It therefore operated largely through indigenous modes of conducting tributary relations and warfare. The response in Banggai and Tobungku was a number of rebellions against Ternaten elites, each using Bugis allies. One diaspora was pit against the other in an area that was peripheral to both Ternate and Bone. The use of these external allies was not new, but the conflict took on a different character as it was part of a wider, ongoing struggle between Bone and the Dutch. Dutch campaigns against what they defined as ‘piracy’ were possibly even more consequential for local alliance patterns. Raiding diasporas that had traditionally played an important role in local politics as military allies came under direct attack. Destroying or reversing diasporas was therefore closely linked to local conflict and autonomy.

In the earlier centuries preceding the introduction of Dutch rule in eastern Sulawesi in 1905 the Dutch presence was felt only through occasional intervention, usually through their ally Ternate. In this period the Dutch were by no means a dominant force in eastern Sulawesi, or even in neighbouring South Sulawesi. The first episode of Dutch
involvement with part of the east coast was in the last decades of the seventeenth century, and then again during the nineteenth century as the colonial state started to expand its influence. This last theme of Dutch intervention and expansion is closely inter-linked with the previous three. First, with regard to the conceptualisation of indigenous polities and politics, the Dutch tried to refashion the political reality of the archipelago according to their own ideas about statecraft and state-formation. The flexibility and diasporic nature of indigenous political relations clashed with the VOC’s more static notion of centrally managed tributary systems with clearly demarcated spheres of influence in which the ‘overlord’ was involved in the affairs of its tributaries and maintained peace between them. A major problem arose from the Dutch point of view after the Treaty of Bungaya in 1669 in which Banggai and Tobungku were allocated to Ternate, but were in fact rapidly incorporated into Bugis political and economic networks. Lack of effective means to patrol the east coast or curb Bone’s influence meant that the VOC was unable to change this situation. The disputed nature of the regional allegiances of eastern Sulawesi reappeared in a different context in the nineteenth century, when Ternate became a vehicle for colonial expansion and the eradication of piracy on a local scale. The claims over the east coast that Makassar had renounced in 1669 emerged once again in the middle of the nineteenth century when the Dutch found that, contrary to colonial law, Bone’s sphere of influence and Bugis activities extended to eastern Sulawesi. In the military campaign in the 1840s, the Dutch and Ternatens were pitted against local elites supported by Bugis in Banggai and Tobungku. In this period, even though the Dutch started to alter the balance of power, the basic dynamics of polities and tributary relationships did not change. Ternate benefited from the Dutch presence, while regional raiding networks and Bone were attacked and went into decline. The second Bone-Dutch war of 1859-60 forced Bone to surrender some of its autonomy and relinquish its claims
to eastern Sulawesi. This satisfied the Dutch for the time being, as it removed this apparent threat from the still fragile but expanding sphere of influence of the colonial state.

Mobility and warfare and raiding, both central to the political dynamics of the region, were precisely the political and economic aspects that the Dutch tried to regulate or change through intervention. Despite the differences between the VOC (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and the developing colonial state (nineteenth century), the actions of the Dutch were often aimed at stopping raiding and reducing or at least regulating mobility. Raiding and warfare were seen as dangerous, disruptive activities that needed to be eliminated in order to create an environment that would allow trade (and the colonial administration) to prosper. Mobility needed to be regulated and divorced from the political sphere, so that polities and individual chiefs could not expand their influence ‘illegitimately’ through diasporic networks.

Ironically, Dutch intervention directed controlling and containing raiding diasporas, caused yet another wave of mobility. Raiding groups dispersed and moved to areas less patrolled by the colonial state. In the 1840s Tobelo groups migrated from the Lesser Sunda’s where they had hosted Magindanao45 raiding groups to Ternate’s tributaries on the east coast of Sulawesi in order to be guaranteed safety from attacks by Dutch warships. There they were quickly incorporated into the local political structure as raiding groups. After the major Sulu and Maluku based raiding groups in the archipelago had been sufficiently weakened, the focus of the colonial state shifted to more localised

45 The raiders known by their allies and victims in Sulawesi as Magindanao were known in the Sulu sultanate as Iranun, a name which refers to their place of origin in the highlands of Mindanao, also located in the southern Philippines. J.F. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1981, pp. 160-171. See also chapters four and six of this study.
groups such as the Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi. By 1880, the Tobelo and related groups in eastern Sulawesi had either been eliminated or relocated to Maluku.

Only at the end of the nineteenth century, did the colonial state begin to effectively change patterns of mobility and raiding. While in Dutch eyes eastern Sulawesi was still an untamed frontier, the end of the nineteenth century saw the first steps towards incorporation into an archipelago-wide bureaucracy. Vaccinations, building coal depots and the first mention of head-taxes were a prelude to what was to follow in the early twentieth century. While migration continued to play an important role at the social and economic level, the political dimension of population mobility, namely diasporic polities, declined. Butonese nobles for instance were no longer allowed to collect tribute from their subjects who had migrated to Maluku. The role and position of violence changed under pressure of the colonial state, which forbade the slave-trade, raiding and warfare. While economically still profitable, raiding could not continue as a viable political strategy under the closer supervision of the colonial state. With new economic opportunities opening up at the same time in commodity production and mineral and resource exploitation, this necessarily affected the way in which polities operated. Dutch intervention did not become a major issue until the era covered in the third section (1830-1880), when colonial expansion is one of the factors that undermined the indigenous political system. Before the introduction of direct rule in the early twentieth century, the maritime world in which eastern Sulawesi was situated had already undergone a fundamental transformation.

**Historical Sources on Eastern Sulawesi**

*Periodisation and European Sources*

The questions addressed in this study arose from my earlier study of the Kendari area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in which the Bugis and Bone played an
important but difficult to define role. The thesis concept was developed to gain a better understanding of both local dynamics and regional relations by expanding my original area of study to a number of neighbouring small-scale polities and their relations with external centres. The nineteenth century Dutch material on eastern Sulawesi contained many references to the tripang trade and slave-raiding. Considering the fact that both slave-raiding and the tripang trade increased in importance in the late eighteenth century, this seemed a logical place to start a historical study of eastern Sulawesi. Once in the archives, however, it soon became apparent that information on eastern Sulawesi for the late eighteenth century was minimal, because the VOC was in decline, and rarely reported on areas more peripheral to their interests such as eastern Sulawesi. In striking contrast, sources on Tobungku and Banggai in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were surprisingly abundant. These documents addressed the themes of local conflict and relations with Ternate and Bone and that had striking parallels to events on the east coast in the 1840s. From perusing these sources there seemed to be a continuity in the political and economic dynamics between the east coast and external centres over a longer period of time that was worth investigating. I decided therefore to include this earlier period and material, even if it could not wholly compensate for the relative lack of sources in the period 1780-1830. As a result, the image of the pre-colonial period, meaning the period before the colonial state incorporated eastern Sulawesi in 1905, has become far more complex and varied than if the study had been limited to the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century was a period of increasing colonial intervention in which traditional political and economic patterns from preceding periods continued to operate and inhibit the actions of the colonial state. My study ends when traditional patterns of mobility and warfare and the regional political system in which they operated were transformed by global economic changes and the penetration of the colonial state. The nearly four
decades of direct colonial rule, which would form the natural sequel to the thesis I have presented here, will now become the subject of a subsequent study.

This ethno-historical study is based primarily on two sets of source material. In the earlier period, the bulk of the sources is concentrated between 1680 and 1730, starting in the aftermath of the defeat of Makassar (1669) and the quelling of the rebellion of Ternate against the VOC (1680). In this period, the VOC hoped to establish a foothold in eastern Sulawesi mainly to partake in the lucrative trade in tortoise shell. The period 1680-1715, especially, yielded a number of detailed reports on local conflict in eastern Sulawesi that showed how local and regional interests were intertwined. The picture that emerges from the VOC sources is that of a dynamic, fluid political landscape, a ‘periphery’ with many centres. The VOC did not succeed in its objective because far more effective Bugis trading networks that dominated external trade in Banggai and Tobungku had already been established. When it became clear that Dutch mediation did not lead to fewer conflicts and that Bugis traders from South Sulawesi had come to dominate the export trade, Dutch interest in Tobungku and Banggai declined. As a result, the direct coverage and amount of reports with information on eastern Sulawesi also decreased.

In the latter period (1780-1880) the bulk of the sources are concentrated in the decades between 1825 and 1860, with another peak in the volume of source material in the 1870s. The nineteenth century interest of the Dutch in eastern Sulawesi was the immediate consequence of attempts to expand the influence of the colonial state by suppressing maritime raiding and by curtailing the influence of the powerful indigenous state of Bone. Lack of logistical resources led to a form of indirect rule in which Ternate became the main instrument for Dutch expansion in the eastern archipelago. The increased interest in eastern Sulawesi stemmed from armed resistance against Ternate influence from local factions that were supported by Bugis, which in turn led to punitive
expeditions and the disruption of trade along the east coast in the 1840s. The fear of claims by rival European powers to uncharted, remote parts of the archipelago, also led to the first forays into the history of the Dutch presence in order to prove the legitimacy of Dutch claims on such areas.

The second set of sources revolve primarily around maritime raiding or ‘piracy’ and the Dutch campaigns to suppress it. Maritime raiding was a serious threat to trade and to the colonial state, and the current slave trade did not serve the same purpose for the Dutch as it had in the eighteenth century. As a result of anti-piracy campaigns elsewhere in the archipelago, raiding groups sought refuge in eastern Sulawesi as it was still relatively free of Dutch influence. Some Tobelo groups from near Flores relocated to Tobungku and Banggai, which were known Ternaten tributaries and would therefore provide them with immunity against Dutch warships. The information obtained from freed captives and captured raiders provides insight into response of these Tobelo groups as Dutch campaigns undermined regional raiding networks and left the Tobelo defenceless. Both sets of sources deal with periods in which transitional shifts at the regional level challenged local leadership, and because of the significant nature of these shifts more information was recorded and preserved.

Thus, the availability and location of historical sources, especially before 1905, is a direct reflection of relations with and intervention by external centres of power outside of Sulawesi rather than as a consequence of internal developments. The frequently heard statement in eastern Sulawesi that ‘there is no history here’ is to a certain extent true. All written, European sources are located elsewhere: Makassar, Jakarta, The Hague and Leiden. Even government publications on local history are rarely available in the provinces they were written about. In the Dutch archives, eastern Sulawesi does not appear as a separate heading or category. Its peripheral position in the Dutch colonial
administrative system means that reports on this coastline are tucked away in collections
and files on Ternate and South Sulawesi, or in the latter part of the nineteenth century
under the heading of ‘piracy’. The reason why Buton receives less attention, particularly
in the latter part of this study, is again a matter of sources, which in turn was a
consequence of the way the Dutch shaped the tributary structure in the eastern archipelago
in the nineteenth century. Tobungku and Banggai continued to be tributaries of Ternate
throughout the nineteenth century, while Bugis aristocrats and traders played an important
role as well. In contrast to its two northern neighbours, Buton had direct relations with the
Dutch and Bone, but in the nineteenth century was not a tributary of Ternate. While it was
affected regionally by the rising tension between Bone and the colonial state, there was
not the same clash at the local level between Bugis and Ternatens that had led to
rebellions and colonial intervention in Banggai and Tobungku in the 1840s.

The form and content of European sources on eastern Sulawesi naturally were shaped
in large measure by the particular interests and cultural backgrounds of the Europeans
who came from far-flung lands to the archipelago in search of spices. With Dutch centres
of administration located in Makassar and Ternate (and in Ambon in the nineteenth
century), it is not surprising that eastern Sulawesi was viewed primarily in relation to
Maluku or South Sulawesi. The reporting on indigenous polities, diasporas, mobility and
raiding was informed by a notion that states were defined by a demarcated territory
instead of the fluid situation found in the eastern Indonesian archipelago with respect to
the shape and dynamics of political formation. Movement beyond the perceived
boundaries of states was seen as an act of transgression or deviant behaviour that needed
to be rectified. As the nineteenth century wore on, the image of small-scale polities in the
Dutch sources changed, rather mirroring changes in the Dutch attitudes than actual
changes in the societies they observed. Rather than autonomous uncontrollable and
conflict-ridden polities at the VOC’s periphery, east coast polities were now seen as rebellious and their elites as corrupt and oppressive. These elites were also suspected of forging alliances with Bugis, acknowledging the overlordship of Bone, and of supporting and co-operating with maritime raiders. This high imperial view of indigenous societies justified the actions of an expanding colonial state that increasingly had the technology to dominate the seas and regulate the populations that move around in them.

**Local Sources: Adat and Sejarah**

Oral and written sources from eastern Sulawesi provide a local perspective on the eastern archipelago that balances and redresses the external perspective of European sources. Though these sources may not be quoted as frequently, they played an important role in my conceptualisation of the area and of the main themes of this study. Even if the reconstruction of local perspectives is far from comprehensive, local sources break down the monolithic view of east coast polities found in external records. The value of oral sources for the study of the pre-colonial period lies less in the actual content and more in their form and general themes. The most striking aspect of oral histories and traditions in the context of this study is their highly localised perspectives, which reflect the polycentric structure of local polities and the tenuous claims of centres over their tributaries. The often contradictory claims and antagonisms were placed within the recognised framework of the polity. Other centres within the polity either made claims to a privileged relationship with the centre, or, challenged the centre’s seniority and importance.

Another important aspect of local sources is that despite the divergence of perspectives and content compared to European sources, it is nevertheless obvious that
both types of sources originated in the same historical reality. Maritime raiding, warfare, the importance of leaders, mobility of populations, relations with outside powers such as Bone, Ternate and the Dutch feature prominently in both written and oral renditions of the local past. Just as European sources were influenced by the cultural and historical perceptions and era of the observers, so too were local sources shaped by the specific context in which they came into being. Many of the written texts were consciously constructed as historical texts, and were shaped both by contemporary local agenda’s as well as nationalist policies that prescribed themes and periodisation. Oral traditions and histories, on the other hand, were shaped more by local relations and antagonisms, but here, too, some informants presented local history as a legitimate but neglected part of national history.

Very few local sources survive from before the beginning of the twentieth century. The earliest sources that contain accounts of oral traditions are arguably not local, since they were compiled by colonial officials and missionaries, though they contained more local information than earlier accounts. In both cases the goal was to understand local societies in order to influence and control them. Colonial officials’ attitudes towards local elites was ambivalent if not negative, since they were seen as corrupt, addicted to opium, and given to slave trade and extortion. Missionaries were more positive, but shared many of the prejudices of colonial officials.

By the early twentieth century, several decades of increased contact with the outside world through trade in forest products had brought inland societies in closer contact

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46 A well-documented example of how local renditions of the past were influenced by conflicting contemporary concerns was documented by Jennifer Nourse among the Lauje people regarding the interpretation of the momosoro ritual performed to ensure communal health and well-being. Jennifer W. Nourse, *Conceiving Spirits, Birth Rituals and Contested Identities among Lauje of Indonesia*, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington and London, 1999.

47 The few pages of text in the Banggai language on raiding recorded in 1889 by Riedel is unusual. His goal was to document the language rather than history, but in the process he preserved a unique account of Banggai of a fisherman who was caught by Magindanao raiders, taken to Sulu and managed to escape and return to
with the outside world than ever before. The indigenous cosmologies and rituals of these societies were in this period already under pressure and starting to disappear. Warfare, headhunting and feasting were strongly discouraged by the colonial government, and by both Christian missionaries and Islamic teachers. The pressure of Islam, Christianity, exposure to an emergent global economy and the gradual influence of the colonial state introduced new infra-structures such as roads, education, healthcare, administrative structures and new economic opportunities. Consequently, new avenues to power and dependency opened as well. The processes that started then, continued throughout the twentieth century, precipitating far-reaching transformations of local societies. As a consequence, oral traditions that were closely tied to structures of power and a high degree of local autonomy, have become less and less relevant to the younger generation. Most younger people are not interested in listening to ‘stories about the past’ which they consider irrelevant, so that oral traditions are quickly disappearing. Traditional forms of knowledge and skills have had to compete with new forms of knowledge such as formal religion and education. Despite these pressures for change, knowledge of oral traditions still existed among the older generation in eastern Sulawesi in the 1990s.

Government interest in regional history starting from the 1970s led to a number of publication series on local culture and history, including the compilation of the *Sejarah Daerah*. Each volume is a collection of streamlined oral traditions on one province with a set periodisation and themes, culminating in the period of independence. This has been followed by a number of seminars on local history and culture in the 1990s and annual

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cultural festivals. The local history seminars in particular, brought out the differences between various local versions of oral history, causing emotions to run high on several occasions. In the 1990s, the contradictions between oral traditions that came to light were increasingly viewed as a sign as a sign of backwardness that needed to be remedied. Official renditions of local history are characterised by the same tendency to smooth over contradictions. I was pessimistic in thinking that such authoritative narratives, especially ones constructed and disseminated locally, would eventually erase the variety of perspectives, which mirrors the fundamental characteristics of the historical political landscape in eastern Sulawesi. However, with the changed political situation in Indonesia, this fear may prove to have been unfounded. Despite attempts to centralise and streamline local history, the polycentric structure of the small-scale polities in the past was still visible, and local understandings of history had not been entirely replaced by such official accounts.

Nevertheless, by the 1990s local notions of the past were influenced by the official categorisation of adat (customary law) versus sejarah (history), even if oral representations did not wholly conform to this division. When inquiring about local history a common response was, that I must want to know about adat-istiadat (local customs) or adat perkawinan (marriage customs). Adat-istiadat, customs or traditions, and particularly marriage customs have become the main focus of the imagined past. This can be partially attributed to government cultural policies whereby local cultures are

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49 The cultural festivals in the provinces were an extension of cultural performances held in Taman Mini, the theme park on Indonesian culture in Jakarta that was sponsored by Indonesia’s first lady Ibu Tien.

50 Besides government sponsored publications and seminars, there were amateur historians who collected oral traditions as well as Dutch publications on their respective areas. In each area there were also individuals, often former school teachers, who had committed to paper their recollections and those of older people they knew about the past so that it would not be forgotten.

51 This process was already occurring in 1994/95 in Banggai and Kendari, and would be the case in Bungku as well were it not so peripheral within the province of Central Sulawesi. At that time, local history was not very politicised, but this may have changed now that the grip of the state has loosened considerably and there is more space for alternative ways of representing the past that support local identities.
moulded to become local, but comparable, variations on a national theme.\textsuperscript{52} Adat along with local costumes, local architecture and local dances have become the standard way in which local culture, that subsumes the local past, is packaged for national consumption, thus shaping the character and content of oral sources for future historians.

However, the importance of marriage customs as a symbol for ‘ethnic’ history is not merely the outcome of government policies with nation-building high on the agenda. Weddings in contemporary Indonesian society are the most visible arena for the display of wealth and status, and for consolidating kinship alliances. In this sense, contemporary weddings represent the continued importance of kinship and alliances often sealed by marriage, which archaeologists and historians have pointed to as characteristic patterns in the past.\textsuperscript{53} In a broader sense, adat also refers to ancestral customs and sacred objects that represent ancestral power, particularly away from the larger towns. The ancestral past is a source of empowerment and moral guidance for the living, even if it is subject to criticism from both Islamic and Christian viewpoints. This spiritual and moral understanding of adat is far removed from western, including my own, notions of history, but in an indirect way has led to a better understanding of the historical importance of kinship relations and local notions of legitimacy. ‘Sejarah’, however, was closer to interests of this study.

Despite the decline of oral traditions and the sweeping changes that occurred in the twentieth century, there is much continuity between early colonial sources and more contemporary accounts of the local past. These local sources cover a wide range of oral and written texts from different periods. Written sources include official government publications based on oral sources as well as hand-written accounts from older people,

\textsuperscript{52} See: Greg Acciaioli, ‘Culture as Art: From Practice to Spectacle in Indonesia’, Canberra Anthropology 8, 1985, 148-172.

\textsuperscript{53} Tony Day argues that families, rather than institutions, should be a main focus when studying the political history of Southeast Asia, because of the importance of kinship ties and marriage alliances. Tony Day, ‘Ties that (Un)Bind: Families and States in Premodern Southeast Asia’, Journal of Asian Studies 55, 2 1996, pp. 384-409.
often schoolteachers, who have committed to paper what they felt should be remembered about the past by future generations. A distinction must be made here between oral traditions and oral history. The former constitute stories or myths that are widely known and have been passed down from one generation to another. There is a standard repertoire of topics that is addressed in these traditions, such as the origin (asal usul) of the polity, Islamisation (masuknya Islam), stories about local heroes and stories about raiding (perang Tobelo). The form in which they were recounted ranged from formal and sometimes ritualised interviews to fragments and truncated popular versions of oral traditions that could be told in any context, including casual conversation. These recollections were distinguished from what was usually referred to as cerita dulu-dulu, or ‘stories about the olden days’; older peoples’ recollections of their lives and family histories. According to local notions of what constitutes ‘history’, many of the sources I have collected and used would be considered inappropriate. Genealogies of non-aristocratic families and family histories, for instance, were not considered to be of significant value for historical research.

Origin myths and stories about the past were told from the perspective of the present in order to explain how things became the way they are in eastern Sulawesi. There was no pretension of giving a complete chronological overview of historical events. These tales are often interspersed with statements such as ‘and the descendants of this person still live here today’ or ‘that is why we have relations with that particular village or area up to the present day’. In the case of villages in the eastern arm of Sulawesi, the tales trace the movement from the point of origin, frequently a mountaintop, down to the coast. In Southeast Sulawesi, the same movement commences in South Sulawesi near Luwu and follows the course of the Konawe River towards the centre of the peninsula and then to the east coast. In genealogies, only those who had descendants are mentioned. A childless
sibling in an earlier generation was omitted, and so were families who moved away and with whom there were no relations. The focus is often one particular family or community that is traced back in time to its origin or to where it connects to other related families or kin groups.

In some cases, Islam or Christianity are reconciled with pre-conversion traditions so that while conversion was still considered as a break with the past there was also continuity since the new religions were pre-figured in their own tradition. Elders in Batui claim that before Islamic missionaries came, they already had Islam, though maybe not the complete version. In Tomori, the local historian was concerned with explaining why Christianity would have naturally appealed to Tomori people by searching for elements in traditional religion that resembled Christian teachings, emphasising continuity with the past rather than a radical break as missionaries presented it. This concern with connecting the old and the new, the local and the foreign was also evident in the way history was referred to in relation to myself. On many occasions, people tried to create a personal connection with me by speaking of a close link with a Dutch person in the past or by referring to stories about the Dutch or other Europeans in general in their history of the area. This reference to the past to create new connections again reflects back on how outsiders and newcomers may have been approached and accommodated in the past through searching for a common link, if possible in the past. This practice had not lost its validity completely. Tracing personal and political lines from eastern Sulawesi outward in all possible directions still seemed to be an important way of making sense of the world.

A rather different aspect of sejarah was that it was linked to power, legitimacy and the importance of sacred sites and objects, often perceived in supernatural terms but with

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54 The clearest example of this was a Bugis kiosk holder near Palu whom I met in 1991, and who insisted that he and I were blood relations. He based this on a Bugis manuscript that his father had, according to which the Chinese and Dutch were descendants of two elder brothers who left South Sulawesi in the remote past. When the Chinese and Dutch arrived in South Sulawesi, they were not visiting some foreign place, but they were coming home.
direct consequences in the ‘natural’ world of politics and economic gain. The loss of this power appeared to correspond with the increasing integration in the Indonesian state, in which Central and Southeast Sulawesi occupied marginal positions. This kind of sejarah was ‘charged’ with the power of ancestors and kingdoms of the past that could not be disclosed carelessly. It can be divided into public or ‘light’ knowledge and esoteric or ‘heavy’ knowledge. ‘Light’ knowledge was not restricted and could be picked up anywhere, during casual conversations in the street or on public transport, at weddings or in the market. ‘Heavy’ knowledge was not accessible to a researcher in my position, because it required a long period of apprenticeship, and, learning not only a local language but also an archaic version of it. Many older people had clear recollections of the Dutch official J. J. Dormeier collecting material for his *Banggaisch Adatrecht.* It had been impossible for them to tell him the truth about Banggai’s history because it was ‘sealed’ by oaths. Disclosure of this information would bring about disaster and illness (see below), and therefore his book was ‘full of lies’. Restrictions on esoteric and power-laden knowledge are not adhered to the same degree as in the past, so that the distinction between ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ knowledge have become somewhat blurred. Especially in areas where Christianity and Islam like Mori and Bungku have gained influence, these taboos were no longer operating to the same degree. In Mori, however, Dutch articles had replaced local knowledge as authoritative sources on the local past, precisely because Dutch missionaries had been so successful. Most of the oral traditions I have used consist of ‘light’ or ‘public’ knowledge on which there is no taboo or where the taboo is no longer operating.

Finally, the sacred power and stories of the past often are believed to reside in natural or man-made features of the landscape such as waterfalls, springs, rock formations and

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55 J. J. Dormeier; *Banggaisch Adatrecht,* 1947.
hills, for instance the waterfall of Simpong, or the spring above Nambo, as well as graves of important people from earlier times. The ‘power’ of such sacred sites was frequently said to have greatly diminished in the last thirty years, but they were nevertheless approached with some apprehension. When violated, the powers associated with these sites were believed to take revenge, also when the violation was caused by developers or government agencies. A frequently told story in Banggai was about a Javanese government official who once entered the sacred cave located above the settlement of Banggai. He was wearing his uniform, which was prohibited, and was instantly punished for this violation with instant madness. The frequent accidents that occurred during the building of the airstrip outside of Luwuk and the torrential rains during the opening ceremony were attributed to a vengeful guardian spirit that had not been acknowledged. Conversely, the positive omens surrounding my fieldwork and the absence of accidents after visiting, for example, the old fortifications of Fafontofure and Mendono were interpreted by various people as signs that local guardian spirits thought it was time for esoteric information to come out into the open. Ironically, I may have become part of oral traditions in parts of eastern Sulawesi that recount the coming of foreigners with special knowledge.\(^5^6\)

**Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe**

The history of writing in eastern Sulawesi is closely related to relations with external powers and participation in wider cultural and political spheres of influence. Two of the four languages used, Bugis and Malay, were not local, but associated with important external centres, Bugis with Bone and Malay with Ternate. Malay was used in

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\(^5^6\) Jane Atkinson found that her departure from a Wana village where she was not welcomed was transformed into a story in the millenarian tradition in which two foreigners who had come to make the Wana prosperous had left because the villagers had annoyed them by making too much noise. When New Tribes
correspondence between east coast polities, Ternate and the VOC in the early 1700s, but may have been replaced by Bugis by the nineteenth century. Much of the indigenous writings, including political correspondence and manuscripts relating to eastern Sulawesi have been lost. Many other texts, particularly in Buton, but also in South Sulawesi, still need to be transcribed and translated. Both Buton and Tobungku produced texts related to the history of the polity both in their own languages (resp. Bahasa Wolio and Bahasa Tobungku) and in Malay using Arabic script. Though it is clear from VOC sources that Banggai rulers and officials also received and wrote letters, there are no indications that other kinds of texts were produced and preserved. Tobungku’s manuscripts were destroyed during the rebel Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) movement, also known as the Gerombolan (1950-1965), when the house of the ruler was burnt down. Buton has a collection of manuscripts that are in the process of being transcribed. Surat-Menyurat Buton is a collection of correspondence, letters written in Buton to the VOC or neighbouring polities dating mainly from the nineteenth century. My use of Malay texts was limited to the occasional letter that was preserved in the Dutch archives and the unusual ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ (Chronicle of the Bungku Regency). I also made use of a published Ternaten manuscript that makes reference to eastern Sulawesi.
If indeed all Tobungku’s manuscripts were burnt during the Gerombolan, then the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ is the only surviving text. In the 1930s, the colonial government took a new interest in indigenous traditions and history in order to incorporate indigenous elements into an otherwise alien bureaucratic structure of the colonial state. In 1931, a Menadonese colonial official was sent to Tobungku to gather material on Tobungku’s history where he was given restricted access to existing manuscripts. The result of his efforts was a carefully selected and ordered compilation of Malay text segments that was transcribed into Roman script. The chronicle consists of thirteen chronologically ordered sections, that each deal with one episode or anecdote concerning Tobungku’s relations with external powers. Rather than a genealogy of traditional power, it provides a genealogy of the Dutch administrative unit, the ‘landschap Boengkoe’, which was the colonial incarnation of the pre-colonial polity of Tobungku. The colonial chronicle deals with one main theme only: Tobungku’s relations to external powers, carefully compiled to conform to Dutch notions of history and of social and political reality. While its narrative style is similar to oral texts, it is chronologically ordered, and a number of themes commonly found in oral traditions such as origin myths, stories of early rulers, Islam, supernatural powers, semi-divine humans or magical objects are conspicuously absent. Most of the content of the text was unfamiliar to older people in Bungku, but names of rulers such as Lamboja and Surabi were still widely known. Despite what appears to be heavy editing, the fragments of which the ‘Hikajat’ is compiled most likely predate 1931. As a whole, the text presents a Tobungku-centred perspective of regional relations, reflecting not only the east coast’s position

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62 It is possible that a longer stay on the east coast of Sulawesi would yield more information of still existing copies. Abdul Aziz, Jasin Husen and R. Rone and others who were knowledgeable about Tobungku’s past, had not seen copies of the manuscripts since they were burnt. There was mention of a person who left Bungku in the 1950s who had copies of some documents, but his whereabouts were not known, nor was it known which documents he possessed.

63 Jasin Husen recalled that the colonial official who was given the task of collecting information on Tobungku’s history was given restricted access to the Tobungku texts.
between South Sulawesi and Maluku, but also a glimpse of how Tobungku as a polity was viewed locally. The portrait of Tobungku in relation to powerful external powers does not emphasise its dependence, but rather its ability to skilfully negotiate relations with these powers as a valued ally.

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This study intends to trace the history of the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi and the regional environment in which they functioned before their formal incorporation into the colonial state in 1905. Their centrality in a historical study poses the problem that despite the fact that such small-scale societies were the dominant mode of political organisation in the archipelago, written (European) sources for such societies in general are patchy. Nevertheless, I have attempted to trace the historical developments in eastern Sulawesi, such as patterns of conflict, relations with external powers, and the gradual impingement of the colonial state in the nineteenth century.

Comparing local and European sources brings to light not only the evident differences, but also the points where they converge and corroborate each other. Oral sources tend to have a stronger focus with respect to local origins, local power and the intricacies of internal relations, whereas Dutch sources focus more on regional tributary relations, conflict and colonial expansion. Oral and other local sources usually take the perspective of a single village, community or polity. Dutch sources, on the other hand, view developments on the east coast from major administrative centres outside of eastern Sulawesi. Despite fundamental differences in form and content it is clear that the both local and European sources provide perspectives on the social and political world. The main themes in this study arise from the convergence of oral and European sources. Certain key events and processes occur in both types of sources: the mobility of itinerant
populations and individuals, the Bugis diaspora, regional and local armed conflict, maritime raiding, the importance of regional tributary relations, the advent of Dutch colonial rule, and the prominence of skilful leaders. It is to the local level of leaders and polities that I now turn.
Part One

Small-scale Polities in Eastern Sulawesi
Leaders and Polities in Eastern Sulawesi

In the 1890s a ‘posthouder’ in Banggai expressed his frustration at the incompetence of the ruler of Banggai and his reluctance to carry out orders from the Resident in Ternate. Aristocrats and commoners alike disregarded his orders, and the presence of a colonial official in Banggai could not change this pattern of defiance. The main reason for the lack of co-operation was that upon returning from his inauguration in Ternate this particular ruler had refused to undergo a second ceremony in Banggai at Kota Jin, the former capital that was destroyed in 1846, which had continued to be an important sacred site. The oath was believed to ensure proper moral and political conduct by the ruler, as any abuse of power would lead to severe illness, if not death. The ruler’s refusal to take the oath meant, in the eyes of the Banggai population, that he did not accept the obligations of a ruler as understood in customary, ancestral law, and could do as he pleased without the fear of supernatural sanctions in case of misconduct. Despite more than two centuries of Ternaten and Bugis influence and increasing intervention by external powers in the course of the nineteenth century, the political authority of the Banggai ruler depended on local forms of legitimisation. This chapter explores different facets of local leadership and sources of power within the context of small-scale polities in eastern Sulawesi.

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64 In 1995, Banggai Lolango, as Kota Jin was also referred to, was the location of the ‘rumah keramat’ or sacred house, devoted to Abu Kasim, one of Banggai’s most important early heroes. The other important ‘rumah keramat’ devoted to his half sister Putri Saleh, had been moved closer to the subsequent centre of Banggai, and was still in use in 1995.

65 A similar belief was noted by Christie for Java. Javanese leadership is constrained by the notion of pamrijh, the belief that a ruler must act without selfishness or greed, which she argues has its roots in the first millennium. Passion and greed were believed to dissipate power. Jan Wiseman Christie, ‘Raja and Rama: The Classical state in early Java’, in: Centers, Symbols and Hierarchies, Essays on the Classical States of Southeast Asia, Lorraine Gesick (ed.), Monograph Series No. 26/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
Small-scale Polities in the Southeast Asian Context

Colonial historiography was preoccupied with the classical, hinduised states of the more remote past that had left monuments such as Borobodur and other, smaller temple complexes. The grand episodes of the Indonesian past were seen as the consequence of external, Indian influence that led to the Indianised kingdoms of Java and Bali. Periodisation of the past was also marked according to different waves of external influence; the Hindu period, the Islamic period, and finally, the Dutch period. The Dutch focus on small-scale political units in the archipelago only started in the second half of the nineteenth century with the expansion of the colonial state into the areas where Dutch claims were not always firmly established. The interest in the codification of Dutch claims to the archipelago in the middle of the nineteenth century coincided with a new wave of colonial historiography. In these histories, the ‘glorious deeds’ of Dutch heroes in the early days of the VOC became the basis of the authority of the colonial state and of Dutch claims to the archipelago. In the process, the Dutch retrospectively reduced the messy, pre-colonial reality of indigenous polities and mobile populations to a series of uniform terms applied to both large as well as small-scale polities.\(^66\) The Dutch terms vorstendom, koninkrijk or simply rijk were used indiscriminately to refer to a wide range of polities, with only the use of the diminutive (rijkje) to indicate that there was a difference in scale and importance between for example Bone, the most powerful of Bugis states, and Konawe, a small-scale agricultural polity that remained largely unknown to the outside world. The rulers or chiefs were referred to as vorst or koning, and similarly the use of the diminutive vorstje or koninkje indicated that the person was a petty ruler of an insignificant ‘kingdom’. The standardisation of terms was closely linked to the formal nature of the

\(^{66}\) This is yet another example of how a state simplified the complex reality of the society it attempts to govern in order to make it ‘legible’. James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve Human Condition have Failed*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1998.
legal incorporation through contracts that left the majority of smaller polities in the archipelago free to conduct their internal affairs without Dutch intervention.67

The complexity and resilience of ‘local level’ political dynamics only came into sharp focus when direct rule was introduced throughout the archipelago at the beginning of the twentieth century. An important concern was how to incorporate the multitude of tiny realms into an archipelago-wide bureaucratic state and subject them to the unifying measures of Dutch colonial policy. In this period, small-scale societies were seen as the preserve of ‘customary law’ (adatrecht) that was codified so that it would not be lost.68

Adat-law studies, of which Van Vollenhoven was the main proponent, led to a pluralistic legal system with different sets of laws for different groups and nationalities, in which the main distinction was European versus indigenous law. The colonial codification of indigenous customary law was based on the idea that indigenous societies were static and that indigenous customs and laws were ancient and unalterable. Hence, these societies were ‘pristine’ and more or less untouched by outside influences. Consequently, they occupied only a peripheral place in a colonial historiography in which even ancient kingdoms were considered an offshoot of world civilisation.69

As the scholarship on Southeast Asia increased, a clearer image emerged of historical states in this region. In contrast to modern states in the twentieth century, historical states in insular Southeast Asia were loosely integrated, not territorially bound units, with generally weak central authority. Hall, for instance, sets out to analyse why a

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67. Resink points out that as late as 1879, ‘native states belonging to the territory of the Netherlands-Indies’ still flew their own flags, that treaties with the colonial state were phrased in terms of international law, and that tolls were not collected by the colonial state until the beginning of the twentieth century. This, in his view, indicates that certainly in legal terms, large parts of the Indonesian archipelago were independent until the early twentieth century. G. J. Resink, ‘Native States of the Eastern Archipelago, 1873-1915’, in: Indonesia’s History between the Myths, Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory, W. van Hoeve Publishers Ltd.- The Hague, 1968, pp. 109-147, 271-303.


higher degree of centralisation was not possible, while Tambiah remarks that ‘we can confidently assert that the stronger form of polity is only rarely and temporarily achieved.’ Warren writes about Sulu that it ‘lacked the means of centralising rights associated with the legal, political and administrative spheres of the state’. Schulte Nordholt goes even further when speaking of Mengwi (Bali) as an ‘elusive state’, its ‘ambivalent centre’ and highly fragmented political structure. Hagesteijn arrives at similar conclusions in her overview of scholarship on ‘early states’ in Southeast Asia. She notes that if centralisation and stability are the criteria for statehood, ‘early Southeast political systems do not pass the test’. She points particularly to the geographical fragmentation in Southeast Asia, and the lack of infra-structure necessary to overcome this major impediment to form more centralised political structures. These so-called states were usually constituted of smaller regional centres of relatively equal strength that were unable to conquer each other for any period of time.

Scholars working on Southeast Asia emphasise that the development of political structures was shaped by the fragmented geographical environment and fluid social structures that shaped the evolution of these societies and polities. The centrality of kinship in historical Southeast Asia has been pointed out by Reid as well:

...in pre-modern times in Southeast Asia the family was a great deal broader and more porous with a high level of temporary adoption, while at the other end of the spectrum the nation and its institutions [...] were extremely weak.

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Instead of searching for states, he is inclined to seek the indigenous political dynamic in a genius for managing without states.76

Watson Andaya remarks that ‘so-called kingdoms were in fact cultural-economic communities composed of a web of kinship-infused relationships.’77 Day goes even further in proposing that a division between the public and private sphere disguises the importance of families, gender and kinship networks in the history of states.78 Furthermore, he sees the dynamics of (competing) families as the central political process rather than the evolution of state structures.79 According to Watson Andaya, a polycentric political pattern is common in Southeast Asia with a tendency towards disunity rather than development towards a centralised state. She warns that the tangible archaeological remains of larger social formations such as Angkor and Pagan might lead us to forget the fact that ‘even larger centres were a coalescence of local power centres and that whatever cohesion they attained was at best tenuous’.80 Further, the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of individual chiefs and families and the competition between them is emphasised in Adas’ concept of the contest state.81 Here, the authority of a central ruler is weakened by a constant struggle between elite factions for resources. The inability of any one leader to dominate meant that the struggle for power could not be permanently resolved and, hence, was an ongoing process. The twin notions of an

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79. ibid.

evolution towards greater complexity and more centralised forms of government have made place for notions of non-linear or cyclical development and dynamic interaction between smaller centres.

In the redefinition of what constitutes a Southeast Asian polity the characteristics of the state have changed to such an extent that they increasingly overlap with definitions of chiefdoms. The term chiefdom was coined to cover a wide range of ‘pre-state stratified formations’. The term was first used by Oberg for particular societies in Central and South America, but only attracted wider attention when Service fit it into an evolutionary paradigm to explain the development of societies. In this developmental sequence, chiefdoms were located between tribal societies and states. An economic dimension was added by Sahlins when he coupled chiefdoms with Polanyi’s notion of the redistribution of economic and luxury goods.

The main testing ground for the chiefdom concept has been the Pacific, though the term has been fruitfully applied to societies in Africa, Iron Age Europe, North and Central America. The term as it is commonly used covers a wide range of complex, stratified societies with some form of chiefly authority. Summarising archeological research on pre-hispanic chiefdoms in Central America, Spencer provides a list of characteristics of chiefdoms very similar to those Hagesteijn attributes to early Southeast Asian states. These characteristics include the relative absence of institutionalised power; an undifferentiated administrative structure of government; a multi-centred structure; relative autonomy of constituent realms; and sanctification of power.

The term chiefdom has not been widely applied to historical polities in Southeast Asia. Ethnographers have used the term chiefdom in its evolutionary context for areas comparable to eastern Sulawesi to indicate societies that possessed a greater degree of hierarchy and social differentiation than tribal societies. For instance, Rousseau, in his discussion of Central Bornean societies, envisages supra-regional integration through as the main criteria for chiefdoms. In the absence of an effective regional political structure, he defines the basic socio-political unit not through its supra-local organisation, but, rather as a social unit demarcated by natural geographical boundaries. Here, integration occurred through informal exchanges between groups that inhabited river basins rather than through institutionalised power structures. Because Rousseau’s definition of chiefdoms emphasises institutionalisation of power, and does not stress kinship or cultural affinities, he concludes that Central Bornean societies were not chiefdoms. The informal council of chiefs that was activated to co-ordinate regional migration and warfare does not in his view constitute a chiefdom, because there were no stable political offices beyond the local level. Since the regional aspect of social organisation plays only a minor role at the local level, he defines these societies as tribal rather than as chiefdoms. In comparison, the polities of eastern Sulawesi fall into this definition of chiefdom, since there were formal councils and offices, even if they were not always politically effective.

As mentioned in the introduction, the linear evolutionary trajectory in which chiefdoms are situated at an intermediate stage between tribes and more hierarchical states has not appealed to scholars of Southeast Asia as the data rarely indicate such a development. However, by shifting the emphasis from hierarchy towards the concept of heterarchy, the seemingly unstable forms of political organisation found in many parts of Southeast Asia are no longer anomalous, but can be seen as forms of organisation

suitably adapted to the fragmented geographical landscape. Heterarchy also liberates the chiefdom concept from an evolutionary framework, thus making it more compatible to the historical Southeast Asian context. White points out that Southeast Asia has many examples of societies that are complex social systems without having well articulated hierarchies or centralised forms of government. Heterarchy also implies that there is no clear distinction between centres and peripheries, that overlapping spheres of influence or hierarchies can co-exist in the same social and political space. Both the concepts of a polycentric state and a chiefdom with particular reference to heterarchy apply equally to a wide range of Southeast Asian polities when removed from an evolutionary context.

The Resources of Leadership

Patterns of leadership are the key to understanding polities in Southeast Asia that operated on a small scale, in which centralised institutions did not play an important role. Sahlins’ classic article on Polynesian chiefs versus Melanesian big men sets up a typology of leaders and the political systems in which they operated. Polynesian systems tended to emphasise inherited status and had more hierarchical forms. Political formations were shaped by ‘an extensive pyramid of groups capped by the family and following of the paramount chief’. In contrast, personal accomplishment played a more important role than ascribed status in Melanesian societies. The pattern of the more diffuse Melanesian political system tended to constitute separate, but equal, groups that were not integrated into an all-encompassing social-political system and were therefore largely autonomous. Big men in this system were the only way in which

84 Wolters drew attention to the concept of heterarchy which had been debated among archeologists as a fruitful concept to apply to the historical Southeast Asian environment.
87 ibid. p. 287.
supra-local organisations could be formed, and even these were only temporary, resembling the situation Rousseau described for Central Bornean societies. Societal formations on a larger scale always depended on linkages between smaller factional organisations and in particular, on economic mobilisation that was in turn determined by relations between the ‘centre-man and followers’. In both the case of Polynesian and Melanesian leaders, personal accomplishment and magical power were important characteristics of leaders as well as the ability to control redistribution.

Wolters borrowed the concept of the Melanesian big man and used it to formulate a ‘cultural matrix’ that the shaped historical contours specific to Southeast Asia. His characterisation of a Southeast Asian style of leadership places great importance on achievement and the ability to attract followers. Inherited status only carried weight if it was supported by achieved leadership skills. Bilateral kinship systems also meant that ancestry could be traced through both the male and female lines, which gave rise to flexible kinship groups that were not always clearly delineated with respect to descent and power. Powerful ancestors could be claimed by many individuals, but were no guarantee of ascribed status or power.\(^88\) The political significance of bilateral kinship structures meant there were no clear rules for succession and great emphasis was placed on proven leadership skills. Wolters and others even speak of ‘genealogical amnesia’, another sign that leadership was based more on achievement than on descent, particularly in politically marginal areas.\(^89\) The political value of shared offspring resulting from new alliances could carry far greater weight as a unifying factor than shared ancestry. This contrasts with unilineal descent groups, in Polynesian societies for example, where political power was concentrated in a limited and clearly circumscribed group.


The political implications of the bilateral kinship system, flexible kinship alliances and other forms of association in shaping Southeast Asia’s political patterns have repeatedly been highlighted by both historians and anthropologists. Individual leaders, rather than unilineal descent groups, were the focal point of alliance groups. The influence of a paramount leader that was based mainly on acquired skills of leadership was not easily transferred to the next generation. The lack of clear rules for succession based on descent often led to internecine conflict after the death of a strong leader. Hagesteijn sees ‘succession disputes as an integral part of political life’ in early Southeast Asian states. Leaders, often brothers or cousins, competed with each other for followers, who could readily transfer their allegiance from one powerful figure to another. The result was a pattern of shifting political alliances and populations at all levels of society.

The political prominence of individual leaders was further enhanced in many parts of Southeast Asia by the geographical fragmentation of the landscape that worked against greater centralisation and the formation of more hierarchical social structures. A chiefdom was made up of a number of similar groups consisting of chiefs, each with their own following, based in their own area. The idea that the power of a leader depended on the number of people he or she controlled rather than the amount of land is now widely accepted. A factor contributing to this situation in Southeast Asia was a relatively low level of population density in marked contrast to vast tracts of unpopulated land and coastlines, which could not be made productive without people. However, the degree of control leaders exerted over people was hampered by just how easy it was for populations to move away or transfer their allegiance to another leader.

Taking all these factors into consideration, the polycentric, fluid polities of Southeast Asia, the political and social structures found in eastern Sulawesi are neither ‘failed’ states, nor are they an historical anomaly on the Southeast Asian landscape. Rather, the chiefdoms of eastern Sulawesi represented more closely the majority of the political and social formations found across the archipelago than the larger, more hierarchical states such as Bone and Ternate. Inaccessible hinterlands and coastlines, mountain ranges and few navigable rivers formed the geographical backdrop of the political and economic development in eastern Sulawesi. Conflict and violence of all kinds were common, either because of localised rivalry and competition or exacerbated by the intervention of external centres. Chiefs formed alliances with peers and followers within the loosely integrated framework of the chiefdom, in which the elite could never fully monopolise supernatural legitimacy. The prestige of leaders did depend on the number of their followers and subjects, but the power of such leaders was in no way absolute.

The standard colonial terminology of *vorst* (ruler) and *rijkgroten* (nobles, aristocratic chiefs) obscured the discrepancy between Dutch expectations that a ‘ruler’ controlled his subjects and the actual political reality where a ruler invariably had only limited authority over his subjects. The confusion that arose about leadership and local political structures was partly due to profound cultural differences between the Dutch colonisers and the societies they tried to make conform to their policies and practises. What the Dutch referred to as ‘little kingdoms’ (*rijkjes*) on the east coast of Sulawesi comprised a fluid and fragile unity of a number of chiefs and their followings, with often competing claims to the position of paramount chosen ruler. Hence, the core of the polity consisted of several powerful men and their kin and followers who, more often than not, agreed as to who would be the ruler. The level of control the ruler could exercise was limited by the power of his associates and near-peers. Powerful local rulers
could dominate other aristocratic chiefs, but the regular occurrence of rulers being
deposed suggests that strong rulers were not tolerated by other chiefs in the polity. The
remainder of this chapter explores the sources of power available to local leaders.

*Trade and Chiefly Power*

Junker’s study on the evolution of pre-hispanic chiefdoms in the Philippines emphasises
control over trade as an important foundation of chiefly power. Control over the
production of local prestige goods was significant because these goods could be used in
exchange for export commodities or, as was the case in Tobungku, locally produced
swords were exchanged directly for imported commodities. In eastern, the production of
local prestige goods occurred in the form of iron-smithing in Tobungku and weaving in
Buton, Mendono and Tobungku. The importance of goods such as iron swords and
woven cloth is borne out by oral traditions that link the origin of the coastal polity with
iron: the first ruler of Tobungku was fishing in Lake Matano when one day pulled up a
sword from the depths of lake. In 1995, the inhabitants of the hamlet traditionally
known for its iron-smithing thus remembered their close historical connection to the
rulers of Tobungku.

The main purpose of imported luxury goods such as Chinese porcelain was to
enhance the social and political status of the elite through display, feasting and gift-
giving. The few early mentions of Banggai suggest that it followed a similar pattern of
commodity circulation set out for the neighbouring pre-hispanic Philippine chiefdoms.
A source from as early as 1304 mentions that Chinese traders obtained iron in
Banggai. 92 According to Ptak, Banggai was located on the ‘northern route to the Spice
Islands’, and there is evidence of trading connections between Banggai and Maluku

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92 The importance of Chinese trade is confirmed by antique hunters in the area who claim that Banggai has the most complete selection of Chinese ceramics of the area.
between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Another indication of the importance of long distance trade and exchange in Banggai is its mention in the fourteenth century text the Negarakertagama as a tributary of Majapahit. Reid suggests that this reference may indicate that iron was exported from Banggai to Java. Since the only known source of local iron is in the interior of eastern Sulawesi near Lake Matano, Banggai must have had established trading networks that funnelled iron and possibly other mainland commodities to Banggai in return for imported goods. In 1532, Urdaneta remarked that Banggai dominated the surrounding islands ‘with which it carried on much trade’. He also commented on Banggai’s belligerence and that he was unable to meet the king of Banggai because of elaborate funerary ceremonies for the queen that lasted for many weeks. From this fragmentary source of information it would appear that Banggai fits into the pattern of emerging chiefdoms that Junker describes for the Philippines: Banggai was wealthy, it was the centre of a local trade network that supplied it with products for long distance trade, feasting took place on a grand scale, and Banggai engaged in maritime raiding.

Whether or not there were other polities of any real importance on the east coast in this period is not clear from the historical sources. By the early sixteenth century ‘Tabuay’, a polity located on the coast in the area of what was later known as Tobungku, was a lively trading settlement. Instead of Banggai, Tabuay now sold large quantities of locally mined iron to Java, Timor and Borneo. Tabuay, too, was at war with its neighbours, but nothing is mentioned about the character of local trade

93. Roderick Ptak, ‘Northern Route’: The Northern Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea-Sulu Zone-North Moluccas (14th to early 16th Century), Archipel, 43 (1992), pp. 27-56.
networks. By the late seventeenth century, the east coast comes into sharper focus in the Dutch sources because of the struggle over the spice trade. Makassar, which had risen to power in the early seventeenth century was defeated by Bone and the Dutch in 1669. During the following two decades, the east coast of Sulawesi was caught up in the turmoil of shifting political and economic networks. In the course of the seventeenth century Buton rather than Banggai became more important to outside traders because of its key location en route from Makassar and Java to Maluku. When the VOC first arrived in Buton in 1612, it decided to open a trading post, but the lack of appropriate trade led the Dutch to close down this post within a year.\(^7\) By the middle of the seventeenth century, Buton was the centre of wars between Makassar and Ternate. The east coast was considered part of Makassar’s sphere of influence in this period, though Buton was increasingly a contested domain. Spices were grown in the Buton archipelago, Tobungku and in Banggai, but not in large enough quantities to cause great concern to the VOC. After Makassar’s defeat, Banggai and Buton were compelled to sign agreements to discontinue growing and selling spices. Both were visited irregularly by the VOC’s spice eradication expeditions, though trade in spices undoubtedly continued. Tobungku also grew spices, but curiously receives little attention on this account in the VOC sources. In this period, the east coast was also a source of foodstuffs for Maluku, though little is known about local patterns of trade and exchange.

Two landmark events changed the regional context in which the east coast polities were situated, and brought them into closer focus for the VOC. The first was the defeat of Makassar in 1669 that was sealed by the treaty of Bungaya. In this treaty the jurisdiction of the east coast was formally transferred to the VOC’s ally Ternate, except for Buton which fell under the administration of the VOC governor of Makassar. The

\(^7\) Generale Missiven I, p. 32, Corpus Diplomaticum I, p. 115, p. 52. These references mention nothing trade in goods that did not interest the Dutch, such as
second key event was the uprising of the Ternaten Sultan Amsterdam against the VOC. Ternate’s tributaries, including Banggai and Tobungku, were drawn into this rebellion that lasted almost a decade, and which was not brought under control until 1680. From this point on, Ternate’s status changed from that of an ally, with equal status to the VOC, to a vassal state in a subordinate position. This political change may have initially seemed merely cosmetic in local eyes, but for the Dutch it was the beginning of greater involvement in Ternate’s internal affairs and with its tributaries. Consequently, the status of Tobungku and Banggai as Ternate’s tributaries now brought them into more regular contact with the VOC. For several decades the Dutch tried to get a foothold on the east coast but without success. Instead, the east coast of Sulawesi was rapidly integrated into expanding Bugis trade networks at the end of the seventeenth century. The Bugis kingdom of Bone, headed by the powerful and capable ruler Arung Palaka, replaced Makassar as the most powerful polity in South Sulawesi. Bone and the VOC temporarily united and fought together against their common enemy Makassar, but as Bone became ever more powerful, its relationship with the VOC became fraught with tension. 

The political implications of these changed regional patterns of trade and the diaspora of Bugis along the east coast is not entirely clear. It would appear that in marked contrast to the impression Urdaneta gives, of fairly centralised control over trade and raiding, a more dispersed localised pattern emerged after 1669 of smaller centres that each maintained connections with outside traders and larger regional centres. Since the Bugis on the east coast appear to have replaced Makassarese, it is likely that these changes in local trading networks had already occurred when the east


coast was integrated into the expanding Makassarese trading networks in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Oral traditions in the Banggai area suggest that local wars that involved Makassarese changed the political constellation within Banggai.\footnote{See chapter three on the oral traditions of Bongganan and Mendono.}

The intensification and expansion of regional trade networks gave opportunity to enterprising outsiders such as Bugis traders and warriors to gain considerable local influence. The conflict on Banggai in the last decades of the seventeenth century, discussed at greater length in chapter three, indicates that control over trade was fiercely disputed by several factions with different regional affiliations. The outcome, in Banggai’s case, was dominance by Bugis traders who engaged with local chiefs directly rather than with a single powerful chief with a greater degree of centralised power resident in either Banggai or Mendono.\footnote{VOC 1826 (1713) f. 114.}

A 1729 source indicates that local traders from Banggai, Mendono and Tobungku were still active in the Gulf of Tomini\footnote{Traders from Magindanao, Banggai, Tobungku, Mendono and others came to Gorontalo to trade gold for cloth, rice and other small merchandise. VOC 2099 f. 944.} and that traders from Banggai ventured as far as Maluku, equipped with letters from the Banggai ruler.\footnote{In 1733, 16 Banggaian traders were apprehended by the Dutch in Maluku on suspicion of smuggling, but were released several years later after intercession by their ruler. Generale Missiven IX p. 486, 487, 704.} This suggests that local trading networks, under the auspices of local rulers, continued to play an important role despite the dominance of Bugis networks in long distance trading.

More detailed, but still limited, information on local trade only becomes available in the nineteenth century; first from Vosmaer in the early 1830s and then from around the middle of the century after east coast trade was severely disrupted by Ternaten expeditions. Vosmaer’s account of Banggai, remarkably, strongly resembles that of Urdaneta in the 1530s, except that now Tobungku is the belligerent and prosperous centre of a local trading and raiding network. In 1854, over a decade after the disruption
of commerce on the east coast, trade in Banggai and Tobungku could only be conducted through local chiefs who exploited the surrounding populations by obtaining trade goods and demanding slaves without compensation.\(^{104}\) The conflict with the Tomori in the hinterland of Tobungku that arose in the 1840s suggests that during Tobungku’s heyday as a trading centre, relations with its hinterland were characterised by a lack of control over both inland and external trade, in contrast to the situation documented by 1854.\(^{105}\) However, the Tobungku chiefs’ control over trade may have been cyclical, because by 1885 it appears that local populations had direct contact with outside traders. The contract concluded between the Dutch and the new ruler of Tobungku in that year states that it is the ruler’s duty to prevent his subjects from becoming indebted to traders, implying that trade in this period was not conducted exclusively through chiefs as intermediaries nor was it necessarily conducted under the auspices of rulers.\(^{106}\)

The limited sources on local patterns of east coast trade suggest long distance trade has played an important role from at least the early fourteenth century, but more detailed information on how trade was organised and conducted is sorely lacking. The patterns appear to alternate between more centralised local trading networks such as those centred around Banggai in the early 1500s and Tobungku in the first half of the nineteenth century to more dispersed networks of trade and exchange in which long distance traders had direct access to local chiefs (Banggai early 1700s) or contact with the population (Tobungku late nineteenth century). For the period after 1680, when sources are more readily available, there is evidence that coastal chiefs participated in exchanges with Bugis traders were an important factor. If this was indeed the case, by 1885 the trade in forest products would have amplified the tendency for indigenous populations to become indebted to traders, since inland people were brought into closer contact with outside traders.


\(^{105}\) ANRI, Besluit 14 September 1859, p. 21, 22. See chapter 6 for a more elaborate account of this conflict.

\(^{106}\) ANRI Besluit 29 Januari 1885, No. 22. I argue in chapter 6 that the original version of this treaty dates from soon after the expeditions to the east coast, since Bugis traders were an important factor. If this was indeed the case, by 1885 the trade in forest products would have amplified the tendency for indigenous populations to become indebted to traders, since inland people were brought into closer contact with outside traders.
trade and often owned or commanded one or more large perahu. As more detailed information on the direct relationship between trade and leadership is absent, I will now turn to the significance of imported prestige goods and other ways of displaying status in eastern Sulawesi.

**Displaying Status in eastern Sulawesi**

The demand for prestige goods stemmed from the need of leaders and chiefs to display status and to reinforce alliances with peers and followers through gift-giving. Prestige goods, both imported and locally crafted, enhanced prestige and wealth. For these goods to be effective political currency, their distribution had to be restricted. In eastern Sulawesi, as elsewhere in insular Southeast Asia, imported textiles and porcelains were the most important of these trade goods, along with gold ornaments. Imported cloth and clothing were extremely prestigious items and therefore in great demand among local elites. Kotilainan states that before the twentieth century imported textiles in Central Sulawesi ‘had little practical value’ and that they ‘merely had ceremonial and ritual significance’ as valuable heirlooms for ceremonial exchanges. The myth of the cloth tree mentioned in the introduction is particularly revealing with regard to the link between textiles, status and power. The highest branches were covered with the most beautiful and colourful cloth, but lower down the cloth became more modest, while the lowest branches were made of the coarsest cloth. Certainly by the middle of the nineteenth century, imported clothing was worn by coastal elites, though often only for ceremonial occasions. Vosmaer noted that among the Tolaki in the 1830s, only those of

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107. For example: in 1701 the Banggai ruler Kalukubulang had three korak-korak, or commanded subjects who owned three korak-korak (VOC 1637 f. 137). The jogugu of Banggai had his own ship in 1706 (VOC 1710 f. 648). In Kendari Bay in 1837 ‘prominent trading chiefs’ had their own ships (ANRI Besluit 31 Maart 1837 No. 3, p. 10).

108. Both the ToPomona and Kaili speakers of Central Sulawesi had special terms to refer to ceremonial clothes, which, along with imported bronze objects, constituted according to Kotilainan the most important part of family wealth. Based on the types of heirloom cloths found in the western part of Central Sulawesi, she concludes that this area was not important to long distance trade before the seventeenth century. Heirloom cloths consisted of Indian patola imitations, printed and painted Indian cloths, ikat cloths from southern Central Sulawesi, and sarita cloths. Eija-Maija Kotilainan, *When the Bones are Left*, 1992, p. 53, 228, 229.
aristocratic descent wore imported cloth. Commoners wore locally produced cotton cloth or barkcloth whereas slaves were forbidden to wear cloth altogether. When the ruler of Banggai was inaugurated in Ternate in 1850, he took advantage of this opportunity to buy an expensive, and, in Dutch eyes ‘tasteful’ wardrobe. All the Banggai officials at the time of his inauguration also wore bits of European uniforms, as was also the case in Muna, where costumes of members of the council were modelled on European uniforms of different eras.

The architecture of dwellings and meeting halls was another means of displaying status. The dwelling of the most prominent Tomori chief was taller than the surrounding houses and supported by a much larger number of posts. In the case of the Tolaki in the Kendari area, the most prestigious building was a large square hall called the laikan aha (meaning almighty house) that was built by the Tolaki ruler Tebau. It rested on a large number of heavy posts of twenty feet high, and the structure itself was between sixty to seventy feet high. The laikan aha was used for feasting and for divining the meaning of the dreams of the ruler.

Staging large feasts was an important ritual aspect of both consolidating and demonstrating power in Southeast Asian societies. As Atkinson commented a propos of the Wana, ritual in the Southeast Asian context is theatrical, and staging a successful ritual adds to the prestige and hence the influence of the leader. In a polycentric chiefdom, feasting was part of the competitive dynamics between the various realms and their leaders in relation to the centre. The political importance of feasting is borne

out by instances in oral traditions where negligence of etiquette and ritual during a
ceremony or failure to invite others was a cause for conflict. Feasting was also strongly
associated with the supernatural aspect of power. The presence of ancestral and other
spirits was invoked and it was widely believed that these spirits were present at such
occasions. Errors in the performance of rituals could invoke their anger and possible
revenge, whereas successful ceremonies were a visible sign of the approval of such
supernatural forces. The main sources that indicate the importance of feasting in eastern
Sulawesi are oral traditions and ethnographic accounts of the early twentieth century.
For example, the missionary H.G. van Eelink reported in 1914 that a Tomori death
ceremony held for several deceased persons lasted for more than two months.¹¹³
Urdaneta mentions that the elaborate funerary ceremonies held for the ‘queen of
Banggai’ in 1532 lasted for more than 14 weeks, and that 150 people were put to death
to accompany her to the after-world.¹¹⁴ In Konawe, Madukalla, the Bugis aristocrat who
married the daughter of the ruler is remembered for the elaborate ceremonies he staged.
In Tobungku, the memory of large feasting ceremonies that were held up to the end of
the nineteenth century were associated with the healing powers of one of the early
rulers.¹¹⁵

Marshalling food supplies was also an important aspect of chiefly power for several
reasons. First, it was the key factor necessary for staging large ceremonies such as
funerals, weddings, and harvest feasts. Second, foodstuffs played an important role in
regional relations as export products, as tribute and in facilitating warfare. Food is most
often mentioned in the sources as gifts to visiting Ternaten or Dutch officials, especially
carabao, or as food supplies for sea journeys such as processed sago. A list of produce

received by the Ternaten utusan in 1850 testifies to the ability of coastal, tributary chiefs to mobilise their subjects to supply large quantities of chickens, eggs, rice, tubers, wax and tobacco on relatively short notice.\textsuperscript{116} Food contributions formed the bulk of tribute received by east coast chiefs. The ruler of Tobungku received irregular tribute in rice and other food from both coastal and inland parts of the polity. Similarly, in the early twentieth century, most of the tribute given to the Tomori chief Marundu was in the form of food: rice, sago and carabao.\textsuperscript{117} 

Food also appears in the sources as an important factor in facilitating regional warfare. The \textit{Geschiedenis van Ternate} mentions that besides men and boats, Tobungku and Banggai contributed large amounts of food that were taken back to Ternate as tribute.\textsuperscript{118} The custom of feeding and maintaining troops of allies who were in the area or the habit of attacking forces confiscating food supplies continued at least in to the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{119} Horses were abundant in Tobungku in the past, but by the 1850s they were extinct, because they were the preferred food of the Ternaten hongi.\textsuperscript{120} Cutting off food supplies was regularly used as a weapon in sieges, so that small islands

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\textsuperscript{115} In the case of the death of Tomori mokole, each tributary group had to contribute a certain amount and type of food or objects for the elaborate death ceremony. Despite the sizeable contributions of rice, buffalo, chickens, eggs, barkcloth, wax, dark blue cloth (used for headcloths during death ceremonies), staging such a ceremony was very expensive and only took place if a chief decided to sponsor it. J. Kruijt, ‘De Moriërs van Tinompo’, 1924, p. 189, 190.\textsuperscript{116} ANRI, Ternate 185c, first page missing, p. 2, 6. In 1850 the tuan komisi from Ternate and the utusan Banggai (supposedly Ternate’s representative on Banggai) travelled to Mondono, Batui, Kintom, Luwuk, Lantiok, Lamala, Basama and Tolangbata. During this trip they collected 2 pikul of wax, 40 pikul rice, 500 containers of sago, 90 pakets of tobacco leaves, 32 dozen chickens and 800 chicken eggs. On the island of Peleng in Lalantang they collected 4 dozen chickens, 100 eggs, 20 kati wax, an unspecified amount of tubers and coconuts. In Liang on Peleng as well he collected the same amount of chickens and chicken eggs, and tubers. The chiefs (kapala kapala) of Banggai gave 3 dozen chickens, 200 chicken eggs, one large ceramic jar (tampaijan) of oil, bananas, tubers, coconuts and wax.\textsuperscript{117} He also received some barkcloth and a number of unspecified smaller items. M.W. Siebelhoff, ‘De Verovering van de rotsvesting Oesondau’ 1907, p. 236.\textsuperscript{118} The food was provided originally when the Ternaten troops arrived their way to Buton to wage war on their opponents, but was left behind to be picked up later on return to Ternate as a form of tribute. Naidah, ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate, in Ternataanschen en Maleischen Tekst, Beschreven door den Ternataan Naidah met Vertaling en Aanteekeningen door P. van der Crab’, \textit{Bijdragen tot de Taal- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië}, Volume 4, p. 445.\textsuperscript{119} Lack of food meant that troops could not be depended on. A trader from Bone who represented the chief of Ussu, recounted the war that had taken place between Luwu and Wadjo. He himself had fought on the side of Luwu, but complained about that the ruler of Luwu not fed or payment, and therefore started to raid randomly. Fritz Sarasin, Paul Sarasin, \textit{Reisen in Celebes; Ausgefuhr in den Jahren 1893-1896 und 1902-1903}, Volume 1, 1903, p. 328.\textsuperscript{120} C. Bosscher, P.A. Matthijsen, ‘Schetsen van de Rijken van Tomboekoe en Banggai’, 1854 p. 100.
that depended on imported foods were particularly vulnerable. Vosmaer praised Kendari Bay as a good place to establish a trading post because it could not be cut off from food supplies in case of a maritime attack. Local populations also used this weapon of cutting off food supplies to help attackers defeat a local elite. This was reportedly an important factor contributing to the defeat of Agama in Banggai in 1846.121 Significantly, when the Tobungku population withdrew into the interior in the 1840s, Bugis traders on the coast were not only cut off from their market, but also from their source of food supplies.122 Not all foodstuffs could be controlled in the same way. In the case of rice, leaders could only make claims to certain lands or harvests if they were worked by their own slaves. However, this situation was different in the case of sago forests over which ownership rights could be more readily established. In Tomori, many sago forests were owned and planted by bonto or lesser chiefs.123

**Leaders and Followers**

Leaders surrounded by their followers moving back and forth across the historical landscape of eastern Sulawesi is a common image in both Dutch and local sources.124

The wide range of ‘men of prowess’ in eastern Sulawesi included elders of agricultural communities, leaders of maritime raiding expeditions, powerful coastal traders and warlords who represented external powers. In eastern Sulawesi, leaders and the pattern of the political system, could best be described as situated somewhere on a spectrum

121. See chapter 5.
122. ANRI, Ternate 180, p. 5b.
123. The ToMori bonto Pu’ukelu was renowned for the sago forests he accumulated in reward for assistance in warfare or other favours. In one case he chose the Tambunga i Ponda sago forest (on the coast to the south of the Bay of Kolonodale) instead of a large number of cloths and brass objects, because his descendants would still eat sago whereas the cloth would wear out. The gift was a reward for Pu’ukelu’s help to the ToPonda when they were attacked by the ToSalampe. The chief Tambunga i Boku, was given sago forests as a reward for helping fight off Tobelo raiders. J. Kruyt, *De Mossers van Tinompo*, Vol. 80, 1924, p. 64.
124. In Saluan people on the coast trace their history through the names of leaders who led them from the sacred Mount Tompotika to the coast over many generations. Kin from neighbouring villages could be traced to when they shared a common leader several generations earlier. Descendants of Bugis on the east coast trace their ancestry to Bugis chiefs who led certain groups from South Sulawesi to the east coast. In Dutch sources names of raiding chiefs are more common, usually with a group of mobile followers.
between Sahlin’s Polynesian chiefs and Melanesian big men. The greater emphasis on hierarchy and inherited status in the coastal polities with a hereditary aristocracy still only thinly disguised the importance of prowess and economic success in any bid for political power, while success as a chief depended on the ability to win people over. Even in Bugis society where inherited status plays an important role, the status of a noble is not sufficient to guarantee political influence without personal skills to attract followers. Conversely, non-aristocratic tau matoa (elders) were able to build effective networks without aristocratic descent. Bilateral descent only increased the possibility of succession struggles, as there was no clear line of descent. Because of the fluidity and polycentric nature of polities, competition between individual leaders was an important factor in the political dynamics of small-scale polities.

There were two contrasting poles to the dynamics of local leadership; on the one hand the centrality of the leader in creating a following and, on the other, the role of followers and subjects in circumscribing the power of the leader. When considered against the comparative background of a number of ethnographic studies in neighbouring areas, the profile of historical leaders becomes clearer. Thomas Kiefer, Susan Millar and Shelly Errington’s studies on respectively Sulu (southern Philippines) and South Sulawesi indicate the importance of leader-follower groups as well as their internal dynamics in a contemporary context. Kiefer sees the dyadic relationship of leader and followers as the key element in Tausug society. A group was not strictly

125. Millar’s study on Bugis in South Sulawesi focuses on the competition between alliance groups and on the formation of smaller groups centred on non-aristocratic elders or tau matoa. Aristocrats who had status, often did not have the ability to create an effective social network such as those of the tau matoa. The lack of prestige of tau matoa on the other hand meant that the continuation of the group over a longer period of time was questionable. An alliance between them proved fruitful; it provided aristocrats with an effective network and tau matoa with a status derived from an aristocratic patron. It is in this remarkable in this light that Errington, who studied the neighbouring ToLuwu (whom she lumps together with Bugis) puts so much emphasis on ascribed status. Even though she admits that low status does not necessarily stop one from becoming a strong leader, she sees this largely as a result of ‘war and disruption’ that upset the order that exists in ‘ordinary’(sic) times. Shelly Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 119; Susan Bolyard Millar, Bugis Wedding: Rituals of Social Location in Modern Indonesia, Berkeley: Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1989.
bounded, but had a constant centre, that consisted of the leader and core of close associates of the leader. Relations with individuals at the periphery of the group, however, became more ambiguous. The following of such a leader consisted of smaller sub-groups that were held together by a pyramid of alliances focussed on the leader. Groups were defined by their leaders, and the composition varied depending on the task at hand.\(^{127}\) Errington also sees the leader as the centre of a kapolo (entourage), who formed the shared focus of the kapolo members. As in the case of the Tausug, the kapolo in Luwu consisted of numerous subgroups, all of which traced their relationship to the leader, who stands out because of his high descent and spiritual potency.

At the other end of the local leadership spectrum is the work of Atkinson, who studied shamanism among the upland Wana (eastern arm of Sulawesi) and Kruyt, who wrote about the less hierarchical societies of inland Central Sulawesi. Both authors show that leadership lacked coercive force and was highly dependent on how others judged an individual’s personality and ability. A prospective shaman among the Wana had to win over an audience through his ritual performance and verbal skills.\(^{128}\) Whether or not a shaman became a respected leader depended ultimately on the opinion of the audience. Kruyt states that chiefs among the ToPomona became influential because they were sought out by others for advice and mediation. If one chief had more success than others as a mediator in conflicts, his reputation would spread to neighbouring groups and he would become known as a mokole. Such chiefs also co-ordinated agricultural labour and ensured everybody got a fair share of land. However, if he were to undertake a project that transgressed adat (customary law), people would readily abandon him.

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Both Atkinson and Kruyt also highlight the importance of mobility in the formation of alliance groups and as a factor in limiting the power of leaders. The Wana who practised shifting agriculture and did not have permanent settlements, regularly moved and regrouped, so that new settlements could form around a powerful shaman. A description of chiefs in the Poso area and its hinterland in 1899 highlights the lack of coercive power of leaders over commoners. According to Kruyt, commoners could only give orders to their slaves, never to their fellow commoners, nor were commands accepted from chiefs. Kruyt also mentions the case of the chief of coastal Poso, who, under the influence of ‘outsiders’ started to behave like a ruler, giving orders and levying a tax on rice. As a result, everybody except his closest relatives moved away, and his influence rapidly declined.129

The tension between these two poles of local leadership is clearly visible in the one thing rulers are most remembered for in eastern Sulawesi, which is their reputation for possessing powerful magic. This power was often referred to as ilmu, inherited or acquired esoteric knowledge.130 Ilmu translates most accurately as ‘power-knowledge’, because mastery of this knowledge enables one to manipulate supernatural forces, which in turn control, the ‘natural’ world.131 A person’s power is revealed through its efficacy, for example, in the ability to manage conflict, and in economic and military success. A person with such power was believed to be able to sway people with words or manage an angry crowd, while the wrath of such a powerful person was believed to

130. ‘Illum’ is originally an Arabic word that in contemporary Indonesian translates as knowledge, both secular and spiritual or magical knowledge. Sometimes the duplication, ilmu-ilmu, is used to refer to magical knowledge.
131. There are obvious parallels with Ben Anderson’s notions of Javanese power, which have subsequently been applied by Errington in Luwu. In her account of Luwu, Errington places great emphasis on the importance of spiritual potency of leaders, and sees the ability to accumulate spiritual potency or samanga as an inherent ability of ‘very high nobles’. Although I generally agree with the emphasis she places on samanga; it is embedded in the view that Luwu was an indic, strongly hierarchical polity, where only those of the right descent have the inherent abilities and means to gain access to power through mystical means. She acknowledges the fact that leaders who were not of high descent rose to prominence but sees this as an aberration. Even though an elite-focused perspective has its
be so strong that it could physically knock people to the ground. This power could be inherited from one’s parents or acquired through studying with a teacher and following ascetic practices such as meditating near known sacred sites such as graves or the ruins of old fortresses such as Kota Jin. On the east coast, Buton in particular was renowned as a good place to acquire ‘heavy’, that is powerful, knowledge, but in fact there were many places where this could be studied, both in eastern Sulawesi as well as further afield. In Palu, Bungku’s rulers were respected for their power, whereas in Banggai, many stories circulated of how rulers had accomplished certain feats solely through the use of magic. In many cases, graves of powerful ancestors can only be visited by their descendants, who enlist the help of the deceased to help resolve pressing social, financial or medical problems. Other sites were open to everybody.

The sources of esoteric knowledge and their legitimacy were a contested domain. On the one hand, there were groups of elders who claimed that true knowledge and spiritually charged heirlooms came from their own ancestors. They emphasised that their ancestral power was older and therefore more powerful than that of aristocratic families. Leaders needed to acknowledge these sources of localised ancestral power to be considered legitimate rulers by such elders. Descendants of former aristocratic rulers, on the other hand, were quick to point out that spiritual power was naturally associated with people of rank. Knowledge was passed down from one generation to the next, and the capacity to wield power was seen as an inherited ability that ‘comes down’ (turun) from one’s ancestors. At the same time, mencari ilmu (seeking knowledge) was open to anybody who could travel, since the source of ilmu of ‘power-knowledge’ were often seen to be elsewhere, outside of eastern Sulawesi. Hedeo Amir, son of the last Banggai ruler remarked that kings in the olden days travelled, ‘because if you stay at home you

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will never become smart (pintar)’. Esoteric knowledge and knowledge of the outside world shaded into one another, because in both cases they were unknown, potentially dangerous realms that could become a source of real power if confronted in the appropriate manner.

As in other parts of the archipelago, esoteric knowledge on the east coast was surrounded by secrecy and prohibitions that limited the possession of this knowledge to a select and privileged group. Disclosing esoteric knowledge to inappropriate people or even uttering chants or names incorrectly was believed to have grave consequences. The term katula was used to describe the suffering as a consequence of such carelessness including illness, death, accidents and other kinds of misfortune. Even though seeking such knowledge was in principle open to anybody, few were willing and able to pursue this search seriously, because the forces that were invoked were potentially dangerous and could harm an individual who was neither ‘strong’ (kuat) nor experienced enough to deal with them.

The historical tensions and contradictions manifest in eastern Sulawesi with regard to such sources of power is typical of an area with decentralised political structures. The supernatural power of rulers and leaders was both recognised and remembered by many informants, but was also challenged and dismissed by others. According to one informant, Banggai was a true democracy in the past, because individuals from any

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133. Such consequences were also feared when I asked to be taken to the ruins of Fafontofure in Tobungku. The trip was postponed many times, because, as it turned out later, people were afraid of taking an outsider to see the ruins because it may lead to accidents. The auspicious signs on the way up to the hilltop were greeted with some relief; a strong fragrance and a sudden rainshower were signs that we were being greeted favorably. My request to visit the ‘keramat’ of Mendono was received with the same reservation. I was advised to go with somebody who had a connection with the keramat because that was safer. A tourist who had visited it a few weeks before me had had an accident on the way back to Luwuk.

134. In relatively harmless cases, students were known to disappear magically for several days, because they were not yet able to deal with the force of the ‘power-knowledge’ they were dealing with. In more severe cases the student could fall sick, or particularly when taboos are not being respected, death might result. Visiting a sacred site without showing due respect or with impure intentions could have similar consequences. When I went to visit the keramat (sacred site) of Mendono, I was repeatedly told the story of a tourist who had visited there several weeks earlier, and who had a traffic accident on the way home.
strata of society could become a ruler as long as they were chosen. When the Dutch came, they restricted the position of ruler to the aristocracy, which he resented because ‘why should we have somebody who only had elementary school education but happens to be an aristocrat when there are high-school graduates’. The privileged position of aristocrats was not necessarily accepted. Examples of people moving away from oppressive leaders such as the chief of Poso also occur in sources on east coast polities. A group of people moved away from Batu because ‘if sugarcane was eaten, the basanyo (chief) had to have the sweet part, whereas the people had to eat the tasteless tip’. In other words, a selfish chief who did not have the welfare of his subjects at heart was not respected.

The most visible index of power was the number of followers an individual commanded, and it was here that the competition between rulers and leaders was most evident to outsiders. A VOC official remarked that the competition between leaders for followers and slaves was the main cause for conflict between them. This competition and conflict was not just found in the small-scale societies of eastern Sulawesi, but was prominent in Maluku as well. The amount of control a ruler exercised over particular populations depended on how well he cultivated relations with his subjects and with other chiefs. The Banggai ruler in 1890 mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, was not obeyed because he was neither trusted nor highly regarded. Relations with other local, supposedly subordinate, chiefs were particularly important, since a ruler only had indirect control over the labour of his subjects through relations with such chiefs. This web of relations corresponds with what Goedhart found in Banggai at the beginning of

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135. Interview, Pak Junus, Banggai, 4 December 1994. For this reason, he wholeheartedly signed the declaration that abolished the swapraja (colonial version of the Banggai polity) in 1950.


137. VOC 3504 f. 1786r.

138. In 1680, the Dutch made the Sultans of Tidore and Ternate sign a contract to allow their subjects to settle freely in each other’s territories, but by 1722 this was found to be a major cause of conflict between the sultanates. L. Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku, pp. 196, 197.
the twentieth century. There was a multitude of chiefs with overlapping spheres of authority, who only commanded the loyalty of certain groups of people.  

Most of the historical source material available with respect to leaders and followers concerns maritime groups, since they were most visible to the Dutch. The variety of these groups in terms of size, political affiliation and economic activities again corresponds closely to a fragmented political landscape; a landscape in which mobility was common. Maritime raiding groups could be formed for a specific mission and have no association with a particular polity. In 1727, VOC officials found that a joint raiding fleet was formed for a single expedition when people from a number of settlements on the south coast of the Gulf of Tomini, decided to share the costs of renting boats in order to raid. In this particular case the raiders had sailed to Banggai where they captured a number of people. Upon return, the captives were divided among the participants of the raid, and taken to their respective villages. Such spontaneous groups and opportunities were not limited to coastal people; in 1695, Tobungku people who lived several days walking inland came to the coast to raid without prior knowledge or permission of the ruler of Tobungku.  

At the other end of the spectrum were the large scale raiding fleets of Banggai and Tobungku. In 1695 Tobungku’s raiding fleet that attacked Toili consisted of 32 well armed korak-korak, whereas in 1714 Buton was said to possessed 40 korak-korak with more than 2000 fighting men that attacked Muna and defended Buton from attacks by Tobungku and Laiwui. Both Banggai and Tobungku could mobilise fleets of up to 100 large and small vessels, which included the perahu of neighbouring groups.

140. VOC 2050.
141. VOC 1556 f. 49r. 490r.
142. ibid. f. 323.
143. Generale Missiven VII p. 86.
144. ANRI Ternate 116 p. 20. See also chapter 3.
Despite the commanding appearance of large marauding fleets, some documented cases suggest that maritime chiefs, too, experienced a lack of coercive power to command and discipline their crews. In 1850, Revius, comments on Ternate’s use of the hongi, an armada made up of crews from various parts of the Ternaten Sultanate, mainly from Halmahera, used to discipline Ternaten tributaries. He noted that when they are subjected to order or discipline, they often dictate to their chiefs, and these, knowing that in case of punishment their men will leave them, do not dare take strict measures.145

The same situation was found to be the case with regard to land-based chiefs. Their wars were often inconclusive because their subjects were not interested in long-term conflicts. Leaders responded to this limitation of their fighting capacity in two ways. First, they formed alliances with outside groups specialised in raiding, who could be called on to join them in case of warfare. The theme of forging strategic alliances with specialised raiding groups, recurs in the following chapters. Second, as the influence of chiefs over their subjects was often tenuous, they needed people who were both more dependable and dependent on them: slaves.

**Slavery**

In Southeast Asian societies where vertical bonds of obligation were common, it was not always easy to distinguish between ‘slaves’ and other kinds of bondsmen and dependants. Slaves formed the closest circle of dependants around aristocrats, and were subsequently the social group most closely controlled. As Reid pointed out, slavery in Southeast Asia was very different from the slavery in the New World where European colonists did not have to adapt to indigenous forms of slavery and bondage. Warren and Reid both view slavery largely in light of control over labour. The owners of slaves

145 ANRI, Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaij en Xulla Eilanden 1850, p. 11a.
controlled the ‘productive and reproductive powers of human beings’ in societies where slavery existed side by side with other forms of dependency and bondage. Slavery was shaped by Southeast Asian notions of hierarchy in which ‘vertical bonding and a mutual sense of obligation’ were central.\textsuperscript{146} This contrasts with Henley’s recent approach to slavery in which the labour aspect is downplayed and a slave is viewed primarily as a status symbol of his or her owner, more akin to prestigious goods such as ceramics and cloth. These different approaches towards slavery as an institution may be attributed to the different perspectives and questions of the authors. Both Reid and Warren are trying to understand slavery and the slave trade on a larger scale, and mainly from the point of view of dominant societies with a labour-deficit that acquired slaves through capture and exchange. Henley, however, has focussed on the small-scale societies of northern and central Sulawesi, where slavery existed on a much smaller scale in both its hereditary and its more commercialised form. Here, the labour value of slaves for production of export commodities such as Warren poses for Sulu, was not always immediately apparent, whereas the status aspect of owning slaves was far more visible.

My own approach to slavery, naturally, takes its point of departure in the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi, where hereditary slavery was widespread, and where the centres of polities exported captured slaves over a long period of time, though not on a large scale. The sources on slavery in eastern Sulawesi, largely from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggest that patterns of slavery resembled the ‘familial model’ found throughout Southeast Asia. Slaves often had their own homes, planted their own fields and retained a certain amount of freedom.\textsuperscript{147} Some worked as servants in aristocratic households, while others lived separately and were called upon when labour was needed, for example to prepare and serve food at feasts, or to gather the harvest.


Vosmaer’s account of slavery in Konawe in the 1820s resembles a ‘closed system’ of slavery, where groups of inherited slaves belonged to families and could not be readily sold to outsiders.  

Slaves in Konawe were considered part of the extended family of the ‘owner’. If a person wanted to get rid of a slave, the first step was to transfer the individual to relatives or friends. If this proved unsuccessful, the next step was to try to sell the slave to a chief, who had more power to make a slave obey. Interestingly, this account dates from a period when slave-raiding and trading were wide-spread in the archipelago. Vosmaer observed that the condition of slaves among the Tolaki was good, better in fact than that of poor people in Europe at the time, because their master had a social obligation to take care of them. The bond linking slaves and their masters, according to Vosmaer, was based on reciprocity. Slaves became the social responsibility of their masters and mistresses, and in return they were called on to provide all sorts of services for their masters. The way slavery as a social system was remembered more than 160 years later in Tankian (Luwuk-Banggai) was remarkably similar:

the **miandaka** (aristocrats) can order the **bababu** or **botuan** (slaves) to do things. If the **bosanyo** (local chief in the Banggai area) had a feast, they had to come, they did not get invited, they just came. They could not sit in the official places, nor could they mix with the other guests, they had to sit way in the corner. They were the original people here, and were poor, different from the miandaka. They had their own houses and gardens, but the miandaka took care of all their needs, their food and clothing.

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148. Inherited slaves in Toraja and Mandar could not be sold or redeemed. ibid. p. 162.

149. After slavery was abolished an official in Gorontalo noted that it continued under the name of anak piara, adopted children, rephrasing it in terms of a kinship relationship. ANRI Gorontalo Bundel 3, p. 21.


151. Interview Pak Abba, kepala desa (village head), 22 Tankian, December 1994.
The involvement of slaves and other dependant people in aristocratic households on the east coast of Sulawesi was still common in the early decades of the twentieth century. In Tobungku in this period the custom still existed that infants in aristocratic families were not to be put down on a mattress until forty-four days after birth. Slave women took turns holding the child for a day and a night. After they had finished their task, they received the sarung in which the infant had been wrapped as a gift.152 This custom shows that slaves could perform a special task that created a singular bond between aristocratic families and certain groups of slaves, in which there was reciprocity. This specific custom is charged with meaning, since a slave woman caring for an aristocratic infant symbolises the dependence of aristocrats on slaves or groups of a lowly rank, incidentally also a recurring theme in origin myths in the region.

Yet another category of ‘slaves’ were entire villages or groups within a polity that had been captured during warfare or who had sought protection from a chief in times of danger. These were groups of people who were associated with a polity rather than with a family or ‘lord’. In Buton, besides slaves who were either bought or had been captured, there was a third group called *pepara bangsa paraka*, which consisted of nine villages that had voluntarily surrendered themselves to the council of Buton.153 This was done in order to receive special protection against raiders or other, lesser predatory nobility. In Tobungku, in 1850, there was also a special group of approximately six hundred slaves (*rijksslaven*) and fifty commoners that performed services for the ruler of Tobungku on a daily basis, such cultivating his fields, possibly the forbears of the slave women discussed above.154 In Konawe the *tamalaki*, who formed a warrior class under the leadership of two nobles, and answered directly to the

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152. Interview, Abdul Azis, February 1995, Bungk’u Tengah.

153. Slaves were collectively was known as papara. Besides the papara bangsa paraka, there were the papara bangsa Talubinara (war captives) and papara bangsa Kantinale (bought slaves). A. M. Zahari, Sejarah dan Adat Fiy Darul Butuni I, p. 115.
ruler were called ‘slaves of the ruler’. ‘Slave’ in the local context of eastern Sulawesi often meant close associate who followed orders, persons with a special status and limited rights, but who could be entrusted with important tasks for aristocratic families.

However, the ‘slave’ was also a commodity in the local and regional economy, primarily circulated as a war captive from elsewhere to supplement the income of local elites. The slaves sold in Buton, Tobungku and Banggai in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were most likely captives acquired through raiding rather than hereditary slaves. In the case of Buton, the export of slaves replaced spices as the main means of obtaining imported prestige goods, while the Banggai elite used the neighbouring island of Peleng as a source of slaves in the early seventeenth century, possibly also as a commodity to replace spices. The commercialisation of slavery and regional trade that occurred in Southeast Asia in the late eighteenth century was noticeable in eastern Sulawesi in terms of the increase of raiding. In the nineteenth century, slaves from Peleng were so common that they were used as a common purpose currency against which the value of trading goods was measured. Slaves appeared to have featured largely as an export commodity in eastern Sulawesi, and not as a means of augmenting production for export, as Warren documented for Sulu in this period, though through their agricultural production slaves may have freed up the labour of others to pursue more lucrative economic activities, such as raiding and trading.

Though the sources on slavery are limited, it does appear, that debt became a more common route into slavery than capture in the latter part of the nineteenth century. By


155. Militaire Memorie van Overgave van de onderafdeling Laiwoei, Aanvulling gelast bij schrijven van Gewestelijk MII Commandant van Celebes en Menado 29 November 1928 No. 2349, Koninklijk Instituut der Tropen 1165.

156. VOC 1647 Letter from Buton: The ruler of Buton writes that all spice trees had been cut down in accordance with the VOC’s regulations. All they have left for export is slaves, which they needed to trade for cloth, rice and other foodstuff. But since Batavia forbade the export of Buton’s slaves to Batavia a few years earlier, ‘this has caused great misery in our land’. The ruler and council of Buton request permission to export slaves, annually 50 or 60, to Batavia, in order to be able to purchase cloth.
this time, the demand for forest products had already made a considerable impact, but it cannot be assumed that the situation Kruyt encountered in Peleng at this time was also common earlier in the nineteenth century. He mentions that in Peleng large numbers of people were indebted to coastal chiefs, and entered slavery as a result. If the number of slaves grew too large for the chiefs to maintain, some were sold to the mainland of Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{157} Debt was in theory redeemable, but if Peleng was in any sense representative, the chances were debt-slaves would be transferred before they could repay their debt. As a result, the category ‘slave’ may have become more elastic as more people were snared each year in debt and bondage. That debt did not automatically translate into slavery is evident from the Tomori case. Among the Tomori, chiefs and other aristocrats were surrounded by people who were indebted to them in one way or another, but who could not be bought or sold.\textsuperscript{158}

The importance of control over people rather than over land is signified by the role and status of slaves. On the one hand the almost familial and personalised relations with slaves highlights the value of slaves as close dependants and followers of influential leaders. Even here, bonds of mutual obligation clearly existed. Slaves served as domestic servants and agricultural labourers whose ‘owners’ were responsible for food, clothing, and sponsoring life-cycle rituals. On the other hand, war captives with whom no personalised bonds existed, were readily exchanged for prestige goods and food. Some captives, groups as well as individuals, over time were absorbed into local small-scale societies.

**Warfare and Raiding in eastern Sulawesi**

Warfare and raiding are one of the best documented aspects of eastern Sulawesi’s history, since as particularly the maritime aspect of it was visible to outsiders. Reports

on warfare and raiding occur in the earliest accounts of Banggai and Tobungku, and dominate the historical sources in the nineteenth century. Junker sees raiding as ‘one of many dynamics of chiefly political economies’.\textsuperscript{159} The goal of maritime raiding was to capture resources such as food stores and slaves, and to undermine the trade of rival polities. She links the increase inter-polity conflict and raiding in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to an increase in foreign trade and the competition between polities for this trade. Similarly, Healey sees raiding as ‘functionally implicated in early Malay state forms’. Predatory raiding and trading were the two ways in which the small-scale coastal polities of Borneo were able to obtain ‘critical resources’ necessary for the reproduction of the state. Raiding was generated by the inherently contradictory relations between coastal states and autonomous inland peoples who supplied important non-subsistence based commodities for export.\textsuperscript{160} The link between raiding and trading on a large and commercialised scale was documented in the Sulu Sultanate in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Warren.\textsuperscript{161}

Warfare and headhunting were certainly not the prerogative of coastal polities. Headhunting was practised by most ethnic groups on mainland Sulawesi, and warfare between inland groups was not uncommon. However, in the coastal polities of Banggai and Tobungku warfare and economic prosperity coincided in the sixteenth century, and in Tobungku also in the early nineteenth century. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Tobungku were known as ‘the most ferocious people of Maluku’, which supports the idea that there was a warrior class in Tobungku.\textsuperscript{162} When Tobungku threatened to attack a Dutch-Ternate delegation in 1808, there was no standing army in the main

\textsuperscript{158} In Petasia, the village where the most prominent ToMori chief lived. His large dwelling housed 173 people, and was surrounded by 24 smaller houses in which another 77 lived. M.W. Siebelhoff, ‘De Verovering van de rotsvesting Oesondau’, 1907, pp. 233.


\textsuperscript{161} J.F. Warren, \textit{The Sulu Zone}, 1981.
settlement, but people were summoned to prepare for war by sounding drums, while messengers were sent to areas further away from the main settlement. Revius, writing in 1850, remarked that one reason why conflicts between small-scale polities in Sulawesi were often not resolved was because their agricultural populations were only interested in short raids rather than a more long-term military campaign, so that there was no decisive victory or defeat. These observations suggest that conflicts were fought not by a separate warrior class, but by the ordinary population under arms. The nearest thing to a professional warrior class were the tamalaki in Konawe mentioned earlier, also called ‘slaves’ of the ruler. The Konawe anakia (aristocrats) of Lalumera, whom the Sarasin cousins met in 1903, related that warfare was their favourite activity, but it is not known whether they were a distinct group of anakia or only a few individuals.

In an environment in which violence was common, it was important for the centre of a polity to have some strategic advantage over other groups. This was created through alliances with external groups such as Bugis and Tobelo, and perhaps internally with groups of slave-warriors such as the tamalaki.

The direct link between warfare and political organisation at the polity-level is most clearly expressed in Tobungku, where its warlike reputation for which it was known in the eighteenth century Dutch sources lives on in local oral traditions. The term for village head in the inland villages was tadolako, which means warrior, or leader of a headhunting expedition. Kings in Tobungku are particularly remembered for their victories. One of the first Tobungku rulers, Lainafa, was known as the warrior king who was impossible to defeat. He was invulnerable, according to oral tradition, because of the sword he owned, which he magically pulled up from Lake Matano when fishing one day. He reputedly waged battles in the neighbouring coastal areas of Banggai, Tojo.

162. VOC 2740, f. 393.
163. ANRI, Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaij en Xulla Eilanden 1850, p. 11a.
164. Fritz Sarasin, Paul Sarasin, Reisen in Celebes Volume 1, 1903, p. 375.
Wawonii and Lasolo. One of his titles was Peapua Sumapoio Nuha which means ‘the one who conquered Nuha’, located near the principal source of iron and nickel in the hinterland of Tobungku. He was also known by a Bugis nickname, Aru Camba, the lord with the beard. According to the myth, he took one couple from each conquered village down to the coast, while another source says they were in fact war captives.\textsuperscript{165} Their descendants formed villages named after their place of origin in the interior. The myth of Lainafa links warfare not only with the formation of the polity, and, with ‘acquiring’ people through warfare, it also traces the possible formation of a local trade sphere; a trade sphere in which the interior with its iron, nickel and food supplies was linked to surrounding coastal areas. The extent of Tobungku’s local sphere of political and economic influence as represented in the mythical account is remarkably similar to the actual situation that Vosmaer encountered in Tobungku in the early decades of the nineteenth century. At this time, Tobungku was at that time at the height of its power as a trading and raiding polity, and dominated coastal trade from Banggai to Lasolo and Wawonii.

While possibly not as central to Banggai’s oral traditions, warfare and warriors are nevertheless also at the heart of the polity’s traditional rituals. One of the primary sacred objects in Banggai is the head of the warrior Abu Kasim, the son of one of Banggai’s legendary kings, and whose magical sword gave him invincibility.\textsuperscript{166} Banggai’s flag,


\textsuperscript{166} Abu Kasim was the son of the legendary Javanese who became king in Banggai and later returned to Java, leaving behind his pregnant wife. As a child Abu Kasim is requested to become king, he declines and travels to Java to meet his father, and on his return his sister and uncle accompany him. After being rejected by his half-sister Putri Saleh, he attempted to fight himself to death. He did not succeed until he gave his sword that made him invulnerable to his enemies. His head was caught repeatedly in the nets of local fishers until they understood that it was a special object and took it to the ruler of Banggai. According to oral traditions this head gradually turned into gold or pewter. It is wrapped in many layers of cloth and stored in a chest, and is one of the most important relics associated with Banggai. It is kept in a ceremonial house (rumah keramat) especially devoted to it, that is cared for by a group of hereditary guardians. This sacred house and its relic play a central in inauguration ceremonies of new rulers. J. J. Dormeier, \textit{Banggaisch Adatrecht}, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indié, Deel VI, ‘s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1947; A.C.Kruyt, ‘De Vorsten van Banggai’, 1931, pp. 505-529, 605-624, Machmud, Babad Banggai, Sepintas Kilas, Jakarta/Banggai, 1986.
now very much a ritual object, is also closely associated with warfare. On the occasion of **mabangun tunggal**, a three day ceremony during which the history of Banggai is recited, the flag is unfurled. This can only be done by the traditional guardians of the flag who dress in red for this occasion, which symbolises courage and bravery. It is believed that at the moment of unfurling a multitude of warriors appear behind them, also dressed in red, who are the invisible warriors who protect Banggai. These warriors could be called on in times of danger by the ruler, if he had mastered the necessary esoteric knowledge. Spiritual prowess of the ruler was obviously crucial for defending an east coast polity in times of danger and for success in military affairs.\(^{167}\)

The position of warriors was heightened by the centrality of headhunting in both inland and coastal societies on the mainland of Sulawesi, which in turn caused cycles of tribal warfare and feuding. Human heads were used in mortuary and fertility rituals and were also believed to ward off calamities. Death, particularly that of a high status person, frequently precipitated headhunting. Headhunting may have also been important as a rite of passage for young men in order to be able to marry, though only evidence for this is Vosmaer’s remark that successful headhunting expeditions were an important occasion for young people to court each other.\(^ {168}\) The Tolaki, whose name means ‘the brave ones’, were feared by their northern neighbours in Tobungku because of their headhunting expeditions, so much so that Tobungku porters begged Revius not to go to the upper reaches of the Bahosolo river because that was the territory of the notoriously belligerent Tolaki.\(^ {169}\) The southern neighbours of the Tolaki, the Tomoronene, suffered

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**167.** Interview with Pak Idat, Banggai, 22 November 1994. The **mabangun tunggal** ceremony was traditionally held once a year around December, but had not been held since the invasion by Permesta forces in the 1950s. During this ceremony, which can last up to three days the history of Banggai is recited by a female medium.

**168.** Among the Tolaki human skulls were highly desired objects. Vosmaer writes that headhunting expeditions by Tolaki were usually carried out under the auspices of chiefs, and that the head was divided among the participants. If a higher chief was present, the head was not divided but taken in its entirety by that chief after the ceremonies had been completed. J. N. Vosmaer, ‘Korte Beschrijving’, 1839, p. 89, 90. In the 1990s, it was difficult to get information on headhunting, since most older people were reluctant to speak about it, and most younger people did not know it had ever existed.

**169.** ANRI, Ternate 180 p. 4a.
equally from regular headhunting raids and warfare during which many were brought back as captives. The Bugis settlement in Kendari Bay in 1850 experienced frequent headhunting attacks by Tolaki, so that they could not travel into the interior safely.  

Headhunting, usually associated with inland, swidden cultivators, was crucial to the power and expansion of the Tobungku polity as well. In 1808 a Tobungku fleet returned with 69 human heads from a raid in the Banggai area. These heads were more than a trophies of war; Vosmaer noted how common headhunting was in Tobungku, and that the Tobungku undertook violent headhunting expeditions in boats. In the centre of the main settlement of Tobungku was a large structure decorated with human skulls, in which large ceremonies were held. Later ethnographic descriptions of neighbouring areas identified these as lobo, in which communal ceremonies were carried out and where celebrations were held after successful headhunting expeditions.

The skills of warrior chiefs increased in importance in times of armed conflict, especially among populations that did not withdraw to remote areas. It is significant that in the period when Iranun and Tobelo maritime raiding was extremely common in the 1820s, the only part of the coast that was inhabited was in the vicinity of Tobungku, which also had a reputation for maritime raiding. Similarly, the area of a renowned raiding chief on Muna (Lohia) was the most densely populated part of the island at the beginning of the twentieth century, despite a lack of water and fertile land. As the most

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170. ANRI, Ternate, p. 5a.


172. Kotilainan describes the lobo among the ToPamona as the village temple which was ‘the dwelling place of the ancestral spirits and symbolized the common origin of the related people [in a Pamona village]. The sacrificial feasts held in the lobo revolved around common ancestral spirits, and were occasions to celebrate the bravery of headhunters. Schrauwers also mentions the lobo as the ‘village temple that served as a ritual centre’. Near the residence of the Tomori paramount chief Marundu stood a lobo with 35 human skulls, heads of his own subjects who had risen against him. The Sarasin brothers and Knyt and Adriani also note the widespread existence of lobo in central Sulawesi, often referred to as the village temple. It was used as a meeting house, a place for guests to sleep, and for village ceremonies. N. Adriani; A.C. Knyt, De Bare-esprekende Toraja’s van Midden-Celebes, Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1912, P. & F. Sarasin, Reise durch Celebes, 2 Vols. 1902-1905; Eija-Maija Kotilainan; When the Bones are Left, 1992, p. 13, Albert Schrauwers, ‘In Whose Image?’ 1995; M.W. Siebelhoff, ‘De Venovering van de rotvesting Oesondau’ 1907, p. 234.
powerful chief of Muna, who raided over land and on the sea, he could offer the best possible protection against other chiefs.\textsuperscript{173} Those who needed such protection but could give nothing in return automatically assumed a dependent status, so that the following of militarily successful leaders would increase in times of unrest.

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The small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi share many fundamental characteristics with larger political formations in Southeast Asia and with what have become known as chiefdoms in the archaeological literature. In fact the emphasis on polycentrism, the importance of personalised leadership, and the relative weakness of large-scale, overarching structures suggests that small-scale polities were the dominant mode of political organisation in Southeast Asia in the early modern era, and certainly more enduring. The centrality of leaders as political and economic actors in eastern Sulawesi is a major theme that can be traced throughout the period under investigation, and into the twentieth century. The power was based on a reputation for physical prowess and spiritual ‘power-knowledge’ that enabled him (and sometimes her) to manipulate and control their physical, social and political realities. Within the polity, feasting demonstrated the leader’s ability to organise people and food resources on a large scale and to muster the support of invisible forces. Foreign prestige goods also enhanced the status of leaders, which is why trade was so important to the political formations in eastern Sulawesi. The sparse historical evidence gives contrasting images of local trade patterns, suggesting that both more centralised (Banggai in the 1530s, Tobungku in the early nineteenth century) and more dispersed (Banggai at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Tobungku in the latter part of the nineteenth century) patterns occurred, depending on the nature of the most important export commodities at the time and on the regional political and economic context. In both cases, competition between

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{173} V.G.A.Boll, ‘Eenige Mededeelingen omtrent het eiland Moena’,
\end{footnote}
leaders would have been driven by the need to control the distribution of imported prestige goods. In this context, maritime raiding was closely linked to trade and to political processes more generally within small-scale polities. Raiding provided wealth, which in turn helped consolidate relations within the polity as well as undermine the trade and power of rival chiefs and polities. The following chapter explores competition and conflict within small-scale polities and the role of external centres in the local context of eastern Sulawesi.
2

Polycentric Polities: Competition, Conflict and External Centres

The Polities and Geography of Eastern Sulawesi

This chapter focuses on the internal structure and tensions in the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi, in which competition for status and wealth played an important role. The geographic fragmentation in Southeast Asia has been recognised as an important factor in giving rise to its characteristic polycentric political landscape.174 Such fragmentation is also evident in eastern Sulawesi in the elaborate early descriptions of mountain chains, dangerous currents, coral reefs, coves and islets in European ship-logs, accompanied by the regular mention of shipwrecks. In European sources, the coast and the neighbouring islands were the most visible parts of the landscape for the simple reason that the VOC and later the colonial state were predominantly naval powers. To further complicate matters, the east coast of Sulawesi was located between Makassar and Maluku, in a peripheral position in relation to Dutch administrative centres. Europeans rarely entered the interior before the beginning of the twentieth century, so that the worlds that lay beyond the coast were rarely mentioned in their accounts. Coastal settlements and islands, particularly Banggai, Tobungku and Buton that were readily known to the outside world as the centres of local polities, were therefore given disproportionate weight in historical accounts.

An occasional remark, however, reminds us that the coastline was in fact also a periphery of an inland world that remained hidden from historical sight. Both Valentijn, writing in 1726, and J. Kruyt in the early twentieth century conjured up an image of the inland Tomori area buzzing with activity, and with relatively easy connections to South

Sulawesi, the Gulf of Tomini and the eastern arm of the island.\textsuperscript{175} Van der Hart, writing in 1850, says that he only lists the coastal settlements of Tobungku, but that there were inland ones as well, some as far away as a seven day walk.\textsuperscript{176} The false dichotomy between coast (visible) and interior (invisible) was therefore at least partly due to the fact that Europeans were largely bound to the deck of their ships, and serious exploration and colonisation of the hinterland of eastern Sulawesi would not get underway until the beginning of the twentieth century.

While Southeast Asia is generally portrayed as ‘uniquely accessible to seaborne traffic’\textsuperscript{177}, travel by sea was not necessarily easy or safe for European or indigenous navigators. For early European travellers the east coast was often an unplanned deviation on their journey from Maluku to Java, when they were easily blown off course on to treacherous reefs and shoals. Because of this danger, assistance to shipwrecks would become an important point of consideration in the relations between the VOC and Buton. A dangerous maze of reefs and shoals in combination with strong currents made the east coast extremely treacherous for European ship captains that did not have the necessary knowledge to navigate through these waters safely.\textsuperscript{178} Francis Drake and his crew spent a month trying to find their way out of a labyrinth of shoals when they navigated down the east coast in 1579, and were only able to reach the relative safety of open sea when ‘friendly Malays’ pointed them in the right direction.\textsuperscript{179} Hence,

\textsuperscript{175} The term ‘Tomori’ does not emerge in Dutch documents until the middle of the nineteenth century. In the 1660 contract between Temate, Tidore and the VOC as ‘groten imbogt van Malalou’. In 1683 Tometana it is mentioned as separate from ‘Tambuco’ (Tobungku). The same Tometana is described by Valentijn in 1726 as being located deep in the having a separate chief, and having good overland connections to both the Gulf of Tomini and the Gulf of Bone. See respectively: Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum II, as-Gravenhage, 1932 p. 342, III p. 309; Francois Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, p. 80, 81; J. Kruyt, ‘De Moriërs van Tinompo’, 1924, pp. 33-214.

\textsuperscript{176} C. van der Hart, Reize rondom het Eiland Celebes, 1853, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{177} A. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680 I, 1988, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{178} Urdaneta mentions that a Portugese shipwrecked in the islands of ‘Macaizes’, very near Tobungku (Tabuay). Andres de Urdaneta, ‘Narrative of the Louisiana Expedition’, 1990, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{179} One of the earliest European seafarers to suffer this fate was Francis Drake. After resting and repairing his ship for a period of six weeks on an uninhabited island near Banggai, his voyage nearly came to an end when his ship struck one of the many submarine reefs off the coast to the north of Tomori Bay. Drake’s ship
European ships generally avoided the east coast altogether, travelling either via north Sulawesi or via Makassar to Maluku.

Nor were indigenous craft free of such danger. The east coast was safe during the west monsoon, but during the east monsoon, high seas made sea-journeys hazardous. The local knowledge necessary to deal with these hazards was not limited to the geography, but also comprised special kinds of esoteric knowledge to control winds and get boats unstuck from reefs. The advantage of such local knowledge and power vis-a-vis outsiders is graphically captured in a segment of the *Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe*, in which a Dutch ship is rescued by Tobungku, demonstrating that the seemingly powerful Dutch in this localised context were in fact powerless and dependent. When the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), so closely associated with the expansion of the colonial state in the Indonesian archipelago, opened a shipping line to the east coast of Sulawesi in 1883, it was the only one in the archipelago that would not operate at night. Especially the stretch between Bungku and

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180 The rescue of the Banggai ruler Agama from Ternaten and Dutch forces in 1846 was attributed to Lananra’s skills to direct the winds. Even though he was frail and blind, his ‘ilmu’ enabled the Bugis vessels from the Gulf of Tomini to arrive within two days. See chapter 6.

181 ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, 1931, p. 14. In 1995 there were still a number of elderly men with the special knowledge necessary to get ships unstuck from reefs. In the contemporary context, this superiority of local ‘power-knowledge’ is contrasted with modern technology rather than with the power of the Dutch. The head of the port authorities in Tobungku, Ten Marundu, related a recent incident in which a large ship had run aground near the anchorage of Tobungku. After all means had been exhausted to free the ship from its precarious position, these elderly men were called upon, who succeeded in freeing the ship after spending one night on board.

182 The KPM was the archipelago-wide shipping company that provided regular services between all parts of the archipelago, starting from the 1880s. The first line to eastern Sulawesi from Makassar opened in 1883, going only half way up the east coast to Tobungku. In the late 1890s the service expanded to cover the entire coast of Sulawesi. See chapter 7.
Banggai was negotiated with great care because of strong currents and shoals. Even as late as 1914, there was still no reliable maritime chart of the coast of eastern Sulawesi despite the dangers it posed to European shipping. Interestingly, after several decades of direct rule by the Dutch, the coastline of eastern Sulawesi was still not well surveyed and documented. It was not until 1945, that an elaborate and systematic description of the geography of the east coast was prepared for the Allied Forces. This report repeatedly stressed the importance of ‘local knowledge’ necessary to approach many of the smaller anchorages.

Similarly, local representations of political and geographic space are often more complete than those found in European sources, since myths and oral histories often include coasts, inland areas and islands, presenting the three cultural and ecological categories in which the area can be divided as interconnected spacial, political and social realities. Most of the interior was densely forested and mountainous, but there were also fertile river basins and plains that became the heartlands of the more agriculturally oriented chiefdoms of Tomori and Konawe. Coastal areas had more frequent contact with the outside world and as economic and political relations with external centres started to play a more important role, the coast became socially and politically distinct from the interior. The Buton and Banggai archipelagoes off the east coast shared similar features; they were surrounded by reefs with abundant marine resources, but also had infertile limestone soils and were relatively dry. Hence, the populations of these archipelagos depended on trade relations with the more fertile

183 Even when travelling in the 1990s between Bungku and Kendari on a small motorised vessel it was too dangerous to continue at night, so that we had to moore near the Salabungka Islands for the night. P. A. Wintjes, ‘Eene Nieuwe Missiepost in’t Verschiet’, Berichten uit Nederlands-Indië voor Leden van de St. Claverbond, 1914 p. 164.


mainland where they could exchange food for locally produced goods (cotton cloth in the case of Buton) or imported luxury goods.

In each polity, there are clusters of overlapping myths that link islands, coast and interior together through kinship, shared or contested heroes, tributary relations, wars and trade. The individual polities mentioned in European sources in fact constitute a mosaic of many smaller communities that each has its own perspective on the past. Cultural, economic and kinship ties link Banggai with coastal tributaries and their mountainous hinterlands. Tobungku is connected in the same way to the inland areas of Matano and ToEpe. The coastal realm of Laiwui was but one realm in the larger inland federation of Konawe, while Buton was surrounded by a myriad of islands and coastlines, each with their own origin myths and chiefs. The landscape was not just populated by humans, nor was it just a backdrop for human activity. While traveling down the east coast, stories were told to me that related to certain parts of the landscape, commemorating events and people in the past, noting particularly dangerous spots inhabited by souls of people who died there, or by a guardian spirit that to be appeased. 186

In the Banggai area myths revolve around the children of Lalogani, who was the chief of a settlement on the top of Mount Tompotika, which was attacked and destroyed. His children were dispersed and became the descendants of Banggai’s population. 187 The eldest brother remained in the highlands, the younger brother lived on the coast and their sister who was the youngest lived on Banggai. Through her marriage to a

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186 Of one many examples is Batu Payung (Umbrella Rock) near the entrance of Kolonodale Bay. This rock that resembles an umbrella, is believed to be the home of a giant octopus (gurita). Out of respect for this potentially dangerous creature, all ships that go through the entrance of the bay must sound their horn.

187 In slightly different variations the following story was told about the children of Lalogani: Originally there was a fortified settlement on Mount Tompotika with Lalogani as its chief. After a devastating attack, the settlement dispersed and the three children of Lalogani moved away from the mountain. The eldest son stayed in the highlands, but the younger brother moved down to the coast where he came in contact with the outside world and became more sophisticated (tambah pintar, become cleverer). The youngest sibling, a sister, moved to Banggai and married a foreigner. Because of her marriage she could demand tribute from her two elder brothers. She appointed the second brother who lived on the coast as the intermediary for the brother in the highlands, who would pass on his tribute to Banggai.
foreigner, she was able to demand tribute from her younger siblings, thus reversing the normal sibling order in the context of expanding trade and contact with the outside world. The importance of long distance trade in the genesis of the Banggai polity is corroborated by historical sources. The ‘northern route’ from China to Maluku in the 14th to 16th centuries passed by Banggai, which enabled the island to participate in this trade through its export of iron and foodstuffs. By the seventeenth century, Banggai was growing spices for external trade, but also continued to participate in local and regional trade in Maluku, as it was a convenient stepping stone on the journey to the eastern islands including Alor and even northern Australia. Though political and economic relations fluctuated within the Banggai polity, historically it comprised the Banggai archipelago, the south coast of the eastern arm of Sulawesi (Balantak, Luwuk, Kintom, Tangkian, Batui) and, arguably, the north coast as well. The small limestone island of Banggai was where the capital usually was located, providing the population or ruler had not moved to the mainland. The mention of iron sold to Chinese traders at Banggai in thirteenth and fourteenth century sources and of foodstuffs such as sago to Maluku in the seventeenth century, suggests that in throughout this period Banggai had close trading links with the mainland of Sulawesi where iron and nickel were mined and sago was abundant. The mainland settlements of Batui, Tankian, Mendono and Luwuk located on the south coast of the eastern arm, were included in the loose political unity of Banggai in the seventeenth century. Mendono competed with Banggai for the position of the most prominent settlement, and during most of the period under consideration, was a more prosperous trading settlement.


The dry, hilly landscape of Banggai and Peleng contrasted with the steep volcanic hills and mountain ranges of the eastern arm, that were well supplied with water, but had no navigable rivers. What might appear to be a rugged interior to outsiders could be traversed at its narrowest point in one day by people accustomed to walking in hilly terrain. As north-south communication across the peninsula was relatively easy, tributary relations of the coastal centres of Mendono and Tankian extended into the hilly interior and up to the north coast to resp. Boalemo and the immediate hinterland of Bunta. The staple on the mainland was rice, whereas on Banggai and Peleng tubers were the main crop. Exports from the mainland were rice and wax, and from Mendono also cloth and cotton in the nineteenth century. The reefs and surrounding environs that were difficult to navigate for large European ships provided an ideal environment for fisherfolk, including semi-nomadic Bajo populations, that provided the important commodities of tortoise shell in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and tripang in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bajo presence in the Banggai archipelago had an important impact on the Banggai culture and economy; all terms related to fishing in the Banggai language were derived from Bajo terms, and the Banggai name for the god of the sea is Sama, the name Bajo use to refer to themselves.\textsuperscript{190} In the VOC period, Banggai exported tortoise shell, but by the early nineteenth century tripang (seaslug) had overtaken tortoise shell as the most important marine product for export.

The most prominent polity on the mainland of the east coast was Tobungku. It’s shoreline consisted of a small coastal strip with a rapid ascent into steep foothills and mountains. Van der Hart notes in 1850 that all ten of Tobungku’s coastal settlements were located on a river mouth, and that each district was named after a river.\textsuperscript{191} While not navigable, estuaries of rivers in the Tobungku area served as anchorages and shallow riverbeds could also be used as walking trails into the interior. Tobungku’s

\textsuperscript{190} A. C. Kruyt, ‘De Bewoners van den Banggai Archipel’, 1932, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{191}
capital Fafontofure was situated on a fortified hilltop on the coast just south of the estuary of the small Sakita river. The fact that Tobungku is described as a series of contiguous coastal settlements stretching north and south of the capital suggests that integration along the coast was more easily achieved than with the interior, even though Van der Hart mentions that some Tobungku settlements were located as far as seven days on foot into the interior. In the late 1840s, Fafontofure was destroyed by Ternaten forces, and the capital of Tobungku was forcibly relocated to less advantageous and defensible site at Lanona, but by the 1870s it had gravitated back to the original location near Fafontofure.

Urdaneta mentions that Tobungku mined iron and exported it to Timor, Borneo and Java as early as the 1530s. The high quality nickel and iron from the interior of Sulawesi was mined from surface deposits near Lake Matano, and found its way to the Gulf of Bone (Luwu) and to the east coast via various trade routes. In the late seventeenth century Tobungku exported tortoise-shell, swords and wax, and was home to the first documented shore-based Bajo settlement on the east coast. By the early nineteenth century, Tobungku was the largest trading settlement on the east coast, controlling an extensive network of local trade and exchange and drawing annual fleets of trading vessels from South Sulawesi. Vosmaer mentions that Tobungku’s expansion took place through control over local trade along the coast and in the Banggai archipelago. In this period, tripang was its most desired export, again because of the strong presence of Bajo collectors. It’s economic role as a staple port for regional trade

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192 ibid.
193 Andres de Urdaneta, ‘Narrative of the Loaiasa Expedition’, 1990, p. 323. The exact location of what Urdaneta calls Tabuay is not mentioned, but since he locates it to the west of Banggai, close to a source of iron which it also exported, this polity is located in the same location as Tobungku in the seventeenth century. Iron swords could have been imported to Banggai by way of local trade from the Gulf of Tomori or could have travelled via interior routes to the eastern arm from where it could have reached Banggai.
194 In 1683 Poso was reported to export iron, which was taken down to the coast by the ‘mountain people’ (berglieden). Generale Missiven IV, p. 517.
ended in the 1840s in the aftermath a number of punitive expeditions conducted by Ternate and the Dutch. Soon after a new Ternaten elite was installed in Tobungku, a decade long dispute arose between the inland Tomori and Tobungku, provoked by the imposition of restrictions the coast-inland trade. Only Dutch-Ternaten intervention in 1856 saved the Tobungku from the humiliation of a disadvantageous peace treaty forced upon them by the militarily more powerful Tomori.

The large Tomori Bay located in the deepest part of the Bay of Tolo, was an important part of Tobungku’s sphere of influence. In the early eighteenth century both Banggai and Tobungku contested this area, but the latter gained the upper hand. The heartland of the inland Tomori was connected to this bay by the river La, one of the few navigable rivers on the east coast of Sulawesi. Rice, iron and other inland products found their way to the outside world via this river. The separation between lowland and upland Tomori (Mori bawah and Mori atas), as they described in appear in early twentieth century accounts appears to have resulted from differential access to external trade. Oral traditions trace the origins of lowland populations and their aristocracy back to the interior, which suggests that as external trade increased, more and more upland Tomori migrated towards the coast. The lowland Tomori, often referred to as Tomoiki, were the dominant group in the Tomori chiefdom that consisted of a federation of more and less powerful chiefs. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the Tomoiki carried on a lively trade along the banks of the La river, trading agricultural produce such as rice and sago for imported commodities. Their close proximity to the source of the nickel and iron deposits made them intermediaries in the

196 Roselaer refers to the bay (diepe inbogt) as Taloa, in which several settlements were located that gradually had been taken by Tobungku. VOC 1727 f. 907.

197 ANRI, Ternate 180, 29a-30a.

198 J. Kruyt, ‘De Moriërs van Tinompo’, 1924.
trade and exchange of these valuable commodities to the coastal Tobungku. Between ca. 1790 and 1850, the Tomori Bay was also the home of maritime raiding groups associated with Tobungku.

The fast-flowing and partially navigable Lasolo river that led to the inland area of ToEpe dominated the area between Tobungku and Konawe. Some oral traditions claim that the nobility of Tobungku originated from ToEpe, so that it may have been an area of some importance to the coastal Tobungku at an earlier time. The river does not appear to have encouraged trade in the same way as the La did, even though ToEpe was known for rice exports in the nineteenth century. The conflicts in the early eighteenth century between Banggai and Tobungku over another rice-producing areas, north of the Tomori Gulf (Batui, Sinora), suggest they were particularly important to both Tobungku and Banggai. Importing rice from such areas would have freed up labour in Tobungku itself to pursue other economic activities to produce export commodities for the local and regional market such as woven cloth, wax and iron swords.

Finally, southeast of the southeastern peninsula of Sulawesi is the Buton archipelago, with its main islands of Buton and Muna, separated only by a narrow strait bounded by sheer cliffs on both sides. Buton, also called Wolio, had its main settlement on a fortified hilltop that towered over a sheltered bay on the southern tip of Buton Island. Buton’s tributaries or barata formed semi-independent polities; relations with Muna in particular were often strained to the point of armed conflict. Buton’s main export in the seventeenth century was spices, but as it maintained a close alliance with the VOC, spice trees were cut down, and by the early eighteenth century, slaves were

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199 Usundau, the main fortification of the Tomori in 1856 was in extremely difficult terrain on a fortified hilltop. ‘De Expeditie tegen Tomorie, op de Oostkust van Celebes’ Militaire Spectator, Tijdschrift voor het Nederlandsche Leger, April-May edition, Breda, 1856), p. 537, p. 542, p. 544.

200 By comparison, the river Usu that originated in Lake Matano and flowed into the Gulf of Bone could be sailed inland for at least two days with large perahu. In 1861 the banks were not inhabited at all, nor was there any indication of it being used for transporting goods or people. Not until the rise of trade in forest products in the latter part of the nineteenth century was it used for the transport of dammar. D. F. Braam Morris, ‘Het Landschap Loehoe, getrokken uit een rapport van den Gouverneur van Celebes’, Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Volume XXXI, 1889, p. 502.
the only lucrative export commodity. The marine environment of the Buton archipelago with its multitude of small islands and reefs made it an ideal habitat for Bajo fisherfolk and raiders, and from the latter part of the eighteenth century onward, marine products particularly tripang became important for external trade. The Buton Strait remained the haunt of maritime raiders up to the first decade of the twentieth century.

Buton was connected to the mainland of southeast Sulawesi through local and regional trade, and through tenuous tributary claims. In the Buton-Kendari area the myths about Halu Oleo link Buton, Muna and Kendari together. Even though both sets of stories give rise to controversy between the different areas, they nevertheless form a shared frame of historical reference. The Konaweha, the main river in the southeastern peninsula, flowed through the inland plains that became the heartland of the Tolaki chiefdom of Konawe. It could be navigated several hours upstream as far as Pohara. The estuary of the Konaweha was settled by Bugis as early as 1700, who named it Sampara. The connection between the Konaweha and its estuary settlement of Sampara is explicitly mentioned in one of the Tolaki oral traditions that relates the story of Madukalla, a Bugis prince, who settled at Sampara and eventually married the daughter of the Konawe ruler. Kendari Bay became known to the outside world as a trading settlement in the early nineteenth century through the efforts of Dutch trader and adventurer J.N. Vosmaer, who established a trading settlement for a few years until his death in 1836. The Lepo-lepo river, a branch of the Konaweha, discharged into Kendari Bay, but was only navigable a few kilometres upstream. The semi-nomadic Bajo who collected tripang and other marine products were attracted to this bay because it was at the southern end of their annual migration route from the Gulf of Tomini down the east coast of Sulawesi. Coastal Tolaki supplied rice, wax and other inland products to the Bajo. Wood was readily available to mend their boats, and water was abundant.

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201 In 1700 a letter arrived for the ruler of Banggai from two Bugis chiefs who were at the Sampara estuary. VOC 1647 f. 129. See chapter 3.
The secluded nature of the bay provided a safe shelter until the winds changed, and the Bajo left for the Tomini Bay. The well-concealed entrance of the bay had the added advantage that it was easy to defend. Buton claimed Kendari as part of its local sphere of influence in the 1830s, based largely on trade connections. However, when Kendari Bay became the location of Vosmaer’s Dutch trading post, Buton’s claims were superseded by those of the ruler of Bone, who considered the Dutch trading post a challenge to Bone’s claims on the east coast, and as an incursion into his sphere of influence (see chapters 5 and 6).

Local economic spheres are most clearly discernible for Buton and Tobungku in the first half of the nineteenth century. Both east coast centres had a strong interest in controlling the tripang trade and organising raiding. A similar pattern occurred was discernible with regard to rice and other foodstuffs that were exchanged for locally produced cloth and imported goods in more peripheral areas of these local economic spheres.

The Politics of Polycentrism: Competition, Conflict and External Allies
The term ‘contest state’ was coined by Adas to capture the dynamism created by competition between near-peers at the centre of the polity. Rulers or paramount chiefs claimed a monopoly over power but in reality were severely constrained by their rivals and near peers among the elite of polity. The conflicts recorded in Dutch sources in Banggai, Tobungku and Buton frequently involved a disagreement between a ruler and a council, which consisted of nobles and potential rivals, or between different factions in a succession dispute. In both cases, outside allies were called upon to fight against one another over local interests. Ethnographic studies, particularly those of Errington, Millar and Schrauwers, show that the status of a leader was closely intertwined with that

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202 For a more elaborate discussion of Vosmaer’s activities and trading post, see chapter 5.

of his kinship group. It is interesting in this context that local sources represent internal rivalry in terms of different localities signified by mythical siblings or divine being. The issues at stake were competing claims to seniority, and, contrasting views of what constituted the legitimate foundation of power: external sources of power, or local ancestral power. Local sources highlight a variety of overlapping different perspectives that point to both conflict, as well as a loose form of integration which occurred within small-scale polities, and was accomplished through negotiated relationships rooted in local identities and histories.

**Ancestral Power versus ‘External’ Sources of Power**

In colonial eyes, the decentralised political structure that characterised such polities was inefficient and did not allow sufficient control by the centre. These polities developed in an environment in which communications were slow and irregular, and populations dispersed. The importance of local ancestral and guardian spirits as a source of political legitimacy only underscores the polycentric structure of east coast polities. It was in the interest of ‘centres’ to justify their position by pointing to a different source of power: external relations. A common theme in local sources is explaining how one realm came to dominate other realms through the intervention of a powerful leader. Such an individual was attributed with supernatural powers, and often could draw support from an alliance with external forces. In local sources, the chiefs of the ‘original core’ groups are represented in a council whose powers include both electing and deposing the ruler. Consequently, the council held considerable power over the ruler. The inherent tension between the ruler and the council was expressed in the use of oaths. Rulers swore oaths on the Koran or invoked local deities, with severe sanctions awaiting those who abused their power to the detriment of their subjects. Such a council of elders or nobles, which stood at the origin of polities and there therefore were invested with ancestral power upon which, at least in theory, the ruler was dependent. However, later additions to the
apparatus of the polity, often at the behest of a new ruler, tended to marginalise the
goinger councils. The contrast between the council and the ruler was most marked in
ceremonies that linked political power to local ancestors in opposition to ‘the centre’
that claimed links with external sources of power. The following section examines
various aspects of the internal dynamics of small-scale polities the competition between
different perspectives on the past, and the resulting views on the foundation of political
power played an important role.

The polycentric structure of east coast polities was highly visible in the inauguration
ceremonies of Tobungku and Banggai. In both polities, local rulers started their careers
by undergoing inauguration ceremonies. Approved candidates for the position of ruler
were inaugurated in Ternate and made to sign a contract, but on their return to Banggai
and Tobungku, they still had to undergo local inauguration ceremonies. The earliest
evidence of a ruler who underwent such a ceremony was Mandaria, when in 1808, the
elders of Banggai complained that his behaviour was not in accordance with the oaths
he had taken. However, the political significance of such ceremonies was not noted
by the Dutch until 1891, when the population of Banggai refused to follow their ruler’s
orders to be vaccinated. Eventually the visiting official discovered that the ruler’s orders
were ignored and that he was generally despised by both commoners and aristocrats in
Banggai, the reason being that he had refused to undergo the local inauguration
ceremony upon his return from Banggai. The ceremony was held at Kota Jin, the
former capital of Banggai that was destroyed in 1846, but still in use for local ritual

204 The contract between Mandaria (Bandarea) and the VOC signed in 1773 stipulates: ‘The newly instituted ruler must conclude a renewed contract with the
VOC and must be introduced to the people publicly and with all the appropriate oaths and respect’. ANRI, Ternate 116 p. 24: ‘We were working at the fort and
discussing amongst ourselves that the king commits many things against us that are not appropriate and that this is not in accordance with the oaths he had sworn
at the time of the contract, and that we were pessimistic about how he would procede in the future’.
205 ANRI Ternate 419, ‘Verslag der reis op mondelinge last van res van ternate door den controleur der eerste klasse bij BB op de Bezittingen buiten Java en
Madoera, J. Stormer’, p. 5.
purposes. The key element of the ceremony was an oath in which the ruler swore to use his power to protect the interests of his subjects. The moral integrity of a person taking such an oath needed to be beyond reproach, since the ancestral powers invoked at the time would be quick to seek vengeance for even the slightest misdemeanour by inflicting illness, misfortune or even death. A ruler who would not take this oath was therefore neither to be trusted nor taken seriously by his subjects.

Both Banggai and Tobungku oral traditions speak of at least two inauguration ceremonies in two different localities. In Tobungku, the newly chosen ruler had to undergo ceremonies in Wosu and in Tobungku proper inside the fort of Fafontofure or Kota Bajo. In Banggai, there was at least one additional ceremony besides the one at Kota Jin. In 1995, the elders of Batui on the mainland claimed that the traditional inauguration ceremony for a Banggai ruler was not complete unless he had also visited Batui and undergone their own inauguration ceremony. In this ceremony, the ruler of Banggai had to drink water that had been poured over an heirloom rifle, and swear an oath that invoked the powers of Batui’s ancestors in case of misconduct. This ceremony, however, was not recognised during interviews with Banggai elders as being of any significance, and in fact dismissed completely.

Dutch sources also mention the custom of the ruler regularly travelling to different places in the polity rather than permanently residing in the centre. After a rift between

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206 The detailed events leading to the destruction of Kota Jin are discussed in chapter 5.

207 Unfortunately I was only able to obtain brief descriptions of the oath that indicated that the power of natural forces, such as thunder and lightning were invoked in case of a violation.

208 See the opening of chapter 1 on the oath at Kota Jin.

209 Similar localised ceremonies occurred in Sulia up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Each small realm had its uma sania (literally: house of the spirits), a prominently placed structure that was the dwelling place of the tuan tanah spirit. Newly appointed sangaji had to visit this uma sania before taking up their office. On this occasion, a goat was slaughtered, sirih and pinang were offered and incense was burned. Afterwards, there was a large celebration with dancing (cakalele). People communicated with the tuan tanah spirit (lord of the land) through spirit mediums. In the early years of direct rule, one such medium advised against building a road, after which nobody dared work on it. Because of strong belief in the supernatural sanctions in case such orders were violated, such localised notions of power could therefore undermine the colonial state. P. van Hulstijn, Mededeelingen van het Encyclopaedisch Bureau XV, ‘Soela-eilanden’, Weltevreden, N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co., 1918, p. 47.
Banggai and Mendono had been resolved in 1692, the people of Mendono sent a messenger by boat to Banggai with a request that the ruler visit them once a month.²¹⁰ The ruler Kalukubulang travelled to each of the mainland tributaries. During the remainder of his rule he alternated between Banggai and Mendono, depending on relations with the nobles of Banggai. At the time of his death in 1710, he was on the mainland in Mendono.²¹¹ When a VOC delegation visited Banggai two years later they found that the new ruler, Baele-baele, who had not been formally approved by either Ternate or the VOC, had been elected several months earlier. The nobles and sangaji of Banggai informed the VOC officials upon their arrival, that they were leaving for Mendono, the mainland, with Baele-baele so he could be ‘shown’ to the people of Luwuk (‘Loocq’) and Balantak ‘in accordance with their ancient custom’.²¹² It is likely that each settlement that claimed a special status within the polity would have had their own ceremonies to welcome or inaugurate a new ruler.

In Tobungku, the ‘circulation’ of the ruler extended beyond the inauguration ritual in Wosu and Fafontofure, and was considered a routine part of political life. Just as Kalukubulang alternated his place of residence between Banggai and the mainland, the ruler of Tobungku also appears to have moved between different parts of the polity. A clause in the contract with the Dutch in 1885 forbade the custom of the ruler of Tobungku to travel from one locality to another where he would spend up to several months at a time.²¹³ The mobility of the ruler in such decentralised, polycentric polities was necessary to draw the polity together: spending time in different parts of the polity fostered closer personal bonds and affirmed local notions of legitimacy, while also strengthening his position. The formation of a larger political entity, therefore, did not

²¹⁰ VOC 1637 f. 131.
²¹¹ According to the Generale Missiven IV, p. 671, Kalukubulang died in 1710 in ‘Madona’ in the settlement of Balantak.
²¹² VOC 1826 f. 116.
eliminate the autonomy of constituent realms but rather incorporated local sources of traditional power to affirm the position of the centre. A leader’s authority could be consolidated through feasting at the local level, which demonstrated his power, wealth and status and gave recognition to different localities as an important part of the polity. From a purely local point of view, the prosperity and legitimacy of the polity was closely linked to local ancestral spirits and traditions. The way a ceremony or ritual was understood by the participating parties could differ on fundamental points such as in the case below between Banggai and its tributary realm Batui. Relations between constituent parts of a polity often remained fragile, and political and economic rivalry could easily turn into armed conflict.

Competition, Conflict and External Sources of Power

The geography of sacred sites and objects in eastern Sulwesi attests to the importance of external centres in enhancing the prestige and power of the owners of such objects. The process of adapting outside influences, and relating to outside powers was not simply one of imitation and submission, but was closely linked to local political processes of rivalry within and between polities. Helms’ notion of ‘acquisitional polities’ is particularly appropriate in this context, since political, economic, cultural and religious elements that served to strengthen local elites were ‘acquired’ from the outside world, usually prestigious centres such as Bone, Makassar, Java, Ternate or from ‘Islam’.  

214 ANRI, Besluit 29 January 1885 No. 22. Oral traditions in Konawe remember their ruler Lakidende for the grandeur of the rituals that he staged in different parts of Konawe.

214 In Konawe, for instance the three-tiered ranking system as well as the first ‘real’ ruler/chief Wekoila were said to have derived from Luwu. According to the government compilation of oral traditions, separate communities each with their own chiefs (mokole) came together under the leadership of Toto-Ngano Wonna (‘ruler at the centre of the polity’). He waged wars to unite various realms into a single polity with its centre in Unaaha (=expansive field). The son of the ruler was named Ramandulangi (langi from langit, meaning heaven) indicating that Konawe had its own line of divine beings at the origin of its polity. Yet, essential attributes of the polity were only instituted with the arrival of Wekoila from Luwu. These included its name, its customary law and the three-tiered ranking system with a hereditary nobility anakia, commoners (tono dadio) and a slave estate (nata) (Monografi Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara, n.d., p. 11, 12).

The contrast that is found between a centre that claims a higher status and other less prestigious foci that however claim seniority, was also apparent in Konawe. A distinction was made between two kinds of sangia (semi-divine ancestors). The Sangia Mekongga and Sangia Konawe came from Luwu and their descendants...
Competition and rivalry in the polycentric structure of polities was closely linked to external sources of power: namely trade, alliances with regional powers and spiritual potency that took the form of cultural and religious appropriations. Access to these external sources of power gave coastal leaders an advantage over other chiefs.

Both mythical as well as historical accounts speak of prestigious foreigners arriving in eastern Sulawesi. Local sources emphasise their special powers, while Dutch sources stressed their connections with external centres. This divine being or powerful foreigner often married the son or daughter of the ruler, symbolising the union of local and exogenous power. The economic and political dimension of these relationships cannot be separated from their cosmological meaning. Many sacred heirlooms such as cloths, manuscripts, weapons and ceramics were imported objects valued for their spiritual potency rather than for their purely monetary value. Helms argues that the reason why foreigners and foreign trade could play such an important role is precisely because ‘distant-powerful centres’ were equated with supernatural or celestial realms of power. On the other hand, Henley emphasises the judicial aspect of such ‘stranger-kings’ who had the prestige and impartiality necessary to unite rival factions. This is borne out for instance in an account of Tojo, in which local elders decided to search for a king who could settle their differences so that fighting amongst them would cease.

were the anakia or aristocracy. The other sangia were called the sangia pine-ata, sangia of the slaves or of the lesser people. These latter sangia were the foci of important rituals at the beginning of the agricultural cycle that were held at various sacred sites in the southeastern peninsula (H. van der Klift, ‘Het monahoe ndao’, Mededelingen vanwege het Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap, 1922, pp. 68-77).

In Buton, there is mention of Java, China, Johor and the middle east. In Tobungku: Johor, Luwu, Ternate, and in Banggai, Java is important and Ternate is mentioned along with the ‘Portugis’ kastella which was also in Ternate. In Banggai the ruler of Mandapar from Ternate is the undisputed transition point when numerous traditions were united and the beginning of the historical polity of Banggai. Before him, the oral traditions are consider to be ‘mitos’, mythological, possibly because of the great divergence, since each small realm traces the founding of the kingdom back to its own origin.

215 In Tojo a flag and a firearm received from the ruler of Bone were given as offerings in times of drought. According to oral traditions recorded in the early twentieth century, these objects were given to Makakato, a relation of the ruler of Bone who was appointed as the first ruler of Tojo (ibid.).

216 Mary W. Helms, Crafts and the Kingly Ideal, 1993.

The elders or lesser chiefs who each ruled their own area formed the council that chose the ruler who symbolised the unity of the polity. Coastal centres in particular took on the role of mediating external political and spiritual forces, and introducing them into the local context. Tojo’s regalia that were gifted by Bone became venerated objects to which offerings were made in times of drought. In Banggai, all four sacred sites on the island are associated with powerful foreigners, or in the case of Abu Kasim, the son of a powerful foreigner.

Dutch officials at the beginning of the twentieth century interpreted the importance placed on the foreign origin of prestigious individuals and objects as proof that local aristocracies were a foreign imposition on a victimised, indigenous population that would prosper from the introduction of colonial rule. In contrast to this colonial viewpoint, foreign origins in the local context signified status and connections with external powers, which enabled local elites to strengthen their position. Furthermore, emphasising foreign and divine origins allowed local elites to set themselves apart from the rest of the population.

**Banggai and its Tributaries: Perspectives on Power and Conflict**

The polity of Banggai comprised the Banggai archipelago and the coastal settlements situated on Sulawesi’s eastern arm with their hinterlands. Each settlement had its own perspective on the past and on the polity as a whole. In this patchwork of diverse oral traditions, Banggai formed a common reference point, though its tributaries on Peleng and the mainland often contested Banggai’s claim to power. Whereas Banggai emphasised its prestigious foreign connections, its tributaries referred to the sacred Mount Tompotika located on the eastern arm of Sulawesi as their point of origin from where the peoples of the peninsula dispersed down towards the coast and Banggai. In

these mainland origin myths, inland people near the mountain have the closest connection with the original source of power in the polity, whereas Banggai was the furthest removed. However, because of her marriage to a foreigner, the youngest sibling was able to dominate her two elder brothers who lived on the coast and the interior of the mainland. In other words, the ‘natural’, birth order of siblings was reversed through the influence of external powers, so that the eldest brother in the interior became the subordinate of his youngest sibling on Banggai. The original source of power and status, Mount Tompotika and the ancestral figure Lalogni had been marginalised by external sources of power.

A similar shift in the locus of power is seen in the origin myth of Bongganan, located on the island of Peling. Just as the mainland tributaries, Bongganan is ambivalent about Banggai’s position. Bongganan, too, claims that it is older than Banggai, and that Banggai usurped its power after a war with Makassar. Bongganan’s regalia were seized by the Makassarese, but proved to be so powerful, that their displacement and unlawful possession caused illness and disasters. Once the cause of the ill fortune was discovered, the Makassarese returned the regalia, not to Bongganan, but to Banggai. Here again, it was because Makassar, an external power, recognised Banggai rather than Bongganan that the regalia, and its power, were lost.219 Banggai’s elders did not recognise Bongganan’s claims, as I was warned would be the case. Nevertheless, informants in Bongganan claimed there was ‘proof’ (bukti) to support their case; each year Bongganan people were summoned to Banggai to carry out a purification ritual, since Banggai people, who were in fact illegitimate owners of the regalia were unable to touch these objects without putting themselves in grave danger. Despite the resentment associated with the myth of Bongganan’s demise, it does give

219 The Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe mentions the anak radja Katjil Bonggana as one of the nobles that participated in the negotiations with Tobungku. Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe, 1931, p. 7.
Bongganan a special place in the Banggai polity because of the historical and ritual connection retained with the powerful, albeit displaced, regalia.220

Batui, which was also situated on the mainland, just south of Mendono, hardly appears in the Dutch sources. It also claims an important place in the Banggai polity because of its close links with the Banggai rulers. Batui saw itself as the source of much of Banggai’s adat (customary law) and power. The contrasting positions of Banggai and Batui are clearly articulated by both sides in the annual tumpe221 ceremony that was still conducted in the mid-1990s. At the heart of the ceremony held in December or January are the first four hundred maleo eggs of the new season. The eggs were transported by perahu, though in recent years by motorised boat, to Banggai, where they were received by the jogugu of Banggai, the ruler’s representative. He, in turn, distributed the eggs among the elders and guardians of the sacred sites on Banggai. A Dutch source first documented the practice of bringing maleo eggs to Banggai in 1908 they were listed as part of the tribute the ruler of Banggai received from Batui.222 The Dutch approach towards tribute was strictly economic, attempting to determine the monetary value of the tribute Banggai’s ruler received so that it could be substituted by an amount of money upon Banggai’s incorporation into the Netherlands-Indies. This approach did not take into account other dimensions of the tributary relationship that would resist the abolition of tribute in the early twentieth century.

Differences between Banggai and Batui revolved around the disputed place of origin of the maleo, a black bird the size of a duck, that lays large eggs harvested from deep

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220 I could get no information whatsoever on the regalia that supposedly came from Bongganan. In the eyes of the Bongganan elders this fact only confirms their story, that Banggai is reluctant to acknowledge the true origins of important regalia.

221 The tumpe ceremony is most likely a vestige of the elaborate harvest celebrations that were widespread before the advent of Islam and Christianity in the area. The fact that the ruler of Banggai was given the first share of the harvest could also be read as an acknowledgement of his role in ensuring the fertility of the land. Local oral traditions interpret it differently. If anything, Banggai needed to be replenished from its source, Batui, rather than the other way around.

222 Goodhart, the first Dutch government official in Banggai after the introduction of direct rule mentions that Batui yielded between 300-500 maleo eggs in 1908. Interestingly, Dormeier, writing several decades later mentions the ceremonious way in which Batui presented tribute to Banggai, but makes no mention of maleo eggs. See respectively: O. H. Goodhart, ‘Drie Landschappen in Celebes’, 1908, p. 462; J. J. Dormeier, Banggaisch Adatrecht, 1947, p. 108.
sandpits near Batui, in high demand because of their size and good taste. Both Banggai and Batui shared the belief that eating maleo eggs before the tumpe ceremony was performed would result in illness, if not death, but interpretations as the cause of the misfortune differed. While the differences of opinion might seem unimportant on the surface, what is in fact at issue is the internal hierarchy of the polity of Banggai and Batui’s position vis-a-vis the centre. Banggai claimed that the maleo originated from the foreign and distant land of Java and reached Batui through Banggai. The maleo birds were given to Banggai’s legendary hero Abu Kasim when he visited his father on Java. The birds did not flourish on Banggai, and for that reason were moved to Batui on condition that the first eggs of each harvest would be given to the original owner of the birds, the ruler of Banggai. In this version, Banggai is the conduit through which power from outside flows to Batui, indicating Batui’s subordinate position in relation to Banggai. Batui on the other hand, claimed that the maleo originated in their settlement and was a gift to the ruler of Banggai. The rulers of Banggai were ‘descendents’ of Banggai, because an early ruler of Banggai was born from a Batui woman. This places Batui in a higher position than Banggai, because power and blood flowed from Batui to Banggai. Batui’s claims that the maleo originated from Batui, accords it in an ancestral, and therefore higher, position in relation to Banggai.

Flowing from the differences on the maleo’s place of origin, were differences on the cause of misfortune if maleo eggs were eaten before the tumpe ceremony was performed. In Banggai, the annual gift of maleo eggs from Batui is seen as tribute from a subordinate realm, a gift of eggs to the rightful owner of the maleo. The retribution following the violation of the taboo of eating maleo eggs is naturally attributed to the power of Banggai. In marked contrast, Batui elders insist that the maleo eggs were a gift from the Batui ancestors to their Banggai descendents, thus placing Banggai in the junior position vis-a-vis Batui. In their version, Abu Kasim’s mother was from Batui,
and her relatives gifted him the maleo. Therefore, according to local elders, Batui relates to Banggai as a grandparent to a grandchild. In this version, Batui was the source of power through the female line which enabled Banggai to engage with the outside world (Abu Kasim’s father on Java). The tumpe ceremony is carried out each year, not to honour the ruler of Banggai, but to honour and obey the Batui ancestors. Therefore, eating the eggs before the tumpe ceremony invoked the wrath of the Batui ancestor. The issue underlying this longstanding controversy is about relative political status. Were the maleo eggs tribute from a subordinate realm or were they a gift from the Batui ancestors to their descendents in Banggai? In other words, was Banggai’s power derived from Batui’s ancestors or from a prestigious foreign ruler in Java? Ironically, the relationship of Banggai and Batui was perpetuated by enacting a ceremony about which the participating parties had fundamentally different interpretations of their shared past and respective status. Both views, however, were validated in the ceremony and the mutual bonds were reaffirmed.

Mendono proved a much more direct challenge to Banggai’s position as a local political centre. The rivalry between Mendono and Banggai is a recurring theme in the Dutch sources and throughout this study. Mendono claimed links with Makassar and Bone, rather than with Ternate and Java, and also claimed that Islam was introduced to the area through Mendono rather than Banggai. In contrast to the Dutch sources, which highlight the Bugis presence in Mendono, oral traditions focus primarily on the earlier link with Makassar and on the importance of Mendono as a spiritual centre. It’s keramat or sacred site on a hill near the estuary of a tiny river, rivals the sites of Banggai. According to people in Mendono, a beautifully illustrated religious manuscript is important ‘proof’ testifying to Mendono’s superior position over Banggai. According to oral traditions, the manuscript arrived in Mendono with a religious teacher from Johor who used it simultaneously as his vehicle and prayer mat. Banggai, it is readily
pointed out by present day inhabitants of Mendono, has no such manuscript, nor did it ever have a famous Islamic teacher, all the more proof that Mendono introduced Islam to the area.

The local prominence of Mendono is also clear in Dutch sources, but in some accounts it is unclear exactly what the nature of the relationship is between the settlements on the mainland and Banggai. Certainly from 1680 onward, when Mendono became a haven for Bugis traders in the area, it appears to be more prosperous than Banggai. With its natural harbour and hinterland rich in agricultural and forest products, Mendono became Banggai’s natural political and economic rival.\textsuperscript{223} Mendono was at least on two occasions the seat of the ruler, in 1710 and 1808, and the same sources indicate that the seat of power alternating between Mendono and Banggai was not uncommon.\textsuperscript{224} The rivalry for the position of the most prestigious centre between Mendono and Banggai as recounted in oral traditions was more than merely a symbolic battle of words. Internal conflicts in Banggai were documented for the years 1680-1700\textsuperscript{225}; 1713; 1741; 1795/6 and 1808. Only in the first and last instances is there actual information on the nature of the conflict. The first documented conflict between 1680 and 1700, which occurred in the aftermath of the fall of Makassar, caused a rift between Banggai and its Ternaten allies on the one hand, and Mendono with its Bugis allies on the other. Because of the strong regional character of this conflict involving Bugis, Ternatens, Makassarese and the Dutch, it will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

In 1713, 1741 and 1795 internal conflicts occurred between the ruler and nobles in Banggai and Mendono, and the Dutch intervened on request of the ruler. In 1808, the last recorded instance of this kind, what was meant to be a formal visit to Banggai, the

\textsuperscript{223} Mendono may not always have been the main centre on the mainland, as it appears that Dutch sources sometimes use Mendono to refer to the entire coast rather than to the settlement of Mendono. Luwuk and Balantak also attracted trade, and it is possible that they were at times the most prominent settlements on the coast. However, the contrast between the island Banggai and the settlements on the coast of the mainland remains the same.

\textsuperscript{224} See chapters 3 and 4.
Dutch stumbled into a complicated conflict that had been going on for several years and involved two settlements on Banggai as well as Mendono. Once again, the ruler Mandaria taken up residence in Mendono after a conflict with elders on Banggai.

**Mandaria, a Banggai Ruler**

Mandaria is the best-documented ruler of Banggai in the Dutch sources, and figures as a significant ruler in Banggai’s oral traditions as well. He ruled from 1772-1782\(^{226}\) when he left Banggai for Batavia and Ternate. He returned in 1795 after a conflict between himself and the nobles of Banggai had been resolved in Ternate. The contract between Banggai and the VOC was also renewed at that time.\(^{227}\) Immediately upon his return to Banggai, he built a large new fort named Kota Cina in 1796, on the small peninsula to the south of the shallow bay on which Kota Jin was located. It was as large as fort Amsterdam in Manado, containing a mosque and forty-three large and small houses.\(^{228}\) It’s name probably refers to the presence of Chinese traders in Banggai drawn to the site by the abundance of tripang, which had become a highly prized commodity and was readily obtained in Banggai’s shallow coastal waters. Mandaria was still in power in 1808 when the Dutch-Ternaten delegation tried to mediate the conflict in Banggai, but he was killed by one of his own relatives shortly after that.

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225 This conflict which led to a rift between Banggai and Mendono had a strong regional dimension and will be discussed at greater length in chapter 3.

226 The first contract between Mandaria and the VOC was concluded in 1773 in the presence of a representative of the Ternaten Sultan. J. E. Heeres, *Corpus Diplomaticum* VI, 1955, p. 343-349.

227 ANRI, Ternate 140 p. 2.3. When Mandaria left Banggai in 1782 for Batavia, his aim was to get support from Batavia in his conflict with other nobles. From Batavia he was sent to Ternate, with a letter that stated that his behaviour had been overbearing and inappropriate for a subordinate ruler. In Ternate he requested to be reinstated as the ruler of Banggai, but this request would only be granted if the dispute with the nobles was resolved. The latter were called to Ternate and reconciliation took place. Mandaria returned and the contract with the VOC was renewed. When the Dutch arrived in Banggai in 1808 the name of the ruler is not mentioned, but if the ruler had changed since the previous contract they would have had him sign a new contract.

228 ANRI, Ternate, Bundel 116, p. 12. The ruins of kota Cina are still visible on the small peninsula to the south of the harbour of Banggai, and this spot was still known by that name in 1995. Neither Dutch nor local sources explain the name ‘Cina’, Chinese. Possibly Chinese trading junks came directly to Banggai, and/or Chinese settled there too.
The 1808 account is unusual because it provides insight into small-scale conflict and relations. Not only do we learn about Mandaria’s relations with Banggai, but also about the conflict between the two main settlements on Banggai. Competition for status between settlements, political manipulation by Mandaria and local beliefs about the foundation of power and prosperity all come to the fore in this case. Even though the account of the conflict is filtered through the eyes of Dutch observers, the rendition of the conflict bears similarities to local sources. As in the case of the contemporary controversy with Batui, Banggai village chiefs claimed that their island had a higher status than Mendono. Mendono on the other hand, often was the seat of the Banggai ruler and the main Bugis trading centre in this period.\(^{229}\) One point of major controversy involved Mandaria accusing the elders of Kota Jin of stirring up Banggai chiefs (sangaji) against him. The latter stopped bringing tribute to Mandaria and no longer obeyed his orders after he moved to Mendono, because, in their eyes, Mendono was only a tributary of Banggai, therefore it did not befit them to take tribute there even if the ruler was residing there.\(^{230}\)

This case also helps to shed light on the extent of the power of Banggai’s ruler. Mandaria was one of Banggai’s most successful rulers. He travelled to Batavia and Ternate, and was able to enlist Ternate’s assistance on his behalf. However, he was also able to harness the labour of his subjects to wage war against Tobungku, to build forts and boats and to pay tribute. Relations between the two fortified settlements of Kota Cina and Kota Jin, both situated on Banggai, deteriorated following an incident when Mandaria’s wife slept with three men during one of his prolonged absences. Jamar, Mandaria’s nephew, who lived in Kota Jin was one of them, the other two were from

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\(^{229}\) Mandaria moved back and forth between Banggai and Mendono, and appears to have left Banggai several times after a conflict with the elders of Kota Cina. The Dutch tried to convince him to return, but he was extremely reluctant to do so. Soon after the Dutch left for Tobungku, he returned to Mendono taking with him all cannons and other weapons. He ordered the people in Banggai to tear down their villages and move into the forest so that the Dutch would not continue to pressure him to return.
Kota Cina. Upon Mandaria’s return, the inhabitants of Kota Jin feared they would be collectively punished for Jamar’s misdemeanour. Instead, Mandaria forgave the entire village in a public ceremony and swore an oath on the Koran, declaring that he would not punish them now or in the future, as the settlement could not be destroyed ‘for the sake of one woman’. But the incident did not end here. Two years later, when Kota Cina experienced crop failure and drought, the elders demanded that Jamar be punished after all, as they were convinced that their current problems were caused by leaving such a transgression unpunished. The possibly incestuous nature of the relationship between Jamar and Mandaria’s wife may account for this reaction as well, since incest was widely perceived to bring about natural disasters. Despite the pressure to have Jamar punished, Mandaria kept his word. Some time after Mandaria left Banggai for Mendono, the people of Kota Cina attacked Kota Jin in search of Jamar, whom Mandaria was no longer able to protect. Jamar fled before his enemies were able to capture him. Interestingly, the adultery committed by Jamar and Mandaria’s wife was not seen as an affront on Mandaria personally, which he had the power to forgive, but rather as a violation against adat which had grave consequences for the entire community if not avenged. The ruler’s public act of forgiveness sealed by an oath on the Koran was not enough to appease the punishing forces that inflicted drought and crop failure on Banggai.

Mandaria resisted not only the demands for punishment from Kota Jin and Kota Cina; he also opposed Dutch attempts to mediate between himself and the Banggai nobles. Furthermore, he refused to return to Banggai to live as the Dutch demanded. His suggestion of oscillating between Mendono and Banggai was also refused, since the Dutch were insistent that he should reside permanently on Banggai. After the departure of the Dutch delegation, Mandaria and his entire following left Banggai and moved
back to Mendono, taking with them all their boats and weapons. The Banggai nobles requested that a new ruler be appointed because ‘they could no longer bear the present one’. Whether this request was taken seriously is not known. According to Kapitan Laota from Banggai, Mandaria had ordered the entire settlement of Banggai to be torn down and its inhabitants to take shelter in the forest so that Mandaria would have a good pretext not to return to Banggai. The resentment against him was so great that eventually he was killed by one of his own relatives. In 1814, Mendono rather than Banggai is mentioned in a list of Ternate’s tributaries contained in a contract with the British. This suggests that Mendono continued to be the seat of the Banggai ruler after Mandaria’s death, and that Banggai could not maintain its position without Dutch assistance. One might speculate that had Dutch influence not expanded in the second half of the nineteenth century, Mendono, with its lively trade, its cotton and cloth production and agricultural hinterland may have remained the centre of polity, and Banggai may have had tales of how its power had been usurped by Mendono.

The case of Banggai suggests that the resilience of small-scale precolonial polities in which the centre did not have strong coercive power lay in interdependent relationships between the centre and other realms that were embedded in local communities and linked to local belief systems. The different and often contradictory views within a polity reflected a high degree of local autonomy where by constituent parts of the polity did not fully accept the centre’s legitimisation of its power. Banggai based its position in the archipelago on connections with exogenous powers such as Java and Ternate,


232 R. Schrader, ‘Het Landschap Banggai’, Nederlandsch-Indische Geographische Mededelingen, Volume 1, September 1941, p. 128. According to Schrader, who had access to more documents than myself, Mandaria left in 1808 for Mecca and had gone as far as Makassar, when he was called back because his wife had reportedly committed adultery (p. 130). This could not have been the same instance that was set against the background of the conflict in 1808, since the adultery involving Jamar and others had occurred at least two years earlier. Schrader does not mention his source, other than the published works of De Clerq (1890), Dormeier (1947) and Knyt (1931). If Mandaria indeed was killed in 1808, as he mentions, then the incident would have occurred after the visit of the Dutch-Ternaten committee.

233 ANRI, Besluit 20 June 1845 No. 15 p. 2a.
while its tributaries emphasised what they saw as more ancient sources of power, or, as in the case of Mendono other external sources of authority and power, namely Makassar and Islam. Despite contradictory claims and conflicting versions of the past between centres and tributaries, these types of traditions contributed to a loose form of integration that facilitated trade and marriage alliances.

Internal Tensions and External Allies in Tobungku
Oral traditions in Tobungku, though less abundant than in Banggai, display the same themes of tension and conflict between an elite and local settlements, an elite that legitimises its power through relations with external powers and local settlements that claim that the power of the elite is derived from and sanctioned by them and their ancestors. In the account of Jasin Husen, locally known for his knowledge of Tobungku traditions, the people of Tobungku swear an oath to surrender power to their ruler they have chosen, in return for his protection and promise to use his power to benefit of the Tobungku people. Jasin Husen’s status as an expert on Tobungku history was widely recognised, but he was also criticised because he was said not to be of royal descent, and, hence could not possess the true history of the ancestry of the Tobungku rulers. Interestingly, his account of the genesis of the Tobungku polity stresses the role of a local chief and his subjects in searching for a ruler who could protect them. This account contrasts strongly with the more widely known origin myth that traces the descent of the Tobungku rulers to divine beings from either Luwu or Ternate, emphasising Tobungku’s historical relations with external centres and local elites, who legitimised their power through such connections.

The belligerent Tobungku polity that appears in Dutch sources attacking Banggai and other coastal settlements is depicted as well co-ordinated and war-like. However,

hidden beneath this unified front in warfare was a polycentric structure of individual chiefs and settlements, sometimes with longstanding tension existing between them. In the oral traditions of the Tobungku area, the centre of Tobungku is pitted against Wosu, both accusing each other of cowardice and betrayal in a war with either Ternate or Tobelo. Both the Tobungku and Wosu elites claim descent from separate divine beings who descended from heaven, and both make claims to having brought forth rulers. The grave of the Tobungku ruler Lamboja located in Wosu was considered proof of Wosu’s prominent local position in the past, which is now largely forgotten. In the inauguration rituals of Tobungku, a newly appointed ruler returning from Ternate had to travel to Wosu first to undergo a ceremony before returning to Fafontofure.

The disunity between Wosu and Tobungku can be traced in the Dutch sources to a succession conflict in middle of the eighteenth century that lasted for decades. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Tobungku was the only one of Ternate’s tributaries that did not have a formal contract with the VOC. It acknowledged Ternate, but not the VOC. The Dutch became aware of trouble in Tobungku when a messenger arrived in Ternate in 1747 with news that the ruler Surabi had died and that Buton with a number of allies threatened to attack. In response, two entire settlements and half the population of Tobungku fled to Buton seeking security and peace. The VOC immediately intervened with the intention to appoint a ‘capable and legitimate ruler’ and decided that Kasi Sinai, whom they were told was one of Surabi’s brothers.

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235 In Tobungku, Tobelo and Ternate are often used interchangeably, because Tobelo were used by Ternate for punitive expeditions. There is more awareness among the current elite of the difference between Ternate, which is remembered as a colonising power that was replaced by the Dutch, as opposed to the Tobelo who raided, captured and killed people.

236 Surabi is also mentioned in the Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe (p. 6) as the ruler of Tobungku to whom the Sultan of Ternate sent a call for assistance in a war against the Talawari. The VOC source of 1749 that records the news of the death of Surabi mentions the presence of Tobungku troops that had been called on by Ternate in 1743 and had remained there since 1744. By 1749 these troops were in an impoverished state because the war had not materialised and they had used up all their resources (VOC 2740 f. 393). In Abdul Aziz’s list Surabi is mentioned as the 6th ruler who ruled from the year 1740, which coincides with other sources (Interview with Abdul Aziz, 14 Februari 1995).

237 In the original: ‘Cassi Sineij’ or ‘Lineaij’, VOC 2740 f. 389.
would be Tobungku’s next ruler on condition that he sign a contract. He declined because the son of Surabi, Lamboja\(^238\), had already been inaugurated in Tobungku as the new ruler. Kasi Sinai was then said to be an ‘illegimate’ son of Surabi, who was not willing to claim the position of ruler with the VOC’s support, especially if it meant opposing Lamboja. The Sultan of Ternate was reluctant to follow the VOC’s directive to mediate between the different parties in Tobungku. However, in 1753 an envoy was sent from Ternate to enquire about dynastic differences in Tobungku, and whether mediation was necessary. But the Ternaten Sultan died shortly thereafter, and mediation in Tobungku did not eventuate.\(^239\) The situation resolved itself when the defeated party left Tobungku and founded a new settlement called Salampe, located on the northern side of the entrance of the Bay of Tomori on the estuary of a small river. Since Lamboja is still remembered as a ruler who died in Wosu, it would appear that the initial successor and son of Surabi was triumphant over his opponents.

After the death of Salampe’s founder, relations with Tobungku were restored, but Salampe continued to steer a rather independent course. A combined Ternaten and Tobungku expedition descended on Salampe in 1793, killing many of its inhabitants. The survivors were transported to Kota Bajo (Tobungku) and Ternate as slaves.\(^240\) In 1850 there was one elderly man still alive who was born in Salampe. When asked about his place of origin he replied that he knew nothing, since he had been only a few weeks old when he left it with his mother, most possibly as a captive or fugitive of the 1793 expedition.\(^241\) The reason for this punitive expedition is not clear, except that Salampe behaved ‘too independently’, challenging Tobungku’s position and control over trade in

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\(^238\) In the original: Lamboda (ibid.). Lamboja is also mentioned in the Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe (p. 7) as one of the anak raja who conclude the treaty with Banggai which reconciles them so that they can fight together on Ternate’s side against Tidore. Other nobles involved in this treaty are also called anak raja, a term generally used to indicate people of aristocratic descent. If the Dutch source is correct then Lamboja was literally an anak raja, a child of the ruler, since he was reported to be the son of Surabi, ruler of Tobungku who died in 1747.

\(^239\) VOC 2882, Memorie van Ternaten 1756 f. 64.

\(^240\) ANRI, Besluit 8 October 1853 No. 14, pp. 121-123.
the Gulf of Tomori. Salampe was rebuilt and by 1808 had established close ties with Bugis settlers and traders. In that year, the Bugis of Salampe fought alongside the ruler of Banggai against Tobungku. The Bugis of Togian (Gulf of Tomini) and of Salampe supplied the Banggai ruler with 20 Bugis paduakang for this expedition. Salampe’s location near the estuary of the La River in the Gulf of Tomori undoubtedly threatened Tobungku’s trade interests in the area. When Vosmaer visited Tobungku in the early 1830s, Tobungku’s resident traders were based in the capital, but the actual place where Bugis and Makassarese merchants came to trade was in the Bay of Tomori on a sandbar that stretched along the coast, and which offered sufficient protection against southeastern winds. Traders were attracted by the large amounts of tripang and tortoise shell supplied by Bajo, as well as wax supplied by inland people. Salampe shared in this growing prosperity, since Revius reported that it was a prosperous trading settlement prior to its destruction in 1826, again at the hands of Ternaten and Tobungku troops.

The Gulf of Tomori was a contested domain and was regularly subjected to punitive expeditions. In 1838 Salampe rose up once again against Ternate and was later punished because it was considered too far away from the centre of Tobungku and too much under the influence of Bone Bugis. After the final destruction of Salampe, the remaining inhabitants moved to Lanona, where they formed a distinct group. Tofi, or Towi, another settlement in the Gulf of Tomori, was also defeated and subjected to tribute payments in the 1840s. In response to Tobungku’s excessive demands for tribute, its inhabitants gradually disappeared into the interior, so that by 1850 both Salampe and

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241 ibid. pp. 120-123.
244 In the succession struggle that followed the death of the Tobungku ruler in 1825, Ternate intervened on the side of the widow. Vosmaer does not mention Salampe, which stands to reason, since when he visited Tobungku a Ternate utusan was already present, something that only happened after the 1826 expedition.
Tofiri were uninhabited. In this year, no remains were to be found of Salampe, except some fruit trees and some traces of former dwellings and fields. Other similar settlements in Tomori Bay gradually disappeared because of constant warfare with neighbouring areas and lack of protection from Tobungku.

What is remarkable is that Salampe continued to play a political role in Tobungku after its destruction as well as after the defeat of Tobungku in the 1840s. In 1850, Koa Matano, the ruler appointed by Ternate and the Dutch when the capital was moved to Lanona, was originally from Salampe. He used his influence to convince the visiting Dutch official Revius that Salampe would be a much better location for Tobungku’s main settlement. They conducted an expedition to survey the site, and Revius was taken by the idea. But three years later, when a new delegation of Dutch officials arrived, Koa Motano had died, and none of the Ternaten or Tobungku aristocrats in Tobungku were in favour of relocating the capital to Salampe. A second expedition in 1853 revealed that the anchorage was not suitable for a major settlement, as the river on which it was located was too shallow even for small perahu to enter.

Despite limitations in the source material, certain tendencies and patterns are illustrated by these cases. The political tensions in both Banggai and Tobungku were between different coastal centres, Tobungku versus Salampe and Wosu, and Banggai versus Mendono. In the case of Tobungku, Wosu was incorporated as an important site into the inauguration ritual, which accorded it a prestigious place in the polity, and acknowledged that at one point, probably during Lamboja’s rule, it was the principal settlement. Salampe’s fate, however, was different. It threatened Tobungku’s commercial interests not only because its proximity to the Tomori hinterland but also

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245 Van der Hart, who visited the Bay of Tolo in 1850, had a map by Horburgh and English maps, all of which indicated that there were settlements on the coast of the Bay of Tolo. He surmises that these settlements either never existed, or, more likely in my opinion, had been abandoned (C. van der Hart, Reis rondom het Eiland Celebes, 1853, p. 82; ARA, Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110 p. 19u).

246 ANRI, Temate 180, p. 43c, 43d.
because of its own independent links with Bugis and assisting Tobungku’s enemy Banggai. Salampe was destroyed at least three times by Tobungku, and on two occasions with assistance from Ternate. Tobungku successfully employed its external allies to crush Salampe as a rival centre, but lost some of its autonomy to Ternate in the process.

**Buton and its tributaries**
Conflict within the Buton archipelago followed a pattern similar to that experienced in Banggai and Tobungku. However, the tendency for external parties to intervene on their own initiative or on request of a Butonese faction was more pronounced because of Buton’s strategic position on route between Maluku and Makassar or Java.248 The treaty of Bungaya in the latter part of the seventeenth century placed Buton firmly outside the Ternaten sphere of influence as far as the Dutch were concerned, but parts of Muna were to be disputed once again by Ternate in the early 1840s.249 In Buton there was a body of shared oral traditions, which revolved around the figure of Halu Oleo. Buton claimed him as the first ruler who took the more prestigious title of sultan. The surrounding polities of Muna, Konawe, Poleang and Rumbia claimed that he originated from their respective areas.250 Each polity had its own historical perspective and version

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247 ibid. p. 43c.

248 Because of its strategic position astride the route to and from Maluku, Makassar and Java, there are many recorded instances of external allies supporting one political faction against another in the middle of the seventeenth century. Examples are the situations in the 1630s and late 1640s when Buton became a focal point for competing Ternaten and Makassarese fleets. In 1647 the Ternaten kaicili Ali was appointed ruler of Buton by Ternate, but had difficulty maintaining his authority because of rebellious subjects who were supported by Makassarese. Reporting on the rest of the east coast, however, is minimal in this period. *Generale Missiven I*, p. 405, II pp. 201, 312, 373, 496, 497.

249 ANRI, Besluit 20 June 1845 No. 15 contains the final dismissal of Ternate’s claims on Tiworo, Kalenggusu, both in the Buton archipelago, and Wowonii, just off the coast of Kendari. These claims were based on a contract concluded in 1814 during the English period, in which these settlements were included as tributaries of Ternate. The dispute was triggered by the presence of a disputed group of people who originated from Kalenggusu. They had originally been captured by Tobungku in the siege of Kalenggusu in 1821 (see chapter 6), and several years later recaptured from the ‘rebellious’ faction that opposed the widow of the deceased ruler in Tobungku. From there they were taken to Ternate, where they became servants and slaves of Ternaten aristocrats.

250 In Kendari in 1988/89 the controversy about Halu Oleo’s origin was still debated; Kendari people claimed that he was born there, whereas this was refuted by people from Buton asserted that he was born on Buton.
of the kinship relations linking them to Halu Oleo, who in some cases was depicted as a local prince, in others was said to have come from Luwu. A major difference with the situation in the Banggai and Tobungku polities, was that the competing parties such as Muna and Konawe were not considered part of Buton proper, but were separate polities with their own councils that were part of Buton’s local sphere of influence.

In Buton the source of local power was symbolised by a maiden with golden hair, Wa kaa kaa, who emerged miraculously from a trunk of bamboo. This origin myth signifies the internal contradictions and tensions inherent within Buton’s political culture between the rulers, who had supernatural power and external connections, and, an council that predated the institution of the ruler and on which the ruler depended for sustenance and support. Wa kaa kaa’s late appearance in Buton’s sequence of origin traditions signifies her ‘young’ status vis-a-vis the pre-existing council of elders. Because she was a mere child who could not even speak, she was carried out of the jungle and taken care of as a young family member. Therefore, all subsequent rulers of Buton were addressed as ‘grandchild’, while the rulers of Buton had to address members of the council as ‘grandfather’, acknowledging the precedence of the council over the ruler. Wa kaa kaa’s supernatural appearance accompanied by the presence of intimidating natural phenomena, however, made her an unusually charged mythical figure. The objects that appeared with her formed the supernaturally charged regalia of later Buton rulers. An elderly woman had a dream in which she received instructions that Wa kaa kaa should be inaugurated as the ruler of the various settlements. The place where Wa kaa kaa emerged from the bamboo was said to have become the foundation site of the kraton of Buton. According to tradition, she married the son of the king of Majapahit, thus linking Buton with a powerful external kingdom. The stone near the main mosque of Buton is believed to be the mythical stone on which Wa kaa kaa was

inaugurated, so that Islam too, which was introduced much later, was grafted on to a foundation of local power.\textsuperscript{252}

Buton claims to have had four barata or tributaries: Muna, Kaledupa, Tiworo and Kalengsusu.\textsuperscript{253} Each of the tributaries had a sarana (council) and a ruler, who were either directly appointed or at least sanctioned by Buton. From the point of view of the centre, the councils of the barata were smaller and intentionally kept less complete than the sarana Wolio, as the Butonese council was known.\textsuperscript{254} The barata were not represented in the sarana Wolio, but they did pay tribute. Buton, like Banggai, developed the reputation of being a powerful centre in terms of ‘ilmu’. Islam was successfully introduced as a new source of power and prestige to a far greater extent than in Banggai, with the centre as the exclusive mediator of this spiritually powerful form of knowledge. Different parts of the sultanate received different parts of the Islamic teachings, with the centre maintaining a monopoly over the full body of the Islamic knowledge. Schoorl interprets this act as a conscious attempt by the Butonese centre to strengthen its position and divide and rule the rest of the polity. The differences with respect to the specific knowledge and ritual practice imparted to each group accentuated the reliance upon the centre, which remained the main source of prestige and power.

Buton’s struggle with its ‘tributaries’ also primarily revolved around establishing and maintaining its political supremacy. While there appears to have been little dispute over the pre-eminent position of Wolio on the island of Buton itself as the political and economic centre, Muna nevertheless disputed Buton’s claim that it was a subordinate tributary. In 1989, the historical relationship with Buton was still an emotive issue among Munanese: they insisted that Muna was a ‘younger sibling’, not a tributary of

\textsuperscript{252} ibid. pp. 33-36.

\textsuperscript{253} The Morononene area on the southern tip of the southeastern peninsula of Sulawesi, was directly under the rule of the sultan and therefore not included as a tributary.

Buton, and in 2001 both Butonese and Munanese warned me not to believe the other’s version of the past. The clash of perceptions between Buton and Muna in the oral traditions is backed by a long list of armed conflicts between Buton and Muna reported in the Dutch sources, indicating that while Buton may have been the most prestigious political centre, its authority was regularly challenged. In 1743, the Butonese refused to assist a VOC official on a customary spice eradication mission, because ‘there were Munanese robbers in the forests with whom the Butonese were at war’. 255 Muna’s independence in the middle of the eighteenth century was all too apparent when the Dutch ship *Rust en Werk* ran aground near Muna and was pillaged by coastal inhabitants, thus violating Buton’s contract with the VOC. 256 The most salient case of how external alliances were employed in internal conflicts between Buton and Muna dates from the years between 1790 and 1820, when raiders from South Sulawesi, Tobungku and Maluku joined forces with Munanese against Buton. Unfortunately for Buton, its strategic location was also astride one of the main routes of the annual raiding fleets emanating from Sulu. Regional raiding shaded into local warfare as various maritime raiding groups allied themselves with settlements on Muna. The best-documented example of such external alliances is the Bugis prince Arung Bakung who settled on Muna and waged war on Buton with help of Magindanao raiders from Toli-Toli ca. 1820. 257 As the maritime attacks on Buton increased, Buton renewed its external ties with the Dutch governor in Makassar, sending special delegations to request arms and ammunition. Conversely, as raiding declined with the activity of Dutch warships and anti-raiding campaigns in the 1840s, Buton’s local position became stronger. By the

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255 Generale Missiven XI, p. 42.

256 VOC 2882 f. 41a. Buton was accused of breaching the treaty with the VOC that stipulated that Buton was to assist Dutch ships in distress rather than pillage them. A punitive expedition was sent to Buton. Buton claimed that not his subjects, but the subjects of Muna had pillaged the ship. Finally, the ruler of Muna was fined 70 slaves, of which 66 arrived alive in Makassar.

257 Arung Bakung’s life and circumstances are discussed at greater length in chapter 4.
end of the nineteenth century, the ruler of Muna was required to reside in Buton, while
government affairs were attended to locally by his representative, the sapati of Muna.

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This chapter explores the relationship between local conflicts in east coast polities and
external allies. The political dynamics between the smaller centres that constituted
polities was characterised by rivalry for status and power, which could turn into armed
conflict. Oral traditions in all three polities discussed in this chapter highlight
contrasting perspectives on power and legitimacy. Whereas political centres tended to
assert their higher status based on their divine ancestry and links with external powers,
tributaries emphasised the local, ancestral roots of their power. In Buton and Banggai,
where local historical sources are more abundant, the importance of local cosmologies
and identities in integrating the polity is more visible. However, contrasting
perspectives between constituent parts of the polity were not necessarily a barrier to
overall political integration, as is evident in the case of Banggai and Batui. Both centres
claimed a pre-eminent status with respect to the other based on different historical
perspectives concerning the ‘flow of power’. The annual tumpe ceremony, in which a
gift of eggs was presented to Banggai, was so deeply rooted in local rituals and
identities that it continued long after the abolition of the polity of Banggai. In Buton, the
centre was strong enough to cultivate existing local differences within the polity based
on the calculated distribution of Islamic knowledge over which the centre had a
monopoly.

The important role that external centres played in the cosmology of local polities is
closely linked to the actual historical role of external centres in providing military
assistance during internal conflicts. The pattern of rivalry and conflict between local
coastal centres, at least in theory, pointed to open access to external allies and trade.
Buton’s main rival was Muna, a neighbouring polity that had close links to Iranun and
Tobelo maritime raiding groups in the period 1790-1820. Buton received direct assistance from the Dutch as well as from colonial anti-piracy campaigns carried out in the nineteenth century. In the conflicts involving Tobungku, Ternate’s assistance was successfully employed to eliminate ‘rebellious’ settlements such as Salampe, which posed a threat to Tobungku’s dominant position as a trade centre. The political and economic competition between Banggai and Mendono would have been resolved in Mendono’s favour because of its successful trade and close links to regional Bugis networks, if it had not been for encroaching Dutch influence in the nineteenth century.²⁵⁸

The connection between polycentrism and external alliances is a paradoxical one. On the one hand localised conflict in a polycentric political and social structure encouraged local elites to seek external allies to strengthen their position vis-a-vis their competitors. On the other hand, while polycentrism was deeply rooted in local geography, cultural perceptions and practices, the ready availability of external support in a regional context where no single centre controlled the seas or external trade further reinforced polycentric social and political structures at the local level. It is not surprising that localised armed conflict within polities declined as the naval power and reach of the colonial state grew and reduced the availability of armed external allies.

²⁵⁸ By way of comparison, in the more inland polities of Konawe and Mori, which were more agricultural in orientation, similar divisions occurred, but between coastal and inland areas. Here too the influence of and alliances with outside parties was a major factor in the dominance of resp. Laiwui and the ToMaiki, and inland groups were at a disadvantage with regard to outside contacts.
Part Two
Diasporas, Tribute and Warfare in Eastern Sulawesi
1680-1830
3 Tribute, Diasporas and Local Conflict in Eastern Sulawesi

1680-1780

For almost three centuries the Dutch only fleetingly dealt with the east coast: as Ternate’s periphery, as a site of regional warfare and piracy, and as an area of ‘illegitimate’ Bugis activity. Besides regional trade and warfare, requests for mediation and intervention from eastern Sulawesi were the main occasions for contact with external powers. Therefore, violent conflict became the best documented aspect of eastern Sulawesi’s political dynamics in Dutch sources. This chapter explores the wider context in which eastern Sulawesi was a contested periphery of both Bone and Ternate’s spheres of influence. The first section explores the position of small-scale polities within wider, regional spheres of influence. The main case study of Banggai (1680-1715) illustrates the characteristically ambiguous position of Sulawesi’s east coast, particularly in times of transition, when regional networks competed for access to trade and local factions competed for access to external allies. The second section of this chapter also focuses regional relations, but viewed mainly through the lens of a local manuscript, the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’. Finally, the last section concentrates on more localised mechanisms that led to intra-polity conflict on the east coast and drew in regional centres.

Regional Spheres of Influence in Transition 1680-1715

The most immediate and enduring experience of external powers in eastern Sulawesi was through itinerant traders and chiefs of itinerant bands of armed men. The relationship between a regional periphery and external centres was made up of various components: regional warfare and raiding, diplomatic exchanges, trade relations, mediation and protection or assistance. Exchanges were both formal and informal and were initiated by both the larger, regional centres of Bone and Ternate as well as by the small-scale polities on Sulawesi’s east coast.
The dynamics of these relationships were complicated by the fact that neither Bone or Ternate nor the VOC could maintain a monopoly over outlying areas for any extended period of time. The result was a highly decentralised and unregulated form of expansion through the movement of people that, ironically, was not necessarily controlled or encouraged by Ternate or Bone. An attempt to define the exact extent of the spheres of influence of Bone and Ternate in eastern Sulawesi leads not only to artificial divisions, but also obscures the reality of the dynamics between external centres and small-scale polities.

The ambiguity of the position of eastern Sulawesi between centres is one of the key characteristics of the area. This position was highlighted in times of conflict or in periods when regional shifts of power were in process, as they were in the last decades of the seventeenth century.

Henley points out for northern Sulawesi that

‘indigenous violence was exacerbated by the predatory activities of outsiders [...] and also by the competitive intervention of major powers such as Ternate, Makasar, and the European spice traders themselves...’ 259

This was even more true for eastern Sulawesi where, in contrast to the northern peninsula, the VOC never successfully eliminated competition from other external agents, notably Bugis. Rather than stagnation, which is often associated with ‘peripheries’, the ambiguous position of eastern Sulawesi between two regional centres led to a marked degree of dynamism, particularly at times when the regional balance of power was in transition. Local factions competed for alliances with and adapted a mixture of cultural and religious influences from various centres.

The expansion of regional spheres of influence by way of diasporas was driven by a number of distinct groups that differed in terms of their loyalties, activities and the duration of their stay in the ‘periphery’. First, there were localised and long-distance traders

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transporting both bulk and more valuable goods from one island to another. Pires notes in the early sixteenth century that ‘a great deal of iron axes, choppers, swords and knives’ were traded from Banggai to Maluku.\textsuperscript{260} ‘Tolo’ (Gulf of Tolo where Tobungku was located) and Banggai are listed along with Morotai, Siau and Sulu, as areas that produced large amounts of foodstuffs, which the inhabitants traded in Maluku.\textsuperscript{261} This trade continued during the period that the east coast was formally a tributary of Makassar, possibly encouraged by the Makassarese trading routes to the east. In the early seventeenth century, Malukans travelled to Banggai to obtain sago, while the trade in swords from Tobungku continued throughout the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{262} Interestingly, Pires does not mention spices, whereas by the seventeenth century, Banggai, Tobungku and Buton all grew and traded spices. This may account for the abundance of new Japanese and Chinese lacquerware Padtbrugge encountered during his visit to Tobungku in 1678, obviously acquired through external trade, probably in spices, that went against the VOC’s desired monopoly.\textsuperscript{263}

Trade networks never operated in a vacuum, however. Political interests were closely linked to wealth. Urdaneta’s report in 1532 indicates that, besides trade, there were diplomatic exchanges between Banggai and Ternate.\textsuperscript{264} Whilst traders could double as representatives of regional centres, there was also a category of aristocrats or chiefs whose role was primarily a political one. An example is Kalukubulang, a Ternaten aristocrat who

\textsuperscript{261} ibid. pp. 221, 222.
\textsuperscript{262} Tobungku swords were exported to eastern Indonesia, where they were exchanged for local products. In Ceram in 1662, ten Tobungku swords were exchanged for one slave \textit{Generale Missiven III}, p. 408.
\textsuperscript{263} VOC 1366 f. 254.
\textsuperscript{264} The ruler of Banggai sent a delegation to the sultan of Jailolo offering three hundred of his men to assist them in their battles against the Portugese, while at the same time lobbying for the hand of the sultan’s daughter. Another instance involving Banggai was when the son of the ruler of Banggai was in a Portugese mission school in 1564, presumably in Ternate, and that the Banggaiaans were inclined to be baptised. Sultan Hairun of Ternate worked against the spread of Christianity, and prevented the ruler of Banggai from converting by arranging a marriage between the latter’s daughter and his own son Baab, who succeeded him in 1580. Urdanetta quoted in: J.J. Dormeier, ‘Geschiedkundige Aantekeningen betreffende Banggai en Gapi’. \textit{Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde}, 1943, pp. 557, 558.
was appointed around 1690 as the ruler of Banggai, to secure it as part of Ternate’s sphere of influence. A second category of ‘foreign’ chiefs and aristocrats in the periphery were not specifically sent by their rulers to accomplish a specific task, but ventured out on their own behalf to trade and raid, and carve out a living in more peripheral areas such as eastern Sulawesi. The Bugis who assisted Kalukubulang’s displaced predecessor were an example. Such men were not sent by the ruler of Bone, but they did benefit from his prestige and strength, since he was believed to be their protector. For these figures, eastern Sulawesi was both a frontier with economic and political opportunities, and a place to flee to after conflicts, a regular occurrence in South Sulawesi. Such frontier areas relieved the pressure of competition in the homelands as they gave the opportunity to restless chiefs and their followings to carry on their activities elsewhere. These two categories of groups and individuals often overlapped, since royal envoys also acted on their own behalf, and adventurer/traders could be called upon by rulers in the centre to take action.

In the case study of Banggai, both Ternate and Bone were expanding into Banggai to replace Makassarese trading networks. In the case of Bone, the expansion through armed bands was not initiated or directed by Bone, but was made possible by its rise to power as a regional centre. In the case of Ternate, the expansion into Banggai took place through aristocratic traders such as Tolsang, who clearly had close connections with Ternate, and through a second wave of aristocrats who hoped to benefit from the appointment of the Sultan’s relative, Kalukubulang.

The most successful regional diaspora was that of the Bugis. This diaspora radiated outward from South Sulawesi, creating an economic, political and cultural sphere of influence, with the most powerful Bugis state of Bone at its centre. The Bugis were, and still are, the largest ethnic group within the south-western peninsula of Sulawesi, where
they inhabit the northern part of the fertile, lowland plains. They were divided into a number of larger and smaller polities of which Bone was the most powerful. Other polities were Wajo, Luwu, Soppeng, Barru, Enrekang, Pinrang, Luwu and Sengkang. To the north were the Toraja highlands, and to the south the closely related Makassarese who had been defeated in 1669.

To distinguish between Bugis from different areas the name of the area was used on its own or in combination with Bugis, for example ToWajo or ToLuwu. The first wave of Bugis migration occurred after the failed Bugis uprising in 1660 in which 10.000 men rose against Makassar under the leadership of Arung Palaka. The Bugis diaspora in the western archipelago had a long-term influence on the course of political history in Riau, Johor and Aceh, where Bugis intermarried with aristocracies and were an important factor in internal politics. The most renowned refugee was the high ranking Bone prince Arung Palaka who fled to Buton in 1661 with a large following. He became the VOC’s main ally in the defeat of Makassar and then rose to the position of ruler of Bone. The hereditary title of the Laiwui functionary ‘kapitan Bondoala’ is said to have been bestowed on the chief of this area who fought with Arung Palaka against Goa in Bontoala (South Sulawesi). This would suggest that Buton was the only ally of Arung Palaka on the east-coast. There was, in any case, a regular trickle of men fleeing South Sulawesi after conflicts.

Both traders and warrior chiefs brought about the initial expansion of Bone’s sphere of influence after Makassar’s defeat in the late seventeenth century. Some traders settled,

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266 Luwu occupied a special place as the eldest kingdom from where all aristocracy originated, but by the seventeenth century it was one among a number of smaller Bugis states.


268 One early documented example were two Bone princes, brothers of the ruler of Soppeng Lapadang Sajati sought shelter in Buton after fleeing from the ruler of Bone Batara Toja in 1725. ARA Geheim Verbaal 5 October 1848, No. 4347, p. 267.
others returned on a regular basis. Some warrior-like chiefs, with their followings, demanded tribute and intervened on behalf of the ruler of Bone, others did the same but were acting on their own behalf. Traders who were reprimanded by Padtbrugge for not having valid passes complained that he was bothering them, honest traders who did not cause any trouble. Instead, he should take action against Bone aristocrats who travel around and randomly demanded tribute under duress. These traders felt hostile towards such itinerant chiefs as they disrupted local societies and possibly discredited Bugis traders as well.269

That is not to say that traders did not benefit from Bone’s powerful position. Their position outside Bone was strengthened because they were perceived to be protected by this powerful political centre. In the case-study below, Jangkal, the deposed ruler of Banggai, was initially treated with apprehension because he was, wrongly as it turned out, thought to be a protege of the king of Bone. Similarly, in 1692 seven Bugis traders, who were apprehended by VOC officials in Manado, were pardoned, because they were under the protection of the ruler of Bone and fining these traders would have caused political tension between the VOC and Bone.270 How entangled Bone’s trade and political power were, is apparent from the Bugis ‘wanderers and deceivers’ in 1719, who, in Kaili, ‘tried to get credit on the pretext of being envoys of the king of Bone’.271 Whilst rulers had little control over traders, they were able to tax trading activities in their own centres. They were also obliged to protect or revenge traders who were their subjects, even if they were in other areas.

An important difference between the Bugis and Ternaten diaspora to eastern Sulawesi was that the latter was much smaller in number, less varied, and not motivated by trade in the same way. Rather, it consisted largely of aristocrats, acting either on behalf of the

269 VOC 1366 f. 695.
270 Generale Missiven V, p. 449.
271 Generale Missiven VII, p. 419.
Ternaten Sultanate or on their own, and of armed expeditions either during regional warfare or in times of peace to discipline tributaries and collect tribute. The main trading diaspora in Maluku was that of the Bandanese, and it did not reach the shores of eastern Sulawesi. Another difference was that the VOC took an interest in Ternate’s east coast tributaries, even if a greater incorporation into the Ternaten and VOC sphere of influence was not accomplished in this period.

In the last decades of the seventeenth century three major regional events increased the activity of both local and regional agents in eastern Sulawesi. Firstly, the fall of Makassar in 1669 forced regional traders, no longer welcome in Makassar, in to areas such as eastern Sulawesi. Secondly, the expansion of Bone immediately following 1669 into what was Makassar’s hinterland brought Bugis traders and warrior chiefs to eastern Sulawesi. Arung Palaka, the VOC’s ally in defeating Makassar, was able to use the VOC to strengthen both his personal position as ruler and the position of Bone itself vis-à-vis other Bugis polities. Finally, the quelling of the Ternaten rebellion in 1681 caused unrest in the Ternaten diaspora communities and pushed defecting Ternaten warlords to eastern Sulawesi. The effects of these events combined with local conflicts continued to reverberate in eastern Sulawesi for at least two decades. In such periods of regional turmoil the different strands of regional relationships become more visible.

The case study of Banggai relates to the period after the defeat of Makassar in 1669, when a new regional balance of power was still being negotiated in regional peripheries. It traces the different strands of these complex relations from small-scale polities outward to various regional centres. In doing so, it explores the position of these polities within regional spheres of influence. The battle that had been won in South Sulawesi continued in eastern Sulawesi in the form of fierce competition for local influence by both Bugis and Ternatens, and the last of the Makassar traders. During the Ternaten uprising in the late

1670s, Sultan Amsterdam called on all his tributaries to rebel against the VOC. After he was captured and taken to Batavia, he was forced to sign a treaty in 1683 that acknowledged the inferior status of Ternate as ‘vassal’ rather than ally of the VOC. From then on, Ternaten sultans were more concerned with assuring themselves of VOC support rather than with their obligations towards their bobato (high functionaries) and subjects. As a result, the links between Ternate and its peripheries were weakened. With the support and military intervention of the VOC, Ternaten Sultans were able to strengthen their position in a way that had not been possible before. At the same time, the VOC insisted on a greater involvement in the affairs of Ternate’s tributaries. The quelling of Ternate’s rebellion was not, however, totally successful. Penati and Ridu, two Ternaten warlords, refused to surrender and continued their activities on the east coast of Sulawesi far into the 1690s. By approximately 1700, an uneasy equilibrium was reached whereby Bugis clearly dominated trade and exerted considerable political influence, but ties with Ternate and the VOC were maintained as well.

For the VOC, the treaty of Bungaya, concluded after the defeat of Makassar in 1669, was to become the touchstone for judging subsequent developments in regional tributary relations. This treaty decreased the sphere of Makassar and Banggai and Tobungku were from then on considered Ternaten tributaries. The Dutch view of a tributary system was a centrally managed set of relationships with subordinate realms from which the centre received tribute and homage, and the overlord was in turn responsible for peace, problem-solving and protection. However, the political reality of the archipelago in this period was at odds with the expectations of the Dutch: peacekeeping and intervention in the affairs of its tributaries was not a high priority for Ternate. Therefore, the VOC had little choice but

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273 Sultan Mandar of Ternate owed his throne to the Company, and acknowledged the superior power of the Dutch by naming his sons ‘Amsterdam’ and ‘Rotterdam’, after the two most important Dutch cities. Kaicili Sibori Sultan Amsterdam succeeded his father in 1675 and ruled until 1690. Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku, 1993, pp. 176, 177.

to adapt to existing practices of ‘managing’ remote Ternaten tributaries with the assistance of other tributaries. Just as ‘indigenous’ overlords, the VOC was approached by tributaries requesting assistance, protection and mediation, and was played off against Bone and Bugis traders or even its own vassal Ternate.

In times when the regional balance of power was shifting, areas such as the east coast were particularly vulnerable. In these circumstances, established relations with tributaries were replaced by competition between opposing economic and political networks in order to secure local influence. The following case study of Banggai in the late seventeenth century takes place in such a period of political and economic transition. It is unusual in that the written record gives some insight into the level of individuals and factions in the conflict, whilst also showing the links to external, regional, power centres. Makassar’s fall and the treaty of Bungaya had not automatically dislodged Makassarese traders in eastern Sulawesi. At the same time, Bugis and Ternaten networks, both backed up by powerful regional centres, were expanding into eastern Sulawesi as well. In addition, the VOC attempted to establish a foothold in Banggai as the overlord and protector of Ternate and its local representatives.

**Banggai versus Mendono: Local Conflict and Regional Relations 1680-1715**

According both to local tradition and Dutch sources, Banggai’s first contact with an external power started with its subjugation in the late sixteenth century to Ternate by the prince and later Sultan Baab. On the Ternaten side, an origin myth accords Banggai an important position, as it was one of the four places where a mythical naga (dragon) egg was found. The expansion of Makassar, starting from the beginning of the seventeenth century, affected Banggai, which was officially incorporated into Makassar’s sphere of

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275 Ibid. p. 206.
influence in 1635. The VOC had initially overlooked Banggai in its quest to eradicate spice trees, but in 1655 De Vlaming discovered, much to his surprise, 128 full grown clove trees, and had them cut down.\footnote{Generale Missiven III, p. 4.} In 1662 Banggai made a request to change its allegiance from Makassar to Ternate, but the VOC refused ‘out of respect for the crown of Makassar’.\footnote{ibid. p. 412.} It was recommended, however, that Banggai destroy its spice trees in order to prevent conflict, words that were to prove ominous.

After the fall of Makassar in 1669, the treaty of Bungaya signed Banggai and Tobungku over to Ternate, whereas Buton was placed directly under the VOC governor of Makassar.\footnote{Although this was motivated as a restoration of the original, and therefore preferable situation, since until 1635 both Banggai and Tobungku had been Ternate’s tributaries.} The treaty also forbade traders from South Sulawesi to sail east in order to prevent Makassar’s influence from expanding eastward again. The treaty may have settled matters in South Sulawesi, but in Banggai, ever shifting changes of patrons and alliances accompanied by violence and threats of violence continued for several decades. In 1678, twenty clove trees were found and destroyed on Banggai.\footnote{Generale Missiven IV, p. 324.} In the same year, the violence predicted ten years earlier if the spice trees were not cut down, became reality when the Banggai ruler Kabudo, his brother Bauleeng and all their relatives were killed by a Ternaten faction in Banggai. Kabudo and his brother were accused of growing spices secretly and selling them to Makassarese traders at a great profit.\footnote{VOC 1345 f. 214, 215.} This trade alliance may account for a report stating that Banggai was ‘under the obedience of Makassar’, and for the fact that it was targeted by raiders from the neighbouring islands of Sula, loyal allies of

\footnote{ibid. p. 53. There is not record of this myth in Banggai despite the frequent references to Ternate in Banggai. The Governor of Ternate R. Padbrugge also mentioned in 1683 that the kings of Ternate were originally from Banggai, but he may have heard this in Ternate rather than in Banggai. Generale Missiven IV, p. 517.}
Very soon after the massacre on Banggai, Bugis ships transported the remaining Banggaians to Luwuk, on the mainland, to escape attacks from (unnamed) raiders. A Bugis chief who was active in the Banggai area quickly filled the vacuum created by the death of Kabudo.

In Banggai’s history, Mendono, located on the southern coast of the eastern arm of Sulawesi, was the most viable alternative centre to Banggai. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mendono claimed links to Makassar, almost in defiant contrast to Banggai which had stronger links to Ternate. From the 1670s onwards, Mendono was the most important local trading centre for Bugis traders, who traded mainly in wax and tortoise shell. Mendono’s river mouth was a good anchorage, and a nearby, fortified hilltop served as a bulwark. An added attraction may have been Mendono’s proximity to food growing areas in the interior, such as Balantak, and to the south along the coast. There is no evidence of spices being grown in Mendono; in fact the decline in the spice trade may be the main reason behind the decline of Banggai’s position as the centre of a local trading sphere. Rice and sago, occasionally exported further east, may have been a staple commodity in the coastal trade. Mendono was the alternative place of residence for the ruler and population of Banggai when under threat of external attack, or when conflicts occurred between the ruler and the nobles of Banggai.

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283 Sometimes Luwuk and Balantak are mentioned rather than Mendono. It appears that Mendono could refer to the area instead of the settlement of Mendono itself. In 1710 Kalukubulang was residing in Mendono, where he died in the settlement of Balantak’. Generale Missiven IV, p. 671.
284 In 1995, the river mouth had silted up and had become quite shallow.
285 I suspect that the cultivation of cloves in Banggai did not get underway until the early seventeenth century, just as was the case with Buton. During the first visit of the Dutch to Buton, they found nothing of interest, which means that spices were not being cultivated. While there is no evidence of spices being grown in Mendono, in 1746, Ceramese traders were rumoured to trade in spices there, though the origin of the spices may have been further east. Generale Missiven XI, p. 371.
**Jangkal versus Kalukubulang**

The second documented move from Banggai to the mainland of eastern Sulawesi was to Mendono (rather than to Luwuk). This took place around 1690 when Jangkal, the Banggai ruler, fled from Banggai to avoid a possible attack by a rival faction. Just as the violent death of Kabudo and his entourage, this conflict, too, was closely intertwined with external interests. The conflict in Banggai started when Jangkal was deposed of by the Dutch governor of Ternate to make way for the Ternaten Kalukubulang, a relative and favoured candidate of the Sultan. Appointing a new ruler was a way of extending the Sultan’s power to Banggai, and was part of the Dutch/Ternaten implementation of the treaty of Bungaya in which Banggai was ‘restored’ to its ‘rightful’ overlord Ternate. Jangkal, too, may have been suspected of trading spices to Bugis or Makassarese traders. The Ternaten faction in Banggai now consisted of two distinct groups. One group of Ternatens, already established in Banggai, may have been involved in the killing of Kabudo. The powerful Tolsang and Sangaria belonged to this group. They were not necessarily opposed to Jangkal, whose appointment they may have even supported. A second group of Ternatens had arrived recently and supported the new Ternaten ruler Kalukubulang. Jangkal protested when heard the news that he was to make way for a new ruler appointed by the Ternaten Sultan. He refused to leave Banggai to give way to Kalukubulang. Eventually, tensions ran so high that Jangkal, fearing for his life, fled with his entourage to Mendono.

Padtbrugge described Banggai in 1681 as including large sections of the mainland coast: the entire north corner of Balantak, south to Mendono, and as far as Tobungku’. The island of Gapi (Banggai) was where the rulers reside.286 At this point, Bugis traders had already started to use Mendono as their main trading centre on the northern part of the east coast. It was therefore no coincidence that Jangkal sought help from Bugis. The discrepancy in information obtained in eastern Sulawesi and in Bone is an example of the...

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286 This formal description of Banggai hardly changed over the centuries, and continues more or less unaltered in the contemporary administrative divisions.

*Generale Missiven IV*, p. 517.
ambiguity of centre-periphery relations. According to local reports recorded by a VOC official in Banggai, Jangkal went to see the ruler of Bone personally to request support for his cause. In the course of a few weeks, 8 Bugis vessels arrived in Mendono, one with 120 men, and the rest with between 10 and 30 each. All evidence points to the fact that these Bugis were specialised in raiding and warfare. Immediately after their arrival, they set off to raid Luwuk and another settlement referred to as Tompotikan, killing and enslaving its inhabitants. When it became evident that Jangkal was willing to make peace with Banggai, the recently arrived Bugis protested, since they had come to help fight ‘the Company’, and even though they were willing to subject themselves to the Banggai king, if they much preferred to raise their sword against him.

The Dutch official De Haas, who was charged with resolving the conflict on Banggai, took the 10 Bugis vessels in Mendono as evidence of Bone’s support. This complicated matters for the VOC, since it wanted to avoid creating tension with its powerful ally in South Sulawesi. In order to remove Jangkal quietly, De Haas offered him a position in Ternate.

Inquiries in Bone revealed that Arung Palaka, the Bone ruler at the time, denied any connection with Jangkal that this plan was abandoned. Jangkal’s status was then reduced from that of a protégé of Bone to an ‘ordinary’ rebel, who simply needed to be removed. The Bugis chief in Mendono referred to as ‘pabicara’, a Bugis noble title, was a powerful enough chief, but there are no further indications as to where he was from in South Sulawesi and or his relationship with the ruler of Bone. There is no doubt, however, that he and his men were a factor to be reckoned with locally, and, that on the east coast his raiding activities were perceived to be associated with Bone.

287 VOC 1497 f. 283f.
288 ibid f. 282f.
289 VOC 1497 f. 288. Pabicara is a common title in South Sulawesi for a functionary who is member of a council.
**Tolsang, a Ternaten Aristocrat in Banggai**

On the Ternaten side, centre-periphery relations were equally ambiguous. Tolsang, a Ternaten aristocrat in Banggai, had built up considerable influence in Banggai, and was ‘treated like a king’. The deposed ruler, Jangkal, also trusted and respected him, so much so that he tried to enlist Tolsang’s support to plead for him in Ternate. Jangkal requested that his ‘father’, Tolsang, travel to Mendono to speak with him directly about the dispute. The Ternatens, who supported the increasingly frustrated Kalukubulang, depended on Tolsang to control their opponent Jangkal and to maintain their position, but they suspected that he might influence the Sultan to reinstate Jangkal. By balancing the different factions, Tolsang’s position only became stronger. During his first, month-long, visit in Mendono, he was accompanied by the two most prominent Ternatens of the more recent group, so as to mediate the conflict between Jangkal and the faction of the new ruler. Jangkal presented Tolsang with a korak-korak, a horse and two slaves as gifts for the Ternaten Sultan. Furthermore, Tolsang was given the best possible food and offered Jangkal’s most prominent women (*meest aansienlijkste vrouwen*). Despite this royal treatment, Tolsang refused to leave his ship the entire time he was moored in the estuary of the Mendono river, nor would he allow Jangkal to ‘kiss his hand’, a common expression of deference and affection to an older, respected person.\(^{290}\) Not long after this visit, Jangkal appeared in the harbour of Banggai flanked by 21 korak-korak, under the pretence of visiting his brother when it was obvious that his intentions were not that peaceful. Again, it was Tolsang who intervened, and succeeded in dissipating the dangerous situation. Jangkal and his fleet left, but then headed off to raid and destroy the village of Banta. A second attempt to mediate failed as well. A fleet from Banggai consisting of 4 large and 10 small vessels was not even able to moor as it was greeted with arrows.\(^{291}\)

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\(^{290}\) VOC 1497 ff. 281r-308f.

\(^{291}\) VOC 1497 ff. 281r-310f; ff. 478-487. *Generale Missiven V*, pp. 448, 584. Banta might be Balantak, the furthest tip of the eastern arm of the mainland of Sulawesi.
**Banggai and Mendono after Jangkal**

In 1692, the situation was resolved by allowing Jangkal and his entourage to remain in Mendono on condition that his followers would return to Banggai after his death.\(^{292}\)

Capturing Jangkal, which was the appropriate treatment for a ‘rebel’, was considered not urgent enough and too troublesome and costly. Also, the more recently arrived Ternatens, who had aggravated the situation, had returned to Ternate by 1692. Several years later, in 1695, Jangkal died. Instead of a reconciliation with Banggai, Jangkal’s relative, Jumur or ‘captain Mur’, had been accepted by Mendono ‘and other peoples’ as their ruler.\(^{293}\)

VOC officials were sent to Mendono to negotiate its submission to Kalukubulang, but the aristocrats in Mendono continued to reject the VOC proposal. Some said to prefer to ‘die ten times’ rather than accept Kalukubulang.\(^{294}\) Bugis who had started frequenting Mendono thirty to forty years earlier, had become much more numerous, and were encouraging the ‘king of Mendono’ to fight Banggai. The VOC planned to have Jumur removed, but when a Ternaten ship arrived in Banggai in 1700, Kalukubulang had already made peace with Jumur.\(^{295}\) Banggai and Mendono were reconciled, and the circa five hundred men, women and children who had fled with Jangkal to Mendono returned to Banggai. Once relations were restored, Mendono requested that the ruler of Banggai visit once a month.\(^{296}\)

The reconciliation of Mendono and Banggai was followed by an attempt by Tobungku to draw Mendono into its own sphere of influence through a marriage alliance. In 1699, a delegation from Tobungku arrived in Mendono seeking a wife for the

\(^{292}\) Generale Missiven V, p. 448.

\(^{293}\) VOC 1556 f. 482f. The ‘other peoples’ are not further specified, but it would seem likely that they were other settlements on the east coast of Sulawesi.

\(^{294}\) ibid. f. 495f.

\(^{295}\) Generale Missiven VI p. 20, 21.

\(^{296}\) ARA, VOC 1647 ff. 129, 130.
ruler’s son. In Mendono they received a lukewarm reception, since ‘nowadays we are under nobody but the king of Banggai’.\textsuperscript{297}

\textbf{Banggai’s Ambivalent Position between Bone and Ternate}

The reconciliation between Mendono and Banggai had not broken the links with Bugis. Rather, Kalukubulang himself was in communication with Bugis chiefs near Kendari, and had called on them for assistance. Within a few years, relations within the Banggai area had shifted to such an extent that instead of Banggai being threatened by Mendono with Bugis assistance, the same Bugis were assisting Banggai through the mediation of the Mendono chief. During the visit of a VOC official, Kalukubulang received a letter requesting from Ladama, the Bugis chief from Bone, who resided in Laiwui at Sampara (near what later would be known as Kendari), the estuary of the Konaweha river. The letter requested a korak-korak that had been promised to him in return for services rendered by Jumur, the captain of Mendono, who apparently had mediated the deal between the Bugis chief and the Ternaten ruler of Banggai. Besides Ladama, there were two other Bugis chiefs known by the names of Tosali and Todani, who also had connections with Mendono, and all were considered ‘destructive elements’ by the VOC, since they detracted from its and Ternate’s influence on Banggai. The VOC official naturally advised against giving the korak-korak to Ladama.\textsuperscript{298}

Even though, in the end, Kalukubulang prevailed as the ruler of Banggai, Ternate’s political and economic grip on Banggai remained weak. Ternate and the VOC were too far removed from Banggai to support his position sufficiently within the polity, nor were they able to exert the same influence as Bugis chiefs and traders. The latter continued to use Mendono as a trading centre, and laid claims to large parts of the east coast and the Gulf of

\textsuperscript{297} ibid. f. 131.
\textsuperscript{298} VOC 1637 f. 129.
Tomini.  When a VOC ship arrived in Banggai in 1702, the first in ten years, the number of Bugis traders moving into Banggai from Manado became so large that Tjamtia, a Muslim Chinese from Ternate, was sent by the VOC to evict them. Repeated admonishments by the VOC not to allow Bugis traders in to the ‘lands of Banggai’ had no effect, because, as the Jogugu stated after his death, Kalukubulang had always forbidden trade with Bugis chiefs, although the sangaji never paid attention to this proscription. Kalukubulang’s direct control did not reach much further than a few immediate settlements on Banggai. Even a relatively minor task, such as furnishing the VOC envoys with boats and food supplies for a trip from Banggai to Mendono, was difficult to accomplish because Kalukubulang could not command the subjects of other chiefs. One of his few known achievements was his success in defeating raiders from the Gulf of Tomini who were attacking Banggai.

Ternate and the VOC’s weak control over the east coast of Sulawesi was also apparent during the spate of armed attacks, a ‘rebellion’ as the VOC phrased it, aimed at VOC and Ternaten allies in the Gulf of Tomini in the early 1700s. The attackers were Bugis and Mandarese. Whether the animosity was directed primarily at Gorontalo rather than its more remote allies, the VOC and Ternate, is not clear from the sources. The VOC demanded that Banggai and Tobungku would hand over the Bugis ‘rebels’, including the earlier mentioned Ladama, but neither polities would comply, and the ‘rebel’ remained at large. Kalukubulang’s reputation was further undermined by complaints from Gorontalo that he had been ‘raiding and murdering’ in the Gulf of Tomini. He reportedly kidnapped

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299 Generale Missiven VI, 1698 p. 20,21. The VOC was anticipating that Ternate would ‘restore order’ meaning the Ternaten order by relocating Jumur to a different island.

300 The same was occurring in Tobungku where the kimelaha Tomagola was sent in the same year. Generale Missiven VI, p. 179.

301 VOC 1637 f. 130. Kalukubulang is not remembered in Banggai, which means he did not make enough of an impression, or he is remembered by a different name.

302 Here, the Bugis chief is referred to as ToDama. Both ‘To’ and ‘La’ are prefixes, whereas Dama is the main part of the name. ‘Tau’ indicates a person in Bugis, combined with a modifier it becomes ‘to’. ‘La’ is Bugis and Butonese, indicating a male of rank. The female counterpart of ‘We’. See: Shelly Errington, Meaning and Power, 1989, pp. 195, 309.
the ruler of Parigi and six of his followers. In addition, Kalukubulang ignored a summons to pay homage to the Sultan in Ternate, only responding when summoned a second time. Whether integration into the Bugis economic and political network was voluntary or not, the political reality was that Kalukubulang had more to fear if he handed over Bugis chiefs than if he disobeyed Ternate and the VOC. Despite this, the VOC vessel that visited Banggai in 1705 was received well by Kalukubulang. The considerable population of Banggai and Peleng was divided into numerous settlements, all ruled by their own chiefs. The relatively small number of people in the ruler’s own settlement showed how dependent Kalukubulang was on co-operation with other chiefs and aristocrats. At this time, rifts between him and Banggai nobles played a greater role than tension between Banggai and Mendono. As a result, Kalukubulang left Banggai for Balantak on the mainland during a prolonged dispute with Banggai nobles in 1708. When Kalukubulang died in 1713, he had been living on the coast of Mendono for several years. It cannot be a coincidence that this was also where both the greatest amount of tortoiseshell and wax was traded, and that Mendono was used by Bugis traders as the base from which they used small boats to visit surrounding settlements. When Kalukubulang died, the nobles of Banggai did not notify VOC or Ternate, but rather quietly chose a new candidate amongst themselves. 

303 Generale Missiven VI, pp. 194, 295.
304 Generale Missiven VI, pp. 220, 265.
305 VOC 1727, ff. 904, 905.
306 VOC 1809 f. 112; Generale Missiven VI, p. 603, 671.
307 VOC 1809 f. 113. Mendono continued to be the main trading centre after the death of Kalukubulang. In 1713 Banggai had not been visited by trading vessels for two years. When the new ruler needed cloth, he sent a ship to Mendono to trade a slave for cloth. VOC 1826 1713 f. 114.
308 The armed conflict in the early 1700s in which Banggai and Tobungku participated was part of a push into the Gulf of Tomini that was officially ratified by the ruler of Bone. The chief Ladama was most likely its leader. In the 1720s the new ruler of Mawomba was inaugurated in Bone and was given military assistance in the form of 70 or 80 armed Bugis who constructed a fort (ARA, VOC 2050, f 219). Tribute was levied in a number of small places (1 pikul of wax from Togean and 1 pikul of tortoise shell from Mawomba) and people were forcefully moved to South Sulawesi to serve the ruler of Bone (ibid. f. 143). In 1719 Radja Todilo of Tamponassi was taken from his village not far from Ampana (south coast of the Gulf of Tomini) by Bugis to Makassar to the king of Bone. He stayed there many months, until he had a chance to escape with some of his men in a ship of the Radja of Bone. Upon returning, he relocated his settlement from Tamponassi to a
This case of local conflict and relations in Banggai illustrates the entanglement of local and regional interests. In the period after the fall of Makassar, political and economic influence Banggai was contested by different external groups, Makassarese, Bugis, Ternatens and the VOC. Even though the conflict between Banggai and Mendono would appear to be very localised, the participation of Ternate and Bugis chiefs demonstrates that regional interests were at stake as well. In the aftermath of the fall of Makassar in 1669, new regional spheres of influence were being formed. The situation in Banggai evolved from a relatively localised conflict between Banggai and Mendono, in which both sides were supported by outside parties, to a situation in which Bugis chiefs and traders were the most prominent external party involved in Banggai’s affairs, though Ternate was not cut off from formal diplomatic relations. Banggai maintained its position of a subordinate tributary to Ternate, and was even ruled by a Ternaten ruler, but in times of conflict and in matters of trade, Bugis traders and chiefs exerted greater influence.

Contrasting Perspectives on Tributary Relations in Eastern Sulawesi

Just as regional centres were surrounded by tributaries, so were the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi surrounded by local and regional centres with which they maintained relations through trade, warfare and raiding. The impact of tributary relations at the regional level depended on the frequency and nature of contact. These relations were shaped by the agendas and interests of both major centres such as Ternate and Bone, and their small-scale tributaries on Sulawesi’s east coast. The different needs and agendas necessarily led to quite different perspectives on these tributary relations. Small-scale polities required protection, military assistance in local conflicts, mediation and prestigious allies. Larger centres, however, needed reliable, but non-threatening allies to strengthen
their position in times of warfare and to lessen the threat of potential rivals nearer the
centre of the polity. They needed protection for their traders, and needed to prevent
alliances from forming between tributaries that could threaten the centre. Importantly,
regional centres needed a frontier to expand into, in order to relieve the pressure of
competition nearer the centre of the polity. The actions of lesser chiefs who exploited
peripheral areas through raiding and trade were either given permission or tacitly condoned
by the centre.

To small-scale centres in eastern Sulawesi Bone and Ternate were a source of prestige,
wealth and power that could be used to serve the interests of local elites and to manipulate
local politics. However, such powers also formed a potential threat in times of war or even
in the absence of war, precisely because of groups of raiders such as Jangkal’s Bugis allies
raiding in the regional peripheries whose actions were condoned or even encouraged by
their rulers. Asking for protection and assistance was one of the main reasons for east coast
polities to approach regional centres. The role of such an external power is particularly
clear in the case of the VOC in northern Sulawesi, where the VOC became the dominant
external power. It was largely through unsolicited invitations to establish new outposts that
the expansion of the VOC took place in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. An important part of the role of the VOC was mediating local disputes.

Henley likens the VOC’s position to that of the ‘stranger king’, an impartial outsider who
was not connected to local society through blood-ties, and whose judgement was therefore
acceptable. In eastern Sulawesi the VOC never obtained the same status, nor was it able to
successfully mediate in conflicts on the east coast in this period. Instead of single external
centre, the polities in eastern Sulawesi looked both to South Sulawesi and to Ternate, and
the relationship with the VOC was mediated largely through its vassal Ternate.

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This dual outlook is reflected in an ‘old saying’ the ruler Mandaria of Banggai quoted to Dutch officials in 1808: ‘if Banggai gets too hot under Ternate it will seek protection from Goa’. This was more than a rhetorical quip. As discussed above, when Jangkal failed to get Tolsang’s support in Ternate, he enlisted the help of Bugis. Similarly, Buton, requested assistance from Makassar in 1699, from the VOC in 1703, and in 1750 from Bone in a hostile encounter with the VOC. The dual outlook of east coast polities as well as the role attributed to external powers is clearly laid out in the ‘Hikajat Landschap Tobungku’. This text speaks of Tobungku’s tributary status to both Ternate (Sultan Baab) and Bone (Raja Palaka). Tobungku became a Ternaten tributary after an encounter with a Ternaten raiding expedition headed by Sultan Baab that threatened to pillage Tobungku. Instead, the skilful ‘sangaji’ of Tobungku transformed Ternate into a powerful ally against Tobungku’s own local enemies. The chronologically ordered ‘Hikajat’ then traces Tobungku’s relations with Bone to the period when Arung Palaka was still a refugee in need of food and support on Buton. Tobungku responds to his request to supply food, but gives two extra shiploads of food as a gift, with the request of ‘everlasting friendship’. Arung Palaka expresses his gratitude, since ‘all other countries hate him, but only Tobungku has shown him kindness’. This debt of gratitude and special

311 In 1699 Buton asked help of Makassar in pre-empting a combined attack by Tobungku, Banggai and Mondono. ARA, VOC 1637 f. 127.
312 In 1703 representatives of opposing factions in Buton went to Batavia to state their case and requesting help. Generale Missiven VI, p. 325.
314 A group of Ternatens was travelling around and left some of their friends behind on Banggai. A conflict arises in Toili when the Ternatens humiliate the Toilians by winning a jumping contest, and which they plan to avenge by killing the Ternatens. Two Ternatens escape to Banggai from where they are taken to Ternate. The Sultan of Ternate revenges his subjects by raiding Toili with his tributaries on Sula and Sulabesi. When the Sultan of Ternate and his men hear rumours about Tobungku’s riches and of the elderly female relative of the sangaji heavily laden with gold jewellery, they proceed to attack Tobungku and capture her and take her possessions. The sangaji of Tobungku approaches the Sultan with an invitation, which is accepted. Then the Sultan is offered a ceramic dish filled with earth covered with grass and cloth in a symbolic act of surrender to Ternate, accompanied by an oath of everlasting loyalty to Ternate. After this, the elderly woman and her possessions are returned and the Ternatens stay for a month, during which there is much feasting and games. In this period Tobungku is attacked by the king of Lobu, who is defeated and captured by Sultan Baab and his men. ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, 1931, pp. 1-3.
position of Tobungku becomes the basis for its request for protection against Bugis chiefs who attacked Tobungku.

Ironically, the marginal position of Tobungku in the Dutch sources is mirrored in the way the ‘Hikajat’ portrays the Dutch. The first mention of the Dutch is only in passing as an ally of Arung Palaka who helped him to become king of Bone. But the first time the Dutch truly appear on Tobungku’s horizon is the incident of the Dutch ship precariously stuck on a reef, when it needed to be rescued by Tobungku and Ternate. This is particularly salient, since the text was assembled around 1939, to trace the history of the Dutch administrative unit ‘landschap Boengkoe’. The ‘Hikajat’ situates Tobungku among the major powers of the region as a valued ally that is given protection, support and gratitude for its help in times of need. Ternate helped Tobungku defeat a local enemy. Bone offered protection against roaming bands of Bugis. The reward Tobungku received from the Dutch was equal to that received by Ternate, demonstrating its high status in the eyes of the Dutch. Interestingly, Tobungku’s tributary position does not attribute it a servile role in relation to the larger centres.

The ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate’, also a Malay text, gives a Ternaten perspective on regional relations. Banggai, Tobungku and Buton are presented as a cluster of remote tributaries in Ternate’s periphery that only come into sharp focus as a result of wars with Makassar in the mid-seventeenth century. Tobungku is but one of many places the Ternaten warlord Kapitan Ali visited on his way to Buton, where the centre of the conflict was located. Just as other Ternaten tributaries, Tobungku was expected to provide men and ships to aid Kapitan Ali in his war efforts against the Makassarese. Tobungku’s relationship with Ternate is phrased solely in terms of demands for assistance and tribute. Tobungku is fined when only half of the men demanded from Tobungku appeared; Sultan

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315 This text was transcribed by Naidah in 1878, but it is not clear when it was written. It contains a number of sections on Ternate’s origin, the wars with Makassar, relations with Bone, the role of Kapitan Ali in eastern Sulawesi, and on Sultan Amsterdam and the rebellion that was put down in the 1680s. Naidah, ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate’, 1878, pp. 381-503.
Baab decreed that Tobungku must pay tribute in the form of ‘two pikul of wax and one hundred bantula of rice as food for the Ternaten envoy, and one buffalo’.\textsuperscript{316} The oath of ‘everlasting friendship’ is an implicit promise that the flow of tribute would also be everlasting, an interesting contrast with the way the everlasting friendship is portrayed in the Tobungku text.\textsuperscript{317}

For regional centres it was essential to ‘manage’ tributaries in a way that ensured that their potential violence would not be directed against the centre, and that they did not form alliances against the centre. For this reason it was necessary to direct violence outward, away from the centre towards the periphery. One way of doing this was to create a hierarchy of tributaries by giving one a privileged position of intermediary between the main centre and other nearby polities. Such a hierarchy was not at all fixed; it could shift over time and could be manipulated at all levels. Sula mediated the relations between Ternate and its east coast tributaries. Letters in both directions past through Sula, and Sulanese often accompanied Ternaten envoys and warlords on their visits to the east coast.\textsuperscript{318} Sula’s regular raiding of Banggai in the 1680s may also be seen in this light. In 1685, Banggai was targeted by raiders from Tomini, Tobungku and Bone, but ‘nobody plagued them more than the Sulanese’. Banggai requested that its complaints would be passed on the Sultan of Ternate, in the hope that this might lead to some form of protection. This, however, was unlikely to occur except under pressure of the VOC.\textsuperscript{319}

Despite the different perspectives on Tobungku-Ternate relations, the two texts both place tribute and contact between polities against the background of violence, whether it be regional warfare or raiding in Ternate’s periphery. In the ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate’, the

\textsuperscript{316} Kapitan Ali fines Tobungku demanding twenty male and twenty female slaves and ten buffalo horns of gold. Tobungku was said only to have paid seven, remaining in debt for ever after. ibid. p. 444.

\textsuperscript{317} ibid. p. 401.

\textsuperscript{318} While reading the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ with Husen Jasin and R. Rone, they commented that Sula was ‘Ternate’s friend’ and that Ternaten envoys usually came with Sulanese.

\textsuperscript{319} ARA, VOC 1428 f. 131f.
tributaries are the source of the ships filled with gifts of food and other goods, in the Ternate text it consists of shiploads of food, ‘for the Ternaten envoy’ who was there on account of a war. The Tobungku hikayat it is the symbolic gift of tribute that averts violence and created a powerful ally. The rare and irregular envoys from Tobungku and Banggai to Ternate during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seem to confirm that payment of tribute was more a side-effect of war than a regular occurrence as the Dutch expected it to be.

In both texts, Ternate is the more powerful centre to which Tobungku swears an oath of allegiance. The implications of the oath, however, are presented differently. In the Ternaten text, east coast tributaries fulfil the demands of the centre: they are to provide men, ships and food for visiting troops. Tobungku as well as Banggai and Buton, are among many allies in the war against Goa. In the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, Tobungku skills in manipulating external forces to serve its own interests are highlighted. Both Ternate and Bone become protectors of Tobungku, and in the case of Bone and the Dutch, the assistance they received from Tobungku confers prestige on Tobungku. Relations with the neighbouring polities on the east coast are presented as latently competitive (Buton) or outright hostile (Banggai).

**Containing Local Violence in a Regional Context**

*The Tobungku-Banggai Treaty (c. 1743)*

A treaty included in the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ highlights yet another possible dynamic in tributary relations: the centre, Ternate in this case, needed help in a war against another tributary, but Banggai and Tobungku were at war with each other. The Ternaten

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320 In a ceremony described in the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, tribute was given to Sultaan Baab. The gift consisted of a ceramic dish filled with earth, covered with branches and grass, a piece of cloth of four ‘depa’ (armlengths) and one large gong, which signified that ‘the land of Tobungku and all its contents are surrendered to the Sultan’, ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, 1931, p. 3.

321 According to the ‘Hikajat’, a Ternaten envoy by the name of ‘Salatoe Abdul Bajan’ was sent to both Banggai and Tobungku with the request to assist Ternate in a war against the Talawari. According to Husen Jasin, a local exert in Tobungku history, what was transcribed as Talawari could also have been read as Tolare.
envoy mediated a peace treaty between the tributaries that contained several clauses were intended to prevent conflict from reoccurring. While considerable caution is called for when dealing with an isolated, and heavily edited text such as the ‘Hikajat’, the particular circumstances and persons are corroborated by the Dutch sources, and the treaty, even if not explicitly mentioned in Dutch sources, can be dated at approximately 1743. The anak raja (aristocrats) in Tobungku and Banggai who signed the contract are mentioned in Dutch sources as well: Surabi, mentioned as one of the anak raja of Tobungku, appears in a Dutch source as the ruler of Tobungku who died in 1747. Lamboja, another Tobungku aristocrat in the ‘Hikajat’, is mentioned in a VOC report as a leader of one of the factions in the war of succession that followed Surabi’s death. Kasim, the anak raja from Banggai, was according to Dutch source the ruler of Banggai who was dethroned in 1749, but requested to be reinstated with Ternate’s assistance in 1757. A Dutch source also mentions that the Sultan of Ternate summoned Tobungku troops in 1743, and that they arrived the following year in Ternate. The fighting did not eventuate, and the Tobungku troops stayed on in Ternate. By 1749, their resources were depleted and that they had become a volatile group that needed to reckoned with. When the Tobungku ruler Surabi died, the VOC wanted to use this to influence the choice of a new ruler and to insist that Tobungku sign a treaty. Tobungku was the only Ternaten tributary at that time that did not have a contract with the VOC. The contract was not pursued because the Dutch and Ternatens feared a violent reaction from the Tobungku men in Ternate, but also because

which in archaic Tobungku meant ‘mountain people’ or ‘primitive people’ (interview, Husen Jasin 1995, Tobungku). It would make more sense if the Talawari were located further east, since it would seem unlikely that Ternate would need assistance to fight Tobungku’s hill people. It is possible that ‘Talawari’ refers to the ‘Toewari’, mentioned in Naidah’s ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate’ as a tributary of Ternate. According to this text, the famous Kapitan Laut, Alie, returns from the war with Makassar with captives, who were given to ‘Toewari’. Dutch sources indicate that at that time, Ternate was at war with Tidore, so that possibly Toewari or Talawari is a place name somewhere in Tidore. Naidah, ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate’, 1878, p. 401.

322 VOC 2882 f 115.

323 If Banggai sent troops, they are not mentioned in the Dutch sources.
Tobungku was considered too remote and often frequented by ‘wandering nations’, primarily Bugis.  

It is important to note that a Ternaten envoy mediated in a conflict between two tributaries only so that military help would be forthcoming for Ternate, not just for the sake of pacifying tributaries. This was a point of difference with the VOC, which wanted all conflict between Ternate’s tributaries to be resolved, while it would appear that Ternate only intervened selectively when it serves its own interest. Peace-negotiations did have a place in Ternate’s tributary system, but peace-keeping as such was not the main role of the centre unless it served an immediate purpose, in this case to persuade warring tributaries to join forces in support of Ternate that was at war with yet another tributary.

The clauses that relate to violence do not prohibit or discourage raiding, but does protect Ternate’s interests. The final clause implicitly endorses pillaging, raiding and even the trade in spices, but stipulated that Banggai and Tobungku must surrender raided goods (barang rampasan) to Ternate. It is not clear to what extent Ternate was able to enforce such a ‘tax’ on pillaged goods. However, the clause suggests that Ternate even endorse raiding and warfare, as long as it could ‘tax’ pillaged goods, thus the threat of potential violence was transformed into a source of wealth. Even if it had wanted to, Ternate was not in a position to prohibit raiding or warfare among its tributaries, especially on the somewhat remote east coast of Sulawesi.

The only other condition relating to Ternate in the peace contract refers to the safety of Ternaten traders on the east coast, that had to be guaranteed by both Banggai and Tobungku. In contrast to the VOC’s ideal of a centrally managed system of political relations in peace-keeping and mediation were instrumental, Ternate’s tributary system

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324 VOC 2740 f. 393.

325 When sailing everywhere while carrying cloves and nutmeg, all pillaged goods (barang rampasan) acquired by Banggai and Tobungku must be surrendered to the Sultan of Ternate ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, 1931, p. 8: ‘Kaanam perdjandjian apabila berlajar kemana-mana membawa tjingke atau pala maka ada barang rampasan didapat maka hendaklah dipersembahkan [kepada] Soelthan Ternate.’ (kepada: in the original: kekawa.)
would appear to be a series of separately negotiated non-aggression pacts between the centre and its tributaries, in which the centre was able to safeguard the interests of its subjects and divert potential violence of tributaries to areas more peripheral or outside its own sphere of influence.

**Causes of Local Conflict in the Treaty between Banggai and Tobungku c. 1743**

If evidence relating to regional conflicts in eastern Sulawesi is sparse, localised conflicts with minimal or no external intervention were even less likely to enter Dutch reports. Yet, as small-scale polities often solicited intervention by external powers, it is worthwhile exploring local mechanisms that led to conflict. The treaty between Banggai and Tobungku was intended to stop a conflicts from arising between Banggai and Tobungku, and its clauses give some insight into conflicts that rarely entered the Dutch sources. Significantly, only one of the clauses deals with the actions of local elites and their allies. This clause forbids either polity forming alliances with third parties to wage war on the other. The pattern of forming alliances with neighbouring or more remote allies for a raiding expedition is a common occurrence in Dutch sources as well. Ternate, Tidore, Bone and the VOC itself made use of this mode of warfare, using groups of allies mount punitive or other expeditions. On a smaller scale, east coast polities used local and regional allies in warfare against their neighbours, which this clause forbids. Such conflict was initiated and co-ordinated by local elites, and often included sieges.

Importantly, three of the four clauses deal with preventing very small-scale conflict from escalating into inter-polity warfare. These clauses present different scenarios in which elites or rulers did not initiate conflict, but were drawn into conflicts between their own

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326 Both in the ‘Hikajat’ as well as in Dutch sources there is evidence of this occurring. In 1683, Banggai with an allied group of Bugis waged war on Tobungku, supposedly to bring back a number of settlements that had defected from Banggai. *Generale Missiven IV*, p. 655; C.B.H. von Rosenberg, *Reistogten in de Afdeeling Gorontalo*, Amsterdam, 1865, p. 136.
subjects and subjects of other rulers. The first clause deals with coastal traders moving along the east coast:

When Tombuku people come to trade in Banggai, and are subsequently killed, there will be no case for conflict (perkara). The same applies to traders from Banggai visiting Tombuku.\footnote{Hikayat Landschap Boengkoe\textsuperscript{,} 1931, p. 6.}

This clause points to the obligation of rulers to protect traders, and to the real possibility of such traders being killed. This level of conflict only rarely entered Dutch reports but is the subject matter of many oral traditions in eastern Sulawesi.\footnote{The need for protection of traders extended to those from Ternate as well. The same treaty between Banggai and Tobungku shows Ternate’s concern for the protection of traders in a separate clause in which Tobungku and Banggai guaranteed their safety and assistance. The link between traders and rulers in Banggai is borne out by the intervention of the ruler of Banggai on behalf of 16 of his subjects who were taken prisoner on suspicion of smuggling spices in 1733 and released three years later on his request.\footnote{Hikayat Landschap Boengkoe\textsuperscript{,} 1931, p. 6.}}

The second clause is aimed specifically at preventing conflicts between common (non-aristocratic) coastal people (orang ketjil pasisir) from escalating into inter-polity warfare:

When common coastal people from Tobungku kill people from Banggai, the latter may retaliate, but must first inform the king so he can inform the rest of the negeri, so that if the king of Tobungku is not willing to take revenge, then the king of Banggai is allowed to avenge the death of his subjects. Tobungku may do the same if it occurs in Banggai.\footnote{Generale Missiven VIII\textsuperscript{,} p. 193.}

\footnote{A similar case occurred in 1728, when a VOC official reported that while Gorontalo and Bugis traders were on Banggai buying wax and tortoise shell, there was an attack by a large number of Tobungku vessels in which ten Banggaian were killed.\textit{Generale Missiven VIII}, p. 486.}
In order to contain such a conflict, a victimised party from the other polity is directed in the first instance to the local ruler. If he will not take up their cause, the are to proceed to their own ruler who then can take revenge without it escalating into war between the two polities.

The third clause deals with internal conflict that accidentally affects subjects of a different polity, which could

If people of Banggai are fighting among themselves, and people from Tobungku get hurt, they may retaliate, and it will have no consequences.\(^{331}\)

The same rules apply to people from Banggai who are visiting Tobungku.

In this case, murder and revenge between parties from different polities can take place without escalating. In a situation of internal fighting any consequences, because internal conflict would make informing the local ruler would be difficult in those circumstances.\(^{332}\)

The sections of the treaty between Banggai and Tobungku dealing with conflict evoke the image of a mixed and mobile coastal population that met through trade, migration and raiding, with little ‘top-down’ or centralised control, except when it came responding to violence committed against a subject elsewhere. In three out of four clauses, the victims and perpetrators are expressly referred to as ‘people from Banggai who come to trade (orang Banggai datang berdagang) and ‘common people (lit. small people, ‘orang ketjil’), whereas the ‘raja’ were only involved when it came to revenge and warfare. This treaty suggests that such conflict was an important cause for intra-polity warfare because

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\(^{331}\) ‘tiada betjaranja.’ ibid. p. 7.

\(^{332}\) Interestingly, the above measures to contain violence contrast with the limited evidence on conflict resolution known from ethnographic accounts in which the payment of fines was the main mechanism. In the Gulf of Tomini the Dutch noted two instances in 1712 where conflict was prevented by paying fines instead of taking revenge. In the first case, two korak-korak from Limbotto went on land in the Gulf of Tomini to replenish their water supplies. A captain from Mendono named Tankobi who happened to be in the area, stole two of their korak-korak, however, without committing any violence against them, so that the people from Limbotto had to borrow small perahu from neighbouring villages to return home. Limbotto then demanded two slaves for each korak-korak that was taken. In the second instance, four slaves from Gorontalo beaten to death by Mandarese. In return Gorontalo demanded two slaves for each murdered slave. It is possible that there was a difference between ‘property’ that was stolen or destroyed and violence. Perhaps closer Dutch supervision in Gorontalo at the time encouraged such solutions. VOC 1809 f. 121, 122.
of the rulers’ obligation to revenge their subjects. The measure to prevent warfare do not attempt to stop between individuals and communal groups from occurring, but rather aim to contain localised violence and preventing it from spiralling out of control to the level of intra-polity warfare. 333

**Slaves and Local Conflict among Polities in Eastern Sulawesi**

The most obvious, economic reason for violent conflict and mutual raiding was the desire for slaves, which constituted an important exchange commodity for local elites. Raiding and pillaging was not limited to periods of regional warfare such as the Ternate-Makassar wars, of the aftermath of the fall of Makassar. Some degree of low-level violence was a structural element of political organisation at all levels. In eastern Sulawesi it was the most visible aspect of competition between polities. In 1735, a VOC official commented with some exasperation on the continuing rumours of wars between the Mandar, Bugis, Tobungku and Banggaians, and that mediation never resulted in long-lasting peace. Experience had taught him that it was not wise to interfere in the mutual complaints and arguments of these polities. 334

Junker sees raiding and warfare as one of several ‘competitive strategies’ to acquire resources (both human and material) as well as undermine the trade position of rivals. 335

The early mention of Banggai and Tobungku indeed shows that lively trade in these polities was accompanied by inter-polity warfare. Reid points out that warfare in early modern Southeast Asia was not geared towards eliminating the enemy, but towards

333 A similar lack of control that the ruler of Buton had over his subjects led to problems when stranded VOC ships were pillaged by coastal populations. The most notorious case was that of the ship ‘Rust en Werk’ in 1737 (VOC 2882, Ternaten). In the eyes of the VOC this was a violation of the treaty with Buton for which was forced Buton to pay a large fine in money and in slaves. The fine was passed on to the ruler of Muna who had to deliver the slaves. The response of the ruler of Buton, that his subjects had acted without his knowledge, sounded like an excuse to the VOC but is consistent with the treaty from the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’, 1931, p. 6.

334 VOC 2313, fs. 875-877. Henley notes for northern Sulawesi that ‘[i]n many areas, inter-communal warfare was institutionalised and perpetuated by headhunting traditions embedded in local ritual and religion’. David Henley, *Jealousy and Justice*, 2000, p. 2.

obtaining captives. This is generally linked to the relative scarcity of population in pre-modern Asia, which caused control over people rather than over land to be the main index of power. A VOC official remarked in 1648 that the wars of the petty rulers of Tagulanda and Sangir (northern Sulawesi) were always based on or resulted in the conquest of slaves. While captives could be kept as slaves for performing domestic chores or tilling the soil, slaves were a important source of wealth since they could be ransomed or sold. They were also used as gifts and as tribute to local and regional centres, and in local exchanges for paying fines.

Warfare in order to acquire slaves may have increased after the VOC attempts to enforce the ban on spices. Slaves became the only legal export commodity that could be exchanged obtaining cloth and other luxury items for the elites in eastern Sulawesi. When Buton and Tobungku agreed to comply to VOC regulations to have spice trees cut down regularly, the rulers and councils received an annual sum from the VOC as a compensation for the lost revenue. The compensation sum was not sufficient to provide for the needs of the Butonese elite, but only became apparent after the VOC placed restrictions on the export of slaves. In 1685 Buton was granted special permission to sell slaves in Batavia.

In 1700 a letter from Buton to Batavia stated that they had cut down all their spice trees, and that all they had left for export were slaves, which they needed to buy cloth, rice to feed themselves. But, Batavia’s prohibition on the import of slaves from Buton ‘had
caused great misery’ to their land. In 1700, 50 to 60 slaves a year were sold from Buton; in 1701 and in 1702 Makassar and Buton were both allowed to export 200 male slaves to Banda.

In eastern Sulawesi slave-raiding was part of warfare. The deportation of entire villages was common practice. In 1700 Tobungku attacked and burned the village Tankeno on Buton and took away its inhabitants as captives, and of another village Barangga part of the inhabitants were killed and the rest taken away as slaves. In 1706 raiders from the Gulf of Tomini pillaged a settlement on Bangane near Banggai, took three heads and captured the remaining 30 men, women and children as slaves. The slaves were divided among the participants and were used locally for agricultural labour, to pay fines and tribute, or were exchanged for trading goods.

There are numerous reports that show that Tobungku and Buton traded slaves for weapons and ammunition both with VOC traders as well as with traders from the western archipelago such as Johor at times when they were regularly at war with each other. In 1683, when mutual raiding of Buton and Tobungku occurred, four large Malay vessels arrived in Buton loaded with Indian cloth, canons and muskets, which they exchanged for ‘a large number of slaves’. In 1695 the Ambonese trader Zacharia was reported to have exchanged two small canons and five muskets for 90 slaves with the Tobungku ruler. Abdul, another trader would have traded a number of cloths for 22 slaves, and yet another traders obtained 48 slaves in Tobungku and Banggai, and in these years too, the raiding of

341 VOC 1647 f. 2. Interestingly, the letter includes tortoise shell among the products that Buton does not have to exchange for imported goods, which may mean that Bajo had not yet moved to the Buton archipelago yet.

342 ARA G. J. Schreiter 2.21.007.57 No. 66, No. 37. Slaves from the east coast can occasionally be traced to Batavia. In 1653 a man named Tagal from Tobungku was sold by Ince Mandil to a Bandanese called Ali probably residing in Batavia. Ten Butonese slaves were also sold in Batavia in the same year. ANRI, Notarieel Archief, Transportacten Slaven, Not. nr 12; Roest, Mei 1652-December 1653.

343 Slaves were not only the result of raiding or warfare. In 1672 the number of slaves available in South Sulawesi increased dramatically because of famine, which reduced many to poverty and dependence. Generale Missiven II p. 679; III p. 896; IV, p. 792-794.

344 VOC 1647 f. 13.

345 VOC 1710, f. 657.
Tobungku both in Buton and the northern part of the east coast occurred.\textsuperscript{347} Slaves were a product of warfare but also ensured the continuation of warfare because they could be exchanged for weapons and ammunition.

Slaves were also taken locally. From at least the early 1700s until far into the nineteenth century, Peleng was a source of slave for the Banggai elite. In 1706 a VOC official reported that

...the Banggaïans for no reason make these people into slaves, so that they have a strong dislike of Banggai and live in continual fear, and flee their villages into the jungle as soon as a boat from Banggai arrives.\textsuperscript{348}

Buton’s slaves also were not only war captives, but were known to be taken from ‘pagan mountain peoples’ (\textit{heydense bergvolckeren}) that were tributary to Buton.\textsuperscript{349} Competition among the elite for captives was evident in Buton for instance in 1684, when the ruler needed to put down ‘rebels’ who were ‘stealing people’ whom they wanted to sell.\textsuperscript{350} While it is not possible to compare slave exports from eastern Sulawesi before and after the VOC prohibition on growing spices, it is clear in for instance Bali that great wealth could be amassed from exporting slaves, and that warfare was the prime means by which to acquire slaves.\textsuperscript{351} What is certain is that acquiring captives was an important aspect of warfare, either for increasing the population of a polity or to be exchanged for war-stores or luxury imports such as cloth and ceramics.

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Generale Missiven IV} p. 656.
\textsuperscript{347} VOC 1556 f. 323f, 323r.
\textsuperscript{348} VOC 1727 f. 905.
\textsuperscript{349} \textit{Generale Missiven IV} p. 331. In 1681 Butonese (and Makassarese) slaves were not in high demand, because they generally were too old (ibid. p. 431).
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Generale Missiven IV}, p. 717.
\textsuperscript{351} From the latter decades of the seventeenth century up to the early nineteenth century, slaves constituted the main export of Bali, providing rulers and lords with substantial incomes. Henk Schulte Nordholt, \textit{The Spell of Power}, 1996, pp. 41-44.
Regional Status and Local Rivalry

In the case study of Banggai, local factions were competing with each other but at the same time local conflict was an extension of regional rivalries. The conflict between Tobungku and Buton in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century was also a mixture of such local and regional factors. In this conflict, however, the antagonism between the two east coast polities was an important motivation for creating and maintaining relations with the VOC and Ternate. In fact, the relative status of each polity in relation to Ternate added extra bitterness to this conflict. As mentioned in the previous section, attempts to involve external centres in local conflicts were common. Fear of retribution from an external centre could be enough to discourage enemies from attacking, and the extra resources could make a critical difference. In both the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ and a VOC report, the presence of Ternatens is mentioned as a reason for an impending attack to be warded off.

The accounts of the seemingly intractable conflict between Buton and Tobungku between from approximately 1680 into the early decades of the eighteenth century confirms the impression of an earlier quoted VOC official that intervention would not lead to lasting peace. After 1715, reporting on this conflict in the Dutch archival record decreases, but not because it was resolved. In 1726 Valentijn noted that:

there was an old resentment between Buton and Tobungku, because 200 Butonese would have been beaten to death. And even though the Butonese are probably wrong, this is not a bad thing, because in this manner we find out many of their secrets.352

In the 1740s, reports reached Ternate again of fighting between Buton and Tobungku.

Part of the rivalry between Buton and Tobungku was concerned with the issue as to whether or not Buton was the most prominent tributary that mediated the relationship
between Ternate and other east coast tributaries. Buton requested official recognition that Tobungku was its own tributary, thus demoting Tobungku to the status of the tributary of a tributary. Tobungku protested against this subordinate status and insisted it was a direct tributary of Ternate, on equal footing with Buton. A retrospective source from 1845 recounts that when Buton was a tributary of Ternate, there was an agreement (djandjian) that Buton held the ‘key’ (namegang kontjinja) to all the negeri of Celebes (Silibi), including Banggai, Tobungku, Muna, Tiworo, Lohia. 353

It is interesting in this light to note how the ‘Hikajat’ underlines Tobungku’s close relationship to Ternate. When a new Sultan was elected in Ternate, an envoy was sent to inform the east coast tributaries of this important event. Tobungku is cast in the role that Sula traditionally fulfilled: the trusted intermediary and companion of Ternaten envoys. A Ternaten envoy travelled to Tobungku first, from where he was accompanied by Tobungku officials to Buton and back to Tobungku again. 354 Though the itinerary is to some degree dictated by geography and sailing routes, in a political environment in which Tobungku’s status was challenged, the role of the Tobungku in accompanying the Ternaten envoy to Buton is a clear statement about how Tobungku wishes to see itself in relation to Buton. In addition, the sequence of place names has strong connotations with ranking lists such as those that occur in origin myths in eastern Sulawesi. In these myths, siblings scatter in different directions, and the sequence of the kingdoms they founded are listed according to their respective status.

Ternate’s role in a period when it was adjusting to the greater influence of the VOC in its internal affairs was not straightforward, and one suspects that the VOC did not know all the goings-on between Ternate and its tributaries. The conflict between Tobungku and

352 Francois Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indië 1724-1726, p. 81.
353 ANRI Besluit 20 Juni 1845 No. 15, Letter from the Sultan of Ternate to the Resident. The letter continues to say that when Buton came directly under the Dutch, this djandjian was forgotten.
Buton was greatly complicated by the Ternaten claims to parts of Muna (Tiworo and Lohia), and by the presence of Penati, a Ternaten warlord who defected from Ternate after the rebellion against the VOC was put down in 1680. He settled in Tobungku, where he continued to agitate against the VOC. The history of Ternate’s claims went back to the wars against Makassar in the middle of the seventeenth century, when Ternaten troops were firmly entrenched on Muna. The strategic position overlooking the straight between Muna and Buton made the Munanese settlements lucrative in terms of raiding and a thorn in the side of the Butonese, whose ships were vulnerable to such attacks.

Tobungku had avoided signing a treaty in which it acknowledged the over-lordship of Ternate and the VOC in 1678. It continued to show signs of resistance against the VOC. In 1683 Tobungku chiefs did not respond to a call of the Ternaten governor of Ternate to come to Banggai in order to resolve the conflict with Buton. Three years Tobungku incited three of Buton’s tributaries to rebel against Buton in the name of the Ternaten Sultan, and against the VOC. In 1687, Tobungku finally organised an expedition to Ternate to witness an important ceremony. On the way, however, it raided and destroyed the settlement of Gannakora, tributary to Tidore, to avenge an earlier attack on Tobunkgu. This caused great tension between Ternate and Tidore, and disgruntled the VOC. Nevertheless, because of Ternate’s antagonism towards Buton, Tobungku was a natural ally. In 1693, the Dutch governor of Ternate requested Tobungku to send men to Muna with the message that the settlements of Tiworo and Lohia to submit to their ‘lawful lord’ Ternate. Fourteen Tobungku men were captured and detained in Buton, and later another seven were captured and their vessels and goods confiscated. The Tobungku ruler requested permission to wage war on Buton, since he felt that ‘Buton wants to exert sovereignty over him’. But since Tobungku formally had no contract with the VOC, the Tobungku ruler was told to travel to Ternate to take an oath of loyalty to the Sultan. Since the VOC

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355 Generale Missiven V p. 584, 585.
discouraged local conflict, it ignored all requests for ammunition to be used in such a conflict and ordered Tobungku not to wage war on Buton. Two years later, during an official visit by VOC envoys to Tobungku in 1695 became tense when the Tobungku ruler complained that the VOC had ignored his requests for assistance against Buton, and that continuous attacks from the latter were the main reason why he had not been able to make the journey to Ternate to pay homage. Furthermore, the Tobungku ruler was insulted because the VOC envoys failed to deliver a personal letter, another sign that Tobungku was not valued by the VOC.

The conflict between Buton and Tobungku continued unabated in the early decades of the eighteenth century, for in 1699 Buton decided to attack Tobungku with the assistance of Makassar, and in 1701 Buton requested permission and assistance from Ternate and the VOC to take revenge on Tobungku who had attacked and destroyed several settlements. The ruler of Buton made a point of mentioning that Tobungku had not responded to calls from either Ternate or Makassar to pay homage to either of these centres. Tobungku took advantage of the confusion in the wake of the death of Buton’s ruler Jaodin Ismael in 1704, who was rumoured to have been poisoned, to launch an attack of two hundred vessels on Buton that destroyed several settlements. Ternate backed Tobungku in saying that Buton had provoked the attack, but still called the ruler to Ternate, even though Tobungku was unlikely to follow Ternate’s orders, since it had not done so in the past.

The ‘Hikajat’ gives a detailed and very localised account of an armed conflict between Tobungku and Banggaians with their Bugis allies. Tobungku, in this incident boasts a close relationship with Ternate, and a fleet of Tobungku ships are on their way to Ternate.

356 VOC 1637 f. 135.
357 Generale Missiven VI, p. 296.
358 ibid. p. 295.
with a Ternaten envoy on board when the conflict occurs. The portrayal of Ternate’s role as a powerful ally in a localised conflict corresponds with Dutch sources: Tobungku was interested in relations with the VOC only insofar as it enhanced its position through official recognition and assistance in local conflict. Buton, too, used its relations with the VOC with varying degrees of success against Tobungku.

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In this chapter, local conflict is the prism through which the local and regional political system is viewed. The case study of Banggai in the years 1680-1715 examines the entangled strands of local and regional conflict in a regional periphery where relations with external centres and networks were adjusting to a new balance of power in the region. The conflict between Bone and Ternate was fought out in Banggai by local factions supported by Bugis raiders and Ternaten aristocrats. By 1700, Banggai had been successfully incorporated into expanding Bugis trading networks, and the Ternaten ruler who was appointed with support of the VOC, was drawn into raiding against VOC allies.

The second section explores the contrasting interests and needs that shaped relations between small-scale polities in eastern Sulawesi and ‘outlying’ regional centres. Small-scale polities viewed relations with external centres as a means to enhance their power and prestige internally and vis-à-vis neighbouring polities. Regional centres needed reliable but non-threatening allies, local protection for their traders, access to local products, and a frontier into which ambitious chiefs could expand. The resulting web of communications,

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359 This particular incident cannot be dated, but it is at a time when the ruler of Banggai was residing in Mendono and was on good terms with Bugis there: A fleet of Tobungku ships that were on their way to Ternate with a Ternaten envoy passed the coast of Mendono. Here, a group of Banggaiaans with their Bugis allies provoked a conflict on sea. In the battle, twenty Tobungku perahu were destroyed and their men killed. The remainder to the Tobungku boats went to the bay of Batui where they encountered forty Bugis and Banggaiaans vessels, one of which carried the Banggai ruler. The Bugis and Banggaiaans started shouting insults as a prelude to a second round of fighting. At this point the Tobungku people shouted out that there is a Ternaten envoy on board, upon which the other parties immediately withdrew. Later in the day, however, when the Tobungku jogogu Nawar asked who started throwing stones at the Tobungku, the Bugis and Banggaiaans replied by throwing stones, and fighting started anew, and the jogogu was killed, and the Tobungku went home. Then the Bugis planned to attack Toili, and the Ternaten envoy led the Tobungku vessels to Rata, where he fought with them against the Bugis. They fled to Sinora and Batui, and after three days...
exchanges and alliances between regional and small-scale centres was multi-layered, multi-directional and fluid. The continuous conflict between Tobungku and Banggai was an important motivating factor for initiating and maintaining relations with external centres. Tobungku successfully evaded the VOC when it appeared that it did not intend to lend its support in the conflict with Buton.

Finally, sections in the ‘Hikajat Landschap Boengkoe’ give a much more localised view of inter-polity conflict. In the account of a conflict between Banggai and Tobungku, both sides have external allies, but they are completely absorbed in local processes with no reference to Ternate and Bone. The treaty clauses pertaining to local conflict in the 1743 treaty between the same polities focus the attention on conflicts involving local traders and commoners from different polities as a cause of inter-polity warfare. Obligations of rulers to revenge their subjects allowed conflicts between individuals and groups to escalate.
In recent years, the period between the decline of the VOC and the rise of the colonial state has been re-examined to discover its broader significance in the larger framework of Southeast Asian history. Reid speaks of ‘a late eighteenth century watershed’, in which a new order was born that marked the beginning of Asian modernity.\(^{360}\) This period also constitutes the ‘last stand’ of autonomous indigenous states in Southeast Asia before the onslaught of colonialism in the nineteenth century. As European mercantile monopolies dissolved in the late eighteenth century, Malay and Chinese shipping increased, as well as British naval and commercial power and American blockade-runners.\(^{361}\)

The search for Asian autonomies in this second ‘Age of Commerce’ might not be best sought in highly visible institutionalised states, but rather in the ‘movement of people, along with the movement of goods and ideas’ which according to Reid was the leitmotiv of the first ‘Age of Commerce’.\(^{362}\) One of the most thoroughly documented examples of the vitality of indigenous states in this period is by James Warren’s work *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898*, in which he links the transformation of the Sulu sultanate to world commerce,


\(^{362}\) Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1460-1680*, 1993, p. 53. Despite the vitality and prosperity found in many Southeast Asian, Lieberman still finds the revival of indigenous states in the archipelago ‘ephemeral and anaemic’ in comparison with the integration and growth of the polities of mainland Southeast Asia in the same period. Lieberman contrasts mainland Southeast Asia with the archipelago in this period and concludes that the ‘centuries-long political and cultural consolidation on the mainland had but limited analogues in the archipelago’. From the perspective of a mainland historian, Sulu’s control over dependent principalities by mainland standards was also tenuous. He suggests that the closest parallel to the supra-local integration achieved by mainland polities were the Dutch and Spanish colonial empires. Though I do not dispute his comparison, judging integration solely by the power of
economic growth and slave-raiding. Instead of the colonial image of piracy that was alleged to have resulted from the decay of indigenous states, Warren links slave-raiding to economic expansion and to changes in the global economy. The intensive Sulu slave-raiding that threatened coastal populations and colonial governments alike was part of a social-cultural pattern and flexible adaptation to new demands for export commodities that had characterised maritime Southeast Asia for centuries. The economic transformation due to expanded trading and slave-raiding was not limited to the Sulu Sultanate, but took place throughout the archipelago in a multitude of small-scale, localised contexts and was shaped by pre-existing patterns of regional relations, trade and local conflict. The question arises how the small-scale polities of eastern Sulawesi fit into the wider scenario of expanded cross-cultural commerce and regional raiding networks. Were there obvious signs of economic change, and if so, did the polities of eastern Sulawesi benefit from the new economic opportunities, or did the control of regional centres tighten in this period?

The answers to these questions remain somewhat tentative and inconclusive. Tracing the historical development of small-scale polities in eastern Sulawesi in this period is hampered first and foremost by the paucity of historical sources. Comparisons with the much better documented case of Sulu are useful because of some obvious similarities, but also difficult because the paucity of sources on eastern Sulawesi for this period readily obscures differences. The east coast of Sulawesi bears similarities to parts of the east coast of Borneo and its relationship to Bone. The parallels between the pioneering out-migration of Tausug chiefs and a certain type of Bugis chief that expanded into Bone’s periphery are unmistakable. The heuristic concept of a zone as outlined by Warren for state-centres may be deceptive. Victor Lieberman, ‘Mainland-Archipelagic Parallels and Contrasts’, c. 1750-1850, in: Anthony Reid, The Last Stand, 1997, pp. 27-53.


364 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1460-1680, 1993, p. 32-36.
Sulu is an important step away from the static images of indigenous polities that focus too much on formal political structures; images that do not take into consideration the diversity and dynamism of relations that converge in regional centres. This concept also does not define polities by delineating a specific territory, but rather by tracing links and networks from the centre to the periphery, allows for a certain porosity at the edges of the ‘zone’. Bone’s sphere of influence was also such a zone, but Ternate’s sphere of influence was much less, since the economic component of trade and exchange as an integrating factor was much weaker. However, the zone surrounding a larger regional centre is, despite its porous nature, a reasonably well circumscribed geographic area.

If the point of reference is not a larger regional centre, but rather small-scale polities, tracing relationships and networks outwards from such polities to various centres results in a very different pattern, possibly an opposite, mirror image of a zone. What is necessary for an area such as eastern Sulawesi is a complementary concept to the ‘zone’, a concept that captures the way different networks are integrated at the local level, thus tracing the same kind of relationships and networks from the periphery out towards various regional networks and centres. Hence, here with some hesitation, I would liken small-scale polities to a ‘node’, denoting a place where various networks converge and overlap, a ‘thickening’ in the web of political and economic relations where different social, economic and political strands come together. Besides the ‘density’ of such relations that indicates integration in regional networks, it is necessary to discern which aspect is concerned, and how the balance of power is distributed between local and external agents. The process of diaspora denotes different degrees of assimilation into local environments and the ‘localisation’ of external elements.

Turning to eastern Sulawesi, sources from the early decades of the nineteenth century indicate that here too, regional-local trade was busy, and alliances with raiding groups played an important role. The Dutch trader and adventurer J. N. Vosmaer reported that in
1830, Tobungku was the main trading entrepot on the east coast of Sulawesi where local products were collected for export. Tobungku traders carried on a ‘considerable trade’ (aanzienlijke handel) along the coast to the north to the Gulf of Tomori and the Banggai archipelago and to the south as far as Wawonii, near the entrance of Kendari Bay. The main products in this trade were wax, tripang and tortoise shell, all of which were transported to Tobungku, where annually a large fleet of Bugis and Makassarese ships came to trade. The Tobungku, who had a reputation in the eighteenth century as a people of warriors, in the early nineteenth century, became known as ‘pirates’. Tobungku in this period was a centre of raiding, connected to both the Magindanao on the north coast of Sulawesi in Toli-toli, as well as to the Tobelo networks that ranged from Halmahera down to Bali and across to the Lesser Sunda islands.

The tripang trade on the east coast appeared to be so potentially lucrative that Vosmaer decided to open a trading post in Kendari Bay. Vosmaer’s main opponent was the Sultan of Buton, as tripang traders at that time were accustomed to pay their dues to him before travelling to Kendari. The earliest information on the state of Buton in this period is from Mulder, who visited Buton between 1828 and 1836. He was impressed with Buton’s sizeable number of large perahu, all locally made from hardwoods found in Buton’s interior. With these perahu, Butonese traders made long journeys, bearing close resemblance to Bugis traders. Cornelius’ impression of Buton in 1840 is that it was a

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365 As mentioned in the introduction, the Sulu-based raiders that reached Sulawesi were known as Magindanao. Warren argues that these raiders who originated from Mindanao, only had weak links with the Magindanao sultanate, and were in fact Iranun, a name that refers to their place of origin on the highland plateau of Mindanao (J.F. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1981, pp. 160-171). See also chapters four and six of this study. I have, however, maintained the name ‘Magindanao’, since this is how they were known to both their escaped victims and to their close Tobelo allies such Robodoi and his followers, who migrated to the east coast of Sulawesi in the 1840s. They were not associated with the Magindanao sultanate, but consistently linked to Sulu or islands within the ‘Sulu zone’.

366 Salomon Muller, Reizen en Onderzoekingen in den Indischen Archipel Gedaan op Last der Nederlandsch Indische Regering tusschen de Jaren 1828 en 1836, Frederick Müller, Amsterdam, 1857, p. 12.
thriving, well organised polity ruled by a ‘sensible and eloquent’ Sultan, whose style of government approximated that of Europeans.\textsuperscript{367} The very lucrative salt trade for internal consumption amounted to 10,000 pikul annually, and was exchanged for cloth and agricultural produce.\textsuperscript{368} Based on the amount of salt consumed in Buton, Cornelius estimated the population of Buton and surrounding islands at approximately 30,000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{369} Large numbers of Bugis and other traders arrived in Buton each year importing arms, ammunition and European cloth directly from Singapore. Tripang, agar-agar (seaweed) and tortoise shell were procured locally and exported in ‘large amounts’ to Java, Makassar and Singapore.\textsuperscript{370} The war supplies imported into Buton were not just used for defence against Magindanao and other raiders or in conflicts with its tributaries, but were also used by Buton chiefs to outfit their own raiding expeditions. Another important, but more elusive, trading centre was Kalengsusu, located on the northeastern coast of Buton, which was defeated by the combined forces of Magindanao, Tobelo and Tobungku fleets in 1822. In 1834 Tobelo raiding groups were given permission to settle there, and they subsequently turned it into a centre for the trade and exchange of raided goods and captives.\textsuperscript{371}

Banggai was, according to Vosmaer, included in Tobungku’s local economic sphere, but later accounts mention that Banggai was visited by between 30 and 40 trading vessels annually, that were drawn there primarily by the availability of tripang. While Tobungku

\textsuperscript{367} ANRI Besluit 16 Mei 1842 No. 12, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{368} ‘Each year a large number of perahu from Buton and other places travelled to Tikoang pick up salt. Each trader then sold it in small amounts. This article is a very lucrative branch of trade, as it is bought daily in large amounts by inland people or exchanged for Butonese cloth and other products’ ANRI Besluit 16 Mei 1842 No. 12, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{369} Interestingly, salt is never mentioned in reports on Tobungku’s exchange with its hinterland, nor did it to play a major role in the Tomori-Tobungku conflict in the 1850s. Populations on the mainland of Sulawesi seemed to have come down to the coasts themselves to burn salt rather than depend on imports.\textsuperscript{370} ANRI Besluit 16 Mei 1842 No. 12, p. 3. In the absence of figures the question how Buton’s trade compared with that of Tobungku in terms of volume of trade remain unanswered.
\textsuperscript{371} ANRI Resolutie 2 Juni 1836 No. 11.
traders may have expanded into the Banggai area, it is also clear that Banggai maintained close ties with the Bugis settlement on Togian.

Again, conflict is better documented than any other aspect of life on the east coast, so that as was the case for the preceding period, it provides a useful point of entry for exploring the changing political and economic context in this period, when Bone and Bugis diaspora communities became increasingly important. Ternate’s influence waned, but the Tobelo diaspora that followed the uprising of the Tidorese prince Nuku incorporated the east coast in networks that reached across Maluku and down to the Lesser Sunda’s. Finally, the southward expansion of Magindanao and Iranun raiders also affected eastern Sulawesi through alliances between these raiding groups, with Tobungku and the Buton archipelago providing the main footholds for these groups. I will in this chapter first explore the various regional networks in which eastern Sulawesi was integrated, and then turn to the local context pertaining to Banggai, Tobungku and Buton to examine how alliances with different external group impacted on the local political context.

**Eastern Sulawesi as part of Bone’s Sphere of Influence**

The Bugis diaspora in the western archipelago had a long-term influence on the course of political history in Riau, Johor and Aceh, where Bugis intermarried with local aristocracies and were an important factor in internal politics. Andaya attributes the success of the Bugis diaspora to the relatively low status of Bugis chiefs who willing to compromise and seek accommodations with rulers and elites in their host societies. This contrasted markedly with the Makassarese diaspora that was triggered by the fall of

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Makassar in 1669, which consisted of high-ranking aristocrats and their following who were not willing to reach compromises with elites in their host societies. Hence, the Makassarese diaspora did not lead to permanent overseas communities or an archipelago-wide network.\footnote{The Makassarese diaspora was triggered by the fall of Goa in 1669. High-ranking nobles with their relatives and following wandered through the archipelago, but did not succeed in settling anywhere permanently, so that in the end no long-lasting diaspora communities were formed. These Makassarese nobles had trouble accepting authority of local rulers and nobility in polities less powerful than Goa had been, and this caused the necessary tension and conflict. Leonard Y. Andaya, ‘The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas’, 1996.}

The spectacular nature and scale of the seventeenth century diasporas that emanated from South Sulawesi as a result of the turmoil there were an exaggerated manifestation of a continuing and more ‘normal’ process of diaspora. Both oral and Dutch sources give the impression that Bugis migration to eastern Sulawesi a long-term and continuous process, a regular flow of people that increased during periods of turmoil.\footnote{The In 1725 two princes from Bone fled to Buton to escape persecutions from the Bone ruler. Arung Bakung, a cousin of the ruler of Bone, fled after a conflict to the east coast ca. 1820. Ligtvoet’s article includes a brief genealogy that shows that LaMango, ruler of Laiwui up to 1878 was a grandson of Arung Bakung, and Sao-Sao, LaMango’s son and successor Arung Bakung’s great-grandson. Oral traditions in Kendari Bay mention Arung Bakung as well but more on the Bugis side rather than by descendants of Sao-Sao, since granddaughter I-Kasiwang was married to Daeng Pawata, the chief of the Bugis settlement in Kendari Bay in 1878. The legendary ruler of Konawe, Madukalla, who reportedly fled Bone and settled at the Sampara estuary, forms the original link with Bone in oral traditions of Konawe is but one of the many Bugis chiefs in oral traditions in eastern Sulawesi. Madukalla, probably Madukellung in its original Bugis form, is not mentioned in the early accounts of Dutch government officials, who probably spoke mostly to elders in the coastal area of Kendari. In the Monografi Daerah, a government sponsored compilation of local history and traditions no mention is made of Madukalla. There is only a brief reference to the area of RanomaEto, which sought independent contact with the ruler of Bone without knowledge of the mokole of Konawe at the time. Even as late as 1905 a Bugis chief with a following of about 70 people left Bone for Kendari to escape pressure from their own ruler who was gearing up for war against the Dutch. By this time, the Dutch were able to intervene, and the prince with most of his followers were shipped back to Makassar by a Dutch ship because they supposedly were harassing the local population. ARA Geheim Verbaal 5 October 1848, No. 4347, p. 267; Monografi Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara, Departemen Pendidikan dan Pendidikan, Tingkat II, n.d.; J. N. Vosmaer, ‘Korte Beschrijving’, 1839, p. 129; A. Ligtvoet, ‘Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton’, 1878, pp. 22, 88; Koloniaal Verslag, 1905, p. 63.}

Outmigration and the...
resulting network of diaspora communities was part of the long term process of political, social and economic expansion in South Sulawesi societies.

Both Acciaioli and Lineton, who studied cases of Bugis diaspora in the twentieth century point out that the ongoing process of migration has been driven by structural tensions within Bugis society. They view migration and diaspora from the perspective of individuals and communities, as a way of coping with competition for status and resolving conflicts. The rank of an individual was determined by that of his or her parents, but could also be retrospectively assigned based on individual success in the social, economic and political arenas. However, opportunities of raising one’s status in the homeland were particularly limited for groups caught in the intermediate ranks of which individual members had difficulty moving upward. With no hope of being appointed to political office and relatively little expectation of a large inheritance in terms of land, trade was the best alternative for those who did not want to risk lowering their status by turning to agriculture. This group was most likely to choose to permanently move away from South Sulawesi. Andaya’s observation of the relatively low status of Bugis chiefs in earlier fases of diaspora suggests that the lower strata of the aristocracy chose to migrate for similar reasons. IJzereef made the same observation for nineteenth century Bone. Officials who looked after the economic interests of the ruler of Bone such as syabandar (harbour masters) and jannang (overseers) originated from the lower nobility or the tomaradeka (commoners) .

In contrast to the relatively well-organised and more powerful states of the western archipelago, in eastern Sulawesi Bugis encountered dispersed populations with small-

scale centres of power. These less prestigious and powerful polities still in relatively close proximity to Bone meant that even commoners from South Sulawesi could lay claim to a relatively high status away from their homelands.\(^\text{378}\) It was also possible for Bugis chiefs who were appointed as representative of Bone to carve out their own niche, such as for instance Ladama in Sampara around 1700. It was as a consequence of the diaspora of aristocrats and commoners combined with Bone’s influence as a maritime power that eastern Sulawesi became part of Bone’s political, economic and cultural sphere of influence.

From approximately 1760 onwards Bugis trading networks experienced a second wave of expansion, this time into Maluku where they displaced the Bandanese who had been the main traders up until that time.\(^\text{379}\) The real strength of Bugis traders was that they travelled to remote areas that in the past had not been visited by long distance traders, and they were also willing to trade in small quantities of goods.\(^\text{380}\) Bugis’ traders also enjoyed the support and protection of aristocratic chiefs. In 1772, a VOC official complained that Mandarese and ToWajo traders placed themselves under the protection of Bone princes, who, in the eyes of the governor of Makassar, were a ‘damage-wreaking brood, who consider themselves to be of royal descent and therefore act with impunity’.\(^\text{381}\) In this particular instance, traders and aristocrats in diaspora formed mutually beneficial alliances; traders were supported by the presence of the armed aristocrats from Bone, while traders provided revenue and enhanced the prestige of their aristocratic protectors.

\(^{378}\) Based on the titles of Bugis in diaspora communities, Lineton concluded that Wajo claimed a higher status in diaspora than they would in their homelands where their antecedents would be better known. Jacqueline Lineton, ‘Pasompe’ Ugi’ 1975, pp. 173-201.

\(^{379}\) Bugis increased the number of their boats trading in Maluku by employing locals who worked in the spicegardens (perkvolk) and whom the Dutch had prohibited from trading. P. van der Crab, De Molukse Eilanden, 1862, pp. 19-22.


\(^{381}\) ARA VOC 3309 f. 738.
The traders in this case were in fact not Bugis from the polity of Bone, but Mandarese and ToWajo from other parts of the southern peninsula of Sulawesi. Outside Bone’s heartland, the terms ‘Bone’ and Bugis were used more inclusively to incorporate individuals and groups that were ethnically speaking not Bugis.

Bugis trading networks expanded in the western archipelago as well, thus controlling the flow of goods in both directions across the island world. By the end of the eighteenth century, Bugis trading networks had expanded far beyond Bone’s political sphere of influence, despite Bugis trading ships flying the flag of Bone. Soon after the founding of Singapore in 1819, Bugis traders flocked there in large numbers, thus creating direct connections with remote parts of the eastern archipelago and bringing in large volumes cheap imports.382

The latter part of the eighteenth century witnessed new waves of Bugis migration to the Gulf of Tomini and the east coast Bugis settled in relatively ‘open’ areas with weakly centralised political structures and intermarried with local elites which they came to dominate. From the Bugis perspective, Banggai, Tobungku and Kendari were part of a continuum of Bugis influence that included the Gulf of Tomini. The narrow stretch of land between Donggala and Parigi connecting the west coast of Sulawesi with the Gulf of Tomini could be readily transversed in one day. Trade goods were transported across the isthmus of the northern arm on foot from Donggala to Parigi, from where they were transshipped in hired boats and carried to various places in the Gulf of Tomini. This route was quicker than sailing around the northern arm past Manado and became a trading highway linking the west coast of Sulawesi to the Gulf of Tomini and Banggai.

The Gulf of Tomini, wedged between Palu and Mondono, became a logical extension of Bugis networks, particularly as tripang emerged as an important trading commodity in the course of the eighteenth century. In the first half of the eighteenth century Bone’s

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influence expanded into the Gulf of Tomini despite efforts of Gorontalo and the VOC to counter this development. Mawomba disappears from the archival record only to reappear in Kruyt and Adriani’s writings as the original settlement of Tojo. The move from Mawomba to Ampana, which was the main settlement of Tojo in the late nineteenth century occurred, according to the same oral traditions, because of the choice of Pile Witi, whom Bone appointed as Tojo’s ruler. Tojo inherited Mawomba’s position of Bone’s official representative in the region. It was located on the northern coast of the eastern arm, approximately two days on foot from Bone, within relatively close proximity compared to travel by both the eastern and western sea-routes that could take weeks. How constant the relations with Bone were is not clear. According to a Dutch source from the early nineteenth century, Tojo had been tributary to Limbotto, but some time in the late eighteenth century Tojo broke away because Limbotto was not able to give assistance in a war with an inland enemy. In 1803, the ruler of Limbotto complained that Togian and Sausu, both of which had been tributary to Limbotto ‘for generations’ were controlled by Bugis. He requested that the Company use its power to make both areas pay their annual sum of tribute.

383 VOC 1809 f. 110.
384 Mawomba disappears from the Dutch records as a coastal settlement. It continued to exist as a river to the east of Lake Poso, and also in the memory of the ToTora’u, that had had its main settlement on the Mowomba river. The chief of this settlement was seen as ‘the father of all ToTora’u’. N. Adriani, A. C. Kruyt, De Bare’e-sprekende Toradja van Midden-Celebes, I, 1912, p. 72.
385 ibid. p. 76.
386 ANRI Gorontalo, Bundel 3, Jilid 4, ‘Verslag van den staat van de afdeeling Gorontalo over het Jaar 1854’, 2v-3v. It just so happened that Limbotto itself had been attacked in a conflict with Bugis on its north coast at Kwandang.
387 Adriani and Kruyt speculated that the request to Bone was made soon after a devastating attack by Ternaten forces, but no specific reason was given by the ruler Lariwu, who died in 1902. N. Adriani, A. C. Kruyt, De Bare’e-sprekende Toradja’s, I, 1912, p. 76.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Togian Islands had become the most important Bugis trading settlement for the Gulf of Tomini and the northern part of the east coast, and was a major supplier of tripang. Though it was economically more important than Tojo, the latter retained the status of Bone’s official representative. In marked contrast to Tojo, Togian Bugis recall their founder as an independent pioneer who left Bone to expand into new areas and to spread Islam. Descendants of Togian Bugis in the 1990s lived dispersed around the Gulf of Tomini, in Gorontalo, Bunta, Pagemana and Balantak on the east coast near Batui. They all traced their ancestry to five brothers who migrated together from South Sulawesi. Lamalongi, the first Bugis from Bone to settle on Togian, married Saribua, the female olongian or chief of Togian. Nowadays, her grave is keramat and is regularly visited by her descendents. Lamalongi himself was from Bone, but his followers included people from Balanipa and Sinjai. Descendants of the Togian Bugis were adamant that Lamalongi was never tributary to Bone, but that they did send envoys to pay official visits to the Bone ruler. In contrast to Tojo, Bone is not seen to have played the role of founder and protector.

The Togian Islands, marked on older Dutch maps as the Schildpad Eilanden (Tortoise Islands), were known for its tortoises, that had been the main export in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, the same marine environment of extensive reefs and shallow coastal waters yielded an abundance of tripang, another marine species that attracted the attention of both local traders and fishers. Situated in the centre of the Gulf of Tomini, Togian was equal distance from all coastal settlements, while also having access to the east coast of Sulawesi and Maluku. In the trade records of Gorontalo Togian Bugis appear regularly as the ‘peddlers’ of the Gulf of Tomini. They redistributed trading goods

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389 Whether Lamalongi was really the first Bugis to wield influence on Togian and intermarry with the local ruling family cannot be verified. The tendency in genealogies in this area is only to remember those who have descendents and whose actions have some meaning in the present. Lamalongi and a number of
throughout the Gulf that were imported via Palu and Donggala from Balambangan and Singapore, and, from Makassar and Maluku. Tripang and tortoise shell were the main commodities for export beyond the Gulf of Tomini. The most detailed record of local trade in this period comes from Gorontalo for the years 1828-1840, in a period, however, when its trade was in decline. These records contain information on imports and exports in Gorontalo by both small trading vessels from the Gulf of Tomini and the east coast of Sulawesi, as well as ships that travelled longer distances and stopped in Gorontalo on their way to Maluku. While these records are of limited value for assessing the overall volume of trade, they still provide an indication of what Bugis trading vessels carried on their journeys that included the east coast during the 1830s. Smaller vessels, often operated by Bugis captains based in Togian, carried local produce such as tobacco, bush knives (parang), rice, sago, tripang, tortoise shell, and cotton from Mendono. Between 1828-1831 tripang from Togian, Banggai and Mendono was still being traded to Gorontalo, but then disappears from the Gorontalo records, presumably because Bugis traders were increasingly evading Dutch controlled ports such as Gorontalo, and travelling to Singapore directly or via the Parigi and Palu connection. Larger ships brought a variety of imported goods, such as cloth, ceramics, opium, sugar, iron, needles, incense etc. The Togian Bugis who travelled to Gorontalo were also linked into the local trade network through their contemporaries who have spread throughout the Gulf of Tomini and the south coast of the eastern arm to determine their relationship to each other.
trading network of Banggai, and most likely travelled further down the coast to Tobungku and Buton as well.

Formally, Togian was incorporated into the existing tributary structure through which Bone maintained ties with eastern Sulawesi when it was placed under the authority of the kabusenja (chief) of Tojo. In practice, however, Togian Bugis acted independently. They played the critical role of external ally in Banggai in the first half of the nineteenth century and also carried on a regular trade with Banggai. This relationship between Banggai and the Togian Bugis was also documented by Dormeier in the early 1940s and still is remembered among descendants of Togian Bugis to this day. Two documented occasions in 1808 and 1846 when Togian Bugis assisted Banggai in an armed conflict indicate that these relations date back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, and possibly earlier.

Another settlement with a strong Bugis influence was Salampe, a small break-away community in the Gulf of Tolo founded in the middle of the eighteenth century after a war of succession in Tobungku. Salampe was also located near tripang fishing grounds, and the outlet for the inland trade from the hinterland of the Gulf of Tolo. In 1808, it joined Banggai against Tobungku, and in the Tobungku succession conflict in 1825 Salampe was destroyed, which also ended its role as a trading settlement.

**Kendari**

Todama or Ladama, who resided at the Sampara estuary around 1700 undoubtedly was followed by other pioneering Bugis chiefs who did not enter the historical record. Konawe oral traditions claim, that Madukalla, one of Konawe’s most prominent early rulers was a Bone prince who fled after a conflict with his cousin, the ruler of Bone. He
was on his way to Ternate, but decided to settle at the estuary of the Sampara. Eventually he married the daughter of the ruler of Konawe and succeeded his father-in-law bringing about innovations in the structure of the chiefdom based on Bugis statecraft. According to local traditions, his rule inaugurated the beginning of official relations with Bone. If this was indeed the case, and it is plausible, these relations eroded with the passage of time but Bone and Bugis culture as a source of prestige and legitimisation had become part of the Konawe tradition.

In the nineteenth century, Kendari’s sheltered bay and proximity to Bajo fishing grounds made it ideal for conducting tripang trade. Arung Bakung, a Bone aristocrat, settled in Kendari and soon attracted numerous Bajo and tripang traders to the bay. He was a Bugis aristocrat from Bone, who had fled because of a conflict with the ruler of Bone who was a close relative of his. After fleeing South Sulawesi, he initially settled in Kendari Bay, then moved to Muna, and, after being defeated in a war against Buton in 1822, moved back to Kendari on request of Tebau, the Tolaki ruler. His presence in the bay once again attracted Bajo and traders, bringing prosperity to the coastal Tolaki as well. Arung Bakung’s descendants could still be traced in Kendari in 1870. Though Arung Bakung was not in direct contact with Bone, he was Bugis and from the perspective of people in eastern Sulawesi fitted into the category of ‘Bugis’ and ‘selatan’. He was closely linked to the far-flung network of Tuanna-I-Dondang, also known as Sarib Ali, a powerful Makassarese aristocrat of Arabic descent, who was allied to the Magindanao of Toli-toli and to chiefs in Tobungku.

Tebau was the ruler of the coastal realm of Laiwui, and possibly of the entire chiefdom of Konawe. Traces of earlier waves of Bugis migrants were much evident in the

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1830s. Tebau was a direct descendant of Madukalla through the Sapati line of RanomaEto, a coastal realm of Konawe. He did not speak Bugis, and his local influence depended on alliances with Arung Bakung and then the Dutch trader J. N. Vosmaer, to bring trade and prosperity to Kendari Bay. Among the coastal Tolaki were descendants of Bugis migrants, but they could neither be distinguished from the rest of the population, and nor speak Bugis. Bugis influence and more intensive trade had separated coastal from inland Tolaki. The former had nominally accepted Islam, practised headhunting less frequently and were more likely to wear cotton cloth. Tebau’s privileged access to external trade was resented by inland Tolaki, who eventually undermined him by conducting attacks on the coastal settlement on the bay. Such raids were most likely the cause of Arung Bakung’s sudden departure.

The successive waves of Bugis diaspora that reached the east coast were shaped by local circumstances, the demands of the emergent global economy and the different ways in which ‘peripheries’ related to regional centres. Tojo was founded as a satellite state of Bone with strong Bugis influence. The migration of Bugis to Togian, largely from Wajo, was a spontaneous process in response to new trade opportunities and Togian was only later incorporated into the formal political structure. Kendari attracted outside attention for the same reasons as the Togian Islands because of the commodity trade, but did not have the same strategic position as Togian did in the Gulf of Tomini. In contrast to Togian where Bugis migration led to settlements and elaborate local trade networks, migration to Kendari in the early nineteenth century continued in the vein of individual Bugis chiefs who depended on a precarious balance of alliances with local chiefs and external allies. The same Bugis and Makassarese networks in which Arung Bakung operated, facilitated a new kind of adventurer to Kendari, the Dutchman Vosmaer, who nevertheless still fit

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393 Tebau was a grandchild of Madukalla through the RanomaEto line, a coastal realm of Konawe that held the title of Sapati. Oral communication Dinah Bergink, November 2000.
the mould of a Bugis chief who depended on personal alliances with local chiefs as well as external allies to guarantee the precarious position of the tripang trade in Kendari Bay.

**Tripang Production and Bajo in eastern Sulawesi**
In the latter part of the eighteenth century eastern Sulawesi found itself on the edge of a new ‘cash crop frontier’ because of its abundance of tripang. The new commodity was processed and traded largely through existing channels that previously been used to market tortoise shell. As new cash crop frontiers opened, old hierarchies were challenged and new ones emerged. The European demand for Chinese tea led to a search for suitable goods to import in order to prevent the haemorrhaging of silver bullion to China. Products in Southeast Asia such as seaslug and birdsnest provided a partial solution.

Seaslug or beche-de-mer, also known for its medicinal properties, became a delicacy in China starting from the middle of the eighteenth century. It was abundant in the shallow coastal waters of Southeast Asia. The Sulu Sultanate became one of the most important producers and retailers in Southeast Asia for these high demand commodities in China. This ‘second Age of Commerce’ was shaped by new cash crops such as sugar, tea and coffee, though old products such as pepper continued to be in high demand. While these products had no direct impact on eastern Sulawesi, the abundance of tripang found along its coasts and islands generated the interest of both local and regional elites. From approximately the middle of the eighteenth century onwards the culinary and medicinal properties of tripang in China made it an important export commodity across maritime Southeast Asia. Tripang, also known as sea cucumber, seaslug or beche-de-mer, prospers in shallow, coastal waters in tropical areas. After the slug-like animals are collected from the seafloor, they are gutted, boiled and dried. Besides the Togian Islands, tripang was

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394 Reid points to Watson Andaya’s study of Jambi as an examples of this. The new economic interests of pepper, tin and gold generated political instability and realignments. Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1460-1680*, 1993, p. 32.
found in the shallow coastal waters of the east coast, and around islands and reefs in the Banggai, Salabangka and Buton archipelagoes.

The emergence of tripang as an export commodity meant the advent of a new political and economic resource that could be exploited by local and regional elites. In a region where the sea was home to mobile populations, distance was not a barrier in the exploitation of marine resources. People from South Sulawesi were involved in collecting tripang from the early stages of the this trade and travelled considerable distances to procure it. The earliest mention of tripang collection for the Gulf of Tomini is from 1735; a Bugis punggawa had a wife in Wajo (South Sulawesi) and in the Gulf of Tomini in Lembunu (not mentioned on maps) where he came to fish for tripang. The establishment of Mawomba only several years before, then, may have already been linked to the exploitation of marine resources in South Sulawesi’s periphery. In 1732, four Bugis-Makassarese vessels were found off the coast of Halmahera fishing for tripang, where they were expected to stay for several months in order to accumulate the necessary amount of tripang. The real expansion and scaling up of the tripang trade started in the 1760s, but intensified in the last decades of the eighteenth century, at a time when the VOC was too weak to oppose for the expansion of Bugis trading and fishing networks. Considering tripang was already being fished in the Gulf of Tomini in the 1730s, it is highly likely that in the following decades the east coast would have also been explored. However, the fragmentary historical sources for these years, do not mention tripang in relation to the east coast of Sulawesi. In 1778, Valckenaer writes that the main exports of

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395 Linguistic evidence shows that most of the crew of the tripang fleets that came from Makassar to the north coast were Makassarese, but there were Bugis as well. Macknight employs the ethically ambiguous term Macassan to refer all the those who came from Makassar. C.C. Macknight, 1979, *The Voyage to Marege*, *Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia*, Melbourne University Press.

396 ARA VOC 2313 f. 1011.

397 ARA VOC 2191 f. 1223.

Banggai, Mendono and Tobungku were slaves and wax,\textsuperscript{399} and the information from the 1790s on Banggai tripang does not feature as an important commodity. The new contract with Mandaria mentioned only Banggai’s obligation to deliver foodstuffs and wax to Ternate, and that Banggai was exempted from its earlier obligation to deliver tortoise shell.\textsuperscript{400} Interestingly, the new, fortified settlement built by Mandaria on Banggai in 1796 was named Kota Cina, ‘the Chinese Fort’, suggesting that Chinese traders came to Banggai, which also had rich fishing grounds for tripang.\textsuperscript{401} Certainly by the 1820s, tripang was the most important product for long distance traders on the east coast.

According to Warren, intensified slave-raiding provided the necessary labour to satisfy the growing demand for tripang and bird nest in the Sulu zone. The rapid growth of the population of Sulu in the first half of the nineteenth century was largely due to the incorporation of slaves into Tausug society. The limited sources on eastern Sulawesi in this period of economic transformation leave the question of labour demand and its exact relation to slave-raiding unanswered. Almost all the available evidence on the slave trade in the eastern archipelago dates from the period after 1820 and points to a relatively localised trade in slaves. Captives from one area were ransomed, sold or given as gifts in a neighbouring area. Two hundred captives seized by Tobungku in the siege of Kalengsusu in 1823 had not been sold on, but were still present in Tobungku in 1825 when a Ternaten expedition captured them and transported them to Ternate. If evidence from around 1850 is any indication of economic roles, slaves were put to work in the fields to cultivate food, and used for domestic chores in aristocratic households.

\textsuperscript{399} ARA VOC 3504 f. 17991.

\textsuperscript{400} ANRI Ternate 140, Contract Banggai 1796. By this time the VOC had abandoned the trade in tortoise shell and mother of pearl, so that the Banggai no longer had the obligation to deliver these products.

\textsuperscript{401} Kota Cina was first seen by Dutch officials during the 1808 visit to Banggai. Mandaria had been living in the new Kota Cina built by himself, rather than in Kota Jin. Comparing the titles of the officials that lived in Kota Jin and Kota Cina at that time, it is interesting to note that the kapitan laut, the ‘sea captain’ who dealt with matters pertaining to warfare and defense, resided in Kota Cina, suggesting that it had indeed taken on a more important role than Kota Jin. ANRI Ternate 116, pp. 12, 13.
Production of food may indeed have been the main activity of most captives, thus indirectly contributing to the production of export commodities by freeing up the labour of the non-slave population. Coastal populations, of for example Tobungku, did procure tripang, but the sources on tripang production point to Bajo as the main collectors of tripang, to such an extent that tripang from the east coast of Sulawesi was referred to as ‘tripang Bajo’. Bajo themselves may have made use of captives, but this could not have taken place on a large scale.

Bajo are not mentioned explicitly in the earlier eighteenth century references to tripang, though they may have been part of the crews of Bugis and Makassarese fishing vessels. As Bajo were already part of commercial networks and had produced tortoise shell in the seventeenth century, they would have been among the first to procure a new and lucrative commodity such as tripang. Their detailed ecological knowledge of the strand and reef environment would have put them in an advantageous situation to collect seaslug.

When the Dutch re-established themselves in the Netherlands-Indies in 1816, they found that the tripang trade had expanded exponentially in the intervening decades. Hence, the Dutch encouraged the tripang trade by abolishing import duties on northern Australian tripang and allowed Chinese vessels to trade directly with local populations. Such measures were also motivated by fear of competition from Singapore, that had rapidly developed into a popular port for the China trade shortly after it was founded in 1819. The bulk of the cargo of Chinese junks leaving Makassar in the early years of the nineteenth century comprised tripang. The tripang trade was almost entirely in the hands of Chinese, Bugis and Makassarese merchants, and a big part of it evaded Makassar and

\[\text{In 1850 the most sought after types of tripang on the east coast were: tripang coro, tripang pandang and tripang gama. Van der Hart mentions the prices for these three types of tripang in Kendari in 1850 as follows: tripang coro: f 60 / pikol; tripang pandang: f 40 / pikul; tripang gama: f20/ pikul. ARA Geheim}\]
other Dutch ports altogether.\footnote{C.C. Macknight, \textit{Voyage to Marege'}, 1979.} There were at least two individual European traders who planned to open trading posts to exploit the tripang trade with the help of Bajo fisherfolk. Vosmaer's trading post in Kendari, which will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter, might have succeeded if he had not died in 1835.\footnote{Earl planned to open a trading post on the north coast of Australia (Port Essington) where the valuable black tripang came from and near to the Aru Islands, which was also rich in tripang. The plan received support from the British government and was opened in 1838. Some Bugis and Bajo from Sulawesi had already traveled to Port Essington, but too soon, so that by the time Earl arrived they had already left. It proved to be a failure because it was too far from shipping routes and too expensive to maintain. It was abandoned in 1849. Earl, George Windsor, \textit{The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832-33-34, comprising a Tour of the Island Java-Visits to Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, Siam &c.; also and Account of the Present State of Singapore with observations on the commercial Resources of the Archipelago.} London, Wm H. Allen and Co. Leadenhall Street, 1837, pp. xi-xiii.} The few available statistics on the tripang trade from the nineteenth century indicate that the bulk of tripang that passed through Makassar came from northern Australia. With an average production of 300 tons a year, the Makassarese managed to secure more tripang than Bugis merchants who traded through Makassar.\footnote{C.C. Macknight, \textit{Voyage to Marege'}, 1979.} Other major areas in eastern Indonesia that supplied Makassar with tripang were Aru, Tanimbar and Papua. By 1853, tripang from eastern Sulawesi had gained a reputation for its exceptional quality in Makassar, and was valued over that from other parts of eastern Indonesia.

The production and marketing of tripang in eastern Sulawesi and the Gulf of Tomini was integrated into regional, Bugis dominated trade-networks that linked groups of Bajo through patron-client relations to merchants who marketed tripang in Singapore, Makassar and Java. In 1823 Bugis traders from Singapore travelled directly to Buton and then to Kendari where they met Bajo flotillas and exchanged tripang for imported commodities.\footnote{ANRI Besluit 16 Mei 1842 No. 12, p. 4.} This represented a real change from over a century earlier, when all

Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, p. 10a. C. Bosscher, P.A. Matthijssen, 'Schetsen van de Rijken van Tomboekoe en Banggai', 1854, p. 112.


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405 Other major areas in eastern Indonesia that supplied Makassar with tripang were Aru, Tanimbar and Papua. By 1853, tripang from eastern Sulawesi had gained a reputation for its exceptional quality in Makassar, and was valued over that from other parts of eastern Indonesia.

406 This represented a real change from over a century earlier, when all
Buton could export were slaves, while marine resources such as tortoise shell were not being exploited. In the same period, Bugis from Makassar travelled with Bajo to the Gulf of Tomini where they fished for tripang. From there processed tripang was taken to Singapore via Togian, Donggala and Palu.\(^{407}\) Chinese traders congregated in Makassar, where they obtained tripang from smaller traders who journeyed for several months to remote places after receiving an advance payment.\(^{408}\) Chinese traders probably also traded directly on the east coast. In the 1820s, there was an established pattern of seasonal migration of Bajo down the east coast, starting in the Gulf of Tomini and ending in the Salabangka Islands and Kendari Bay, which determined the rhythm of the eastern Sulawesi tripang trade. While little is known about the tripang trade from Banggai in the period before 1840, Vosmaer left a vivid description of the fleets of Bugis and Makassarese trading vessels making their annual visit to Tobungku. The importance of semi-sedentary and nomadic Bajo communities to Tobungku’s prosperity is apparent from the name of Tobungku’s anchorage ‘Kota Bajo’, now located at the estuary of a small stream, but in the past possibly the site of a fortified coastal settlement that complemented the hilltop fortification of Fafontofure.

**‘Bajo-Bugis\(^{409}\)** and Patronage

The patronage relationships between Bugis traders and groups of tripang-producing Bajo were embedded in the broader, regional relationship of Bone’s political and cultural sphere of influence. The degree to which the tripang trade and the Bajo were indeed

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\(^{408}\) In the early decades of the nineteenth century Chinese junks came to Makassar of which the return cargo consisted mainly of tripang. Upon arrival advances were given to traders in order to travel to places outside of Makassar to buy tripang and other goods, which took up to five months. ANRI Makassar 291/7, ‘Rakende de Handel van Makassar’.

\(^{409}\) As Frake correctly points out, Bajo or Bajau as they are known in Malaysia and the southern Philippines, is an exonym. Charles O. Frake, ‘The Genesis of Kinds of People in the Sulu Archipelago’
associated with Bugis and Bone was self-evident from its decline after the defeat of Banggai and Tobungku in the 1840s, in which Bugis were heavily involved. The link between Bajo and Bugis is best documented for the latter part of the nineteenth century, when indeed these links may have become even stronger. Verschuer reports in 1883 that all Bugis and all Bajo in the Gulf of Tomini were from Kendari Bay and paid tribute to the Bugis ruler. The Bajo were called ‘Bajo-Bugis’, to distinguish them from Bajo Sulu and Bajo Visaya.\footnote{F.H. van Verschuer, De Badjo’s, \textit{Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap} 1883, Volume 7, 1883, p. 6.} A linguistic survey of Bajo in 1989 confirms that the Bajo in the Gulf of Bone, up the east coast and into the Gulf of Tomini speak the same Samal dialect.\footnote{Oral communication from SIL missionaries.} Sopher also presents the case for close relations between Bajo and Bugis, and indeed descriptions of villages divided into Bugis and Bajo wards are almost commonplace in archival and published sources.\footnote{Abdul Aziz mentioned for instance that the Bajo, who were specialised in marine produce (\textit{khusus hasil laut, cari ikan, menyelam}), arrived in Bungku Selatan (Salabangka Islands) with Bugis. Interview, Abdul Aziz 14 feb 1995 Bungku, Sulawesi Tengah.} Bajo settlements in eastern Sulawesi in the 1990s revealed a high percentage of intermarriage with Bugis and many people of mixed Bugis Bajo descent. Also, Bajo origin myths in Sulawesi make frequent reference to Bone.

It is tempting to project this close alliance between Bajo and Bugis back into this earlier period as well, especially as the early mention of tripang involve Bugis in areas where Bajo were already present such as the Gulf of Tomini. Such alliances undoubtedly occurred, but Vosmaer’s account gives reason to believe that there was a difference between itinerent Bugis traders and the actual patrons of the east coast Bajo, who had to guarantee the safety of the fishers and traders. Such patrons were likely to be local chiefs, including Bugis chiefs such as Arung Bakung who had settled on the east coast.
Frake’s study of the Samal in the southern Philippines indicates that there was a fluid hierarchy of Samal identities, in which settled Samal ranked higher than nomadic Samal. Nomadic Sama who acquire a land base ‘might desperately proclaim this’, because of the higher status associated with such a base.\footnote{Charles O. Frake, ‘The Genesis of Kinds of People in the Sulu Archipelago’, 1980, p. 324.} The stereotype of Bajo as nomadic boat-dwellers was only partially true in the early modern period.\footnote{Padtbrugge, writing in 1678, already noted that the common belief that Bajo cannot live on land for more than three days without getting sick was proven untrue by the Bajo settlement on land in Tobungku. VOC 1345 f. 285.} Padtbrugge noted that in the late seventeenth century that Bajo in Tobungku lived on land and could barely be distinguished from the rest of the population.\footnote{E.C. Godee Molsbergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van de Minahassa tot 1829}, 1928 p. 70.} Vosmaer, too, writing in the 1830s, reports that Bajo lived on land, and were wealthier than nomadic Bajo. Sedentary Bajo used paduakang of 10 to 15 koyang, whereas nomadic Bajo only had boats of 7 to 8 koyang. Bajo who lived on land

placed themselves under the protection of the kingdom where they settled, have mixed more with the coastal inhabitants and taken on their religion and customs... \footnote{J.N. Vosmaer, ‘Korte beschrijving’, 1939, p. 115.} Such sedentary Bajo left their families at home and travelled in fishing fleets led by their own chiefs. In this arrangement, Bajo settled in the vicinity of their patron who then accorded them protection, probably sponsored their voyages and life-cycle ceremonies, and guaranteed a secure anchorage or even a place to live on land. The patron also facilitated trade of valuable commodities like tripang. The little information extant on such small-scale alliances dates from the 1820s and 1830s. When Arung Bakung left Muna for Kendari, a group of Bajo went with him. Soon, his presence in Kendari Bay
attracted many more Bajo, and then also traders. After Arung Bakung’s departure from Kendari, the Bajo dispersed again. The same cycle repeated itself when Vosmaer took up residence in Kendari Bay. Within a few months several hundred Bajo moved to the bay, and many others from neighbouring areas also followed. Vosmaer reports that Bajo he encountered in eastern Sulawesi repeatedly asked him to become their patron and to settle in Kendari Bay so that they could congregate there as they had done when Arung Bakung had lived there. Bonds between a patron and his Bajo followers were strengthened by ties of reciprocity and debt. Bajo could be ‘bought’ by a new patron if he paid their debts to their existing patron. This is what Earl planned to do in the early 1830s in order to get Bajo to follow him to the trading post he planned to open on the north coast of Australia.

A second type of patron-client relationships was based on a more commercial exchange in which a bond of debt and obligation tied Bajo to their patrons. Contact with patrons was limited to two meetings a year. Traders who came to the east coast to buy tripang met with groups of Bajo, first at the beginning of the fishing season (the beginning of the west monsoon) to give an advance in kind and again at the end of the fishing season (the end of the west monsoon or the beginning of the east monsoon) to collect the tripang and sell goods to the Bajo. The period between handing out the advances and receiving

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417 ANRI Ternate 180, p. 24d.
418 George Windsor Earl, The Eastern Seas, 1837, p. 335. A British trading post that was opened on the north coast of Australia in 1824 was closed down after five years when failed to attract trade. Earl concluded from talking to Bugis and Chinese in Singapore that the closure had been premature, and argued for the reopening of a trading post. Port Essington was opened in 1838, but did not meet expectations and was closed again nine years later. ibid. p. xi-xiii.
419 Earl notes in the 1830s that in Makassar Chinese dealt with Bajo directly: ‘They are chiefly employed by the Chinese in fishing for trepang, or sea-slug, and according to the policy invariably adopted by the latter in their dealings with the natives, are generally involved in debt, from which extrication is nearly hopeless’. ibid.
420 ANRI Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, ‘Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaij en Xulla Eilanden 1850’, p. 35d.
the tripang normally took about four months. In the case of tripang Bajo and their patrons would meet whether or not the catch had been significant, a different kind of arrangement than with other trading commodities collected by local populations. Traders acquired the tripang at an inflated price and paid the Bajo with silver coins, preferably old ‘Hollandse dubbeltjes’. The very same coins were then used by the Bajo to purchase goods from their patrons; goods which they used to barter for food with coastal, land-based populations. The trade goods were bought from the merchants at such high prices that a cycle of debt ensured an ongoing social and economic relationship with a particular trader. Some of the traders shipped tripang directly to Singapore, others acted as intermediaries for Chinese traders in Makassar who gave advances of goods and money to enable voyages to distant places where tripang was plentiful for the return journey.

In the 1830s, local elites in northern Sulawesi started to tax mobile tripang fishers as a way of raising revenue. The advent of the taxation may have been a reaction to the rise of Bugis traders wresting the lucrative away from local elites, in a period when there was less demand for slaves. In response to the imposition of this taxation, many Bajo moved away from north Sulawesi to the Banggai archipelago and the Pangalisian Islands, so that by 1839 tripang fishing along the north Sulawesi coast and the Gulf of Tomini had declined. A decade later, however, the tripang trade on the east coast would further decline because of much more dramatic events than the advent of increased taxation.

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421 ibid.
422 The time such traders spent away from Makassar was reported to be around five months, which would allow for a four month fishing period and a return trip to eastern Sulawesi. ANRI Makassar 291/7 ‘Rakende de handel van Makassar’.
424 The source does not mention who demanded the tribute, presumably local rulers. ANRI Gorontalo 3 1839, p.10v. See chapter 5 for the effects of the Banggai and Tobungku rebellions on the tripang trade.
Raiding Diasporas

The second part of this chapter is devoted to raiding diasporas that reached the shores of eastern Sulawesi in the period 1780-1830. As is clear from the preceding chapters, maritime raiding and warfare were intimately bound up with the political dynamics. Warren’s work links the increase in raiding and the emergence of regional raiding networks in the latter part of the eighteenth century to an expansion in regional and global trade. Raiders were literally ‘fishers of men’ in that slaves were a lucrative trading commodity.\textsuperscript{425} The close alliance between local elites and raiding groups, which Junker argues reached back to the fourteenth and fifteenth century continued into this period.\textsuperscript{426}

Evidence from the early modern period suggests that raiding was often carried out by specialised groups that maintained symbiotic alliances with political centres. These often somewhat marginalised groups depended on such centres for status and protection in return for military assistance, gathering intelligence and conducting trade. Their strategic role was flexible; depending on the situation they were used for political control, accumulating wealth and undermining rivals.\textsuperscript{427} In the Malay polities in the western archipelago sea people (orang laut) played this role. In Makassar origin myths, Bajo had this role of a privileged but marginal group, which suggests that these ‘sea people’ were present at the beginning of the powerful maritime polity.\textsuperscript{428} After Makassar’s demise in the late seventeenth century, many Bajo shifted their allegiance to Bone. In Maluku, the role of maritime raiders was played by ‘alfurs’, usually pagan groups from Halmahera such as the Tobelo and Galela. They carried out expeditions on behalf of the Ternaten and

\textsuperscript{425} J.F. Warren, \textit{The Sulu Zone}, 1981.
\textsuperscript{426} Laura Lee Junker, \textit{Raiding, Trading, and Feasting}, 1999, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{427} See also: Barbara Watson Andaya; ‘Raiding Cultures and Interior-Coastal Migration in Early Modern Island Southeast Asia’, in: \textit{Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia, Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tarling}, Brook Barrington (ed.); Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, Monash Asia Institute, Centre of Southeast Asia Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Vic. 1997.
Tidorese sultanates. In the case of Sulu, the most prominent raiding centre of maritime Southeast Asia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Iranun and Balangingi Samal raiders, in origin outsiders and marginal, were in close alliance with members of the elite who were at the core of the Sulu sultanate. The marginal position of such groups was important in order to prevent their military power from being directed against the centre.

In small-scale centres, a similar pattern of alliances with raiding groups also occurred. However, within the wider regional setting the relationship with such external groups was more complex, since they were often linked to major regional centres of power. The coasts of eastern Sulawesi were frequented by maritime raiders who varied with regard to place of origin, political affiliation and the size of their fleets. In the period between 1780 and 1820 new regional alliances were formed that linked eastern Sulawesi both to Magindanao and Sulu raiders and to Nuku and his successor Raja Jailolo. Two processes occurred simultaneously: local raiding groups were drawn into regional networks and raiders from regional centres were drawn into local conflict. This is most clearly seen in the antagonistic relations between Banggai and Tobungku on the northern part of the east coast and in the conflict between Buton and its tributaries. Before exploring the patterns of maritime raiding in eastern Sulawesi in greater detail, I first want to turn to the regional raiding networks centred on Sulu and Maluku, that both expanded into eastern Sulawesi at the end of the eighteenth century.

**Raiders from the Sulu archipelago: Magindanao, Iranun and Balancingi**

The first written account in the Banggai language is the testimony of a Banggai fisherman who was captured by Magindanao raiders in the 1860s or 1870s, taken to Sulu and then managed to escape. The fear they struck in the hearts and minds of local people was

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still remembered in the 1990s. In European accounts, maritime raiders associated with Sulu also drew a great deal of attention. The expeditions that emanated from the Sulu archipelago in the last decades of the eighteenth century were unprecedented in size, in the amount of destruction they inflicted on coastal settlements and on the geographical range of their raids. Warren documented the expansion of these raiders and the establishment of their satellite communities throughout the Philippine and Indonesian island worlds.\textsuperscript{431} While they were active in other parts of the archipelago in the last decades of the eighteenth century, Banggai was especially targeted by both local and Malukan raiders from the Gulf of Tomini, Seram and the Raja Ampat Islands. In the 1790s, Magindanao raiders were also active near Kwandang, northern Sulawesi, and had formed alliances with Tobelo raiding groups who had migrated there in this period.\textsuperscript{432} The Dutch were aware of the importance of Toli-toli as a Magindanao base from at least as early as 1793, when an official noted the ‘very close alliance’ (\textit{een zeer nauwe alliantie}) between the Magindanao and the ruler of Toli-toli.\textsuperscript{433} From the north coast of Sulawesi the Magindanao often continued their expeditions further east to Maluku. The majority of Magindanao fleets from Toli-toli travelled south through the Strait of Makassar where they separated in different directions. The Buton archipelago was used as the last staging point before going further south to the Lesser Sunda’s, Papua and Maluku. During their long expeditions the Magindanao set up alliances with local communities, whose members sometimes joined their raiding expeditions. They also maintained close relations with Tobelo communities in Manggarai (Flores), who provided shelter for them and with


\textsuperscript{432} The exact year when the Magindanao and Tobelo started to raid near Kema is not mentioned. Wieling just remarks that there had been no noticable increase in their activity in the six years after 1797 after which the Dutch post in Gorontalo was abandoned. ANRI Manado 165, ‘Berigt omtrent het al of niet bezitten van Gorontalo door den Gouverneur van Ternate’, C. L. Wieling, 1806, p.12.

\textsuperscript{433} ARA Comite Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1791-1800, 1793, Paragraphs 53, 103.
whom they intermarried. Certainly by the early nineteenth century, Magindanao and Balangingi groups had formed alliances in the Buton archipelago on Muna and possibly other tributaries of Buton whom they aided in conflicts with Buton.

The combined expedition of Dutch warships and indigenous chiefs from South and Central Sulawesi that destroyed Toli-toli in 1822 was the first severe blow to the Magindanao raiding networks in the eastern archipelago. Merkus’ remark on the increased activity of ‘Magindanao and Halmahera raiders’ on Sula in 1823 suggests that the destruction of Toli-toli may have caused some of these raiding groups to move further east.\(^{434}\) It is possible that some of their activities were also shifted to the islands of the Lesser Sunda’s such as Kalatua, which was known as an important base for Magindanao raiders in the period before 1850. A few years after the defeat of Toli-toli, Dampelas,\(^{435}\) on the west coast of central Sulawesi, emerged as the new centre for Magindanao raiding and slave-trading.\(^{436}\) A recurring theme in the testimonies of freed captives was the forging of alliances between raiders from the fringes of the Sulu-archipelago with chiefs and rulers throughout the eastern archipelago. One captive related that the ship on which he travelled had bases in ‘Papua, Tobelo, Maluku, Balangingi, Magindanao, Tobungku

\(^{434}\) ARA Schneiter 2.21.007.57, 1823, p. 34. Interestingly, by the early twentieth century, there was no memory of the Magindanao in Toli-toli. In 1912 the population was divided into the ‘original’ population, consisting of the coastal Toli-toli and the Dondo who originally lived in the hills, and groups who originated from elsewhere, the Bugis, Bajo, Kaili, Tamalasa, Mandarese and Gorontaloers. ‘Nota betreffende het Landschap Toli-toli’, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 54 (1) p. 35.

\(^{435}\) In the 1850s, Dampelas was still the main centre for slave trade on the west coast of Sulawesi for Magindanao raiders. Many captives who escaped or were freed mentioned that slaves were exchanged for rice and other food in Dampelas. ‘Berigten omtrent den Zeeroof in den Indischen Archipel over 1856’, *Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch-Indië*, VII, 1873, pp. 350-378.

\(^{436}\) In 1833 the new settlement of Toli-toli (Kalankanang) was located about ten hours walk away from the old Toli-Toli (Binontoang), on the coast between Lakea and the old Toli-toli. The inhabitants still visited it regularly to make sago. ANRI Manado 48/IV, ‘Verslag Residentie Manado 1833’, pp. 28, 29.
and Kalangkangan (Toli-toli)’. In each of these places, local rulers and chiefs maintained good relations with raiders.\textsuperscript{437}

\textit{Tracing the Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi}

The Tobelo, an ethnic group originating from the Malukan island of Halmahera, formed a network of diasporic communities that connected the east coast of Sulawesi to Bali, the lesser Sunda’s, Obi, Seram and Halmahera. The Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi were refugees of the turmoil in Maluku caused by the Nuku movement in the 1780s.\textsuperscript{438} Nuku was the nickname of Syaifuddin, the third son of the Tidorese Sultan, who stepped down in 1772. However, he was rejected as the successor to his father’s throne by the VOC. Nuku’s political campaign to secure the throne of Tidore turned into a large-scale armed uprising during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. This war against the Dutch and Ternate dislocated thousands of people on both sides. Entire communities took up a wandering existence for years on end, with only temporary settlements dispersed throughout Maluku, but based mainly on the north coast of Seram. Nuku’s fleets, which could number between thirty and eighty vessels, roamed the eastern archipelago, raiding and destroying Dutch posts and allied settlements. His following consisted of people from Tobelo, Galela, Maba, Weda, Patani, Gebe, the Raja Ampat Islands and Goram.

As the VOC was struggling to survive, Nuku took advantage of the situation and formed alliances with British country traders. Nuku’s claims to the throne of Tidore were recognised during the British interregnum and he was finally inaugurated as the rightful sultan of Tidore in 1802. During his rule, Tidore’s claims to the north coast of Seram were of great import, since this was one of the busiest centres of trade in Maluku. After

\textsuperscript{437} ‘Berigten omtrent den Zeeroof in den Indischen Archipel over 1856’, 1873, p. 371.
Nuku died in 1805 his nephew, Raja Jailolo, succeeded him in Halmahera, the homeland of the Tobelo. Significantly, after Nuku’s death, the links between the kedaton of Tidore and Halmahera intensified, as well as the links with the Tobelo in diaspora.\(^\text{439}\)

The Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi were part of a much wider regional network that extended from their homeland on Halmahera, Seram, and Obi to Flores and Sulawesi. In the years that the Bugis trade was expanding and Sulu based maritime raiders were moving into the eastern archipelago, yet another diaspora was unfolding, largely driven by political turmoil and economic expansion in Maluku. The diaspora of those usually referred to as Tobelo and Galela did not equal that of the Bugis and Makassarese in either scale or impact, but within eastern Indonesia it was an event of some significance. The term ‘Tobelo’ in a limited sense refers to an ethnic group on the east coast of the northern peninsula of Halmahera. In a wider sense it referred to the Tobelo raiding diaspora that included assimilated captives and people from other Malukan islands.\(^\text{440}\) The homeland of the Tobelo, Halmahera, was divided between Tidore and Ternate so that each sultanate had Tobelo subjects. These groups did not convert to Islam, but rather adhered to their animist beliefs, which placed them outside of the dominant culture of the sultanates. They practised subsistence agriculture but also spent time at sea procuring marine products. Their maritime orientation was evident from the tribute of the Ternaten Tobelo, which consisted of pearls, tripang and tortoise shell.

The Tobelo gained a fearsome reputation as maritime raiders in the VOC period, because they were employed in disciplinary expeditions against tributaries of Tidore and Ternate. They assisted Ternaten officials to pacify newly subjected areas along the

\(^{439}\) According to Andaya, the kingdom of Jialolo, located on Halmahera, was one of the ‘four pillars’ of Maluku. It was destroyed by the Portugese in 1551, and its royal family moved to Ternate where it continued to represent Jialolo in ceremonies where the presence of all four pillars were required. L.Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku*, 1993, p. 179.

\(^{440}\) The Tobelo were also frequently referred to as ‘alfurs’ or ‘alifuru’, a term widely used in the eastern archipelago for animist, inland groups.
peripheries where raiding was condoned. Their reputation for headhunting and spending long periods at sea to procure sea products further reinforced the image of Tobelo as raiders. Because of a tradition of out-migration, there was regular movement between the homeland and diaspora communities. The relationship between Tobelo and the Ternaten elite bore striking parallels with the Bajo in their relations to Bone. Both were culturally and politically marginal groups, who had forged a special relationship with the coastal elites.

The first wave of Tobelo migration westward from Maluku occurred between ca. 1780 and 1790. Tobelo went to the north coast of Sulawesi, to Tobungku, the Strait of Buton, and further west to the Strait of Selayar. Tobelo raiding activities were soon reported in the Strait of Buton and the Strait of Selayar. The group referred in the sources to as Tobelo included refugees from Ternate, Seram, Tidore and Bacan.\footnote{ARA Verbaal 22 January 1825 No. 49/46 p. 2.} The first mention of an alliance between Tobelo and an east coast polity is 1795, when a group of Tobungku and Tobelo raiders attacked a VOC expedition sailing from Gorontalo to Parigi to dismantle the VOC post there. In 1808, the Dutch found the ruler of Banggai issuing orders to prepare a war expedition to retaliate against ‘the Tobungku and the Tobelo, who had seized a number of coastal settlements tributary to Banggai and taken many prisoners’.\footnote{ANRI Ternate 116, p. 20.} Their ships were decorated with human skulls, and their shields adorned with human hair, including blond, northern European hair, which confirmed an earlier report that Tobungku raiders had attacked a European ship.\footnote{ANRI Ternate 116, p. 5.} By this time, Tobelo settlements were dispersed along the coastline of Tobungku, but were primarily concentrated in the Bay of Tolo. This bay was used as a staging base during the months of November through to March.\footnote{ARA Verbaal 22 January 1825 No. 49/46 p. 4.} One of the most prominent Tobelo chiefs was named
Tobungku, after his place of birth. He moved regularly between Tobungku, Selayar and Flores in the 1820s.\footnote{The Tobelo chief Tobungku met Vosmaer on the east coast during his travels there in the 1820s and 1830s, and had agreed to settle in Kendari Bay under Vosmaer’s leadership. When Vosmaer died in 1836 Tobungku was no longer interested in this plan. ANRI Besluit 31/3 1837 No. 3 p. 10.}

A string of Tobelo settlements sprung up on the sea-route between Halmahera and eastern Sulawesi which facilitated movement of raiding fleets and temporary migrants. These migrants went to Obi and other islands with Tobelo communities to open new fields for agriculture and swelled the ranks of the raiding crews for shorter periods of time. Some stayed only for a few years until they had accumulated enough wealth to return home. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the permanent core of Tobelo raiding chiefs and their immediate followers was formed by Tobelo born in diaspora. According to the statements of freed captives and captured raiders, slave-raiding was the primary goal of Tobelo expeditions, though occasionally goods were also looted.

In eastern Sulawesi, the Tobelo today are remembered as raiders. Between contemporary Bungku and the Gulf of Mori or Kolonodale was a village called Pebatoa, which means in Mori language ‘gathering together’. Pebatoa was remembered as the place where the Tobelo gathered their captives before taking them away.\footnote{Interview with Ridwan, Bahunsuai, kecamatan Bungku Tengah, Kabupaten Poso, Central Sulawesi, February 1995.} According to older people in the Tobungku and Tomori areas, resistance against the Tobelo meant a certain death, if one did not resist, they would take the unfortunate person away to Ternate.\footnote{Interview, Samir Salindo, Bahodopi, Kecamatan Bungku Selatan, February 1995.} One elderly person also remembered a place named Bahonbelu, where the Tobelo used to interrupt their journeys if the seas were too rough, sometimes for several days. In the 1990s, children were still frightened into obedience with the threat that the Tobelo might come and get them. The historical connection between the Tobelo and Ternate is retained in the oral histories of eastern Sulawesi in which Tobelo and Ternate
are often used interchangeably, even when the Tobelo on the east coast were not associated with Ternate. Just as ‘selatan’ was a generic term for Sulawesi, Ternate seemed to mean ‘further east’, so that Tobelo who fought on behalf of Ternate and independent Tobelo slave raiders were not distinguished.

**Regional Diasporas, Alliance and Conflict in the Local Context**

The remainder of this chapter deals with patterns of alliances and conflict in eastern Sulawesi, both between raiding networks (Magindanao and Tobelo) as well as between various raiding groups and local elites in Banggai, Tobungku and Buton. The dramatic descriptions of raiding fleets pouring forth from Sulu on their annual expeditions rightfully captured the attention of European observers. Less striking, but more pervasive was the continuation of localised raiding on a smaller scale. In 1761, the VOC decided to shut down its small post on Banggai, because ‘many perahu with Mandarese, Paluans, and Parigians were roaming the seas between Banggai and Balantak’, so that Banggai was cut off from the food supplies of the mainland.\(^{448}\) The only piece of information Valckenaer had to report in 1778 on Tobungku, Mendono and Banggai, was the pattern of continuous attacks by sea-raiders that included besides various Malukan groups, Mandar, Bugis and for the first time also Magindanao.\(^{449}\) He also reported that Bugis ‘raiders’ who demanded tribute in the form of slaves from local rulers, claimed to act on behalf of the ruler of Bone, but supposedly without his consent.\(^{450}\)

In 1795 it became evident that a shift had occurred in alliances among external allies on the east coast. Followers of Nuku not only raided the east coast, but also settled there and formed an alliance with Tobungku. In 1795, this alliance is mentioned for the first time when Tobungku and Tobelo raiders attacked a VOC expedition sent from Gorontalo.

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\(^{448}\) ANRI Ternate 79, ‘Concept Memorie van de Agtbare Heer van Schoonderwoert’, p. 53b. Whether this affected the population of Banggai that did not depend on rice imports to the same degree is not known.

\(^{449}\) VOC 3504 f. 1760. The Malukan groups mentioned were: Weda, Patani, Maba, ‘Papua’.
to close the VOC post in Parigi. The expedition failed because of this attack, and the Gorontalo Bugis who accompanied the VOC expedition suffered great losses as well. At the same time, Buton was being regularly attacked by Raja Jailolo’s fleets.\footnote{ARA Comite Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1791-1800, Ternaten 1793-1794, ‘Jaarverslag Molukken’, par. 62-64; ARA Verbaal 22 Januari 1825 No. 49/46, ‘Over de Zeerovers No. 9’.
\footnote{ARA Comite Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1791-1800, Ternaten 1793-1794, Tweede Afdeling, Paragraph 23.}} In 1793, a Butonese ‘kapita’ was ransomed by a Chinese trader. The kapita had been captured several years earlier by a group of 7 korak-korak manned by raiders from Maba, Patani and Weda, who took him to the north coast of Seram. After a severe smallpox epidemic he was able to flee but fell into the hands of Tobelo, who took him to their homelands where he remained for a year before he was ransomed.\footnote{ANRI Manado 66 ‘Extracta Extract Patriasche Generale missieve geschreven door den HoogEdele Heeren Seventiene in Nederland aan Hunne HoogEdelheeden den Gourverneur Generaal en de Raade van India te Batavia gedateerd Amsterdam den 7\textsuperscript{e} December 1791’.
\footnote{ARA VOC 3504 f. 1798l, 1798r. The neighbouring islands of Sula and Taliabo were devastated by regular Papuan and Magindanao attacks. The Dutch fort on Sula was disbanded in 1775, also because it was commercially no longer viable.}

The Dutch official in Gorontalo warned that if the VOC withdrew its post in Gorontalo as well, the area would be taken over very quickly by sea-raiders, and rice deliveries from Manado to Ternate might be cut off.\footnote{ibid. The neighbouring islands of Sula and Taliabo were devastated by regular Papuan and Magindanao attacks. The Dutch fort on Sula was disbanded in 1775, also because it was commercially no longer viable.} The Dutch response to these raiding attacks differed depending on the importance of the area. In the case of northern Sulawesi, an effort was made to organise Ternaten korak-korak flotillas for patrols. While in eastern Sulawesi, the Ternaten Sultan, who must have received complaints from its east coast tributaries, requested that action be taken. But, instead of patrols, the Dutch governor tried to pressure the Tidore Sultan and the ruler of Bone to stop their subjects from raiding.\footnote{ibid. The neighbouring islands of Sula and Taliabo were devastated by regular Papuan and Magindanao attacks. The Dutch fort on Sula was disbanded in 1775, also because it was commercially no longer viable.} However, after 1797, when the VOC post in Gorontalo was withdrawn,
the activity of Magindanao in the Gulf of Tomini and the east coast of Sulawesi only increased. 455

The Magindanao in Toli-toli were part of a regional network of Iranun raiders, but also operated in a highly localised network of alliances. Besides the ruler of Toli-toli, Magindanao were in alliance with Tuanna-I-Dondang in South Sulawesi, and through his network they were linked to Tobungku and settlements in the Buton archipelago. It was Tuanna-I-Dondang who encouraged Arung Bakung to wage war against Buton from his base in Muna. Tuanna-I-Dondang promised the assistance of his Magindanao relations in Toli-toli. But the Magindanao were unable to keep their promise, because of the successful Dutch expedition against Toli-toli in 1822. As a consequence, Arung Bakung had to abandon his war against Buton and returned to Kendari.

The Toli-toli Magindanao also had close connections with Nuku and his successor Raja Jailolo. These connections may have dated back as far as 1791, when the Dutch received news that Nuku had sent five vessels to the ‘Sultan of Magindanao’ to request assistance in his struggle against the Dutch. 456 With no further information on the Magindanao and Iranun connections and even this fact denied two years later, it remains uncertain whether such a direct connection existed at this time. By 1806, the Magindanao of Toli-toli had formed alliances with Tobelo raiding groups based in Obi, 457 and by the early 1820s, relations between Raja Jailolo and Magindanao raiders in Toli-toli were well established. When Niru, a son of Raja Jailolo, died on the island of Kabaena (to the south of the southeastern peninsula of Sulawesi) in 1822, his body was taken to Toli-toli to be

buried with that of his brother, Kimelaha Sugi, who had been buried there earlier.\textsuperscript{458} In 1823, only two years after the devastating expedition against Toli-toli, Raja Jailolo called upon the Magindanao chiefs in Toli-toli to stage a joint expedition against Kalengsusu (north Buton) with his Tobelo fleet.\textsuperscript{459} The expedition consisted of one hundred Magindanao perahu from Toli-toli, fifty led by Raja Jailolo, and several perahu under the leadership of the Tobungku chief Sudarema.\textsuperscript{460} When Kalengsusu’s population ran out of food and was severely weakened, they were attacked and defeated. Its chief was killed, many of its inhabitants fled to southern Buton. More than 700 captives were divided among the fleets of the Magindanao, Tobelo and Tobungku. The siege of Kalengsusu is one of the only documented examples of a joint expedition based on alliances between regional raiding networks in which an east coast polity, Tobungku, took part.\textsuperscript{461}

Alliances between Magindanao and the more sedentary Tobelo in the Lesser Sunda’s took the form of patron-client relations. Tobelo settlements provided shelter and foodstuffs for the annual expeditions of the Magindanao. Their raiding fleets moored in Tobelo settlements for several months each year at the end of the west monsoon. While waiting for the winds to change, they hauled their boats ashore and repaired them. In various places, stockpiles of food were made on which they could draw during their journeys. Interestingly, Tobelo who migrated to the east coast of Sulawesi in the 1840s and 1850s, claimed they did not raid themselves, but rather divided their time between collecting marine products and cultivating food, similar to the life-style of Tobelo in their homeland of Halmahera. Their Magindanao patrons took tortoise shell and possibly also tripang with them on their return journey to Bonerate and eventually Sulu to be traded.

\textsuperscript{458} ANRI Besluit 31 October 1824 No. 1 p. 4b, 4c.
\textsuperscript{459} ibid. p. 2a.
\textsuperscript{460} ibid. p. 2d.
\textsuperscript{461} ibid.
The hierarchical relationship between the two groups was visible in the marriages concluded between them. Magindanao men married Tobelo women but never the reverse.\textsuperscript{462} The greater wealth of the Magindanao was displayed through the more expensive clothing and jewellery of the Magindanao women compared to that of Tobelo women, and by the high bride prices Magindanao paid for Tobelo women.\textsuperscript{463} Status difference between Magindanao and Tobelo raiders was also apparent from dealings with Daeng Magassing, a chief from Bonerate whom the Dutch contracted to negotiate a peace contract with raiding groups near Flores. The Magindanao had larger perahu and their leadership was more hierarchical. Among the fifteen Tobelo chiefs only one had a title: kapitan Dagi-dagi. Tobelo chiefs negotiated themselves, as opposed to the Magindanao who were represented a single chief, with the prestigious Arabic title of Syarif, who carried on the negotiations on behalf of all ‘Magindanao’. Another significant difference was that Tobelo chiefs did not have Islamic names, whereas many Magindanao chiefs did. Several Tobelo chiefs bore the names of their place of origin, Dodingo, Tobungku (Tabonko) and Palu, which in itself was an indication of the mobility and geographical range of the Tobelo diaspora. The prominent chief Tobongko, for instance, was named after his place of birth; Tobungku.\textsuperscript{464} Amongst the fragmentary information that was recorded during this period there are two reasonably well documented cases of conflict on the east coast that allow us to examine the patterns of local conflict and the use and involvement of external allies.

\textit{Buton}

As the tide of maritime raiders swelled in the archipelago, conflicts between Buton and its tributaries became increasingly intertwined with various raiding groups from elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{462} ANRI Besluit 8 October 1853 No. 14, [Interrogation of] Langodi, 18 December 1852. Magindanao men paid quite high bride prices for Tobelo women.

\textsuperscript{463} ibid. [Interrogation of] Daruna, daughter of Robodoi.
In fact, compared to a century earlier, local conflict involving Buton had shifted from conflict with Tobungku to conflict with Muna. This development was closely linked to the involvement of external parties such as Arung Bakung and the regional marauding network he was part of. The pattern of external alliances was nevertheless still shaped by the antagonism between Tobungku and Buton, since Tobungku remained allied to the Magindanao and Tobelo who attacked Buton. The serious challenges Buton faced in the last decade of the eighteenth century from its tributaries as well as from outside enemies led the Sultan of Buton to renew relations with the Dutch. The conflict with Muna that had raged in the mid-1750s resumed once again in 1790, but now with a third party involved. The Sultan of Buton complained that migrants from Bone settled on Muna had fuelled the conflict.

The Buton archipelago was routinely raided by Tobelo and Galela raiders, whose captives often emerged further east on the odd occasion when they escaped or were ransomed. Buton was attacked in 1794 by unidentified raiders, and the following year Buton and Muna were at war with each other once again. In the same year, an exceptionally large contingent of Butonese was sent to Makassar to renew their contract, reinforced by an oath. The subsequent year another ‘extra-ordinair’ contingent was sent to Makassar to express Buton’s gratitude to the VOC for renewing the contract, but the threatening external situation continued unabated. Between 1794 and 1796 Buton faced repeated attacks from raiders, renewed conflict with Muna, and threats from British warships. However, Buton’s request to the VOC in 1798 for ammunition to fight Muna was turned down.

464 ANRI Resolutie 12 November 1833 No. 3; Besluit 31/3 1837 No. 3, p. 10.
465 ARA Comite Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1791-1800, No. 90, Ternaten 1793-1794, Register op de korte Marginaale Aanteekeningen der Secreete Resolutien genoomen in Raade van Politie te Ternaten ten Casteel Orange, p. 27-29, 32, 61, 63.
As was the case with Tobungku, Buton was not just a victim of maritime raiders, but was itself also heavily involved in raiding. However, in marked contrast to Tobungku, maritime raiding and alliances with marauders were used to undermine the political centre of Buton that was trying to establish some form of regional hegemony. Raiders emanating from Sulu soon discovered that Buton was a convenient staging point to use before embarking in different directions across the eastern archipelago. Local conflict was advantageous to from elsewhere raiders, as an alliance with one side provided not only a safe anchorage, but also local allies and nearby raiding grounds. In 1799, Sultan Asiraruddin of Buton notified the Governor of Makassar that the ruler of Muna, with whom he had been at war for years, had been defeated.\textsuperscript{467} Muna’s ruler was killed and its population subjected itself temporarily to Buton. However, eleven years later, Munanese who had pillaged a Dutch ship in 1810 could not be punished because Buton was once again engaged in a war with Muna.\textsuperscript{468}

When the Dutch were replaced by the English during the Napoleonic Wars, Buton used this new situation to get recognition of its claims on the east coast when a new contract was drawn up in 1814. In this contract, Buton was acknowledged by Britain as the overlord of the entire east coast, thus restoring it to the position it held in the seventeenth century as the ‘key’ to the east coast of Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{469} Mendono, then the capital of Banggai, and Tobungku were listed among its tributaries, as well as Kalengsusu, Tiworo and, Muna, with whom Buton was engaged in almost perennial conflict.\textsuperscript{470} Whether the English recognition of Buton’s claims carried any weight in the local context is not clear, but the pattern of attempting to restore its political position as the ‘key’ to east coast is through recognition of claims over neighbouring polities is

\textsuperscript{467} KIT, H. W. Vonk, ‘Memorie van Overgave (aanvullende) van de Onderafdeling Boeton’, 1939, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{468} ARA Geheim Verbaal 5 October 1848, No. 4347, p. 267.
\textsuperscript{469} ANRI Besluit 20 June 1845 No. 15, ‘Brief van Sultan Ternate’.
\textsuperscript{470} ANRI Besluit 20 June 1845 No. 15 p. 2a.
consistent with what Buton had attempted to in the late seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{471} A 1939 document notes that in 1816 Tiworo and Muna once again waged war on Buton, and that they were defeated in 1823.\textsuperscript{472} Considering the dates, this must have been the war waged by Arung Bakung, supported by Tuanna-I-Dondang, who was based in South Sulawesi, and Magindanao raiders from Toli-toli. In light of other evidence from primary sources, the date of the defeat of Muna must be placed in 1821 or soon thereafter, since Arung Bakung ended the war against Buton because of the defeat of the Toli-toli Magindanao in that same year. Hence, the siege of Kalengsusu in 1823 would have been a continuation of the conflict, this time initiated by Raja Jailolo. Buton, as an ally of the Dutch had to withstand the combined forces of the Magindanao and Raja Jailolo’s followers, as well as from Tobungku during this period as the Dutch reasserted their authority across the archipelago.\textsuperscript{473}

When the Dutch returned, they nullified the 1814 treaty. In the 1824 listing of Buton’s tributaries both Tobungku and Mendono (Banggai) are no longer mentioned. Interestingly, besides Muna, Tiworo and Kabaena, Kalengsusu which had fallen to the ‘Tobel’ three years earlier was also listed as one of Buton’s tributaries.\textsuperscript{474} Whatever was codified in the written colonial documents, Buton was still not at peace. Schneiter remarked in 1825 that Buton was constantly at war with its neighbours ‘the Tobelo’.

Local alliances with Tobelo and Magindanao on the east coast were shaped by the long-standing rivalry between Buton and Tobungku. Tobungku’s position was strengthened by alliances with Tobelo and Magindanao raiding groups, while Buton was

\textsuperscript{471} ANRI Besluit 20 Juni 1845 No. 15. The letter of the Sultan of Ternate mentioning Buton’s position as the ‘kontji’ to Ternate’s east coast tributaries is mentioned in the context of dispute between Ternate and Buton about parts of Muna.


\textsuperscript{473} ANRI Besluit 31 October 1824 No. 1.

\textsuperscript{474} Wowonii, the small island of the east coast near Kendari was also considered part of Buton but not as a separate tributary. ARA Verbaal 22 January 1825 NO 49/46, ‘Rapport over Bouton’, 15 Juni 1824.

\textsuperscript{475} ARA Collectie Schneiter 125, ‘Stukken betreffende Celebes’.
undermined by the presence of the same raiders who formed alliances with Buton’s tributaries. The VOC, Buton’s main external ally, had gone into decline and was in no position to effectively assist. The contrast between the neighbouring polities was very noticeable in the 1820s. Schelle, writing in 1825, paints a gloomy picture of how Buton was affected by raiding attacks. From 1816 onwards, when the Dutch returned to the archipelago, repeated reports had reached Makassar regarding the devastation caused on Buton by the raiders based at Toli-toli on the north coast of the northern peninsula. These maritime raiders came in fleets of 70 to 80 boats to raid in the strait of Selayar and the strait of Buton, and pillaged ‘entire provinces’ of Buton. The cultivation of cotton and the weaving industry, which had brought prosperity to the population in earlier years had gone into decline due to the same raids. Buton’s population had moved away from coast because of the continuous attacks and was declining. According this report, Buton also suffered more from lack of food than anywhere else in the Netherlands-Indies, which indicates that not only was agriculture on Buton adversely affected, but trading connections with the mainland of Southeast Sulawesi from where foodstuffs were imported were badly disrupted. Buton was ravaged by regular attacks, and its agriculture disrupted, while Tobungku was a bustling port, and the only place on the east coast where settlements were actually visible from the sea, as everywhere else the population had moved inland to avoid attacks.

477 ibid., ‘Rapport over Bouton’, 15 Juni 1824. In one case raiding in other parts of the archipelago was to Buton’s advantage. One particular kind of cotton, known as Capa Hollanda, grown on the Tukang Besi Islands, and renowned for its fine quality, had shot up in price after the cultivation of the same type of cotton on Bima had declined because of raiding attacks.
**Tobungku versus Banggai**

Finally, I wish to revisit the conflict between Tobungku and Banggai in 1808, this time placing it in the context of the role of external centres and competing allies set against the background of other developments that took place in this period. The goal of the Dutch and Ternaten expedition to the east coast in 1808 was to announce that a new Dutch king had come to power and to renew relations between Ternate and its east coast tributaries.\(^\text{479}\) The expedition consisted of three Ternaten vessels, two Banggai paduakang and a Tobungku junk. In Sula, seven armed korak-korak joined them.\(^\text{480}\) When they arrived in Banggai, they found that Mandaria was residing in Mendono, and was engaged in a war with Tobungku. He was not at all eager to comply with the demand to relocate to Banggai, nor was he willing to surrender the sangaji of Batui who was accused of attacking and killing an Ambonese on a Dutch ship that was stranded near Batui. The kapitan Bagundi from Batui who admitted his guilt, was to be taken to Ternate to be tried. It was against this background that Mandaria threatened to withdraw his allegiance from Ternate if the kapitan was not eventually returned, stating that, if Banggai was too hot under Ternate they would place themselves under the protection of Goa.

The parallels here with the situation a century earlier are striking. Tobungku was raiding Banggai’s southern tributaries, and Banggai was in the staging a counter-attack to recapture these settlements, with the aid of Bugis allies. The pool of Bugis allies had expanded to include the communities at Togian and Salampe, each of which supplied their own boats. However, one difference was that Tobungku made effective use of its Tobelo allies, who used Tobungku as a semi-permanent base. During the visit of the Dutch and Ternatens in Tobungku, a fleet of 14 vessels returned from raiding in Banggai. Interestingly, they only had three captives on board, but carried sixty-nine fresh heads of

\(^{479}\) Napoleon had his younger brother Louis Napoleon made king of the Dutch Republic in 1806.

\(^{480}\) ANRI Ternate 116, p. 2, 3.
people they had killed in the course their expedition. The vessels on the beach stored on
the beach under boat-shelters were decorated with ‘a multitude’ of human skulls.\textsuperscript{481}

The Dutch, still working on the age-old principles of wanting to mediate conflicts
between tributaries, made an attempt to reconcile Banggai and Tobungku. From Banggai,
the Dutch-Ternaten delegation travelled to Tobungku, where they were undoubtedly were
perceived as allies of Banggai. The ruler of Tobungku flatly refused to receive the
deployment, even after repeated requests. The gifts from the Dutch and the Ternaten sultan
were reciprocated with the insulting gift of a mutilated buffalo. Incessant beating of gongs
day and night, both on the beach as well up in the hills, was summoning surrounding
peoples to assist in the event of an attack.\textsuperscript{482} The Tobelo and other raiders were dispersed
along the Tobungku coast, particularly in the Gulf of Tomori.\textsuperscript{483} The Tobungku noble
Kaicili Ronke chased some of the Ternaten rowers back to their boats, while making it
clear that they could not impose their will on them, ‘because Tobungku was no longer
what it been in earlier years’.\textsuperscript{484} It is possible that at this time Tobungku was already
allied to Magindanao raiders as well.

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Despite the relatively sparse information on local developments in the period 1780-1830,
it is clear that a number of important changes took place. The opening of the new
commodity frontier for tripang created new economic and political opportunities for both
local and external elites. As a result of the expanded trade opportunities, the Bugis
diaspora to eastern Sulawesi intensified, and its centre shifted from Mendono to Togian.

\textsuperscript{481} ‘...behangen en vercierd met eene meenigte menschen hoofden...', ANRI Ternate 116 p. 10.
\textsuperscript{482} Both the Sulanese Abdul as well as the Tobungku captain Piru who traveled with them from Ternate
informed the Dutch that the beating of the gongs was to call people for warfare. ANRI Ternate 116, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{483} ibid. p. 6.
\textsuperscript{484} ‘...dat wij niet moesten denken dat we hun te Tomboecoe iets konden komen wijs maken want
Tomboecoe was, niet gelijk in vroegere jare’. ibid. p. 7.
The close relations between Bugis traders and Banggai that had existed earlier, continued with the Togian Bugis. Though information on relations with Bone is limited, it would appear that a growing diaspora of traders and chiefs to eastern Sulawesi would have drawn it further into Bone’s wider sphere of political and economic influence. However, in the early nineteenth century, not Bone, but two raiding networks took on the role of effective external ally in local conflicts; Tuanna-I-Dondang and related Magindanao groups, and, Raja Jailolo and related Tobelo groups.

In relations with external powers there were continuities, but also important changes. Interestingly, the shifts in power that had taken place on a larger scale in the archipelago did not appear to have markedly changed patterns of local conflict compared to a century earlier. Alliances with raiding groups enhanced Tobungku’s position vis-a-vis its neighbours Buton and Banggai. Through the Tobelo raiders, Tobungku participated in their trading and raiding networks that extended across the eastern archipelago to Seram, Obi and Halmahera, and south to Bali and the Lesser Sunda’s. In Buton, however, the advent of these same raiding groups only intensified and prolonged conflict in the Buton archipelago. The protracted conflict in Buton was exacerbated by the island’s strategic position in relation to shipping routes, which made it extremely attractive for maritime raiders. However, the situation in Buton was, not a complete departure from the developments a century earlier, when Tobungku incited Buton’s tributaries to break away.

One reason why the general upsurge in raiding elsewhere in the archipelago may not have lead to great changes in local patterns of conflict was that mutual raiding was already an established pattern, and slaves were an important source of revenue for local elites. In fact, the rise of tripang as an export commodity may have reduced the importance of raiding at a local level. Also, the expansion of regional raiding networks blended at a local level in with already established patterns of conflict. In periods when
there was no great rivalry between regional networks, east coast polities carried on their own business of trading and raiding their neighbours with the help of localised groups of allies. The regional networks of Bugis, Tobelo and Magindanao remained only loosely affiliated with important political centres.

Both in Tobungku, and on a smaller scale in Kendari, the close link between the tripang trade and (protection from) raiding is evident. As soon as Arung Bakung left Kendari, the tripang trade collapsed. The events surrounding the person of Arung Bakung illustrate a number of shows how a number of different aspects of local and regional relations. He was a refugee from Bone who fled to Bone’s periphery. There, he was able to create alliances with local rulers whose power he enhanced through his connections to regional raiding and trading networks. He participated, probably even initiated conflict between Buton and Muna, but was unable to continue when his back-up support, the Magindanao raiders, suffered their first blow at the hands of the Dutch. In the following decades, however, the expanding influence of the colonial state would play a growing role.
Part Three

The Making of a Periphery 1825-1905
This chapter focuses on eastern Sulawesi as it became a ‘frontier’ of the colonial state, a state that aimed to expand Ternate’s sphere of influence while undermining Bone’s. More specifically, this chapter describes and analyses the Dutch attempts to stem maritime raiding and the conflicts in Banggai and Tobungku in the 1840s that were supported by local groups of Bugis. In this period, local conflict in eastern Sulawesi, overlapped with what could be called ‘resistance conflicts’ against an emergent colonial state. The east coast of Sulawesi in this period was one of the areas where the expanding colonial state encountered indigenous social and political spheres of influence that could not be easily ‘conquered’ or contained within clearly defined geographical boundaries or spaces.

After the return of the Dutch to the archipelago in 1816, the moving frontier of the colonial state expanded from Ternate westward to include eastern Sulawesi. In the same period Bone, one of the most powerful indigenous states in the eastern archipelago, resisted the encroaching influence of the Dutch. The ambiguous political position of eastern Sulawesi located between Bone and Ternate since the late seventeenth century increasingly became a major anomaly. Eastern Sulawesi was now caught between the competing claims of Ternate and Bone, the former backed by them, while the latter was resented and feared by them. Dutch policy was still overtly anti-expansionist and anti-interventionist, the danger of rival European powers making territorial claims to extensive areas beyond Dutch control in the outer islands necessitated the Dutch to secure exclusive rights to the large parts of the Indonesian archipelago. In addition, the struggle against

Denys Lombard sees the struggle against piracy as one of the components of ‘resistance conflicts against the colonial powers’. In the case of eastern Sulawesi, the conflicts or ‘rebellions’ in Banggai and
‘piracy’ became one of the main justifications for colonial intervention. Bone’s claims over eastern Sulawesi were challenged by the colonial state, and its position of overlordship was one of the major factors leading to a violent confrontation with the colonial state in 1859/60.

From a purely Dutch perspective, important opportunities for trade, as suggested by Vosmaer, competed with problems of Bugis expansion and maritime raiding. The ‘illegitimate’ activities of Bugis and maritime raiders were the catalyst for colonial intervention, drawing the Dutch further into the affairs of eastern Sulawesi than they intended. However, the colonial efforts to create order the indigenous complexity of overlapping diasporas, competing political claims and ‘piracy’ were greatly restricted by lack of resources. The early attempts to stem the tide of piracy either depended on the support and skills indigenous allies, such as the Bonerate prince Daeng Magassing and the Sultanate of Ternate, or on the personal influence of individuals such as Vosmaer who had created his own network of contacts. The raiding diasporas of the Tobelo and Sulu-based Magindanao and Balangingi eventually succumbed under combined colonial pressure. The Bugis diaspora, however, based on the principles of economic pioneering and migration, continue unabated into the twentieth century.

**Anti-piracy Measures 1820-1835: Negotiation and Incorporation**

The return of the Dutch to the Netherlands-Indies signalled the beginning of a new phase in the history of maritime raiding in eastern Sulawesi. The first successful expedition conducted against the Iranun raiders in the Sulawesi area took place in 1822 at Toli-toli. A several Dutch warships were accompanied by the fleets of a number of indigenous chiefs from central and south Sulawesi who also had suffered under Iranun attacks. This alliance between the Dutch and indigenous chiefs represented a continuation of the VOC practice

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Tobungku also fall into this category. Denys Lombard, ‘Regard Nouveau sur les ”Pirates Malais”, 1ere moitie du XIXe s’, *Archipel* 18, 1879: 231-250.
born of necessity of enlisting indigenous allies to fight against a common enemy. An unexpected consequence of the successful attack was that the coalition of Arung Bakung backed up by Tuanna-I-Dondang’s men abandoned their campaign against Buton because the required assistance from the Toli-toli raiders did not eventuate after the devastating attack.\textsuperscript{486} Even though the defeat was a significant setback to the Iranun raiders, the Dutch official placed in Toli-toli after the successful expedition, still had to wait for a warship to travel to Palu because it was unsafe for him to travel on his own because of the large number of raiding perahu still active in the area.\textsuperscript{487} The resilience of the Iranun soon became evident as Dampelas, further south on the northern arm, emerged as a new centre of the slave trade in Toli-Toli’s place.

The early decades of the nineteenth century was characterised by three attempts to incorporate maritime raiders into the colonial state through treaties and resettlement plans. The most important social experiment of this kind was with Raja Jailolo, Nuku’s successor, who continued to use the north coast of Seram as a major base, but whose claims to the Tidore Sultanate had no chance of being fully acknowledged.\textsuperscript{488} In 1822, Raja Jailolo’s subjects on the north coast of Seram numbered more than 8000, not counting those who were at sea or settled elsewhere. Dutch-Ternaten anti-piracy measures directed at populations suspected of supporting or carrying out maritime raiding inadvertently increased Raja Jailolo’s numbers.\textsuperscript{489} In 1822, a large number of refugees from Halmahera

\textsuperscript{486} See previous chapter.
\textsuperscript{487} KITLV H 76, Verslagen uit het Gouvernement der Molukken, f. 7.
\textsuperscript{489} The reasons people gave for leaving their homes and joining Raja Jailolo provide an interesting insight into the role of violence in the political system. According to Dutch reports, people left their homes to avoid oppression by the Ternaten and Tidorese sultanates, particularly the former. The hongi, raiding expeditions operating under the auspices of elites, followed people wherever they moved with demands for tribute. They became so desperate they would give their children away instead of being killed. The pressure was so great that they were willing to participate in maritime raiding rather than being victimised themselves. Since the Dutch could not provide protection against the small-scale raiding that took place in
who had been punished by Ternaten hongi because of their suspected participation in maritime raiding joined his ranks. Raja Jailolo and his disaffected followers in turn attacked areas that were directly or indirectly allied to the Dutch. The Dutch concern about the swelling ranks of Raja Jailolo’s followers led to the first experiment of resettling ‘pirates’, and in this manner incorporating them into the colonial state system. Raja Jailolo used his personal control over maritime raiding groups as his main bargaining chip to obtain formal recognition of his claim to the throne of Tidore. This was out of the question for the Dutch, but they did grant him the north coast of Seram and nullified Tidore’s claims to this area. Raja Jailolo’s followers then agreed en masse to establish villages there, as long as they did not have to go to Tidore.

The attempt to transform a diasporic, raiding polity into a land-based oriented polity populated by peasants and fishers failed for a number of reasons. The location was not suitable for supporting a large concentration of people that depended almost entirely on agriculture. Further the coast was too swampy, and too much labour was required to cut down the forests. While, local sago forests did not provide enough food. More importantly, Raja Jailolo’s power still depended on his alliances with maritime raiding groups who continued to bring him tribute. The new sultan was soon accused of supporting raiding, receiving gifts from raiders and being addicted to opium, whereas the Dutch expected him to encourage his subjects to settle down and open new fields and grow food crops. More and more chiefs with their followers moved away, mostly offshore to the nearby island of Obi that had served as a forward base for the Tobelo for decades. Semi-sedentary communities consisting of women and slaves were left behind when the men went on

Maluku, joining Raja Jailolo who had some control over these raiders was a more attractive choice. His reputation as an even-handed and fair minded ruler spread throughout the islands and he was said to be more popular than either of sultans of Ternate or Tidore. ibid. p. 498.

490 The chief of Sawai on the north coast of Seram was held hostage for three months by Raja Jailolo because he had allowed a Dutch steamship to anchor near his village. This provoked retaliation from the
annual raiding expeditions. In 1833, Raja Jailolo requested permission to move to Obi as well, where his subjects were better able to feed and clothe themselves. The Dutch refused his request, removed him from his position and abandoned the project. The remaining chiefs from Maba, Patani and Weda, who together had 1300 subjects, then returned to their original homelands. But the Tobelo and Galela continued to live on the north coast of Seram and on Obi. One hundred and eight Papuan children who did not belong to anybody, were sent to work in the spice gardens of Banda.  

During the same years of the experiment with Raja Jailolo and his followers, the colonial government also undertook two other similar projects to transform the Tobelo and Iranun around Flores into peaceful subjects of the colonial state, through negotiation and resettlement. The first was carried out by Daeng Magassing, an aristocrat from Bonerate, a small island to the south of Sulawesi with longstanding connections to maritime raiders. He was to use his ‘local’ knowledge and status to form alliances with the raiding groups and resettle them on Tanah Jampea. This tiny island to the south of Selayar, had in the past been tributary to Bonerate, but because of frequent attacks by raiders had become depopulated. Here, the resettled raiders would be able grow their own food and live in peace under the protection of the colonial government. In 1830, fifteen Tobelo chiefs signed a peace treaty with Daeng Magassing, which was reinforced by swearing an oath. Towards the end of that year, Daeng Magassing left for Bima and Tana Jampea with his recently acquired following that numbered around 300 people. But three years later, it was evident to the Dutch that this project had failed. Daeng Magassing himself was suspected of committing acts of piracy, and orders were issued to confiscate his ship. Five years later, a Dutch government official was told in Kendari that Daeng Mangassing

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Dutch resident Merkus, who was the first official to begin to re-establish Dutch authority in Maluku. The Dutch and Ternaten forces took the fortress and burned over 800 boats. ibid. p. 493.  
491 ibid. p. 503.  
492 ANRI Resolutie 12 November 1833 No. 3.
‘served the Dutch government in appearance only’, and that arms and ammunition supplied by the Dutch were used to raid and pillage. The booty was subsequently sold in Kalengsusu, the very same settlement that had been captured by Raja Jailolo and the Iranun in 1822, on the northeast coast of Buton.\textsuperscript{493} The connections between Bonerate and Iranun raiders continued: in the 1850s Iranun ships were frequently reported to take in water and supplies in Bonerate. In that period, the son of Daeng Magassing sailed in a fleet of raiding perahu of Iranun and other raiders.\textsuperscript{494}

\textbf{Vosmaer and the Kendari Bay Settlement ca. 1830-1845}

The second project to attempt incorporating ‘pirates’ into the colonial state was initiated by the Dutch trader and adventurer Jan Nicholas Vosmaer, who come from a prominent family in The Hague. His plan to open a trading post and resettle maritime raiding groups was reluctantly supported by the colonial government. Vosmaer’s project is of interest, because of his ambiguous role as agent of the colonial state an agent who could only be successful by adapting to a local system which he was initially able to manipulate to his own advantage, but which ultimately the colonial state set out to undermine. His tiny colonial trading outpost that was abandoned before it was even properly established would cause a wave of resistance from Buton and ultimately from Bone, even if formal political relations with nearby Kendari were weak virtually or absent.

Before arriving in the Netherlands-Indies, Vosmaer had sailed around the world and visited his brother, who was a colonial official in South Sulawesi. Fascinated by the

\textsuperscript{493} ANRI Besluit 31 March 1837 No. 3, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{494} ‘Berigten omtrent den Zeeroof in den Nederlandsch-Indischen Archipel, 1858’, \textit{Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde}, 1873, p. 307. After Daeng Magassing was dismissed from the government’s service and his boats confiscated, he was also banned from visiting or living anywhere under Dutch rule. This ban was lifted after he assisted the captains of a Dutch schooner that had been attacked by their own crew in 1841. His father, who was the \textbf{bonto} (equivalent to ruler) of Bonerate ordered him to take the Dutchmen to Bima, the closest Dutch post. ANRI Makassar 7 & 7A, ‘Beknopt
indigenous trading vessels arriving from different parts of the archipelago, he learned to speak both Bugis and Makassarese and befriended Makassarese chiefs and maritime traders. Through these personal contacts and the patronage of Tuanna-I-Dondang also known as Sarib Ali, he was able to travel safely to the east coast. In October 1830 he bought a brig in Batavia with his business partner Brouwers Holtius, which he baptised ‘Celebes’. Exactly a year later, he completed his first trading voyage to the Gulf of Bone, Buton and up the east coast as far as Tobungku. Unfortunately he suffered shipwreck on the return journey near Selayar, and lost all the notes he had taken. On this journey he ‘discovered’ Kendari Bay which he then named after himself, calling it the Vosmaerbaai. He also encountered a booming tripang trade, with Tobungku as the most important centre on the east coast. Vosmaer immediately saw an opportunity to open a trading settlement that could double as a government out post in Kendari Bay. He convinced the struggling colonial government to support his bold plan on the grounds that he would be able to transform ‘robbers’ into ‘honest and decent people’ and resettle them in Kendari Bay. From Batavia distant standpoint, it was a matter of taking specific advantage of Vosmaer’s local knowledge and skills, which he had obtained through extensive contact with Makassarese and Bugis chiefs and traders.

Vosmaer entered into alliances with a number of Tobelo chiefs whom Daeng Magassing had also listed as his new followers. He was able to win the confidence of these raiders through the patronage and protection offered by Tuanna-I-Dondang, thus operating in the same manner and regional network as Arung Bakung who preceded him as a key

Overzigt der Stukken en Aangelegenheden rakende de Regten welke Boni zich heeft aangematigd over de Landen gelegen in de Tomini-Baai’.

495 ARA Vosmaer Collectie 548, 153, Letter by J.N.Vosmaer to ihs brother J. Vosmaer, Batavia, 29 August 1829.

496 ibid, Letter to J. Vosmaer, 31 October 1830, Surabaya 16 October 1831.
patron of the tripang trade in Kendari Bay.\textsuperscript{497} Besides resettling maritime raiders, Vosmaer argued that a Dutch out post in Kendari Bay would attract some of the indigenous trade on the east coast that thus far had evaded ports under Dutch control. But in the aftermath of the failure of Daeng Magassing’s venture, the idea of resettling ‘pirates’ was not greeted with great enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{498} Further more, the colonial government could not authorise opening new government posts without consulting with the Netherlands. Hence, Vosmaer was appointed Resident of Gorontalo, from where he could travel to the east coast. It was hoped that he would gather further knowledge about the various people who inhabited this still virtually unknown coast, and establish good relations with them, at little cost to the colonial government. Batavia granted Vosmaer permission to conduct trade but refused his request for a personal advance of \textsterling 25,000, - so, as to not subsidise private trading schemes.\textsuperscript{499}

Kendari or Laiwui, previously unknown to the Dutch except through a long-forgotten Bugis chief in 1700, became the best-known spot on the east coast for decades to come. Vosmaer’s long description of Sulawesi’s south-eastern peninsula and his treatise on tripang species and preparation that was published in 1839 in the \textit{Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen}\textsuperscript{500} became the main source of information on the east coast, along with Van der Hart’s shorter account written in 1850.\textsuperscript{501}

Kendari Bay is a long, narrow bay with an entrance that is so well concealed that even

\textsuperscript{497} Nicholas J. Vosmaer, ‘Korte beschrijving’, 1839, pp. 63-184; ANRI Resolutie 7 Mei 1835 No. 2; Resolutie 2 Juni 1836 No. 11.
\textsuperscript{498} ANRI Resolutie 7 May 1835 No. 2, Makassar to Batavia, 21 February 1835, p. 1d.
\textsuperscript{499} ANRI Resolutie 12 January 1835 No. 16, Resolutie 7 May 1835 No. 2, Resolutie 7 May 1835 No. 2, Batavia to Makassar, 19 March 1835.
\textsuperscript{500} N. J. Vosmaer, ‘Korte beschrijving’, 1839, pp. 63-184. By 1860, Vosmaer was remembered as a Dutch colonial hero for his pioneering explorations. His 1839 article was quoted by authors far into the twentieth century as the only authoritative source of information on this area.
\textsuperscript{501} The published account of this journey and the unpublished version are nearly identical, but the unpublished version contain slightly more information. C. van der Hart, \textit{Reize Rondom het Eiland Celebes}, 1853; ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110.
from a very short distance it is invisible.\textsuperscript{502} For this reason, according to Vosmaer, Bugis traders in the early decades of the nineteenth century frequently passed it by and anchored at Bokori, a small island near the entrance of the bay. Coastal Tolaki travelled there from the mainland to meet the Bugis traders.\textsuperscript{503} However, in the first part of the nineteenth century the bay was sought out by Bajo, who were attracted there by its sheltered anchorage, abundance of food, fresh water and wood to repair their boats.\textsuperscript{504} It was Vosmaer’s encounters with Bajo fisher folk that initially drew his attention to Kendari.

Under the patronage of the Bugis aristocrat Arung Bakung, Kendari had become a prosperous trading settlement with a large number of semi-nomadic Bajo and cross-cultural traders frequenting the bay in the late 1820s. Tebau, the Tolaki chief, who had invited Arung Bakung, also benefited greatly from the trade. When Arung Bakung left Kendari with his following, the Bajo stopped visiting Kendari in large numbers, and so did the traders, thus depriving Tebau and the coastal Tolaki of their principal source of wealth. Vosmaer was introduced to Tebau by a younger relative of Tuanna-I-Dondang when they visited Kendari. Just as Tebau had requested Arung Bakung to take up residence, now he was eager for Vosmaer to settle there too.

Laiwui was a coastal realm that was part of a loose federation of Tolaki chiefs often referred to as Konawe, after its most prominent realm in the hinterland of Kendari Bay. One of Kendari’s advantages was that it could not be cut off from food supplies in the hinterland by a siege, as was the case with Ambon and Banda, and it was easy to defend because of the narrow entrance to the bay. The disadvantage of proximity to its hinterland was that Kendari was not easy to defend from inland headhunting expeditions. The

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\textsuperscript{502} It is so well concealed that when entering the bay by ship, it seems as if the ship is heading straight into the rocky coastline when a sharp turn suddenly reveals the entrance and a view of Kendari Bay.

\textsuperscript{503} J.N. Vosmaer, \textit{Korte Beschrijving}, 1839, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{504} See previous chapter for a discussion of Bajo migration and the tripang trade.
population of Laiwui was estimated at approximately 7000 in 1837.\textsuperscript{505} In the 1830s, Laiwui extended northwards along the coast as far as Matarape, which later became part of Tobungku and southwards to Rumbia, inhabited by the ToMoronene, which in later decades was claimed by Buton. Buton claimed suzerainty over Kendari, and Butonese influence was noticeable in the rank titles of Lakina and Sapati, which were borrowed from Buton. Tebau’s clever alliances with Arung Bakung and then Vosmaer enabled him to elevate his status and ignore Buton’s claims of dominance.

Tebau is one of the few chiefs about whom there is a more elaborate account because of his encounters and transactions with Vosmaer and other Dutch officials. Vosmaer described him as shy but of good will, of average height, with ‘pleasant’ facial features, and about 50 years old. Tebau adhered strongly to the ancestral custom of using bird augury to determine auspicious days. He was reported to have postponed a meeting with the Dutch official Bastiaanse on government matters for several days until an auspicious bird call was heard.\textsuperscript{506} His residence was located in Lepo-lepo, a few miles inland on a small tributary that connected the Konaweha river to Kendari Bay. There he had erected a large meeting hall that was named Laikan Aha (great house) which was used for ceremonies and meetings. It stood a part on its own, as Tebau’s subjects lived dispersed on their fields. They were averse to living in settlements, despite repeated orders by Tebau to do so. The main reason was their fear of epidemics and raiding. Tebau did not make major decisions on his own but rather consulted with other prominent men in the realm, and both Vosmaer and Bastiaanse felt that he was ‘too dependent’ on other nobles.\textsuperscript{507} Tebau had several perahu at his command, which he used to travel to the bay and also to trade, as did other influential men in and around Kendari Bay.

\textsuperscript{505} ANRI Besluit 31 March 1837 No. 3.
\textsuperscript{506} ibid. p. 12. The bird that played an important role in bird augury was locally referred to as the sui, and was considered sacred.
\textsuperscript{507} ibid. p. 18.
Relations between coastal and inland Tolaki were tense and subject to the forces of change. During Vosmaer’s stay there was already a noticeable difference between the way of life and customs of the coastal Tolaki, who wore imported cloth and had absorbed some Islamic and Bugis influences and the inland Tolaki who wore bark cloth and practised headhunting. When queried on the custom of headhunting, Tebau stated that only the inland Tolaki still practised this ritual and form of warfare. Relations between Tebau and the inland Tolaki, had deteriorated after he formed alliances with Arung Bakung and then Vosmaer, and interior Tolaki started to undermine his rule. These external alliances promoted trade and increased Tebau’s wealth, and provided some access to weapons and military assistance. This growing challenge to Konawe’s central position aroused the resentment among the inland Tolaki, resentment that would continue into the twentieth century as colonial rule supported the position of Laiwui rather than Konawe. Vosmaer does not mention the exact reason for Arung Bakung’s departure, only Tebau’s apologies for what had happened, and that ‘it’ was not his fault since the inland people were beyond his control. Tebau clearly could not protect coastal settlements from inland attacks that were intended to undermine his authority. The danger of such attacks launched from the interior was left out of Vosmaer’s promotional article, but it clearly formed a real threat to the coastal settlements, on the bay at least into the 1880s.508

Besides the scattered Tolaki, there was a permanent settlement of people from Tiworo (Muna) on the coast of the bay, most likely followers of Arung Bakung who came with him from Tiworo to Kendari. In 1849, ‘kampung Tiworo’ was still the main, permanent

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508 A Jesuit who stayed in Kendari for several months in 1883 mentions that it was unwise to leave the settlement unarmed, not even to fetch water, because of the ever present threat of attack by headhunters. In 1988/89, the antagonism between Laiwui and Konawe was still evident in the conflicting claims as to which realm was the most important. ‘De Eerste Vestiging van den Katholieken Missionaris aan de Kendari-Baai’, *De Katholieke Missiën*, 1886-87, Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 121-123.
settlement in the bay.\textsuperscript{509} The Dutch official Bastiaanse was approached there by what he called ‘indigenous chiefs of trade’. Only one acknowledged Tebau, which implies that his actual influence over trade in the bay was limited. These men had their own trading perahu and sailed as far as Buton, and possibly further. The most prominent figure was the self-declared kapitan laut, a Makassar trader who fled to Kendari to avoid repaying debt. He still nevertheless traded to Selayar, exporting rice or tripang from Kendari. More importantly, he controlled the local interpreter and wrote letters on behalf of Tebau without consulting him. Bastiaanse ordered him to leave Kendari on account of selling Butonese captives and because of his tendency to dominate affairs in Laiwui.

By the beginning of 1836, Vosmaer had met with Tobelo raiding chiefs on Selayar, including the prominent Tobelo chief kapitan Tobungku, and notified Batavia that eighty perahu would ‘go over’ to the Dutch side.\textsuperscript{510} Vosmaer played down the extent to which he himself now depended on the protection of these raiding chiefs, and that the future success of his trading post also possibly depended on these somewhat dubious connections. The former governor of Makassar, D. W. Pietermaat, who had spoken to Vosmaer in 1832 and 1833 about his plans to open a trading post in Kendari Bay, was pessimistic about its chances of success because of objections coming from Buton, Luwu and ‘Bone Bugis’, all of whom made some claim on Kendari.

Vosmaer indeed complained bitterly about the Sultan of Buton’s attempts to undermine his trading post. The Sultan claimed Kendari as his tributary, and tried to employ Tobelo raiding groups to attack the new settlement.\textsuperscript{511} News reached Makassar that he had posted a reward of one hundred slaves for the persons who managed to kill Vosmaer. He went so far as to grant certain Tobelo raiding chiefs permission to settle in

\textsuperscript{510} ANRI Resolutie 2 June 1836 No. 11. 
\textsuperscript{511} ibid. Letter from former Governor of Makassar D. W. Pietermaat to Batavia 21 April 1836.
Kalengsusu on north Buton on condition that they attacked Vosmaer’s trading post in Kendari. Interestingly, he made a point of forewarning the Bajo in Kendari in case of an attack so that the tripang trade would not be harmed. However, because of their good relations with Vosmaer, the raiding chiefs Dagi-Dagi and Tobungku rejected the Sultan’s offer. Buton also made a formal complaint to the governor of Makassar about Vosmaer’s plans to resettle raiding groups, in the Bay; ironically, the very same groups he wanted to employ to attack Kendari, because he worried that they would now disturb Buton. Buton depended on Kendari for agricultural imports, but also demanded duties from traders who went there to collect tripang from Bajo fishers. The Sultan’s claims were flatly denied by Tebau, who admitted only to having formal trade relations with Buton.

Rumours had spread that the Sultan had posted a large reward to whoever would kill Vosmaer. He did indeed die on Buton in 1836, but because of a fever that started on a journey between Selayar and Buton on board his own ship. Tebau wrote a letter to Makassar pleading to maintain the post in Kendari. Based on an 1837 report by Budi Bastiaanse, who was sent to Buton and Kendari on a fact-finding mission, the Governor of Makassar decided to continue the post at Kendari. According to his report Vosmaer’s plans for a colonial trading post had been realistic. A Bajo chief informed Bastiaanse that the day before his arrival the former chief of Kalengsusu passed through Kendari on his way from Buton to Tobungku with three armed korak-korak. His aim was to persuade Tobungku to join him in combined attack on Kendari. The presence of the Dutch post between Buton and Tobungku may have temporarily united the traditional enemies in a common purpose to destroy the Kendari Bay settlement. Whether Tobungku’s support eventuated is not known, but raiders from Kalengsusu regularly attacked Kendari, while

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512 ibid., Letter from Sultan of Buton to Governor of Makassar, 4 April 1836.
514 ANRI Besluit 31/3 1837 No. 3, ‘Advies van de raad van Indië, 6 March 1837.
the Sultan of Buton denied having any knowledge of these attacks. At this time, Kalengsusu was a market for stolen goods and captives, frequented by the likes of Daeng Magassing and the Tobelo raiders.

The Bajo chiefs implored Bastiaanse to maintain the government post, so that they would be able to leave their women and children behind in safety when they went fishing and trading. For the time being, Cornelius, Vosmaer’s trusted underling, was considered the most capable person to run the trading post. When the post was not closed down despite Vosmaer’s death, the Sultan of Buton threatened the Dutch presence there would eventually lead to problems with Bone. The Bugis claim over Kendari Bay in the 1830s was not voiced directly to the colonial government and appears to be based on the widespread presence of Bajo fishers in the bay; fisher folk from whom the Bugis ‘enjoyed great benefit’.515 In Kendari, people were aware of Bone’s claims, but stated that they were in no way dependent on Bone nor were they worried, because Bone was too preoccupied with its own internal conflicts.516 Towards the end of 1840, Cornelius arrived in Makassar with unsettling the news that a severe smallpox epidemic had killed most of the population of Kendari Bay, including Tebau, and that the rest of the population had fled deep into the interior. Consequently, Cornelius was forced to abandon the depopulated settlement in Kendari Bay.517 Very soon thereafter, a group of Tobelo raiders used the Bay as an anchorage and started to build houses. Before returning to Makassar, Cornelius had spent four months on Buton and maintained good relations with the Sultan. During his stay, the Sultan mounted an expedition of 15 large perahu with 1000 men and succeeded in defeating the raiders who had settled in Kendari Bay. If these were the very same raiders whom the Sultan had earlier encouraged to raid Kendari Bay, they were not shown any mercy in the presence of a Dutch government official. Interestingly, three of the five

515 ibid., On board of HM Schooner ‘Krokodil’, 31 October 1836.
516 ANRI Besluit 31 March 1837 No. 3, p. 21.
517 ANRI Resolutie 13 May 1836 No. 12, ‘Post te Kendari ingetrokken’, p. 2.
captured chiefs were Tobelo, while one was a cousin of the Butonese Sultan, and the fifth a Makassarese, once again underlining the symbiotic ties between local elites and the Tobelo raiders. They were all beheaded in Buton.\textsuperscript{518}

Vosmaer’s idea of settling maritime raiders and transforming them into ‘peaceful subjects’ did not end with his death. In 1837, the Governor of Makassar organised for Tobelo chiefs and four hundred of their people to be settled on Tombolangan, a small island near Selayar, possibly some of the same chiefs Daeng Magassing and Vosmaer dealt with earlier. This project would prove successful. The Tobelo turned to fishing for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{519} Vosmaer’s experiment ended abruptly, but it had drawn the attention of the colonial government to the east coast. The Sultan of Buton proved to be right concerning Bone’s claim. Ten years after Cornelius left Kendari Bay, a new Bugis settlement had arisen, with the syabandar Latumana or Latimammang (harbour master) as its head, who collected taxes on behalf of the ruler of Bone.

\textbf{Contested Spheres of Influence, Bone versus Ternate}
While the Bugis had been a consistent presence in eastern Sulawesi since the late seventeenth century, it would appear that Bone’s direct involvement was only triggered when another regional power threatened its position of overlordship. This occurred several years after the return of the Dutch to eastern the archipelago when Batavia proposed an updated version of the Treaty of Bungaya. In this revised 1825 version, Bone no longer held the privileged position it had enjoyed as prime mediator between the Dutch and other South Sulawesi rulers in the original treaty.\textsuperscript{520} Instead, Bone would now have the same status as the other South Sulawesi kingdoms. The resulting tensions led to the first Bone

\textsuperscript{518} ibid. pp. 5, 6.
\textsuperscript{520} L. Y. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palaka}, 1981.
war in 1825. The war remained a stalemate, because Dutch troops were withdrawn from
Sulawesi to fight in Java where the government was facing a much more serious conflict
led by Diponogoro.

Despite the general policy of non-intervention outlined by Batavia and the Ministry of
Colonies in the Netherlands, a special committee that investigated the Dutch position in
Sulawesi advised in 1834 that a reduction of government control in Sulawesi was not to be
recommended. If the colonial government was perceived as weak in South Sulawesi, this
would undermine the authority of the colonial state throughout the archipelago, especially
wherever Bugis and Wajo migrants were settled. 521 Clearly, the government committee
had recognised the possible political Ramifications and widespread impact of the Bugis
diaspora.

Relations between Bone and the colonial government remained extremely tense. In the
1830s, Bone requested help from the straits settlements in their war against the Dutch, and,
in late 1830s, James Brooke’s visited Bone, Wajo, Sidenreng, Luwu and even the more
remote Mekongga (southeast Sulawesi). Though an uneasy compromise was reached in
1838 in which Bone was accorded the position of ‘first ally’, possible British interference
alarmed the Dutch government to such an extent that James Brooke was expelled from the
colony in 1840. 522 Fears of further British competition were only heightened by advice
from a Dutch agent in Singapore that trade agreements should be concluded with all
remaining independent rulers in the Netherlands-Indies as soon as possible to pre-empt
other European powers, namely the British, from staking out trade and territorial claims.

521 Harry van Beers, ‘Boni moet boeten, de Nederlandse gezagsuitbreiding op Zuidwest-Celebes ten tijde
522 KITLV, Korn Collection No. 435, p. 463. James Brooke had come to Sulawesi at the behest of Datu
Lampula, a Wajo ruler who had tried to destabilise the government of Sidenreng, a strong ally of the
Dutch in 1839 and only failed because of Bone’s intervention. In 1840, Datu Lampula received 12 chests
of rifles, 20 barrels of gunpowder and a rifle with seven barrels from James Brooke. H. van Beers, ‘Boni
moet boeten’, 1986, p. 15.
This was a sufficient pretext to make haste with establishing the exact boundaries of the Netherlands-Indies.\textsuperscript{523}

Upon the return of the Dutch to the archipelago in 1816, Ternate resumed its position as a close ally, and over the course of much of the nineteenth century became the main vehicle through which colonial expansion was felt in eastern Sulawesi, up to 1880. Hongi, which were used to eradicate illegal cultivation of spices in the VOC period, were now used in the nineteenth century to suppress maritime raiding. The Ternaten Sultanate was linked to its periphery through carefully managed networks of aristocrats, who represented Ternate and used the outlying areas as personal fiefdoms that generated revenue. Ternaten officials placed in eastern Sulawesi in the early decades of the nineteenth century still operated in the same mode as those who had come to these coasts in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, treating these settlements and polities as personal domains that had to create their own source of revenue. The tension between the political dynamics of the Ternaten traditional political system and the agenda of the colonial government that depended on Ternate as an instrument of indirect rule to expand its influence would become all too apparent in eastern Sulawesi.

Closer involvement with Tobungku came about after the death of the Tobungku ruler Kaicil Papa, who had stopped paying homage to Ternate during his reign. His wife, who headed one faction in the subsequent succession struggle requested help from Ternate in exchange for closer tributary ties with the polity. The queen’s opponents were crushed by the Ternaten expedition that followed in 1826. A number of settlements in the Gulf of Tomori were destroyed, including Salampe, the base of Banggai’s Bugis allies in the

\textsuperscript{523} H. van Beers sets out the different levels in the colonial government that each had different agenda’s and perspectives. The Ministry of Colonies was primarily concerned with the claims of other European power, whereas the authorities in the Netherlands-Indies, particularly in Makassar, were concerned with the intricacies of political alliances and events in South Sulawesi. The differences of opinion between levels of government accounts for the paradox that Dutch influence in the archipelago expanded in a
conflict with Tobungku in 1808. Interestingly, the 200 Kalengsusu captives that had been resident in Tobungku since the terrible destruction of their settlement several years earlier were also transported to Ternate where they became slaves of Ternaten nobles. Ternaten officials were now placed in Tobungku and in Banggai to scrutinise the practice of local elites and protect the interests of the Ternaten sultan, while also ensuring they received their fair share of trade and levies. Vosmaer remarked in 1836 that the Ternaten utusan in Tobungku was only there to enrich himself, and that he abused the name of Ternate and the Dutch government in his personal endeavours. He also complained that Tobungku would continue to give shelter to maritime raiders as long as the utusan was still in power. Within a few years, however, the position of Ternatens in Tobungku would be severely challenged by combined local and Bugis resistance.

Bugis influence in the Gulf of Tomini was on the increase in the 1820s, with Togian being one of the main centres of Bugis trade. Van Guericke remarked in 1823 that the inhabitants of the Gulf of Tomini did not fear the Dutch government as much as they had in the past. Instead, ‘they feared the Bugis who were now there in large numbers and exerted authority over them with impunity’. As the Dutch were unable to patrol the Gulf effectively, seeking protection or complaining to the Dutch was of little use. At the same time, Dutch observers noted the apparent paradox, that ‘while the chiefs of these places acknowledge the ruler of Bone as their overlord, the authority of this ruler is limited...’. The fact that Togian had appointed its own ruler without consulting Bone was, at least in Dutch eyes, evidence that this seemed to be the case.

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525 ANRI Resolutie 7 May 1835 No. 2, Vosmaer to Batavia 21 February 1835, p. 2a.
In 1829, rumours reached Gorontalo that Bone was mounting an expedition to secure its tributaries in the Gulf of Tomini with the help of Banggai and Tobungku. The Dutch official in Gorontalo was extremely alarmed, as Gorontalo’s defences were in such a sad state that they could not withstand an attack of combined Bugis forces and their allies from Banggai and Tobungku.\(^{529}\) However, it is unlikely that Bone was planning to mount an expedition at this time. Rather a skirmish in Banggai in the same year would appear to have put the Bugis in the Gulf of Tomini and in Banggai on a state of alert. A report of 1829 states that all of the east coast was ‘quiet’ except for Banggai, where the ruler was encouraged to rebel against Ternate by wandering Bugis under the leadership of Daeng Mangajai. Two korak-korak, one of which was carrying a Ternaten envoy, were chased away. After this incident, the ruler and his Bugis supporters left Banggai for Mendono, where they erected three fortifications.\(^{530}\) The ruler of Banggai appointed Ujo Panda, a Bugis from Togian as his kapita laut, who wanted to build more fortifications along the north coast of the eastern arm as well. Ujo Panda tried to persuade other Togian Bugis to participate, but the Bugis chiefs refused on the grounds that they were subjects of Bone, and needed permission from Tojo first, where Bone’s local representative resided.\(^{531}\) Support was, however, forthcoming from Tobungku in the form of sixty korak-korak,\(^{532}\) and support was also sought from the ruler of Mooton as well. The news that Bone was mounting an expedition indicates yet again how closely Bugis in diaspora were linked with Bone. The Dutch Resident in Ternate feared that if the Banggai ruler was not quickly brought to submission, he would join maritime raiders such as the Iranun and Tobelo, who

\(^{529}\) ibid.

\(^{530}\) The name of the ruler is not mentioned, but Schrader says that this was Atondeng. R. Schrader, ‘Het Landschap Banggai’, 1941, p. 130.

\(^{531}\) ANRI Manado 115, Brieven van Gorontalo 1828-1833, No. 22 Gorontalo 29 May 1829; ANRI Manado 76, No.17, Manado den 9 Juni 1829, p. 3. ‘Ujo Panda’ in the original document is spelled ‘Oedjo Panda’; compare: ujung pandang (Malay), look-out point, also the name of one of the main fortifications of Sultan Hasanuddin of Goa.

\(^{532}\) ANRI Manado 115, ‘Brieven van Gorontalo, 1828-1833’; No. 22, 29 May 1829.
were equally hostile towards the Dutch.\textsuperscript{533} But the Banggai ruler was defeated and taken to Ternate where he was summarily discharged from his position, and the matter was not mentioned again.

However relations between Bone and the Dutch governor in Makassar deteriorated once again in the 1840s for a number of reasons. The Dutch governor de Perez attributed the regular occurrence of friction to the hostile attitude of the new ruler of Bone who was installed in 1845, and, who had been a prominent member of the anti-Dutch faction that had caused the upheaval in Bone in the 1830s. The colonial government’s change of policy in the 1840s driven by the necessity for unrivalled Dutch claims to Sulawesi also contributed to the increased tension.\textsuperscript{534} Significantly, the title of the Governor of Makassar was changed to ‘Governor of Celebes and Dependencies’ (Celebes en Onderhoorigheden). The ruler of Bone took exception to the changed title, since this placed the governor in a political position above him, which in his view was a breach of the new Bungaya treaty whereby Bone was considered an ally, not a vassal. Hence, he consistently addressed the Governor with his old title of Governor of Makassar in his letters.

A major point of friction in these years was Bone’s relentless claim to the east coast of Sulawesi. Information reached the Governor in Makassar that there was a Bone syabandar in Tojo. In response to the Governor’s queries regarding this matter, the ruler of Bone replied that this area was indeed under his authority. The governor then requested that Bone’s subjects cease to exert authority in eastern and north Sulawesi, to which the ruler replied that he ‘did not wish to claim anything that did not belong to him’.\textsuperscript{535} In other words, he did not intend to relinquish his claims to Tojo, and in fact claimed Banggai and Tobungku as well. These claims would only become self-evident to the Dutch with the onset of the ‘rebellions’ in Banggai and Tobungku.

\textsuperscript{535} ibid.
The Agama Rebellion in Banggai and the Togian Bugis

The closer supervision of Ternaten officials opened up the possibility to undermine the Banggai ruler through complaints to Ternate. The Banggai ruler Agama, who played an important role in the second ‘rebellion’, had come to power after he travelled to Ternate to make a complaint against the current ruler Laota approximately ten years earlier. In 1808, Laota was the kapitan of Banggai who travelled with the Dutch Ternaten expedition from Ternate to Banggai, and went ahead to Mendono to announce the arrival of the expedition in Banggai. His loyalties rested with Banggai, rather than with Mandaria who resided in Mendono and drew on Bugis support. In fact, when Mandaria’s Bugis allies had planned to kill the Dutch official Waning, Loata secretly informed him so that he escaped to Gorontalo in time. Laota was remembered in Banggai for the severe nature of his rule, supposedly liked by commoners but resented by aristocrats and Ternaten officials who felt unjustly restricted in their activities. His anti-Bugis stance may also have created enemies such as Agama, who was of Bugis descent. According to Dutch accounts, Agama conspired with local chiefs and Ternaten officials to have him removed by filing a complaint in Ternate about Laota.

Ironically, a similar complaint about Agama triggered the political standoff in 1846. Agama was accused of ‘inappropriate behaviour’, including raiding several villages and killing an Islamic cleric. When Ternaten envoys came to Banggai to investigate the complaint, they were chased away. This explicit act of defiance was considered too serious to leave unpunished. Ternaten-Dutch troops arrived several months later, and Agama and his followers were successfully driven off Banggai. However just as in 1829, Bugis allies were informed of Agama’s plight and sprung into action. Agama and his following were

536 ANRI Ternate 116, pp. 1, 13, 24.
never captured because of the assistance they received from the Bugis in the Gulf of Tomini. Agama had sent his son Mayor Moha to Togian to inform them of the impending danger of a Ternaten attack. Three contingents of Bugis came together from Togian, Mooton and other places in the Gulf of Tomini to assist Banggai, and they arrived just in time to rescue Agama and his following. The flight from Banggai took place in 12 korak-korak owned by the ruler himself, 7 Bugis perahu, and six smaller vessels. Van der Hart assumed that the ruler of Bone was behind this daring action, because of the presence of Bone officials and traders now in Mendono and Balantak.539 This incident of flight is remembered in Banggai by Agama’s descendants as well as by the descendants of the Bugis captains who participated in the rescue operation.540 In accordance with the age-old divisions in Banggai, Mendono dutifully supported the Ternaten side in the conflict, but this prosperous settlement was nevertheless ransacked by the hongi, much to the dismay of the colonial officials.541

For such decisive action, as described in both archival and oral sources, local allies were crucial, and consulting with Bone first would not have been possible under the circumstance. However, if Bone was not directly involved in the actual expedition, it did support the rescue operation. Two letters from the ruler of Bone conveyed by means of Agama’s son reveal that the Bone ruler was well aware of what had happened in Banggai, and he summoned the Banggai fugitives who were residing in Kendari and Buton to come to Bone. A letter was sent by the means of his ‘follower’ Ambekoro, to inform the Sultan of Buton about the Banggai refugees and to make unequivocally clear that the ‘Aru Banggai’ (lord of Banggai) was under his personal protection.542 Sections of this letter are

538 ANRI Ternate 180 eerste bundel p. 20a-20d.
539 C. van der Hart, Reize rondom het Eiland Celebes, 1853, p. 97.
541 ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, p. 31a.
542 ibid., appendix.
particularly revealing about Bone’s historical involvement with the east coast. The opening section of the letter addressed to Buton invokes the long history of relations between Bone and Buton. In the archives left by his predecessor the ruler of Bone found evidence that their ‘lands are connected by a bond of friendship and trust’. Manyoru, the name by which Agama was known in Bone, was to be protected from harm and if he committed any crime, he was not to be punished without knowledge of Bone. The reason for eliciting Buton’s help was ‘because Ternate claims them [Banggai]’. The reason given for summoning the Banggai refugees to Bone was that the ruler of Bone had to satisfy the demand of the Dutch governor of Makassar with detailed information regarding the matter of ‘Aru Banggai (lord of Banggai)’. However, repeated requests to surrender Agama to the Dutch were refused, and Agama remained in Bone under direct protection of the ruler until his death. For this reason he is remembered in Banggai by the death name Mumbudoi Bugis, the ruler who died in ‘Bugis’. Bone’s refusal to surrender Agama to the Dutch only further increased the tension surrounding the issue of Bone’s claims to the east coast of Sulawesi.

Tobungku’s Rebellion

When the ruler of Tobungku died in 1839, the council did not inform Ternate or consult with the Sultan about the installation of a new ruler; instead the Tobungku nobles appointed one themselves. This ‘serious offence’ was punished by a hongi that was sent to restore Ternaten dominance and appoint a new ruler, Dongke Kombe, who had the approval of the Ternaten Sultan. The restored order was short lived, because in 1840 the entire Ternaten occupation force of twenty soldiers and the utusan were killed. This action was carried out with the assistance of two Bugis princes, Daeng Mangkalla and Daeng

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543 ibid.
Palili, who were based in Kendari. Daeng Mangkalla was reportedly inaugurated as the ruler of Tobungku instead of Dongke Kambe. In 1841, a second expedition was sent to Tobungku which, after the loss of many lives, finally succeeded in restoring Ternate’s supremacy over Tobungku by the middle of 1842. The most important perpetrators were arrested and taken to Ternate: Dongke Kombe, Daeng Mangkalla the Bugis chief from Kendari who was proclaimed as the new ruler, Bokni Telemahano, a Tobungku woman of noble descent who was married to the former, the jogugu, the kapitan laut and twelve lesser chiefs. Very little information is available on yet a third expedition sent against Tobungku in 1848. Van der Hart mentions that in 1848 the capital of Tobungku was forcefully relocated to Lanona, a flat coastal strip to the north of the original capital. The population had to swear an oath that they would never return to the hilltop fort of Fafontofure. De Clerq also mentions the third expedition in 1848, in which the inhabitants of Towi (Tofi) in the Gulf of Tomori were subjugated and forced to carry out corvée labour (heerendiensten). The remnant population moved away into the interior and the

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544 Machmud, Babad Banggai, Sepintas Kilas, Jakarta/Banggai, 1986. After a ruler died a deathname was used, usually referring to the place of death. Descendents of Agama in the Luwuk-Banggai area still use his name and remember that he fled from Banggai to Bone with assistance of Togian Bugis.

545 F.S.A. de Clercq, Bijdragen tot de Kennis van de Residentie Ternate, Korte Kroniek, 1890, (n.p.). In an overview of Bone’s involvement with the east coast, the Resident of Ternate mentioned only one rebellion in Tobungku, whereas the utusan of Banggai was reported to have mentioned two rebellions. Revius, however, writing in 1850, mentions three, and refers to a ‘rebellion’ in Tobungku that took place in 1834. Considering Revius was probably the best informed about Tobungku it is likely that this earlier uprising took place, even if it is not mentioned in any other available source. ANRI Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaïj en Xulla Eilanden 1850 p. 4c.

546 According to De Clerq, Donke Kombe was replaced by Kaicil Papa in 1848, implying that he may not have been implicated in the killing of the Ternatens in 1842, but allowed to return to Tobungku. ibid.

547 ANRI 20 June 1845 No. 15, Ternate to Batavia 15 October 1842; F.S.A. De Clerq, Bijdragen tot Kennis van de Residentie Ternate, 1890, p. 114; Ikhtisar Keadaan Politiek Hindia-Belanda Tahun 1839-1848, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Penerbitan Sumber-Sumber Sejarah No. 5 Jakarta 1973, p. 344. Daeng Mangkalla was killed on the way to Ternate because he caused ‘amok’.
settlement was depopulated.\textsuperscript{548} Several references to Bugis influence in 1850 in Revius’ report suggest strongly that once again the Bugis were implicated in resistance against Ternate.

Dutch interpretations of what caused the violent resistance against Ternate focussed on the influence of outsiders, the misconduct of Ternaten officials and on Bugis intervention backed by Bone. Most references to the Tobungku rebellion attributed it to Bugis intervention.\textsuperscript{549} There are indications that Bone was actively trying to court both Banggai and Tobungku by sending envoys and that Bone exerted some authority over Togian and Tojo. There is no doubt that Bugis involvement in both the Banggai and Tobungku uprisings was approved by Bone either retrospectively as in the case of Banggai, or possibly even instigated in the case of Tobungku.\textsuperscript{550} Just how much the Kendari Bugis were in fact influenced by Bone is a mute question, but there is no doubt that Bone supported concerted actions that undermined Ternaten and Dutch influence in eastern Sulawesi. In 1848, a Bugis named Latumanna arrived in Tobungku and introduced himself as a syabandar and envoy of the ruler of Bone. The same person (syabandar Toemama) was also active in Tojo and later mentioned in Kendari as well.\textsuperscript{551} Claiming that Tobungku was Bone’s tributary, Latumanna challenged Ternate’s overlordship over Tobungku and demanded to see documents as proof of the Ternaten claim. According to the Dutch official Revius, he was not well received and barely escaped with his life. Some time later, Bugis and Makassar traders brought news that Daeng Magassi, reported to be a Bone

\textsuperscript{548} F.S.A. de Clercq, \textit{Bijdragen tot de Kennis van de Residentie Ternate}, 1890, p. 144. De Clerq mentions that this expedition took place during the ruler of Kaicil Papa.

\textsuperscript{549} A published summary of what occurred says that the rebellion was led by two Bugis princes from Kendari Daeng Mankalla en Daeng Palili, who subsequently proceeded to attack Banggai where they were unsuccessful. An Arab named Syech Abdul Rachman and a Butonese who were involved in the revolt were also apprehended and sent to Ternate, the latter was returned to Buton on account of ignorance. \textit{Ikhtisar}, 1973, p. 343, 344.

aristocrat, was planning to attack Tobungku with 100 boats in order to subjugate it to Bone.\textsuperscript{552} This rumour was the circulating same year that it was confirmed that Agama, or Aru Banggai, was in Bone under protection of the Bone ruler.

Analysing the conflicts in Banggai and Tobungku solely in terms of growing antagonism between Bone and the Dutch would not do complete justice to local factors. In Banggai, the tensions between local factions and the possibility of using the intervention of Ternate in to advantage these conflicts clearly played a role in the lead-up to the 1846 struggle in Banggai. In Tobungku, Revius clearly points to local resistance against Ternaten aristocrats as an important factor. He reported that the driving force behind the resistance in 1841 was the jogugu Langanangan, who enlisted support from the Kendari Bugis. The jogugu was unable to sustain his position because the inland people cut off his food supplies.\textsuperscript{553} The rift between the coastal elite and inland population in this instance served to undermine the ‘rebels’. In the following decade this rift between the coast and interior would lead to new problems that once again would require intervention.

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In the nineteenth century, eastern Sulawesi’s ambiguous position situated between Bone’s and Ternate’s spheres of influence, placed it on the edge of a moving frontier of an expanding colonial state. The two main issues that brought eastern Sulawesi into contact

\textsuperscript{551} ibid.

\textsuperscript{552} ANRI Ternate 180, Eerste Bundel, p. 5c-6a. This Daeng Magassing was most likely not the same as the Bonerate prince who had connections with Tobelo and Magindanao raiders, although Bonerate did have close tributary ties with Bone. In 1850 Daeng Magassing is discussed by the Sultan of Buton and Van der Hart as one of Bone’s envoys, and not mention is made of any connection to Bonerate or raiding. J. A. Bakkers, ‘De Eilanden Bonerate en Kalatoa’, \textit{Tijdschrift van het Bataviasch Genootschap}, 1862, XI, pp. 215-255; ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Verrichtingen van den Kapitein ter zee C. van der Hart bij Zijne Ontmoetingen en Aanrakingen met de Verschillende Vorsten en Hoofden op Bouton, langs de Oostkust van Celebes, de Bangaai en Soela Eilanden enz.’ p. 1b.

\textsuperscript{553} ANRI Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, ‘Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaij en Xulla Eilanden 1850’, 5b, 5c, 12d.
with the colonial state in the period 1825-1848 were suppression of maritime raiding and eastern Sulawesi’s political status in relation to Bone’s sphere of influence. The short-lived trading post established in Kendari Bay had depended on Vosmaer’s personal skills and connections with interlinked regional and local raiding networks in which he functioned both as a client of Tuanna-I-Dondang, and, as a patron of Bajo fisher folk and Tobelo raiders. The colonial outpost provoked reactions both from Bone and from Buton, and drew Bone’s attention to Kendari Bay as a trading port and a place where Bugis influence was relatively easy to establish.

The conflicts in Banggai and Tobungku were the result of both local tensions and of the way in which Bone and Ternaten influence expanded into their peripheries. The latter followed the same patterns of statecraft as in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: formal tributary relations, punitive expeditions, envoys, and the sanctioned activity of semi-autonomous aristocrats and trade. As was the case in the late seventeenth century, the Dutch supported Ternate’s claims and tried to curtail Bugis influence in eastern Sulawesi. But the colonial state was confronted with a paradox. Because it lacked resources, the colonial state had to combat Bone’s influence by using Ternaten aristocrats to control local elites in eastern Sulawesi. However these aristocrats were no more committed to the agenda of the colonial state than were their Bugis counterparts, and operated politically much in the same way. Dutch intervention and support for Ternate in fact intensified Bone’s interest in eastern Sulawesi.

Evidence from this period suggests that one of the effects of the expanding influence of the colonial state, was a decrease in localised warfare, as the internal tensions in Banggai and Tobungku were exacerbated through external pressures and alliances. In this respect, the conflicts in Banggai and Tobungku in the 1840s resemble the Jangkal conflict in Banggai in the 1690s. Both took place in periods when the boundaries of regional spheres of influence were under serious pressure and being renegotiated. In both cases there was
heavy-handed external intervention by Bone and Ternate, the latter backed by the colonial state, and local elites looking to alternative centres for support. In both cases there was also local resistance against Ternaten intervention. In Jangkal’s case, resentment against the appointment of Kalukubulang, and in the 1840s resentment against Ternate’s encroaching influence. However, the outcome of the two conflicts was very different. In the 1840s the Bugis ‘rebellions’ were defeated. The expeditions against Tobungku and Banggai redressed the local balance of power in favour of Ternate, and also caused a dramatic decline in the Bugis dominated tripang trade.

Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the expeditions and intervention on the east coast of Sulawesi was not what the Dutch intended. The ways in which the newly installed Ternaten elites in Banggai and Tobungku responded to the east coast trade crisis would require further intervention by the colonial state.
In the period between 1848 and 1880, the colonial state started to make a serious impact on local conflicts and alliances. However, the effects of its intervention led to unexpected developments at the local level that required a different approach than just punitive campaigns. In the second half of the nineteenth century, there were three major issues that required the attention of the colonial state. First, the Tobungku-Tomori conflict was closely linked to the disruption of Tobungku’s staple-market for locally produced export commodities and promoting slave raiding. The colonial government in Ternate was drawn into this local conflict because it felt compelled to defend Ternate’s tributary Tobungku. Second, the issue of Bugis activity on the east coast took on new dimensions and meaning. Bone’s refusal to relinquish its claims to the east coast was one of the major factors in fuelling tension with the colonial state. The resulting war in 1859/60 led to Bone’s defeat, but not to a noticeable decline in Bugis influence on the east coast. Finally, the anti-piracy measures in other parts of the archipelago undermined the position of the Magindanao raiders and precipitated shifts in alliance patterns between raiding groups and land-based polities and communities. Ironically, in eastern Sulawesi the impact of these measures was an increase in raiding, as raiders moved away from their normal routes into less frequently patrolled waters. The shifting colonial frontier at a regional level, reduced Bone’s power, and started to break down regional raiding networks and their alliances with local chiefs. On the local level, Dutch intervention for the first time reached right in to the interior of eastern Sulawesi.

The Tobungku-Tomori Conflict: Local Conflict and the Moving Colonial Frontier
After the problem of ‘resistance’ was eliminated in Banggai and Tobungku, Ternaten officials were installed to supervise local elites more closely. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, these new Ternaten elites followed the traditional pattern of political organisation attached to their privileged position on Ternate’s periphery, exploiting local resources and trade. What was new, however, was that increasingly, Ternaten aristocrats were now operating on the frontier of a colonial state, rather than at the periphery of Ternate’s traditional regional system, a system that had enjoyed the protection of the Dutch. If Vosmaer complained in 1836 that the Ternaten utusan was abusing the name of the Dutch while enriching himself, these complaints only multiplied as contact with Tobungku and Banggai increased in the aftermath of the 1840s punitive expeditions. Dutch Residents tried to alter the, in their view, exploitative nature of Ternate’s relations with its east coast tributaries by intervening directly in the affairs of Ternate’s tributaries, but could not scrutinise Ternaten officials in eastern Sulawesi in the same way.\footnote{Resident Bosscher noted that it took more than a year for a vessel from Banggai to travel to Ternate carrying the three chosen candidates for the position of ruler. The main reason was not lack of ambition for the position of ruler, but the great reluctance of Banggaians to travel to Ternate, where they were kept for long periods without pay or food. The strongest were kept there permanently to work for Ternaten aristocrats and often did not return to their homeland. In 1859, Resident Bosscher made a trip to Banggai to inaugurate the new ruler Suak. He took this opportunity to allow two Banggaian korak-korak that had participated in the Tomori-expedition of 1856 but were detained in Ternate, to return home. ‘Memorie van overgave van het bestuur der Residentie Ternate door den aftred. Resident C. Bosscher 1859’, in: \textit{Ternate}, 1980, p. 129.}

The punitive expeditions against Tobungku seriously disrupted Tobungku’s trade. Kota Bajo with its hill-top fort Fafontofure had to be abandoned and the capital was relocated to a swampy, coastal plain several miles to the north that was difficult to defend against outside attacks. In 1850, Van der Hart visited Lanona, the new capital of Tobungku. Instead of the lobo Vosmaer encountered, the main structure in Lanona was a Ternaten style mosque. The Lanona site had several major disadvantages. Its low-lying coastal plain flooded with the least amount of rain, and the population readily suffered from fevers attributed to opening new fields. Its anchorage was extremely

\footnote{Resident Bosscher noted that it took more than a year for a vessel from Banggai to travel to Ternate carrying the three chosen candidates for the position of ruler. The main reason was not lack of ambition for the position of ruler, but the great reluctance of Banggaians to travel to Ternate, where they were kept for long periods without pay or food. The strongest were kept there permanently to work for Ternaten aristocrats and often did not return to their homeland. In 1859, Resident Bosscher made a trip to Banggai to inaugurate the new ruler Suak. He took this opportunity to allow two Banggaian korak-korak that had participated in the Tomori-expedition of 1856 but were detained in Ternate, to return home. ‘Memorie van overgave van het bestuur der Residentie Ternate door den aftred. Resident C. Bosscher 1859’, in: \textit{Ternate}, 1980, p. 129.}
difficult for ships to approach, particularly during the east monsoon, even for small boats with outriggers.\footnote{One of the korak-korak of Revius’ expedition was smashed to bits on the beach by high waves while trying to more. ANRI Ternate 180, ‘Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Banggaaij en Xulla Eilanden, 1850, p. 13a.} For this reason, Revius moored his boat to the north of Lanona in Baho Eha. Nevertheless, Lanona had 1500 inhabitants in 1850, which in Revius’ estimation was a sizeable settlement. Tobungku still carried on ‘quite a bit of trade’ with Bugis, Makassarese and Mandarese who were, however, increasingly frightened away by the dangerous anchorage. Hence, Tobungku no longer commanded the same important position in local or regional trade as it had before military expeditions.

Several Dutch observers notes in both Tobungku and Banggai a great drop in the number of Bajo fishing boats arriving each year to collect tripang. Consequently, the tripang trade shifted away from both polities to Kendari, where by the late 1840s a Bone syabandar was levying taxes and export duties.

The first priority for the Dutch was to secure their political rights by strengthening Ternaten overlordship over its tributaries, whereas matters of trade and taxation were considered of less importance. Great care was given to choosing a new ruler and drawing up a contract with Tobungku, the first one ever. The contract between Koa Matano\footnote{Koa Matano, intriguingly, was from Salampe, but there is no further information on his background or the fate of Salampe. It is possible that inhabitants of Salampe continued to live in Tobungku, despite the destruction of the settlement in 1826, and that Salampe nobles came to the fore after a large section of the Tobungku nobility (the jogugu, the kapitan laut and 12 lesser nobles) had been arrested and convicted. Koa Matano wanted to relocate the capital of Tobungku to the original site of Salampe in the Gulf of Tomori, but it was found to be unsuitable because of the silted up estuary. This raises the question as to when and why the silting up occurred. If Salampe had been a prosperous trading settlement only several decades earlier, one might expect that the anchorage had been suitable then. One possibility is that after the destruction of Salampe in 1826, the population moved inland turning to agriculture, thus causing deforestation in Salampe’s hinterland and the siltation of the estuary in 1850. Mendono and Boalemo seem to have suffered a similar fate. According to Lamentut, the Boalemo river used to be deep enough to allow a schooner to enter. The estuary in Mendono in 1994/95, however, was very shallow, and certainly could not have been entered by a korak-korak or paduakang.} and the Sultan of Ternate in 1850 was intended to prevent a repeat of the
First, attempts were made to create a stronger central authority through which Ternaten officials could exert their authority, while funneling all revenue away from the local elite to the Ternatens. The chiefs of Tobunkgu would no longer elect a new ruler as they had done in 1839, but either were to send a suitable candidate to Ternate to be inaugurated. Another interesting stipulation in the contract was that only men of rank could be appointed as chiefs, and that in this matter ‘the custom of Ternate will be followed’. Establishing Ternaten adat as more legitimate and prestigious than local adat strengthened Ternate’s position as overlord and as a ‘source’ of Tobungku power. The greater emphasis on stratified rank would also help create and consolidate a new Tobungku aristocracy as a distinct group that would become interrelated to the Ternaten aristocracy.

557 Judging from available sources, the contract concluded in 1850 was the first one to be concluded with the Dutch. The only copy of a contract with Tobungku dates from 1885. In the archival record, several other contracts are mentioned, but I have not been able to locate them. De Clerq, for instance, mentions a contract concluded with Tobungku’s ruler Sadik in 1850. There are strong indications that the key clauses of the 1885 text date from around 1850. First, it was common practice that when contracts were renewed, the old contract was repeated, sometimes with minor changes. Second, the clauses were obviously intended to prevent a recurrence of a rebellion and to discourage trade with Bugis. From Revius’ account, it is obvious that he was already implementing the clause that stipulated a single ceremony must take place in the capital, when he insisted that all the Tobungku chiefs were called to Lanona for that occasion. Also, the clauses regarding trade and contact with Bugis are consistent with Revius account in 1850. When Revius travelled to the east coast in 1850 a contract was concluded with the ruler of Tobungku in the presence of the chiefs of the main settlements. In 1852, three candidates were selected, from whom Kaicil Baba was chosen and inaugurated in Ternate in 1853. He returned to Tobungku after that. If there are copies of these contracts, I have not been able to locate them in the archives. F.S.A. de Clerq, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Residentie Ternate*, 1890, n.p.; ANRI Besluit 29 January 1885 No. 22 p. 9, art. 9; ANRI Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, ‘Algemeen Verslag omtrent de Oostkust van Celebes, Bangaaij en Xulla Eilanden 1850’, p. 2d, 3a.

558 ANRI Besluit 29 January 1885 No. 22, p. 8, article 8. This was probably not a new stipulation, since the reason for the expedition in 1840 was precisely because Ternate was not consulted.

559 ibid. p. 6, article 5. Bosscher and Matthijssen report in 1854 that ‘previously’, harbour duties and fishing taxes were divided two ways between the Sultan of Ternate and Ternaten chiefs in Tobunkgu. The Sultan then relinquished his half of the revenue to the Ternaten chiefs, so that all revenue from sea-related activities fell to the utusan. In 1885 this was still the case. C. Bosscher; P.A. Matthijssen, ‘Schetsen van de Rijken van Tomboekoe en Banggai’, 1854, p. 88.
The polycentric structure of Tobungku, which formed a stumbling block to external intervention and influence, was nevertheless now recognised in several ways. Revius was only too aware of the fact that the ruler had limited control over other chiefs, and that therefore a contract with the ruler alone may not have much validity. For this reason, all the chiefs of the more important settlements were now summoned to the main centre.\textsuperscript{560} This was purposeful break with the ‘custom of the past’ which entailed the ruler travelling to the different settlements of Tobungku to undergo local inauguration ceremonies, and staying for up to two years in various parts of the polity. Wosu’s special status within Tobungku was formalised by a separate tribute of the kodi (20 pieces) of sarung to the Ternaten Sultan.\textsuperscript{561}

Ternaten officials were also placed in the main coastal settlements to stem Bugis influence and to introduce Ternaten customs and rules, though they were not meant to interfere in village affairs. Revius felt that the Ternaten presence gave Tobungku more prestige vis-à-vis its neighbours and that it made for a more stable government of the realm instead of the ‘Tobungku chiefs who quarrelled among themselves’. The new contract also had implications for the pattern of Tobungku’s tribute to Ternate and internal tribute to the Tobungku. Tribute to Ternate as listed in the contract consisted of seven swords, seven spears, seven hardwood\textsuperscript{562} posts for making spears, to kodi of blue

\textsuperscript{560} ibid. p. 9, article 8.
\textsuperscript{561} ibid. article 9. The main antagonism in Tobungku was between Wosu and the main settlement of Tobungku. However, Abdul Aziz, who was descended from Tobungku aristocracy (rather than Wosu) acknowledged Wosu’s special position within Tobungku. After having undergone an inauguration ceremony in Ternate, the ruler could not return to Tobungku before visiting Wosu. Here, a copy of the Koran placed over the head of the ruler, upon which he had to pronounce an oath and the ‘kalimat shahada’. If the ruler did not use his power for the best interests of the people he would not live long. Despite the apparent Islamic character of his ceremony, it has the same function as the Kota Jin ceremony in Banggai, in which ancestral and natural forces were called upon to ensure proper moral conduct of the ruler. Interview, Abdul Aziz, February 1995, Bungku Tengah.
\textsuperscript{562} The Dutch term used is \textit{ijzerhout}, literally iron wood. In contemporary Indonesian, this term means ebony, which is abundant in the jungles of central Sulawesi.
sarung and six pieces of kain bomba. The slave that was traditionally part of the tribute package to Ternate was replaced by two kodi of blue Tobungku cloth and two pikul of wax. Slaves had also traditionally constituted part of the internal tribute within Tobungku, and had to be replaced with the same sort of commodities as Tobungku sent to Ternate.

Despite the successful punitive expeditions, a new contract and stricter measures to control Tobungku, Ternate only partially succeeded in imposing its influence. Van der Hart remarked in 1850 that the Sultan of Ternate did not have the power to pacify all the chiefs (vorstjes) of Tobungku, nor was there any prospect of keeping them in subjugation that would not threaten his authority, so that he limited himself to maintaining his authority in the main settlements of Tobungku and Lanona. The turn of events certainly did not do much to stem internal conflict. Van der Hart remarked in 1850 there was still a great deal of local conflict among the Tobungku chiefs.

Maritime activities, which had been such a dominant characteristic of Tobungku’s political and economic life, came under the strict control of Ternaten officials. The Tobungku elite was no longer able to exert authority over the seas of Tobungku, nor were they to receive any revenue from marine products or harbour duties. The utusan of Ternate was now entitled to this revenue. Another clause in the contract meant to prevent a ‘rebellion’ from occurring forbade direct contact between (Bugis) traders and the Tobungku ruler. Instead, traders were to report directly to the Ternaten utusan, thus further eroding the position of the indigenous elite. At the same time, the ruler was to prevent his subjects from becoming indebted to Bugis traders, as had happened in the

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563 Blue cloth was locally woven in Tobungku and in high demand among inland people for its durability.

Kain bomba I have not been able to trace, possibly a different kind of locally produced woven or bark cloth.

564 ARA Geheim Verhaal, 23 April 1851, No. 110 p. 17a

565 ibid. p. 14b.

566 ANRI Besluit 29 January 1885, No. 22, article 7.
past, as this would lead to greater political influence than their own ruler. Revius was pleased to find in 1850 that Bugis influence was minimal, even in areas where they had strong influence in the past, and that only in Lanona some local women were married to Bugis traders.\footnote{ANRI Ternate 180 Eerste Bundel, p. 5a.}

The disruption of the Bugis trading networks and of the tripang trade in Tobungku in the 1840s led to a shift from maritime to inland commodities for trade and exchange. When the number of Bajo on the east coast declined, the main source of attraction for the traders had disappeared. External trade was no longer as lucrative as it had been, nor did it provide as much revenue for local elites, including Ternaten aristocrats. Harbour duties and fishing tax from the reduced number of Bajo fishing boats did not generate enough revenue, so the coastal elite turned its attention inland. In 1854, Tobungku’s exports consisted exclusively of inland products: wax and swords, crafted on the coast from iron mined in the interior. Revius mentions that the Ternaten aristocrats who took control of local trade undercharged the local population for the goods. They also forced hill people to deliver goods and slaves.\footnote{ibid. p. 19c, 19d.}

Bosscher and Matthijssen, who visited Tobungku in 1854, confirm that Tobungku’s trade had seriously declined. That year, not a single trading paduakang came, although in normal years three or four visited.\footnote{C. Bosscher; P.A. Matthijssen, ‘Schetsen van de Rijken van Tomboekoe en Banggai’, 1854, p. 88.}

After Tobungku had been pacified, the moving frontier of violence stretched inland. For the first time, Tobungku’s inland neighbours appear regularly in Dutch reports. Tomori was an inland federation consisting of a number of powerful and lesser chiefs, with an estimated population of between 35,000 and 40,000 people. By the late 1840s, Tobungku, weakened by Dutch-Ternaten expeditions, was regularly attacked by their inland neighbours, the Tomori. In a letter from Tobungku written in 1849, the ‘raja Tombuku’ and the Ternaten utusan ask for help against the Tomori who had ‘killed 21
Tobungku [people]’, pillaged goods and taken captives. As the economic focus shifted towards the inland trade, iron, from which Tobungku’s swords and knives were crafted, became the main bone of contention. Besides the Tomori, the Tolaki and Toluwu attacked inland areas of Tobungku in 1850. The Tomori attack on Nuha in 1850, which was tributary to Tobungku and a source of iron, points again to the intention to disrupt Tobungku’s trade. In 1850, the men accompanying Revius on a trek to Tobungku’s interior dared not take rafts down the Bahusolo river, because it would carry them through the territory of their hostile southern neighbours, the Tolaki, who had the reputation of being the most dangerous head-hunters of Sulawesi. Luwu, situated on the Gulf of Bone, shared the same iron- and nickel rich interior with Tobungku, which may have been the underlying reason for the Toluwu attacks in 1850. The valuable iron ore was transported from Lake Matano down to Luwu via Usu.

Warfare between Tobungku and Tomori was not a recent phenomenon. In 1853, the Tomori fortification of Ngangampada that had been taken twenty years earlier by the Tobungku, was lost again to the Tomori. Intermittent border raiding now turned into a systematic campaign. Tomori border villages were abandoned, and food supplies were taken inland. The inland Tobungku population was forced to move into more densely populated areas and could not work their fields. even the main settlement of Lanona was

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570 The transcript of this letter is to my knowledge the only surviving copy of a letter from Tobungku to Ternate. The reason it was copied into Romanic script and given to the Dutch was because of the request for an expedition. The letter mentions that Tobungku envoys were sent to Tomaiki (coastal Tomori) to fetch the Tobelala, Tobungku subjects who had been captured, but that the Tomaiki refused to release them. In 1857, one of the requests that Tobungku made during the peace negotiations was that 300 people who had been captured nine years earlier be returned. ANRI Ternate 180, p. 2, 4.

571 ibid. p. 7b. Revius speaks of ‘Loefoe’, which is the way Tobungku pronounce Luwu, just as Wana is pronounced Fana, and Towi becomes Tofi. The common prefix wawo- (high) becomes fafo as in Fafontofure, Tobungku’s main fortification.

572 ibid.

573 ANRI Ternate 180, p. 3d, 4a.

574 ANRI Ambon 1465, ‘Expeditie Mori’, Ternate, 30 September 1854.
not safe from attack. Entire villages were seized and their inhabitants taken away to
the interior while more and more settlements in the border areas moved inland and
switched their allegiance to the Tomori. Tomori attacks were primarily directed at the
Muslim elite; the ruler, the aristocrats and the Ternaten officials, whereas the animist
part of the population suffered less. Dutch steamships that visited the Gulf of Tomori
in 1850 and 1853 sent envoys inland to contact the Tomori mokole, but they returned
with the message that the Tomori did not acknowledge either the Dutch or Ternate, and
would not come to the coast to negotiate.

As Tobungku’s situation became ever more precarious, the Resident of Ternate was
more inclined to respond to requests for help. In 1856, the Tobungku ruler resided in
Sakita, only a few hundred meters north of Fafontofure, rather than in Lanona. It would
appear therefore that under pressure of the Tomori attacks the Fafontofure fortification
was reoccupied. It was not until that year that a Dutch-Ternaten expedition was sent
to punish the Tomori. A combined force of Ternaten, Banggai and Tobungku men

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575 ANRI Oost-Indisch Besluit 1 June 1854 No. 7, quoting a letter from the Governor of the Molucca’s
dated 20 February of the same year. A number of Tobungku villages near the border of Mori had been
burned, and the entire district of Tomoiki (often Tomaiki in older Dutch sources) had been taken.
Attempts to mediate between them by the assistant resident had failed because people in Tobungku would
not deliver a letter from the Dutch government in Tomori for fear of attack. ANRI Ambon 1465,
‘Expeditie Mori’, Ternate 30 September 1854.
576 O.A. Uhlenbeck, ‘De Tomori-Expeditie van 1856’, *Mededeelingen betreffende het Zeeewezen*, I, 1861,
p. 3. In Uhlenbeck’s account there is no mention of maritime raiding in Tobungku, just that in the past it
had been a prosperous and free settlement and that it went into decline because the ‘despotic Ternatens’
who gradually destroyed its trade and freedom with hongi.
577 ‘De Expeditie tegen Tomorie, op de Oostkust van Celebes (April-Junij 1856)’, *Militaire Spectator,
Tijschrift voor het Nederlandsche Leger*, Breda, 1856, p. 526.
579 A locally compiled account of Mori’s history relates that the Towi area in the gulf of Tomori (Gulf of
Kolonodale) had been captured by the Tomori in 1851. According to this account, control over trade was
the main issue. The is particularly interesting, since the only written documents that state this are in the
Jakarta archives. The compilers may have had access to Uhlenbeck’s account or other Dutch material but
were unlikely to have had access to these archival documents. Another surprising piece of information is
that according to this local account, Towi was the main area under dispute, and was captured in 1851. If
were about to besiege the first Tomori fortification Usumbatu, when it surrendered. The headman of Usundau believed that after his surrender, the Tomori mokole would not be able to defend themselves and would resort to retreating into the interior with the intention of drawing the attacking troops further and further into difficult and unfamiliar terrain where they would be at a disadvantage.\textsuperscript{581}

The expedition managed to stop the regular attacks by the Tomori, but did not end Tomori dominance over Tobungku. In 1859, a Dutch official arrived in Tobungku to find that a peace treaty had been negotiated in which the more powerful Tomori had imposed humiliating terms on Tobungku. The latter had to deliver twelve rifles, of which four had already been delivered, and one slave who was to be sacrificed as a recompense for the people killed by the Tobungku.\textsuperscript{582} The sacrificial slave, a symbol signifying Tobungku’s inferior position in relation to Tomori, particularly irked the Resident, since he felt that indirectly Ternate and the Dutch were also humiliated. he succeeded in meeting with the Tomori mokole and a number of Tomori bonto, lesser nobles, who were eager to make their grievances against Tobungku known to the Dutch, who might instruct Tobungku not to repeat such actions. One of the bonto delivered a

\textsuperscript{580} Siebelhoff, writing in 1907, reports that each village had its own mokole, but there were four powerful mokole, and that the one in Petasia was the most powerful. The three others were from Kangua, Ngusumbatu and Pa’onggu. M.W. Siebelhoff, ‘De Verovering van de rotsvesting Oesondau in het rijk Mori op Celebes’, \textit{Indisch Militair Tijdschrift}, 1907, Volume III p. 233.

\textsuperscript{581} Usundau (Oessoendau) consisted of 80 well-constructed houses and had 171 armed men. The night after the surrender of Usundau, envoys from the ruler of Usumbatu (Oessoembatu) entered the fortification and killed people to avenge the premature surrender. The inhabitants of the settlement feared the revenge of the ToMori mokole so much that they requested to be taken away by the Dutch. They were resettled in Bacan, where they formed successful agricultural settlements. Three years later 110 Tomori returned. ‘De Expeditie tegen Tomorie, op de Oostkust van Celebes (April-Junij 1856)’, \textit{Militaire Spectator, Tijdschrift voor het Nederlandsche Leger}, Breda, 1856, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{582} ANRI Besluit 14 September 1859 No. 5, p. 18.
‘very lengthy and animated’ speech, in which he emphasised that the Tomori attacked Tobungku and cut off trade only to retaliate against the wrongdoings of Tobungku, especially the imposition of restrictive rules that advantaged Tobungku (Ternaten) chiefs. In the past, according to the bonto, trade between Mori and Tobungku was unrestricted, ‘people from Tobungku could travel and trade anywhere in Mori’ and vice versa. But suddenly, Tobungku chiefs forbade their subjects to travel to trade in Tomori and stopped people from Tomori trading in Tobungku, with the exception of the chiefs themselves. At first, people from Tobungku and elsewhere still traded secretly with Tomori, but eventually this practice was no longer possible. When Tomori were killed and the Tobungku people refused to pay compensation, a breach of common practice, their resentment was so great that they cut off trade altogether. Their position was stronger than that of Tobungku, as they did not depend on imports for their livelihood, and if desperate, the Tomori could walk to the Gulf of Bone or Tomini to acquire the same imports. The Tobungku, however, did depend heavily on the trade with the Tomori to maintain their political influence, so they accepted the humiliating terms laid down by the Tomori. The new peace treaty that was negotiated under Revius’ supervision addressed all the Tomori grievances. Both peoples would be free to move between the coast and the hinterland without interference from chiefs, but had to continue to pay hasil (tribute) to their own chiefs. Everyone was free to conduct trade with whomever they wished and at prices they themselves determined. Tobungku chiefs were forbidden to confiscate Tomori trading goods, and the Tobungku could no longer prevent Tomori from making salt on their beaches. Importantly, if there was a dispute between Tomori and Tobungku, neither party would take up arms, but would subject the


584 ANRI Besluit 14 September 1859 No. 5, p. 23, 24.
dispute to the verdict of the Netherlands-Indies government. Finally, the Tomori mokole requested a Dutch flag, which they would fly at Tompira, the main Tomori settlement on the banks of the La river. This flag would be a sign that both Tomori and Tobungku were now under the protection of the Dutch, or, as the mokole phrased it, that ‘the same three provides shade to both’.  

Only two years later, in 1861, combined Ternaten and Tobungku forces attacked Usu, one of Luwu’s main tributaries, at that time located on the coast, presumably on the estuary of the Usu river that connects Lake Matano to the coast. This was continuation of the struggle for control over iron deposits, but now directed at Luwu, on the coast of the gulf of Bone, which was also an outlet for iron from the Lake Matano area. With the limited information currently available, it is impossible to know whether the Tobungku had achieved a greater degree of control over the inland sources of iron and nickel. The question of the extent of Tomori involvement in this campaign and in Tobungku’s trade in the years after the peace treaty remains unanswered. Within a decade, the rise in the demand for forest commodities would once again change the

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586 None of these documents could be located in 1994, so that my knowledge of this event was limited to brief descriptions of the documents in the ‘Index of the Algemeene Secretarie’ (ANRI) in the year 1861: Kl. 1 July No. 10616; Kl. 4 September No. 14802; Kl. 17527/61 fl 1745 R, Kl. 21361/61 f 1745 X, Kl. Oct. 23 No. 17527, Kl. 21361/61; Kl. 1745X; Kl 28 Dec. No. 21361. In these brief descriptions Usu is referred to as ‘a prominent Luwu settlement located on the Gulf of Bone’. In 1889, this settlement was located on the Usu river up to the point to which it was navigable from the coast. The trade in forest products which had risen to prominence by 1880 may have been the reason for the settlement to move inland to this point. D.F. Braam Morris, ‘Het Landschap Loehoe, getrokken uit een Rapport van den Gouverneur van Celebes’, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* Volume XXXI, 1889, p. 502. In 2002, I returned to the ANRI and was able to locate Kommissariaal 4 Oct no 14802, which stated that further investigation of this war had not yielded any information.
economic situation, posing new problems and creating new opportunities for local elites.

**Contested Claims and the Second Bone-Dutch War 1859-1860**

The colonial state developed a more urgent interest in the east coast because of Bone’s claims. The activities of Bugis traders and aristocrats seen in this light did more than disadvantage tributaries of Ternate, they were increasingly seen as an extension of Bone’s claims to eastern Sulawesi, in Dutch eyes, illegitimate. To settle matters for once and for all, the government in Batavia decided to send two Dutch ships under the command of captain C. van der Hart to circumnavigate Sulawesi in 1850. The goal of this journey was to investigate and clarify the situation on the east coast and to end Bone’s claims to this area. During this peaceful expedition, the captain was to ‘remind’ local rulers of their obligations towards the Netherlands-Indies government. Rumours that a Bone syabandar was operating in Kendari were queried in Buton. The Sultan remained vague about whether or not a Bone syabandar was operating on Sulawesi’s east coast, as he was balancing precariously between the Dutch and Bone. He admitting to have heard a rumour, but undoubtedly knew of the syabandar in Kendari. Once in Kendari, the syabandar named, Daeng Pawata, introduced himself as the ‘raja’ of Kendari. When asked about the ruler of Laiwui whom Vosmaer had become so familiar with, the syabandar replied that he had died several years earlier. Instead, Van der Hart could meet his representative, the chief of Laiwui, who bore the title of Sapati and lived in Lepo-lepo. The two functions were no longer united in the same person as they had been in the days of Tebau. The Sapati appeared impoverished, and complained that he was not receiving his promised share of harbour taxes levied by the syabandar. He was unable to conclude the treaty that Van der Hart suggested, since he had to consult with Bone. Each year Laiwui paid tribute to Bone in the form of one male or female slave, 40
pikul of rice and 50 wooden poles for spears. Laiwui’s tributary relationship with Bone was confirmed by a letter from Bone sent by way of a trusted envoy, Daeng Siroa, in which Arumpugi (title of the ruler of Bone) rebuked the people of Laiwui for neglecting to pay their respects and carry out services for Bone. The Sapati complained that the tribute payment of rice was a heavy burden, especially if the harvest had been poor. Interestingly, Revius commented in the same year, that the ‘kingdom of Laiwui’ which as in fact the ‘the kingdom of the Tolaki’, was in name only tributary to Bone. The Bugis control over Kendari Bay, but were not able to subjugate the Tolaki. Bugis inhabitants and traders rarely went to the beach, and then never without heavy protection, because they were exposed daily to attacks from the ‘alfur’. Even if Bugis control did not extend into the interior, it did deprive the coastal Tolaki of the benefits that they had enjoyed in the time of Tebau. Another significant difference was that changed relationship with Bone compared to the 1830s. Tebau was a coastal chief of an agricultural population whose alliances with Arung Bakung and Vosmaer gave him privileged access to trade and imported commodities. In 1850, the Laiwui chief (Sapati) received no revenue whatsoever from trade in Kendari Bay, and the presence of the Bone syabandar brought him no advantage. Instead, he was urged to pay tribute to Bone in the form of rice produced by his subjects and to also send people to work in Bone.

To convince Van der Hart of the validity of his position, Daeng Pawata presented a letter with the seal of the current ruler of Bone. He was the successor of Latimamang, who had died recently and whose grave was in Kendari. After Latimamang’s death, the ruler of Bone took possession of all his belongings. The name of a Bone envoy named

588 ibid. appendix.
589 ANRI Ternate 180, p. 5a.
590 ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, p. 1d-6a.
Latumana is also mentioned by Van der Hart during his stay in Buton, but this may be
the same as the deceased syabandar Latimamang. If they were indeed to different
people, their mandate was very similar, as envoys who were to levy taxes on trading
goods in small ports on the east coast, one in Kendari, the other in Tojo and Tobungku.

In 1847, a confrontation occurred between the kabusenya of Tojo, the traditional
representative of Bone in eastern Sulawesi, and Latumana, who arrived there with a
mandate from Bone to collect tax. Tojo, which inherited Mawomba’s position as Bone’s
representative in eastern Sulawesi, based its claims on relations that went back at least a
century. Despite the fact that the Togian Islands had overtaken Tojo and a key centre of
Bugis economic influence, Tojo retained its special political status. Around 1830, Tojo
had been a coastal settlement near the estuary of the Tojo river, but on account of
repeated Tobelo and Magindanao attacks, it moved inland, as did other settlements in
the vicinity such as Loinan, Saluan and Pati-Pati. In 1852 there were only a few
houses situated at the estuary of the river, but nothing that indicated that it might be a
political centre of any importance. In contrast to its predecessor Mawomba, that was
located near the coast, the main settlement of Tojo could only be reached after a six-
hour walk into the interior. This was where the ruler with the title of kabusenya lived,
‘who rules in the name of the ruler of Bone from Boalemo to the Poso river with the aid
of his Bugis subjects’. These ‘Bugis’ subjects were in fact people of mixed Bugis
descent, and still formed a powerful group within Tojo, possibly the descendants of
contingents of soldiers sent from Bone in the previous century. The first direct challenge
to Tojo’s position was in 1847, when Latumana arrived in Tojo with a following of

recorded in the late nineteenth century, the capital was moved inland and further east by Mokole Maeta,
nicknamed ‘the black ruler’, around the middle of the nineteenth century. This inland site continued to be
visited after the capital had been relocated back to the coast in the late nineteenth century, becaues of the
graves of former rulers that were visited, especially in times of drought. See N. Adriani; A.C. Kruyt, De
Bare’e-sprekende Toradja’s van Midden-Celebes, Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1912, I, p. 78.
armed men, claiming he was sent by Bone to levy taxes. Tojo had been ruled by kabusenya Latonro (note the Bugis name) for the past twenty years, and he considered himself the representative of the ruler of Bone. However, according to what he told Van der Hart, Latonro had never taken tribute to Bone. Latumana had presented Latonro with a letter from Bone that authorised him to levy taxes and exert authority on behalf of Bone. Latonro countered Latumana’s claim by saying that his letter had no validity according to the customary rules that he was aware of. Latumana and his stayed for eight months, but were unable to exert their authority or levy taxes on trade and cockfighting. After a skirmish between Latumana’s men and Latonro’s subjects the former left. Thirty houses in Tojo were burnt and several Bugis from Bone were killed.  

Tojo’s case demonstrates the variety of relations that Bone had with different parts of its periphery and how the current ruler of Bone was attempting to secure his rights over areas where relations had been dormant for decades. Tojo, under Latonro’s leadership, and Kendari, under the syabandar, form a striking contrast. Tojo’s position was similar to that of Buton when it was still a tributary of Ternate and considered the ‘key’ to the east coast. Dutch threats to Bone’s overlordship occasioned a new wave of expansion through envoys with special mandates. In Tojo, the personal mandate of Bone’s envoy clashed with Tojo’s traditional role as Bone’s representative. Bone’s dormant relations with Tojo were to be transformed by arrangements like those that existed with Bonerate, where Bone’s syabandar levied taxes, and the children of the aristocracy were taught Bugis. Bone also had to be notified about the choice of a new ruler, and the council had to appear in Bone if summoned. Tribute, consisted of local products, was taken to Bone, and in the case of an important ceremony in Bone,

593 C. van der Hart, Reize rondom het Eiland Celebes, 1953; ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110.
Bonerate had to supply dancers.\(^{594}\) In the case of both Bone and Ternate, aristocrats with mandates from their rulers played an active role in extending the centre’s sphere of influence and strengthening tributary ties with peripheral areas. In both cases they seized control of local trade and levied taxes on behalf of their ruler. A Bonerate noble remarked that Bone princes ‘need much during their stay, and when they leave, they take much of our goods and people with them on behalf of the ruler.’\(^{595}\)

Bone’s continuing refusal to relinquish claims on the east coast was a major obstacle in relations with the Dutch. In addition, the ruler of Bone refused to surrender Agama, also known as Aru Banggai. Eventually, the Dutch decided that a military campaign was the only solution to humble Bone, so they took measures to mount an expedition that led to the second Dutch-Bone war of 1859-60. This time Bone was defeated and reduced to the same semi-colonial status that had been imposed upon Ternate in 1683. The governor of Makassar had the right to appoint the ruler, the *tomarilalang* (second man in charge) and the *arung pitu* (council of seven). A great part of Bone’s social following in the southern part of the peninsula, the islands of Selayar and Bonerate was disassociated from it. It was no longer allowed to undertake political activity outside of the borders fixed by the colonial government.\(^{596}\) A new contract was concluded and a new ruler and council were pressured to formally relinquish Bone’s claims to the east coast in 1860. This downsizing of Bone was aimed at cutting ties between Bone’s centre and its wider sphere of influence. It was informed by the misconception of that Bone’s role, as the centre was pivotal in maintaining its political, economic and cultural influence in areas beyond South Sulawesi.

\(^{595}\) ibid. p. 233.
Despite the dramatic political change after Bone’s defeat, Bugis continued to exert influence in the Gulf of Tomini and the east coast of Sulawesi. One Dutch official speculated that news might have not yet reached that far because of the blockade imposed on Bone’s ports. In 1863, however, long after the blockades were lifted, Bugis influence in eastern Sulawesi continued unabated, and the colonial authorities commissioned a report to investigate whether further measures needed to be taken to curb their influence. The conclusion was that for the time being any measures to assert Dutch authority would be ineffective, and that in the long run increased contact with the colonial state and European trade would lead to an undermining of Bugis influence. In 1883, however, Verschuer reported that all Bugis and Bajo in the Gulf of Tomini still paid tribute to the queen of Bone, and that she sent envoys to these areas regularly.

Anti-piracy Campaigns and Shifting Alliances ca. 1845-1880

By the 1840s, colonial policy towards maritime raiding had changed to the use of force with steamships rather than resettlement plans and negotiation. The threatening presence of the ‘pirate’ became an important justification for expanding Dutch influence into eastern Sulawesi. Even though raiding vessels could often out-manoeuvre steamships, their presence now posed a real threat, especially to communities that hosted raiders. Reports complaining about raiding vessels that managed to escape were

597 ANRI Besluit 14 May 1863 No. 4, ‘Maatregelen om aan de gezagvoering der Boeginezen in de landen op de Oostkust van Celebes en in de bogt van Tomini een einde te maken’. The titles used in letter of May 1860 to the queen of Bone were adjusted to reflect the new political reality: the governor of Makassar was now ‘the Governor of Celebes and Dependencies (Celebes en Onderhorigheden). The letter was addressed to the vassal queen (leenvorstin) of Bone.


599 The image of the Muslim pirate that took root in the Philippines did not exist to the same extent in eastern Indonesia, where pirates were more likely to be associated with paganism and barbarian customs; the persistant rumours that pirates ate their victims.
common. Because of their scale, Magindanao and Balangingi expeditions were targeted as they entered the Indonesian archipelago. The campaign directed at the allies of raiders, the host communities that supplied them with food and gave them shelter, was more effective. On a different front, Spanish warships were making inroads in Sulu waters. Successive Spanish campaigns against the Balangingi in 1848 reduced the number of slave raids in the Philippine archipelago. Some of the survivors sought the protection of the Sultan of Sulu, others migrated to the Tawi-tawi Islands, and yet another group settled on the tiny island of Rium, near Flores. Raiding routes frequented earlier, such as the Makassar Strait along the east coast of Borneo were avoided. One of the new routes that was not so heavily patrolled was the east coast of Sulawesi.

**New Alliances: Migrating Raiders and Local Elites in the Colonial Periphery**

Piracy in eastern Sulawesi was, just as its polities, small-scale and decentralised. Guns and warships were not sufficiently effective when it came to eradicating this kind of piracy. Here, the struggle against piracy was aimed at breaking the alliances between local elites and maritime raiding. If such alliances continued, raiders would enjoy the protection of local chiefs, who notified them in time so they could evade Dutch warships. Instead of force, the colonial state pressured local chiefs and rulers into pledging their support in the fight against piracy and slavery and, under no circumstances provide raiders with shelter and food. But, without closer surveillance by the Dutch, little changed. Thwarting the alliances between raiding groups and indigenous rulers in eastern Sulawesi would prove a more difficult task than disrupting raiding routes and dispersing large raiding fleets.

Ironically, the anti-piracy campaigns directed at regional raiding networks had the unexpected effect of fostering new alliances between raiding groups and Ternaten.

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aristocrats in Banggai. In the light of patterns that have been explored in previous chapters, such alliances are not surprising. However, in this period, Ternaten aristocrats were appointed under auspices of the Netherlands-Indies government and were expected to join in the crusade against raiding. The anti-raiding campaigns directed at Tobelo host communities of Sulu-based Magindanao and Balangingi in the Lesser Sunda’s set in motion the migration of a number of these communities who suffered from attacks and no longer felt safe. As the power of the Magindanao networks waned, these Tobelo shifted their allegiance to the emerging regional power that could afford them protection: the colonial state and its close ally Ternate. The Tobelo in the Lesser Sunda’s were part of the same migration of Tobelo to Tobungku, that followed in the wake of the Nuku rebellion in the 1790s. In some cases, the sons of the original Tobelo chiefs who had migrated there from Maluku now led their followers to Banggai and Tobungku, where they hoped to find immunity from Dutch warships.

The first documented arrival of such a group of Tobelo was in 1846 in Banggai. The Tobelo chiefs Sorani, Suruan and Palele, accompanied by lesser chiefs, family and followers left their villages in Kalatoa after Dutch warships had attacked them. They arrived just as Ternaten aristocrats who were struggling to put down the Agama rebellion in Banggai, and were immediately employed as military allies. The conflict in Banggai followed the familiar pattern of using local allies. Banggai drew on its traditional Bugis allies in the gulf of Tomini, and Ternaten forces conveniently formed an alliance with the recently arrived Tobelo migrants. One measure to stem Tobelo raiding was a decree issued by the Ternaten Sultan that all Tobelo had to return to Ternate. However, an exception was made for the recent arrivals in Banggai because of the assistance they gave to the Ternaten troops. The Tobelo chiefs Saurian and Saurian
were allowed to settle in Banggai, and Saurian was even given the position of kapitan with an accompanying insignia.\textsuperscript{601}

The new Ternaten elite in Banggai was confronted with the same problem as in Tobungku: they too were confronted with disrupted trade after an armed punitive expedition and the resulting lack of revenue. Here too, Ternaten officials took control of the domestic market; acquiring products far below market value and demanding forced deliveries of wax and slaves.\textsuperscript{602} Only two years later, in 1848, there was yet another armed conflict in Banggai, this time driven by resentment against the Ternaten aristocrats, whose Tobelo allies habitually raided in the area, and did not spare Banggaians. The Banggai ruler attacked the Ternaten utusan with Bugis allies.\textsuperscript{603} The number of paduakang that visited Banggai each year dwindled from around thirty in 1845 to only a few by 1850.\textsuperscript{604} This left local chiefs, who depended primarily on local and long distance trade, with only a small amount of tribute, which consisted of foodstuffs such as sago and rice. In Banggai, the loss of revenue from the declining tripang trade was supplemented by raiding carried out by the recently arrived Tobelo under the auspices of two Ternaten officials. Sorani, the most notorious Tobelo chief, was known to raid from Tobungku up into the Gulf of Tomini. He went as far as Mooton, incidentally also one of the places that supported Agama, where Sorani captured the chief’s son. Protection from the Ternaten officials ensured that he was not pursued or reported to the Dutch, at least not in Banggai. The new of Sorani’s activities reached Van der Hart on several occasions during his journey around Sulawesi in 1850, and also Ternaten officials in Banggai protected that Tobelo raiders. The utusan of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{601} ANRI Ternate 180, p. 21a.
\item \textsuperscript{602} ibid. p. 19c.
\item \textsuperscript{603} ANRI Makassar 7 & 7a, ‘Beknopt Overzigt der Stukken en Aangelegenheden rakende de Regten welke Boni zich heeft aangematigd over de Landen gelegen in de Tomini-Baai’. p. 2. This document mentions that the first conflict was in 1846, but that Agama did not flee until after a second conflict in 1848.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Banggai, who was to assist the Dutch in their campaign against piracy was the one who warned the Tobelo chiefs Tevea and Palele of the imminent arrival of Van der Hart’s ship on the coast of Balantak.

The ruler of Kendari related to Van der Hart that Sorani befriended three boats from Laiwui when they spent several days moored together at the anchorage of Tobungku. As soon as they left the harbour, Sorani attacked them. A Balantak trader reported to have seen ‘kapitan Sorani’ returning to Banggai with a large number of boats loaded down with looted goods such as weapons, gold coins and several captives who were sold to Mandarese. While Van der Hart reported a decline in the coastal slave-trade, debt-slavery continued to exist, as there was still a demand for slaves in South Sulawesi. Here, Makassarese traders were permitted to import people as agricultural labours, where they were registered as bondsmen or pandelingen.

From the Dutch point of view, however, one major problem was simply replaced by another. A defiant ruler supported by Bone was now replaced by a Ternaten elite that sponsored maritime raiding and the trade in slaves, and, engaged in alliances that the Dutch were trying to eradicate. For the Tobelo, who were looked upon with greater kindness than the Magindanao, the option of resettlement and becoming ‘peaceful’ peasants was still open. In 1853, the Ternaten Sultan sent out an official directed to the Tobelo and Galela who were ‘roaming’ the coasts of Flores, which summoned them to return to their homelands or surrender to the Sultan of Ternate. If they failed to do so within a year, all Tobelo at sea without valid seapasses would be treated as raiders and be subject to attacks from Dutch warships. The letter, which was widely distributed, was

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604 ANRI Ternate 180 p. 36b.
605 ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, p. 10b.
606 The Balantak trader himself had bought a woman with her child whom he believed was related to the kapitan of Gorontalo. Captives were often considered valuable because of the possibility of ransom. ibid. p. 1d-2d, 30a, 30b, 31a.
part of a plan to reverse the Tobelo diaspora and resettle them as peasants and fisherfolk. The Dutch resident of Ternate, however, did not have much confidence in this measure after the failure of resettling Tobelo in 1833. He had more faith in regular patrols by Dutch warships.608

In 1850, two more Tobelo raiding chiefs arrived, this time in Tobungku where they surrendered voluntarily to the Ternaten utusan. Their followings consisted of fifty men, women and children. Two other notorious Tobelo chiefs, Loba and Kesi who also had been raiding in the Banggai area, came to Ternate with the same intention.609 In 1853 yet another group of Tobelo, led by kapitan Laloba, arrived in Lanona, Tobunkgu, to surrender themselves to the utusan Ternate. Their story was similar. They had left their villages on Rium and Gumu because of continuous attacks by Dutch warships and wished to return to Maluku and submit themselves to the Sultan of Ternate. This group consisted of eighty-four men and fifty-seven women and children in six paduakang. They were disarmed and sent to Ternate accompanied by a trusted Ternaten official.610

In Banggai, arriving at the same time as Laloba, was Robodoi’s group. Their history is better documented than that of the other groups because upon arrival in Banggai, they were still in close contact with Magindanao raiders active along the coasts of eastern Sulawesi.611 Robodoi, accompanied by his relatives and slaves travelled from their home village, Gumu, on Magindanao vessels via Lombok, Kabaena and Salabangka to Banggai over a period of three months. According to testimonies of several of the other Tobelo, Robodoi and another Tobelo chief Chaga ‘migrated to Manggarai when prince Nuku was at war with the Company.612 Before Robodoi surrendered to Ternaten officials in Banggai he wanted to retrieve the Tobelo women who were married to

608 ANRI Besluit 8 October 1853 No. 14, p. 4.
609 ARA Verbaal 23 January 1851 No 20, Inventaris No. 67, p. 141.
611 ARA Geheim Verbaal 23 April 1851 No. 110, p. 2a, 2b.
Magindanao men, since this was where their ways would part for good. The Magindanao would let the women go on condition that Robodoi join them one last time on a raiding expedition near Balantak. During this expedition, Robodoi was fatally wounded, and did not live long enough to make the journey to Ternate. But, moving to eastern Sulawesi did not automatically sever the alliances between the Tobelo and their Magindanao overlords.

The same campaigns that forced Tobelo communities to leave their villages also pushed Magindanao and Balangingi\textsuperscript{613} raiding groups into the still unpatrolled waters of eastern Sulawesi. Increasingly, the east coast and Gulf of Tomini were used as an alternative route to Sulu instead of the now heavily patrolled east coast of Borneo.\textsuperscript{614} In 1844, the busy trade in the Gulf of Tomini centred on Togian had been reduced to a third of its normal volume because of the relentless attacks by Magindanao and Tobelo raiders who had moved into this area.\textsuperscript{615} On the onset of the north-west monsoon Sulu-based Magindanao raiders went out in fleets of fifty to sixty vessels, which then broke up into smaller flotillas, the largest being between fifteen and thirty. The island of Binyunong in the Gulf of Tomini was one of their meeting places, as was the island of Bangka, where they took on water, fire wood and food, and repaired their boats. Using the winds of the east monsoon, the Magindanao returned from Manggarai on Flores to the east coast of Sulawesi, where some of them joined Tobelo flotilla’s. Others waited for the arrival of trading perahu from Makassar in the Buton Strait, and yet another group joined fleets fitted out from Bonerate.

\textsuperscript{612} ANRI Ternate 183 b.

\textsuperscript{613} While the Sulu-based Magindanao and Balangingi both shifted their raiding routs to eastern Sulawesi in the 1840s, only the former appear to have had alliances with the Tobelo.

\textsuperscript{614} Koloniaal Verslag, 1853 p. 51-54.

\textsuperscript{615} ANRI Manado 118, Menado, Brieven van Gorontalo, 1844-1845, No. 18, Gorontalo 14 November 1844.
The presence of such formidable raiding groups on the east coast required local elites to take a different approach than that taken with the less menacing and more easily controlled Tobelo. A testimony from Robodoi’s daughter, Daruna, revealed that the Ternaten aristocrat responsible for patrolling against maritime raiders in the Banggai archipelago had concluded a treaty with Magindanao raiders and with her own Tobelo group on the beach of Lalanta (Peleng).\(^{616}\) The alliance was sealed by swearing an oath on the Koran. Furthermore, the Ternaten kapitan kota had sold opium to the Magindanao, which he later denied. The extent of Banggai’s involvement with Magindanao raiders then cast suspicion on all Tobelo groups who chose to resettle at Banggai rather than Tobungku.

*Indigenous Allies in Anti-piracy Campaigns*

By the mid-1860s, large raiding ships had become rare in the seas of the Netherlands-Indies, and this was attributed to persistent patrolling and how of force by the Dutch and Spanish navies. Warships as a means of suppressing maritime had been criticised in the late 1850s for being too expensive and ineffective in pursuit of raiding perahu, both large and small. Larger perahu were relatively low in the water and often discovered Dutch steamships before they were spotted themselves. They were also fast enough to move way in time. Small vessels readily disappeared into creeks and sailed into shallow water inaccessible to warships. Bombing campaigns against pirate settlements by warships dealt a major blow to large-scale regional raiding networks, but did not lead to their immediate demise. As regional networks broke down, a multitude of smaller, more localised raiding groups multiplied.

Situations like Banggai, where new alliances were made with both Magindanao and Tobelo raiders occurred elsewhere as well, drawing more land-based communities into maritime raiding than had been the case previously. A further problem with small-scale

\(^{616}\) ANRI Besluit 8 October 1953 No. 14, p. 23, 24.
raiding fleets and boats was that they were difficult to detect, because they often doubled as fishing perahu, and were furnished with legitimate passes. Severing alliances between such raiders and local elites was seen as the key to solving the ‘problem’ of raiding, but could only be effectively accomplished with more frequent surveillance.\(^6^{17}\)

The colonial state sought the answer to this problem in the time-honoured custom of actively involving indigenous allies. Regular expeditions in Maluku caused a new wave of Tobelo migration from Halmahera and Bacan. This time moving to eastern Sulawesi did not give much respite, since Dutch patrols responded promptly by moving eastwards to the Sula- and Banggai archipelagos in their pursuit of Tobelo raiders. As Dutch naval power and frequent indigenous patrols were extended into eastern Sulawesi, the threat of sanctions for protecting raiders became far greater than the fear of retaliation from raiders.

At this time, Tobelo vessels had crews of approximately ten men, and expeditions were carried with four or five boats. For larger more important expeditions, several smaller flotilla’s banded together to form a larger fleet under the command of a chief who was chosen by the lesser chiefs. The largest documented fleet of Tobelo perahu in the 1870s was 48 vessels in the years 1872/73 in the Gulf of Tomini.\(^6^{18}\) From there, the fleet divided into smaller raiding groups that spread along the east coast of Sulawesi. The extent of small-scale raiding on the east coast is apparent from the Italian Beccari’s reports on his experiences in Kendari Bay in 1874.\(^6^{19}\) He wrote very little about the

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\(^6^{17}\) See references to raiding in the 1850s: ‘Berigten omtrent den Zeeroof in den Nederlandsch-Indischen Archipel’, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-*, *Land- en Volkenkunde*. It may not be a coincidence that these elaborate retrospective accounts of the anti-piracy campaigns started to be published just as the anti-piracy campaigns were criticised for being ineffective.

\(^6^{18}\) ‘Memorie van Overgave van het bestuur der Residentie Ternate door den aftredenden Resident S.C.I.W. van Musschenbroek aan den benoemde resident,1875’.

plants he set out to collect, but a great deal about the constant threat of attacks by 
maritime raiders.

By 1878, the Tobelo and other raiders in the eastern archipelago no longer dared 
to raid openly. The alliances between raiding chiefs and land-based elites broke down 
under the same pressure as the alliances had between Tobelo and Magindanao several 
decades earlier. The more extensive patrolling by Dutch warships made it difficult for 
local chiefs to maintain their relations with Tobelo and protect them. For the same 
reason, there was less fear of retaliation by Tobelo raiders if chiefs and rulers did not 
co-operate with them as they had done in the past. At this time, more Tobelo chiefs 
surrendered voluntarily to the Dutch. One of these was Medom, or Medomo, who was 
among the most notorious and influential of the Tobelo leaders. In 1879, continuous 
patrols and expeditions were carried out against the ‘alfurs’ in the waters around 
Banggai and Sula. Local chiefs and groups of Bajo who were former allies of the Tobelo 
were pressured into participating.620 The Dutch then decided to contact the remaining 
Tobelo chiefs through their former chief and friend Medom. These Tobelo were to 
resettle the island of Obi, which had served as a base for the Tobelo for several decades. 
After four months in Banggai, Medom only succeeded in bringing back seven men, 
three women and eight children to his village.621 They were made to swear an oath 
ever again to commit acts of piracy. Medom’s settlement expanded; by the end of 1879 
more than forty former raiders and their families had come voluntarily to settle under 
his leadership. He also convinced three other notorious Tobelo chiefs and their 
followers to surrender to the Dutch Resident in Ternate, after they had been pursued in 
vain by the Ternate Said Mohammad Said’s hongi in 1878. These headmen had been 
living deep in the interior of Obi with sixty men, women and children for fear of the 
Ternaten hongi. The last Tobelo chief in eastern Sulawesi, Tofor, was tracked down and

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620 Koloniaal Verslag 1879, p. 28.
defeated on a tiny island south-east of Banggai with the help of Tobelo informants. In eastern Sulawesi, no descendants of Tobelo raiders are to be found, since the movement back to Halmahera in the latter part of the nineteenth century included their local affines. The collective memory that remains of the Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi is of their reputation as dangerous raiders, who occupied themselves solely with murdering and capturing people.

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In the period between 1848-1880, eastern Sulawesi became part of a moving frontier of the colonial as well as being a periphery of Bone and Ternate. Expansion of the Netherlands-Indies state that reached to eastern Sulawesi in this period was affected through use of Ternate’s ‘diasporic infrastructure’. Conflicts in Ternate’s periphery that in earlier periods would have been ignored, now were reasons to intervene to ‘restore order’. The colonial state was confronted with the paradox of using Ternaten aristocrats whose mode of operation was not in line with Dutch ideas of colonial intervention. These aristocrats operated in the traditional mode of centre-periphery relations in Ternate’s diasporic sphere of influence, using the mandate from the centre to protect the Sultan’s and their own interests. For this reason, Dutch-Ternaten intervention against the Bugis-supported conflicts and anti-raiding campaigns led to problems in eastern Sulawesi unforeseen by the Dutch. With the decline of the tripang trade, which had been an important source of revenue, Ternaten elites in Banggai and Tobungku focussed their efforts on controlling the trade in inland commodities such as wax and iron, as well as raiding for slaves, in both cases leading to armed protests and further political turmoil.

621 ibid. 1880, p. 22.
622 A. Hueting, ‘De Tobeloreezen in hun denken en doen’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië 78, 1922, p. 22. In 1902, the young Christian congregation of Wari on
In Banggai, the Tobelo refugees from anti-raiding campaigns elsewhere now raided for slaves under the auspices of Ternaten aristocrats who, in the Dutch mindset, were allies in the fight against piracy. The arrival of migrant groups of Tobelo in eastern Sulawesi signified a shift in the balance of power in favour of the colonial state: the dominance of Sulu-based raiding networks was broken, and the colonial state with its allies became the preferred patrons of Tobelo raiding groups because of the protection they could afford. Tobelo chiefs severed their alliances with Magindanao raiders and sought alliances with Ternate or its tributaries Banggai and Tobungku. Despite this regional shift of power, the basic political and economic mechanism that sustained raiding continued at the local level. The pattern of alliances between raiders and land-based elites persisted so that raiding was supported on the level of small-scale polities and was geographically more dispersed than previously.

The rising tension between Bone and the colonial state added to the eagerness of the Dutch to intervene in eastern Sulawesi. Bone disputed Ternate’s claims to the east coast, and refused to relinquish them, further escalating tension that finally erupted in the second Bone-Dutch war in 1859-1860. Bone was defeated and reduced to the status of ‘vassal’ that Ternate had held since 1683, and restrictions were imposed aimed to undermine Bone’s wider sphere of influence. However, Bone’s defeat did not have the desired effect of reducing Bugis influence in eastern Sulawesi. As the Dutch discovered, this influence did not depend on the overlordship and protection of Bone, but rested on local alliances, once again pointing to the semi-autonomous nature of Bugis communities and individuals in diaspora and the decentralised nature of the Bugis sphere of influence. As this sphere was challenged, the ruler of Bone embarked on a different course, using envoys to keep a closer eye on developments in eastern Sulawesi. In the case of Tojo, the existing arrangements of using one polity as an

Halmahera was joined by a small group of Muslims who had been taken back by Medom because they
official representative was challenged by the new wave of active interest when an envoy from Bone claimed rights to levy taxes that the kabusenya of Tojo felt were his only. The activity of envoys may have declined after the defeat of Bone, but Tojo continued to acknowledge Bone’s overlordship. Despite the resilience of Bugis influence and the persistence of alliances between maritime raiders and local elites in eastern Sulawesi, the waning political dominance of Bone and the declining power of Sulu-based raiding networks signalled the beginning of the end of a political system premised on politically and economically powerful diasporas that linked small-scale polities into wider spheres of regional influence and development.

were related to Tobelo raiders.
Commodities, Cash Crops and the Beginnings of Colonial Bureaucracy
1880-1905

The more interventionist role of the colonial state that started in the final decades of the nineteenth century eventually led to the end of the traditional regional political system in which east coast polities had functioned up to that point in time. The transition of the colonial state into the most powerful naval force in the archipelago downgraded the political role of Bone and Ternate. In this chapter, I trace earlier themes of this study into the final decades of the nineteenth century as eastern Sulawesi entered a new phase of integration into the global economy and incorporation within the colonial state. Each theme provides an insight into the specific character of the overall economic and political changes that were occurring.

Eastern Sulawesi was now no longer situated between two political centres, but rather occupied an ambiguous position on the periphery of the expanding colonial state. At the same time, the world-wide demand for damar, rattan and copra opened a new resource frontier on the east coast, which set in motion a new flow of people in search of wealth and commodities. Chinese traders arrived on the coasts of eastern Sulawesi to set up trading posts; Bugis repopulated stretches of abandoned shorelines and ventured inland as produce traders. And finally, groups of men from other parts of inland central and southeast Sulawesi covered large distances in search of forest products. Islam also travelled on the wave of economic expansion beyond its traditional boundaries that confined it to coastal areas, providing a new religious and social framework in the face of sweeping changes.

The polycentric nature of the small-scale polities was accentuated by the dispersed and decentralised character of the trade in forest products. Local rulers, who were increasingly employed as the instrument of the colonial state, had little authority.
Relations between small-scale polities with the colonial state had changed radically. Mutual raiding no longer occurred, and local elites had to forego alliances with maritime raiding groups. However, local conflict continued on a smaller scale as a result of competition for control of the new economic resources. Finally, as the political dimension of previous diasporas was systematically undermined, new economic diasporas emerged, equally uncontrollable by the colonial state. The irony of the continuing Bugis diaspora was that as Bone declined as a political force, the Bugis colonisation of coastal strips meant that, inadvertently, an enormous territorial expansion took place, one that would prove impossible for the Dutch to reverse.

Small-scale Societies and the Cash Crop Commodities 1880-1905
The economic changes occurring in this period were beyond the immediate control of the colonial state. In the early 1880s, the demand for new forest products started to mobilise economic forces in the archipelago.\textsuperscript{623} Chinese and Arab\textsuperscript{624} traders with their steam-powered vessels plied between the small coastal anchorages and larger ports of Gorontalo, Makassar, Ternate and Singapore. Their access to capital and wider markets challenged the hegemony of Bugis traders on the east coast. Gorontalo was revived as the main collection point for forest products from the Gulf of Tomini and the Banggai area. Togian lost its position as a trading centre, and became a major supplier of copra. Despite occasional coastal raiding after 1880, colonial efforts to stem maritime raiding had rendered the coasts safer. Security and prosperity no longer depended on access to guns and alliances that guaranteed protection, so that more people now could freely take part in the new cash-crop economy. Between 1880 and 1890 patterns of trade in Banggai responded to the changed regional environment. A greater part of the

\textsuperscript{623} Increased competition in the Chinese market led to a drop in tripang prices. This translated immediately in a decline in tripang exports. The number of tripang fishers leaving for the coast of northern Australia also declined. \textit{Kolonial Verslag 1883}, p. 219.
population now took part in collecting rattan and damar, which made imported commodities such as cloth more accessible.

The Togian Bugis continued to play an important role in the carrying trade in the Gulf of Tomini at least into the 1860s, but it is not clear whether their dominant position in the Banggai archipelago was restored. By 1880, the trade in the Banggai area was in the hands of Gorontalo and Bajo traders. The Bajo in the Banggai area were more than just fishers. They traded with large boats and collected forest products as well. At this time, local populations were still frightened to leave their villages for fear of Tobelo attacks. However, the Bajo in the Banggai area were able to keep the raiding Tobelo at bay by travelling in large armed convoys. After the last Tobelo and Galela raiders had been removed in the 1880s, the danger of such attacks declined, and the Bajo lost their advantageous position. Only ten years later, local trade in Banggai was almost completely in the hands of ten Chinese from Gorontalo who shipped products back and forth to Gorontalo several times a month. After 1890, Bajo are only mentioned for their tripang fishing, and, their migratory journeys, which continued to stretch from the Togian Islands down the east coast to Kendari Bay. At this time, Makassarese tripang traders who came to buy tripang visited Kalumbatan, the main Bajo settlement on the coast of Peleng near Banggai.

Interest in eastern Sulawesi now came from further afield as well. In April and June of 1891 four steamships from Singapore flying a British flag moored in Toili and Batui

624 Many of the so-called Arabs in eastern Sulawesi and the Gulf of Tomini were in fact Pakistanis. They intermarried with Arabs and were considered by the local population to be one and the same.

625 ANRI Ternate 419, p. 22.

626 The Bajo on the neighbouring island of Sula were also originally from Sula, and collected considerable amounts of agar-agar (seaweed), as well as fishing for tripang and tortoise. The Bajo village there, Pohea, had 206 inhabitants. Their fishing grounds were off the coasts of Taliabo. F.S.A. de Clerq, Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Residentie Ternate, 1890, p. 132.

627 For this reason, the posthouder suggested to move the Bajo from Kalumbatan (Peleng) to Banggai to improve the economic situation of the latter. ANRI Ternate 419, p. 19.
where they picked up large loads of rattan.\textsuperscript{628} The abundance of forest products also attracted the attention of the Handelsvereeniging van Gorontalo (Dutch Gorontalo Trading Company), which had some links to Makassar, but was in closer contact with Singapore. From Gorontalo the bulk of the forest products were shipped directly on a small steamship owned by a Chinese kongsi in Singapore. The Handelsvereeniging negotiated a contract that gave them a monopoly on collecting and trading forest products in Banggai with the Sultan of Ternate. However, neither the ruler of Banggai and nor colonial government had been informed about this new arrangement. As soon as the Handelsvereeniging had the contract, it started to demand payments from Chinese who were already trading in forest products in this area. The first taxes levied in Banggai were not imposed by the colonial government but by a private European trading company that had bypassed both local elites and the colonial state. It was this kind of unfettered economic development that hastened colonial intervention in eastern Sulawesi, which still had a politically ambiguous status.\textsuperscript{629}

Further economic activity was encouraged when the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM) opened a monthly line on the east coast in 1881. The line started in Makassar, travelled along the coast of the Gulf of Bone, around the south-eastern peninsula to Kendari and Tobungku, but no further. In 1891, the KPM route was split into two; Line 11 travelled up the west coast of Sulawesi, around the northern tip to Gorontalo, and then on to Maluku where it stopped in Bacan, Banda and Ambon, and then on to Surabaya on the north coast of Java. Line 12 travelled between Kendari, Buton, Palopo, Saleyar, Sinjai, Bulukumba, Makassar and back.\textsuperscript{630} The KPM service facilitated the regular travel of Chinese to Kendari Bay, but Bugis and Makassarese

\textsuperscript{628} ibid. p. 21.

\textsuperscript{629} Similar to the situation in Banggai, the Chartered Company leased the northeast coast of Borneo directly from the Sulu Sultan Jamal ul-Azam in 1878 to prevent it from falling into Spanish hands. In this case, however, the British Government would neither annex the territory, nor would it allow the firm to sell it to a foreign power, so that the Chartered Company developed and administered the territory on a commercial basis. J. F. Warren, \textit{The Sulu Zone}, 1981, p. 134, 135.
from South Sulawesi (Saleyar, Bonthain and Makassar) also made extensive use of this new means of transport and shipping.

The dominant economic role of the Chinese based in Gorontalo did not extend as far as Tobungku, where Makassar was the main destination for forest products rather than Gorontalo. The key factor responsible for this difference was the extension of the route of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), from Kendari to Tobungku in the early 1890s. This regular connection greatly facilitated trade and transport between Makassar and Tobungku and the low freight prices allowed small-scale traders who did not have enough capital for their own steamship, to operate freely. The easy and reliable connection with South Sulawesi may also account for the greater influence of Bugis and Makassarese Islamic teachers in Tobungku around the turn of the century.

When the Bajo in Banggai reverted to trading solely in tripang and were no longer involved in forest products, their networks continued to be more oriented towards South Sulawesi. However, the trade in forest products from Banggai proper, was more oriented towards Gorontalo. In the 1890s, the tripang trade bypassed Banggai completely, and traders went directly to the Bajo settlement of Kalumbatan, located just north of Banggai on the coast of Peleng, a place that was strongly influenced by Bugis. The exclusion the other apparent in oral histories of the area shows that despite their proximity to each other, Banggai and Kalumbatan existed in different worlds. The Bajo in Kalumbatan were clients of Makassarese and Bugis merchants who had direct links to Makassar. After the collapse of Bugis trade in Banggai after 1846, Ternate was its main external centre, especially as the contact intensified in the latter part of the nineteenth century as a result of the expansion of the colonial state. Here, Bajo were

630 ANRI Financiën 655, ‘Voorwaarden van Aanbesteding voor het onderhouden van geregelde Stoomdiensten in den Indischen Archipel gedurende 1891-1901’.

631 ANRI Bogor BGS 5-1-96 No. 95, Gewestelijk Bestuur, Residentie Ternate, 3 Mei 1895, p. 2. The KPM line No. 10 was extended to include Tobungku. More precise information on the expansion of the KPM into this area is not reported in the Koloniale Verslagen nor in a Campo’s extensive work on the KPM. At the
labelled with the standard stereotype of ‘newcomers’, despite their long history of involvement in the tripang trade in the area and the permanent settlement of Kalumbatan that can be traced back into the nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, the Bajo of Kalumbatan had little to say about the rulers of Banggai, who had not played an important role in their history. The descendants of their Bugis and Makassarese patrons looked down on the Banggai aristocracy.

In 1891 the Chinese in the town of Banggai controlled the export and import trade completely, travelling almost weekly to Gorontalo by paduakang or schooner. The exports from Banggai comprised: 4000 pikul copra; 200 wax; 100 coffee; 50 cacao; 100 mother of pearl shells; 25 tripang.\textsuperscript{632} Interestingly, forest products were not part of Banggai’s exports, nor was much known about commodity trade outside of Banggai proper. Copra was the most important bulk commodity, indicating that Banggai followed a similar development pattern to the north coast of the eastern arm of Sulawesi. In this area, coconut plantations were set up by Chinese who used local labour to clear the forest, plant and harvest the coconuts. However, on a small island near Banggai a renowned Makassar haji did the same thing by employing Bajo.\textsuperscript{633}

Tobungku was a bustling trading settlement in the 1880s. Unlike Banggai, it was located close to the interior from where damar was extracted. Here too, trade was decentralised, but the main settlement was prosperous.\textsuperscript{634} The contrast between the degree of economic activity in Banggai and Tobungku was so great that the posthouder suggested to be stationed in Tobungku rather than in Banggai. While little is known about Tobungku’s trade in these years, more is known about Luwu, which was in many

\textsuperscript{632} ANRI Ternate 419, p. 22, 23.
\textsuperscript{633} In 1995, the descendants of these Bajo lived in Kalumbatang. They had been sworn to secrecy by an oath of loyalty to their former patron which forbade them even to mention his name after his death.
\textsuperscript{634} Koloniaal Verslag 1882, p. 22.
respects comparable to Tobungku. Similarly located on a coast with a forested hinterland, it also had a lively trade in forest products. This trade was conducted exclusively by Chinese, Arab, Bugis and Makassarese traders who had settled there. Ships transported goods directly to Makassar or Singapore.\textsuperscript{635} Imports usually consisted of rice, salt and dried fish.

Kendari, like Tobungku, benefited from its proximity to the source of forest products with similar trade results. Import and export duties were not paid in money, rather it was the custom to present the ruler and aristocrats with a gift of opium, \textit{arak} and other (unmentioned) items. The most populous settlements were in Kendari Bay, and were inhabited by Bugis, Butonese and Bajo. Two thirds of the entire annual export of Kendari Bay consisted of 20,000 pikul of rattan, at the value of f50,000,-. The manufacture of sampan (dug-out canoes) shared second place on the export list with an average of one hundred a year worth f1500,-.\textsuperscript{636} However, tripang and mother of pearl collected by Bajo, both valued at f1500,- a year, made up only 5\% of the total annual export; while 1,905 pikul of gabah or unhulled rice was exported at the value of f3900.\textsuperscript{637}

By the 1880s, the number of slaves moving across the region had been reduced to a trickle. As maritime raiding declined in the late nineteenth century, the interior of eastern Sulawesi increasingly became a source of slaves, either through an increase in debt-slavery and tribute demands or through inland raiding.\textsuperscript{638} Atkinson’s reconstruction

\textsuperscript{636} ANRI Bogor, Makassar, 5 March 1901. Who produced the sampan is not mentioned. Both Butonese as well as Bajo were known for building boats, but it also possible that coastal Tolaki engaged in boat-building, since they had a tradition of using dug-out on the river. In 1991, boat-building was still carried out on a small scale by Bugis near the entrance of Kendari Bay.
\textsuperscript{637} These figures would have been more interesting if they could have been compared with ones from two or three decades earlier. In 1901, there were no regular markets in the Kendari area, and barter was used instead of money. The products imported in exchange for local products were 40,000 packets of tobacco, opium, arak, gambir, petroleum and 12,000 pieces of unbleached cotton.
of the history of Wana shows that the extension of Tobungku’s influence to the inland Wana served to funnel slaves to the coast. A system of fines was introduced that could only be paid with imported goods that were monopolised by chiefs. The ranking system of chiefs itself was introduced from Tobungku as a means of extending Tobungku’s influence into the inland area of Wana.

An important effect of the suppression of maritime raiding was an increase in inland raiding such as occurred in the Toraja highlands in South Sulawesi and in the interior of Mindanao in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. In Toraja, raiding increased in the 1860s when the frontier for slave-raiding was pushed further inland as a result of a stronger Dutch presence in the southern peninsula. The shift to highland raiding and slave-trading was facilitated by the new economic networks of the coffee trade. Slave raiding was open to anyone who could organise a raid. When the coffee trade shifted from Luwu to Sidenreng, the main outlet for Toraja slaves did too. Slaves were also ensnared through debts incurred from gambling, and often not given the chance to repay their debts with forest products.

Ileto documented a similar process in Magindanao from as early as the 1850s. Here extensive raiding of the upland Tiruray was triggered by the naval strength of the Spanish that cut raiders in the southern Philippines off from the Christian target areas. The occupation of Jolo, the centre of the Sulu sultanate in 1876, stopped all raiding to the north, and accentuated the importance of the traffic in inland slaves from Sarangani Bay in Mindanao.

In eastern Sulawesi maritime raiding continued on a small scale into the early twentieth century, but little is known about the extent of inland raiding in this period. In the neighbouring area of the Gulf of Tomini, the interior certainly was a source of slaves

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in the 1870s. In Poso, Tojo and Bangka on the north coast of Balantak, Bugis traders and other ‘foreigners’ conducted the slave-trade ‘on a large scale’, but it is not known whether the majority of slaves were raided captives or had entered slavery through debt. In the southeastern peninsula there is even less evidence of inland raiding.

When the Sarasins traversed the peninsula in 1903, they were told that slave raids did not occur in the interior, which contrasted with the Palopo area in the same year where expeditions to punish villages in the interior yielded large numbers of slaves. However, in the southeastern peninsula, the Sarasins were told that if Bugis wanted slaves, they would trick people into coming to the coast rather than use violence. In coastal Kolaka, the slaves owned by Bugis were from Muna, rather than from Kolaka’s hinterland, an indication that possibly Muna had become the main source of slaves. The Sarasins also noted that as late as 1905, in the hinterland of Kendari, inland people were still lured away by coastal traders and then kept on the coast to work for them.

The growing need for labour and the greater involvement of inland peoples in the forest commodity trade increased the chance of bondage through debt. The same economic principles applied to the trade as in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. Traders gave an advance in the form of goods after which the forest products were collected. The incurred debt usually exceeded the value of the forest products collected, and, according to the Dutch, these goods were purposely undervalued to create a continuing cycle of debt and assure a flow of cheap forest products. The advent of regular shipping lines that could transport much larger volumes of trade goods at regular intervals intensified this process. In areas similar to eastern Sulawesi, this intensification of market demand and KPM trade led to an increase in debt-slavery and other forms of

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642 ANRI Manado 13, 1850-1882, Riedel to the Resident of Manado, No. 946, Gorontalo, 20 September 1875.


644 ibid. p. 374. In contrast to the southeastern peninsula, the Sarasins did hear of slave raids carried out from the Palu valley in the interior as far as Bada (Central Sulawesi).
bondage. In West Papua, for instance, the opening of a KPM line triggered an expansion of trade and as a result, slavery of coastal peoples increased as they were unable to pay their debts.\textsuperscript{645} Closer by, in Central Sulawesi, the Sarasin cousins who travelled extensively in Sulawesi reported in 1895 that Arab traders used slaves to transport goods from the interior to the coast of the Gulf of Bone.\textsuperscript{646} By the early twentieth century local indebtedness to Chinese drew the attention of controleur van Engelenberg. In Togian he created a local co-operative in collaboration with the KPM to overcome this problem. Individual copra producers were then able to sell their produce directly to the KPM without the mediation of Chinese middlemen.

The polycentric character of political power on the east coast was accentuated by the dispersed nature of the new commodity trade. External agents increasingly engaged directly with producers without the mediation of local chiefs. If the position of the ruler of Banggai had formerly been prestigious, it now lost status as it became more directly controlled by Ternate and the Dutch. In Banggai, as well as in Tobungku, the position of ruler appeared to have been filled on demand of the Dutch, rather than on local initiative and demand. In 1891, the village where the ruler lived in Banggai was neglected and the houses were in a poor state of repair. This situation was in stark contrast with respect to neighbouring hamlets that were in a much better state. The same was found in Tobungku where the main settlement was also neglected, while the overall population was relatively prosperous. The polity was no longer the primary arena in which aristocrats and others competed to gain access to external resources of wealth and power. Mutual maritime raiding, which to a large extent had been underpinned by economic motives, was replaced by murders of outside economic rivals by local individuals. These conflicts in fact resembled the kind of small-scale conflict between individuals and communal groups that triggered inter-polity warfare described in the

1743 treaty between Banggai and Tobungku. Instead of rivals from neighbouring polities, the ‘enemies’ who were killed in the early 1890s were Chinese. These murders drew attention to the inability of the colonial government to intervene in such matters or even punish the perpetrators because of a lack of basic resources and passive resistance on the part of the local population. In order to investigate the spate murders, the posthouder had to borrow a boat to sail across to the mainland of Sulawesi where the murders had taken place. He succeeded in arresting a Ternaten haji who had killed the Chinese Liem Ban Soan in Balantak. In addition, a person called Barudatang (Malay for: just arrived) was arrested on the island of Peling. All the Bugis perpetrators were able to escape because they were protected by powerful Banggai-Bugis families.

The posthouder quickly dismissed the Resident’s proposal to levy a head tax in Banggai, since this would only apply those who were not subjects of the Banggai ruler, e.g. to Bugis and Bajo. The administration of such a tax clearly went beyond the ability of the apparatus of the colonial state, and was sure to provoke resistance that could not be countered.

**Loose Ends of the Colonial State**

In the period preceding 1905, the status of many areas in the ‘buitengewesten’ was ambiguous, claimed nominally by the colonial state, but with no real presence of effective power to intervene in local affairs. Theoretically, other European powers could no longer intrude, as the treaties concluded with the local rulers excluded them. In 1905, the ambiguous status of eastern Sulawesi came to an end. In this year, the colonial state

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647 See chapter 3.
648 Barudatang means ‘just arrived’ in Malay. No further explanation is given of the name.
649 This pattern was also found in Sabah where the Chartered Company at the same time. See: James F. Warren, *The North Borneo Chartered Company’s Administration of the Bajau, 1878-1909*. Papers on International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 22. Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1971.
created a **tolgebied**, in which it had exclusive rights over import and export duties in return for compensation from the colonial government. The finalisation of the tolgebied coincided with the signing of the **Korte Verklaring**, a standardised, widely used treaty in which a polity surrendered all authority over foreign affairs to the colonial state and acknowledged the overlordship of the Netherlands-Indies. The resolution of all judicial ambiguities not only eliminated the possibility of other European powers from intruding, it also finalised the shape and boundaries of the colonial state.

In the preceding decades, the key issues that had drawn the attention of the Dutch to eastern Sulawesi in the earlier decades had been resolved. Bone had been defeated. The continuation of Bugis activities, even political influence in eastern Sulawesi, was irksome to the Dutch but was thought to be more easily controlled with the passage of time. Outright ‘rebellions’ no longer occurred. Maritime raiding, which had been another major concern in eastern Sulawesi, still took place from bases in Tobungku and Muna. However, the scale was so much smaller that, while damaging the interests of the local traders and population, raiding no longer posed a threat to the colonial state or trade as it had in earlier decades. The mainstay of the colonial economy in this period was rubber, tea, coffee, and mineral mining. None of these occurred in eastern Sulawesi, leaving it in the ambiguous position of being a formal part of the Netherlands-Indies, but still beyond the effective administrative reach of the colonial government; a loose end of the colonial state.

**Flags and Boundaries**

In 1888, Dutch flags and a length of rope were given to the rulers of Banggai and Tobungku, and were to meant be flown on official occasions. Several years later, in 1896, the boundary between Banggai and Tobungku was officially drawn up. Even though direct rule would not be introduced for another ten years, the presence of Dutch flags and the creation of an ‘official’ boundary were highly symbolic of the political
changes underway. However, for the time being, the ability of the colonial state to intervene could not keep up with the rapid developments in eastern Sulawesi. Drawing up boundaries was meant to satisfy the Dutch, who needed to determine the exact jurisdiction of each ruler. But, it also clarified the jurisdiction of each ruler in relation to possible concessions on forest products, a more pressing concern as we will see below.

A similar, legalistic outlook led the colonial state to give Bugis and Bajo, who continued to acknowledge Bone as their overlord, a separate status. They were to be governed by their own chiefs who in turn were accountable to the Netherlands-Indies rather than to Bone. The colonial state was trying to take on the role that Bone had traditionally held, and more. Legally, now the entire population of eastern Sulawesi had entered some contractual arrangement with the colonial state.

**Chinese Economic Activity in Eastern Sulawesi**

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, though, it was not the Bugis or Bajo who were a cause of great concern, but rather control over Chinese and other ‘vreemde oosterlingen’, oriental, non-European foreigners, such as Arabs and people from the Indian subcontinent, who were moving into eastern Sulawesi. The nineteenth century concern about the uncontrolled influx of Chinese traders echoes complaints of Dutch officials starting from the late seventeenth century regarding Bugis traders, with this important difference that the Chinese, who imported their own labourers, were not linked to any competing political centre.

After a major effort to rid the seas of piracy, the next step was to assume more control over the new wave of migrants who were quickly becoming the most dynamic economic actors in eastern Sulawesi. The first tax to be levied in Banggai was, as mentioned above, not imposed by the colonial government, but by a trading company.

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650 The Sarasins note that Bugis men could marry local women, but never the reverse, because of the difference in status. F. Sarasin, P. Sarasin, *Reisen in Celebes*, 1, 1903, p. 347.
This new situation posed problems for the colonial state, and needless to say, the contract between the Handelsvereniging and the Ternaten Sultan was challenged. Consistent with the legalistic approach to such matters, the Dutch governor of Ternate first set out to establish what constituted a legal contract. Subsequently, the contract with the Handelsvereniging was declared null and void based on his conclusion that the Sultan of Ternate traditionally did not have rights to the forests of Banggai, and therefore was not able to cede these rights to a trading company. Furthermore, the Dutch Resident established that the political contract between Ternate and the government took precedence over any other legal arrangements between the Ternaten Sultan and third parties. The next question was who had jurisdiction over the forests? Traditionally, local populations collected forest products and the trader paid a small fee to the ruler or local chief. This was customary elsewhere in the Gulf of Tomini, and in this respect Banggai was clearly no exception.

**Islam in the Periphery of the Colonial State**

Instead of Bugis and ‘pirates’, now the rising tide of Islam was increasingly seen as a threat to the colonial state, because of its strong political overtones that would undermine Dutch influence. Reformist Islam took on stronger anti-European sentiments in the 1870s. The fall of Jolo in 1876 at the hands of the Spanish led to a blossoming of orthodox, militant Islam that spread throughout Sulu, to Mindanao where Islamic sentiments could be called upon to unite fragmented areas to resist the Spanish. Similarly, the war in Aceh, the Dutch encountered a strongly Islamic

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651 Technically, this was correct, the Ternaten Sultan had never exercised authority over Banggai’s forests. At the same time, based on a strictly legalistic approach, a government attitude could have argued that the Sultan traditionally had received a share of (the levies on) export products such as wax, tripang and mica. And, while the sultan had not exercised rights over the forest, wax, a forest product, was part of Banggai’s tribute to Ternate. Therefore, the Sultan should be able to at least tax this new export commodity.


population. In 1877, the annual report on the Dutch colonies for the first time included a
special heading for ‘religion’, (godsdienst), that was filled almost exclusively with facts
regarding the progress of Islam. Frequently recurring themes were the rising numbers of
people undertaking the journey to Mecca and the activities of Islamic teachers, often
Arabs, in remote parts of the archipelago, who were feared to be gaining considerable
political influence. Central and southeast Sulawesi were mentioned in this list of remote
places where Islam was making headway. Reports on the progress of Islam in the
animist interior of central Sulawesi gained momentum when missionary and
ethnographer Albert C. Kruyt opened a mission post in Poso in 1891.

A ‘buffer-zone policy’ was devised to protect animist populations, mostly residing
in inaccessible inland areas, from being converted to Islam. As part of this policy, a
Jesuit was given permission to visit the Bugis settlement of Kendari in 1882 in order to
gather information on how best to proselytise among the animist, inland Tolaki. He was
unable to make contact with the Tolaki who were hostile towards the coastal Bugis of
Kendari. The Jesuit gave up after few months when local Bugis built a new mosque near
his house. He was the first of missionaries in Southeast Sulawesi who wrote negatively
about Bugis. Not only had they thwarted his attempts to proselytise, in his view they
were ‘too lazy to do anything’.654 Bugis retained their reputation for undermining Dutch
influence, now not so much as agents of Bone, but as propagators of Islam who exerted
illegitimate political and economic influence over vulnerable, animist peoples. The
higher status of Bugis vis-à-vis indigenous peoples coupled with their relative wealth as
traders and cash crop growers only increased their authority in local contexts. The link
between economic change and social-religious change was very close in areas that had
previously been relatively isolated from outside influence. Kipp, whose study deals with
the inland Batak in north Sumatra, noted that the message of missionaries, whether they
be Islamic or Christian, was only meaningful in the face of sweeping changes resulting from new cash crops and increased contact with the outside world.\footnote{Koloniaal Verslag 1883, p. 17; ‘De Eerste Vestiging van den Katholieken Missionaris aan de Kendari-Baai’, De Katholieke Missie, 1886-87, Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 121-123.} It is significant that in the last years of the nineteenth century the large annual harvest celebration \textit{lumense} in Tobungku was abolished as a direct result of the influence of Bugis and Makassarese religious teachers.\footnote{Rita Smith Kipp; \textit{The Early Years of a Dutch Colonial Mission, The Karo Field}, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1990, p. 16.} Aziz, a member of Tobungku’s aristocracy who had been involved in local politics from the 1950s onward, remembered that his father and grandfather moved to the coast and converted to Islam in 1892. They took on Muslim names and then embarked on the pilgrimage to Mecca. They were taught by a Bugis teacher from Watampone (Bone) named Haji Nur.\footnote{655 In the lumense ceremony a carabao was slaughtered and divided among all participants. Participation in this ritual was also believed to bring about healing of ailments. According to Aziz, his father participated in the very last one, and during this ceremony he was cured of some ailment on his leg. Interview Abdul Azis, 14 February 1995, Bungku Tengah.}

\textbf{Bugis’ Economic Expansion}

There was more to the continuing Bugis diaspora than economic expansion and the spread of Islam. The Dutch discovered once again, much to their chagrin, that contracts on paper did not change the actual political reality as much as they had expected. Despite the contract signed in 1860 in which Bone’s claims to the east coast and the Gulf of Tomini were relinquished once and for all, the Dutch discovered in 1887 that Tojo still acknowledged the overlordship of Bone. Hence, it was deemed as important to make tributaries relinquish claims to ‘their’ centre. Tojo was subsequently pressured to sign a formal recognition of Dutch authority over Tojo; again, however, the treaty carried little weight.\footnote{ibid.} Bugis still remained the lingua franca in the Gulf of Tomini to

\footnote{658 Koloniaal Verslag 1888, p. 18. By this time the population of Tojo was estimated at 90,000, and the area was considered to be very fertile.}
such an extent that in 1892, the controleur of the Gulf of Tomini made use of a Bugis translator to communicate with coastal chiefs.\textsuperscript{659}

Before the colonial state moved into inland areas, these places were already being visited by enterprising Bugis who brought trade, wealth and a religion that was obviously successful in dealing with the outside world. A more thorough study of Bone in this period might yield interesting insights about how it responded to the new economic and cultural opportunities. In 1898, Bone intervened in the coffee war between Luwu and Sidenreng. Instead of receiving the military assistance Luwu had requested, Luwu was notified that the Toraja highlands had now become a vassal of Bone.\textsuperscript{660} In the same years Bone Bugis and aristocrats from Luwu were engaged in a fierce struggle for control over trade and monopolies in Mekongga, on the southeastern peninsula. The Sulawatang of Mekongga who acknowledged Luwu had fled because of the hostility of Bugis. He only dared to return under protection of the Dutch, who supported Luwu’s claim to Mekongga.\textsuperscript{661} The same struggle for political and economic control extended into Kendari, where in 1901 the Sarasins reported that a Bugis aristocrat was trying to obtain a monopoly on the trade in forest products in the Kendari area. In the interior yet another Bugis aristocrat was lobbying for the position of main ruler in Konawe.\textsuperscript{662} The authority of more recent Bugis settlements such as Bunta in the Gulf of Tomini and Kendari was ostensibly limited to the coastal strip only, ‘as far inland as one could throw a stone’ or ‘as far as a gong could be heard’.\textsuperscript{663} Nevertheless, even at the end of the twentieth century these coastal strips were still referred to as having been under Bone’s authority (‘di bawah Bone’), because they were inhabited by Bugis who traditionally acknowledged the ruler of Bone.

\textsuperscript{659} ANRI Bogor, Besluit 24 February 1897 No. 50.
\textsuperscript{661} F. Sarasin, P. Sarasin, \textit{Reisen in Celebes} I, 1905, pp. 337, 342.
\textsuperscript{662} ibid. p. 358.
In November 1905, during the lead-up to the third Dutch-Bone war, this time over relinquishing harbour duties to the Dutch, the posthouder of Banggai intercepted a letter to Kalumbatan from the gallarang of Bagusolo to the chief of the Bugis in Salabangka. This letter reminded the gallarang of an earlier agreement they had made to assist Bone against the Netherlands-Indies government. Even as late as 1908, three years after Bone had been defeated by the Dutch, the Bajo of Kalumbatan refused to receive a Dutch official who came to announce new taxes, since they considered themselves still tributary to Bone. Only after a representative of the Bugis king accompanied the Dutch official did Kalumbatan reluctantly submit.

Small-scale Polities in Eastern Sulawesi 1800-1905
In each of the polities of the east coast, the encroaching influence of the colonial government and the emergent cash crop economy were felt in different ways. The new direction of colonial policy with regard to more peripheral areas of the ‘buitengewesten’ became apparent in two ways in eastern Sulawesi. First, in Banggai, the anti-piracy investigations led to the placement of a posthouder, an indigenous, colonial official, who tried to carry out Dutch policies indirectly through exerting influence on the local ruler. In Buton, the last decades of the nineteenth century were filled with a string of small confrontations, in which Buton had little choice but to give in to Dutch demands. In the following section I will give a brief overview of each of the east coast polities in these decades of transition.

Buton
The transition to a more bureaucratic and interventionist colonial state was felt in Buton later than in Banggai and Tobungku. For most of the nineteenth century political

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663 This coastal strip around Bunta was considered to be about two kilometers in width. J. J. Dormeier, Banggaisch Adatrecht, p. 48.
664 Koloniaal Verslag 1906, p. 67.
relations were conducted in the style of the VOC. The semblance of a diplomatic exchange between independent, though not equal, states was still adhered to, and representatives of the Butonese sultan continued to travel to Makassar to receive their gift of compensation that was first instituted when Buton agreed to concede to the VOC monopoly in spices. Buton had been able to keep the Dutch at bay with a mixture of diplomacy, covert resistance and balancing between Bone and the Dutch. But, in the last decades of the nineteenth century this was no longer sufficient. A string of minor conflicts between the colonial government and the Butonese sultan led to a show of colonial force in which Buton had to give way each time.

As the colonial state expanded its influence over the seas, one of its priorities was to control indigenous movement and mobility. In the case of Buton this meant restricting the activity of its ‘wandering’ nobles outside of Buton. In 1876, forty-three Butonese vessels with around 700 men appeared in the port of Banda, commanded by Butonese aristocrats. They had no official papers and a ‘defiant attitude’. These men had come to collect tribute from the many Butonese who had migrated to Maba, Ceram, the Kei Islands and Aru on invitation of the colonial government to work in the spice gardens. Those who refused to pay tribute were threatened that relatives back home would bear the consequences. The following year the Sultan of Buton was officially notified that Butonese nobles were no longer permitted to extort money from individuals who, in Dutch eyes, were no longer Butonese subjects. The Dutch never recognised the legitimacy of such political claims beyond the actual homeland, but were now increasingly in a position to enforce such a ban. From 1877 onwards, Butonese

666 ‘…een zeer aanmatigende houding’.
667 Koloniaal Verslag 1876, p. 27; ibid. 1877 p. 25.
668 Ligtvoet contributes the activity of Butonese nobles overseas to the fact that there was an excess of high-ranking nobles to be supported within Buton, which put great pressure on lower ranking nobles and traders. The activities overseas in Banda pursuing Butonese subjects and raiding reduced the pressure within Buton itself. A. Ligtvoet, ‘Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton’, 1878, p. 17.
who migrated elsewhere could no longer be claimed as subjects of Buton. The prohibition may not have stopped Butonese nobles from journeying east, but if and when they did, it was more discrete and small-scale.

Buton’s internal affairs were not immediately affected by the new prohibition, but this, too, would change. Each time a new sultan was chosen, more conditions were attached to obtaining official approval from the colonial government. In May 1887, the Governor of Celebes travelled to Buton to discuss Buton’s reluctance to grant permission for the building and maintaining of a coal depot for refuelling Dutch steamships. Hence, official approval of the new sultan was made conditional on his cooperation. During this visit the Butonese sultan refused to come on board the Dutch warship, nor would he send members of his council to represent him. In response to this ‘grave insult’ the Sultan was ordered to journey to Makassar within a month to apologise for his undiplomatic behaviour, and then make a formal request to renew the contract with the Netherlands-Indies government. When the Sultan once again did not comply, the governor of Makassar set out for Buton with three warships and threatened to attack the town of Bau-Bau if his demands were not met. Finally, in the face of gunboat diplomacy, the Sultan and all the members of the council came aboard the Governor’s ship, asked forgiveness and agreed to build the coal depot. The governor returned the visit with the entire landing squad of the three warships to make the point that Buton was not in a position to defy the colonial state. Governor Bakkers insisted that the seating arrangements during official visits were changed, so that the higher status of the representative of the colonial state vis-à-vis the Sultan was clearly visible. This type of seemingly small but subtle demand by the Dutch, often followed

669 ARA Mailrapport 1876 No. 644, ‘Vaarbeperking Boetonse prinsen’.
by passive or active resistance, continued for several decades until the introduction of direct rule.

**Banggai**

Nursewan’s three month investigation of Tobelo and Galela raiders in the Banggai archipelago had uncovered close connections between these raiders and the Banggai elite, Bajo traders and fishers. The Ternaten hongi led by Said Mohammad against the last remaining Tobelo and Galela in 1879 was under the supervision of Nursewan. After the successful elimination of raiders in the Banggai archipelago, Nursewan stayed on as a posthouder whose task was to ensure that the Banggai elite did not fall back into the old pattern of forming alliances with raiding groups. He also tried to establish influence in internal affairs by introducing new rules regarding taxation, disease control, and internal conflicts. His activities were extremely limited because he did not own a boat, and depended on local chiefs for transport. Contact with the mainland of Banggai was difficult, and Tobungku could only be reached with great difficulty. Nursewan was unable to estimate the number of Bugis resident in Tobungku because he had not been able to travel there for many months.\(^\text{672}\) He duties were limited to finding suitable candidates for the position of ruler after the death of the Banggai ruler in 1880, trying to vaccinate the population and resolving criminal acts such as the murders of Chinese mentioned above.\(^\text{673}\)

Nursewan succeeded in finding suitable candidates for the position of ruler. Trouble threatened, however, when Unga, the grandson of the deceased ruler, insisted on being

\(^{672}\) In the same year, a posthouder was appointed for the neighbouring Sula, as well as a number of pertada (local chiefs) in Obi and Saluwi who were to report to the posthouders as soon as suspect vessels ventured into their waters.

\(^{673}\) In 1881 the Sula and Banggai archipelagoes and the east coast of Sulawesi were visited by the government steamship Bromo and in the same period another government ship paid a visit to Banggai as well. While marked in the indices the reports were unfortunately unavailable because of the limited accessibility of the Bogor depot at the time of my research.
nominated for the position, but the posthouder was able to diffuse the tensions. The prevention of a smallpox epidemic, however, proved more difficult. In 1884 news reached Banggai that a person infected with smallpox had returned from Gorontalo on a paduakang based in Kalumbatan. The posthouder hitched a ride on a boat to Kalumbatan and placed a marker on the house of the sick person as a warning not to enter. His attempt to vaccinate the population against smallpox failed, first because the vaccine had died out, and then because the ruler was not co-operative. The response of the ruler shows that vaccination as an instrument of empire was potentially sensitive. Without telling the posthouder, the ruler dispatched several chatib, his own Islamic officials, to Lolantang on Peleng to vaccinate people. The vaccinations were too limited and the vaccine possibly no longer active, so that the smallpox epidemic in 1885 claimed many lives in Banggai and the surrounding islands.

In 1891, the suggestion of the introduction of taxation in Banggai by the Ternaten resident was dismissed. There were twenty Bugis in Banggai, and five hundred in Bunta on the north coast of the eastern arm, but the posthouder felt he would not be able to enforce taxation since he was not even able to contact them most of the time. These were the same Bugis who protected the Bugis Abangakelala, Lananrang and Sangawang who were suspected of killing the Chinese trader Sei Tjong Siong in Baisama on the eastern arm of Sulawesi. They were descendants of Togian Bugis who had taken up residence in Bunta in the 1860s, when the Banggai ruler granted them permission to settle in Bunta as a token of gratitude for assisting in a war. They were still in close

675 ANRI Ternate 185c. This is the only surviving letter by Nursewan from Banggai in the archive of the residency of Ternate. There were obviously other reports on which information in the Koloniale Verslagen were based, but these reports either did not survive, or were kept in the Bogor branch of ANRI which was difficult to access at the time of my research.
677 ANRI Ternate 419 p. 22.
678 J. J. Dormeier, Banggaisch Adatrecht, 1947, p. 48. More precise dates and names do not exist. The last recorded instance in which Togian Bugis assisted Banggai was in 1846, during the ‘rebellion’ against Ternate, in which case Agama would have been the ruler who granted them permission to settle in Bunta.
communication with Togian and the memory of their participation in the conflict with Ternate and the Dutch in 1846 would not have inspired co-operation if Dutch taxes were imposed.

The weakness of the Dutch presence in Banggai was that it was based on the premise that a carefully selected ruler would carry out the orders of the Resident in Ternate. Upon his return from Ternate, the new ruler refused to take the oath at Kota Jin, the former capital of Banggai, which had been destroyed in 1846 during the Agama conflict. The oath sworn on the ancestral heirlooms of Banggai called on supernatural forces to inflict illness, or even death, on the ruler if his conduct was not of the highest moral standard. The ruler’s refusal to take the oath meant that the Banggai population viewed him with great suspicion, since only persons who could not be trusted would be reluctant to take the oath. Because of the suspicion he aroused by not taking the oath, the new ruler’s orders were neglected by his immediate subjects as well as by other chiefs. The residence of the ruler, built on a cliff behind the settlement of Lompio, was so ramshackle that a visiting official feared it might collapse. Despite the prestige of external powers, such as Ternate and the Dutch, which had contributed to the position of Banggai as a political centre, the legitimacy of the ruler still depended on taking the oath at Kota Jin, which made him accountable to local ancestral powers.

The passive resistance of the Banggai ruler towards the posthouders turned more openly hostile after he learned that he would be deposed by the Dutch if he were to embark on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He lost enthusiasm for his function, and since he had already received several warnings from the Resident of Ternate, he chose to resign. The prospect of a pilgrimage to Mecca and its associated prestige was more attractive than the position of ruler that was curtailed by Dutch influence. The failure of this first attempt to exert indirect influence on Banggai and its coastal ‘dependencies’ revealed how fragile the Dutch position was. True resolution of the problems encountered by the
posthouder required more direct, structural intervention. Nevertheless, the posthouder was praised by the Resident of Ternate for ‘greatly contributing to the improvement of unfavourable circumstances’.  

**Tobungku**

Tobungku’s location close to forested hinterlands enabled it to benefit from the boom in forest products. When the colonial government decided it was time to re-establish contact with Tobungku, its capital had relocated from Lanona, at the base of Fafontofure, its original location before the destruction of Tobungku in the 1840s. As safety increased, the fortified hilltop was not reoccupied, but a new settlement, Sakita, grew up on the beach at the estuary of the small Sakita River in the immediate vicinity of the fortress.  

The occasional reports on Tobungku in the 1870s and early 1880s revolve around a quick succession of rulers, appointed on initiative of the Dutch, as there did not appear to be much interest in the position in Tobungku. In 1872, a government ship visited the capital, which was found to be in a sad state, since it had been abandoned a year and a half earlier after the ruler died. The new ruler was appointed in 1874. He travelled to Ternate to be inaugurated, and departed for Tobungku but was never seen again, as he and his following were captured and killed by raiders.  

A visit by the steamship Batavia in 1877 found Tobungku in a ‘chaotic’ state, presumably meaning that there was still no ruler. It was not until 1880 that a new ruler was chosen again, ‘according

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679 ANRI Ternate 273, ‘Memorie van Overgave van het bestuur over de Residentie Ternate door den aftredenden Resident J. van Oldenborgh aan den optredenden Resident, Ternate 13 Mei 1895’.

680 In 1872, a settlement named Pambaleang was mentioned as the capital of Tobungku, whereas Tobungku itself was said to be a river rather than a settlement. This settlement is not mentioned on any maps nor could I find out anything about it in Tobungku. *Koloniaal Verslag 1873*, p. 22.

681 ARA Mailrapport 1874 No. 300.

682 *Koloniaal Verslag 1878*. 
to the wishes of the people’. However, this ruler died the following year, and the government of Tobungku was then in the hands of the utusan of Ternate and the posthouder, who could only visit Tobungku very occasionally. The descendants of the deceased ruler were summoned to Ternate so that a new ruler could be chosen ‘according to the current customs’, which at that time was still that the position of ruler rotated between different aristocratic families.  

It was not until 1884 that a new ruler, Kaicil Laopeke, was finally inaugurated in Ternate. As in Banggai, there was not much enthusiasm for the position of ruler, which only appeared to be filled on initiative of the colonial government.

All this time, the Ternaten utusan still played a role in Tobungku as well, but it is not known much influence was attached to this position. In 1995, older people still spoke of the period of Ternaten rule, which had preceded Dutch rule, so that Ternaten influence was remembered as a subjugation to an external centre. There must have also been a considerable amount of intermarriage between Ternatens and Tobungku aristocratic families. In the early twentieth century two groups were recognised within the Tobungku elite; the descendants of Lambojo, who descended from Luwu and Matano, and who reigned in the middle of the eighteenth century, and the descendants from Lasando who originated from Ternate.

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683 ibid. 1880 p. 22.
684 Koloniaal Verslag 1882 p. 22. It is unfortunate that the ‘customs’ are never specified. In view of the fact that the Dutch acknowledged the fact that there was no single dynasty, it seems strange that only the descendants of the deceased ruler were summoned instead of the more common procedure where a number of candidates were selected and summoned to Ternate.
685 When a copy of the renewed contract with the recently inaugurated Tobungku ruler Laopeke was sent to Batavia for ratification, the information about the predecessor conflicted with information there. In the new contract Kaicil Latojo was mentioned as the predecessor, whereas records in Batavia mentioned Moloku (Maluku?, original: Molooke), who was inaugurated in 1874. The news of Kaicil Moloku’s fate may not have reached Batavia. Kaicil Latojo was probably the ruler inaugurated in 1880, and who died the following year. A report of 1884 regarding the succession in Tobungku could not be located, neither could the report sent to clarify the issue of when Latojo had been inaugurated. Besluit 10 December 1884 LaC No 265/2; Koloniaal Verslag 1885 p. 25.
686 The two groups were distinguished by the different pakaian adat (formal clothing) worn during ceremonies. Labojo’s descendants wore a black outfit with a yellow selendang (sash), and the descendants of Lasando who was said to be from Ternate, wore a white headscarf, white shirt and trousers with a folded sarung.
In the early 1890s, the government considered moving the posthouder from Banggai to Tobungku because of its lively trade and larger number of ‘foreign traders’. Also, rumours that Tobungku still mounted maritime raids filled the government with concern. After Tobelo and Galela raiding ended, Muna and Tobungku continued to mount raids on settlements in Banggai, though this clearly was no longer on the scale it had been in the past.\(^{687}\) Violent conflict now appeared to result not so much from raiding, but from tension emerging on the new economic frontier of forest commodities, where traders from elsewhere could change the local balance of power. In Tobungku, Bugis were more dominant than Chinese than in Banggai, as the KPM line No. 10 facilitated connections with Makassar. That is not to say that there were no Chinese in Tobungku. An incident in a small settlement on the Tobungku coast indicates that the trade in forest commodities drew local migrants in addition to Chinese and Bugis. In 1892, groups of Munanese and Kendari people arrived in the small coastal settlement of Dongin, where they agreed to collect forest commodities for a Chinese who had a small trading post there. After four days, the Chinese and his two servants from Gorontalo were killed and all the trading goods looted.\(^{688}\) The trading goods were subsequently found, which suggests that the perpetrators were not professional raiders, and that the attack was not premeditated. This incident, along with similar ones in Banggai, were an indication of how precarious the position of outside traders was in areas where they had no local connections. An important difference with the Chinese is that they were not operating within the wider political framework that had supported earlier waves of Bugis and Ternaten migration to eastern Sulawesi. They were not associated with regional centres such as Bone, nor did they in this early stage have local patrons who

\(^{687}\) Koloniaal Verslag 1893 p. 28.

\(^{688}\) Koloniaal Verslag 1893 p. 28. Dongin is not indicated on even the most detailed map of the Kabupaten Poso, 1990.
eased the way in the manner that Tuanna-I-Dondang had done with Vosmaer. They were the exponents of a of new centres such as Singapore and represented new ways of economic exploitation that depended on access to capital and on connections with an emerging global market. In the meantime, the safety of Chinese traders depended entirely on establishing good connections with the local populace. Several decades later, in the early twentieth century, many Chinese traders had formed the necessary alliances and intermarried with local aristocratic families.

De Clerq, the Dutch resident of Ternate in 1890, remarked that Tobungku’s lively trade was in no way controlled by Tobungku chiefs, nor did they control the ‘alfurs’ in the interior who brought wax, rattan and damar down to the coast. The role of coastal chiefs in facilitating trade at this time is not exactly clear. Atkinson’s reconstruction of the history of the inland Wana in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, suggests that in this period Tobungku’s elite was extending its political networks into the interior. While closer ties may have occurred after the disruption of coastal trading and raiding in the 1840s and 1850s, the rise in demand for forest products would have only encouraged this process further. Atkinson’s reconstruction suggests also that the interior became an important source of slaves for Tobungku. Tobungku recognised one Wana mokole as its representative and gave him special privileges and support, which in turn gave him an advantage over his peers. With the military backing of Tobungku, he pressured other inland chiefs to contribute to his own tribute payments for Tobungku. This mokole, who was most active in the slave trade, was at the same time the sole source of imported objects needed to pay adat fines. In this manner, Wana customary law was transformed to funnel slaves to Tobungku. Kruyt attributes the institution of debt-slavery in Wana to Luwu, when they were forced to acknowledge Luwu’s

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689 To some extent, my own safety in eastern Sulawesi was guaranteed by the assumed protection of the Indonesian government, since I was seen as a tamu pemerintah, a guest of the government, and carried official letters.

overlordship, again suggesting a link between subordination to a coastal polity and debt-slavery.  

When direct rule was introduced to eastern Sulawesi and the slave-trade became a thing of the past, the tiered chiefdom in the Wana interior reverted to a relatively egalitarian system. Though evidence is patchy, it is clear that the demand for exchange goods was a determining factor in Tobungku’s coast-inland relations. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the interior was not only a source of wax and iron, but also of slaves and increasingly important forest products. The importance of the latter may have changed patterns of food production in Tobungku, a since areas such as ToEpe that produced large amounts of rice, would have also been prime areas for collecting forest products. However, lack of historical sources for this period prevent a more detailed analysis.

**Konawe-Laiwui**

The ‘alfur’ realm of Laiwui had never enjoyed the same status as other east coast polities. It was claimed as a tributary of both Buton and Bone, and its northern coastal settlements were absorbed by Tobungku in the course of the nineteenth century. In 1880, the governor of Makassar travelled to Laiwui to inaugurate Sao-Sao, a descendent of Arung Bakung, the Bone aristocrat who settled in Kendari in the 1820s. When the Dutch governor of Makassar gifted Sao-Sao with a flag and a seal, there was no resistance to using the flag, since Laiwui did not appear to have a flag of its own.  

Three years later the colonial government contracted a steamship to maintain a regular service to Kendari to improve communications with this area. The contract with Sao-Sao drafted in 1884 raised the problematic issue of defining Laiwui’s ‘territory’ in Dutch terms. The colonial state was the latest in a series of external parties that had shored up Laiwui’s status in relation to the inland realms of Konawe. Both Arung

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692 ANRI Besluit 20 April 1884, No. 12, ‘Nota’, n.p., article 11.
Bakung and, arguably, Vosmaer were connected to outside powers, but their local influence depended on their own personal skills and their relations with Tebau. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Bone syabandar’s power was based more firmly on his connection with Bone. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the colonial state tried to take the place of Bone by ratifying the power of the local ruler and increasing the frequency of communications with Kendari Bay. All relations with external powers in the bay emphasised Laiwui’s position in relation to other parts of Konawe. However, as the colonial state moved away from a personalised relationship with a single ruler to a more formal relationship, the contested nature of the relations between Laiwui and Konawe became visible in the archival record. In order to conclude the 1880 contract, the Dutch wanted a clearer definition of Laiwui’s territory.

Confirming contemporary notions of Southeast Asian polities, Sao-Sao claimed that Laiwui consisted of the (unspecified amount of) land around Kendari Bay and any land occupied by his subjects. This would have comprised the six villages on Kendari inhabited by Bugis, Makassarese and Selayarese, consisting of about 1300 inhabitants in total, and Sao-Sao’s Tolaki subjects who had their fields in the vicinity of Kendari Bay. This vague definition did not satisfy the Batavia where the contract had been sent for approval, it left Kendari vulnerable to claims of neighbouring polities. The issue was not resolved. Relations with Bugis and Bajo in Kendari were easier to deal with. According to the contract they acknowledged Sao-Sao, but had their own chosen chief who was directly responsible to the Dutch governor in Makassar. To pre-empt any claims that they were tributary to Bone, the governor made sure the position of the Bugis chief remained occupied. The Bugis chief who died in 1883 was replaced in the same year. The 300 or so Bajo who stayed in the Kendari Bay after their annual

693 ANRI Besluit 20 April 1884, No. 12, p. 2.
migration down the coast in search of tripang were, like Bugis, not considered subjects of the coastal Tolaki ruler.

Besides the settlements in the bay, there were fifteen coastal settlements to the north and five to the south where trade with the interior took place. The population of Tolaki was estimated at ca. 20,000 based on the amount of rice and damar that was exported through Kendari Bay. The status of the coastal and inland areas further removed from the bay remained unclear at that time. In 1901, Laiwui was considered the capital of the Kendari area, without taking into account whether or not Sao-Sao’s authority was recognised in the interior. The Sarasins, who traversed the south-eastern peninsula in 1903, were the first Europeans to note that Laiwui, from an inland perspective, was merely a coastal realm of Konawe. This had immediate practical consequences for them, as Sao-Sao was unable to guarantee their safety in Kendari’s hinterland. 694

Interestingly, the Sarasins’ description of Konawe in 1903 is remarkably similar to Vosmaer’s seventy years earlier. They found that Konawe was a loose federation of a large number of districts in which the most influential anakia or nobles had the greatest authority. 695 The trade in forest products did not change the decentralised political structure, though it did bring inland areas into an unprecedented level of contact with traders from outside the peninsula. Deep in the interior the Sarasins encountered a Makassarese trader who had built a make-shift godown for rattan. The increased contact between the coast and inland areas was also evident in the sudden appearance of the term Tokea in a government report to refer to the indigenous population of Kendari, instead of the commonly used term ‘Tolelaki’ or ‘Tollaki’. 696 Treffers states that ‘Tokea’ was a derogatory term used by coastal people, which probably also included

694 A similar problem was encountered in the early twentieth century in Mekongga. The authority of the ‘hadat’, the ruler and his council, did not reach far enough into the interior to use this as a basis for colonial administration. ANRI Makassar branch, ‘Nota over Kolaka, Memorie omtrent den stand van zaken in de ounderafdeling Mengkoka’, van Wieland, 5 December 1908.

coastal Tolaki, to refer to inland peoples rather than an ethnonym. Similar tensions to the ones described for Banggai and Tobungku also arose here. The murder of a Chinese trader referred to as Baba was still widely remembered in Kendari in the 1990s. The routes of forest products to the coast were, however, to have far-reaching political consequences. According to a 1908 report, the boundaries between Mekongga and Kendari/Konawe were drawn based on which coast forest products were taken to.

The political fragmentation of Konawe was reflected in the use of ethnonyms. The Tolaki occupied the inland area between the Konaweha and Lasolo rivers. They were notoriously warlike, feared among their northern neighbours in Tobungku, and indeed two of them mentioned to the Sarasins that warfare was their favourite activity. To the north of Kendari in Asera and Wiwirano, the population did not consider themselves Tolaki but referred to themselves as ToWiwirano, ToAsera, ToWatu and ToWaru. In the inland areas of Lambuia and Pondidaha, the local people introduced themselves to the Sarasins as Tokea. The physical features of the latter were markedly different from the Tolaki the Sarasins encountered, whose features resembled those of Bugis. It would appear that the Tolaki occupied the same position in Konawe as the ToMaiki had in Mori; an inland group with privileged access to external trade, and towards the end of the nineteenth century increasingly also to firearms. The Sarasins concluded that the Tolaki were a ‘warrior tribe’ that had successfully dominated other groups. Possibly here, too, inland raiding had proved advantageous to certain groups. If coastal Tolaki elites had ever controlled trade to the inland realms of Pondidaha and Lambuia, by the early years of the twentieth century they had considerable competition from Bugis,
Makassarese and Chinese traders who ventured into the interior in greater numbers than in the past.

**Conclusion: The End of a Regional System**

In the period 1880-1905, major changes in the regional political system that started to emerge middle of the nineteenth century became far more visible. Whereas previously, eastern Sulawesi was an ambiguous periphery situated between the two regional centres of Bone and Ternate, now it increasingly occupied an equally ambiguous position at the periphery of a colonial state, a state which undermined the pattern of alliances that had formed the basis of indigenous political and economic relations. Maritime raiding diasporas were replaced by new economic diasporas of Chinese and Bugis, and intrapolity warfare and raiding made way for small-scale conflict, and murders of potentially powerful Chinese traders. Ironically, at the same time that eastern Sulawesi was being drawn further into the colonial state, new economic opportunities such as the trade in forest products emphasised existing tendencies towards fragmentation or polycentrism.

The presence and intervention of the colonial state in these decades increased as its objectives changed from eradicating maritime raiding to introducing more permanent control at the local level. Attention was given to improving communication through steam-liners, and carefully filling in legal gaps in the relations with more remote areas. But as had occurred in the past, greater knowledge of a local area or problem only increased the desire to intervene. The colonial state’s main instruments of power were a show of force through regular patrols and the representatives of the colonial state (the posthouder in Banggai) and the Ternaten Sultanate. Even though the posthouder was praised for his efforts, it was evident that in order to impose tax, control mobility of new

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699 The Luwu noble who accompanied the Sarasins on their journey across the southeastern peninsula, increased the number of guards at night as soon as they entered Tolaki territory out of fear of being ambushed. He said that ‘nobody was safe with Tolaki, not even their family’. For this reason, Tolaki who visited Mekongga were guarded continuously. P. Sarasin, F. Sarasin, *Reisen in Celebes*, I, 1895, pp. 358, 371, 372, 375.
migrants or regulate the exploitation of forest products in a satisfactory manner, more structural and long-lasting intervention was needed. The control of local ports and the levying of duties in these ports was accomplished through treaties with numerous individual rulers in the first years of the twentieth century. The resulting control over indigenous ports was a natural extension of the control over the seas, and was the first tangible step to control on land, forming yet another step towards the imposition of direct rule between 1905-1908.

The rapid economic developments occurring at that time were, perhaps, a more immediate force for change than the increasingly felt presence of the colonial state. The demand for rattan, damar and copra opened a new cash crop frontier that was readily explored and exploited by new diasporas from outside, both Chinese and Bugis. Indigenous populations were engaged in collecting damar and rattan, in clearing the forest and planting coconut palms. The greater contact between coastal and inland populations due to new economic developments led to an influx of imported commodities, an increased exposure to Islam and a decline in headhunting for ritual purposes. As maritime raiding became more and more difficult, slaves were now increasingly procured from inland areas, either through overland raiding or through debt.

Although Bone had relinquished its claims to the east coast in 1860, Bugis inhabitants in eastern Sulawesi and new migrants certainly had not relinquished their claims to Bone as a political centre and source of local power. If anything, the influence of Bugis pioneers and traders increased as they pushed ahead in opening up inland areas in eastern Sulawesi. Their prestige and power was based on wealth, knowledge of the outside world, which included Islam, and their historical connection with Bone. Even though Bone was not called on for military support, it was still a prestigious centre and a powerful enough economic force in the region. It appears that, just as slave raiding
turned inland, Bone’s expansion also concentrated on inland areas as well, encouraged by the increased trade in forest products.

Diasporas continued to play a crucial role in eastern Sulawesi, but their nature changed. The colonial state had systematically undermined the political aspect of diasporas by trying to ‘contain’ Bone and Buton within their ‘own’ territories and by carefully defining the boundaries of polities. The boom in forest products and copra, however, triggered new diasporas of migrants who were more oriented towards global markets and the Islamic world and were not associated in the same way to indigenous political centres of Bone or Ternate. Even though Bone was still viewed with suspicion, it was reformist Islam that was perceived as a potential undermining force of the colonial state. Bugis migrants, who, in previous centuries would have been seen as agents of Bone, were recast as Islamic protagonists; the danger lay in their increased contact with the still animist, inland areas where they could to use their power and prestige to turn local populations against the colonial state. In the minds of indigenous people and of colonial officials in these areas, the lines between Islam and Bugis influence blurred. The ambiguous position of eastern Sulawesi at the periphery of the colonial state ended with the introduction of direct rule in 1905. But, ironically, at the time that both Bone and the east coast were subjected to direct colonial rule, the east coast was more open to Bugis influence than ever before in its history.
Conclusion: The End of a Regional System

This study focuses on a number of small-scale polities in eastern Sulawesi in the two centuries preceding the establishment of colonial rule in 1905. The timespan of the study allows an exploration of the history of eastern Sulawesi through three major transitions in the regional political constellation and its transformation into a ‘periphery’ of the colonial state in the course of the nineteenth century. In the two centuries preceding the advent of direct colonial rule, east coast polities occupied an ambivalent position in between two major spheres of influence, that of Bone in South Sulawesi, and that of Ternate in Maluku. The late seventeenth century was marked by an important transition in the eastern archipelago; the fall of Makassar and the suppression of a rebellion in Maluku as the VOC established itself as an regional power to be reckoned with. The second transition occurred as the east coast was drawn into expanding trading and raiding networks, in which slave-raiding and the tripang trade determined the rhythm of economic activities along that coast of Sulawesi. While the initial entry of the Dutch in the archipelago had had only a limited impact on the patterns of political, economic dynamics in this area of Sulawesi, the gradual transition that took place in second half of the nineteenth century, as the colonial state and a globalised economy encroached on local spheres of influence, transformed and undermined the existing political system both at a regional and a local level.

As laid out in the two introductory chapters, east coast polities were never major centres of political and economic power. They were characterised by their small-scale, polycentric nature, which they shared with the majority of the archipelago’s polities, both large and small. Regional centres of power such as Bone and Ternate operated on a larger scale, but still consisted of a multitude of diverse, smaller polities and leader-follower
groups, similar to those encountered in eastern Sulawesi. It is at this point where the notion of a polity in whatever form is too limited and the wider political constellation needs to be taken into consideration. Looking first at the regional centres, Bone and Ternate were centres of wider spheres of influence that included vassals, close tributaries, more remote tributaries and networks of traders and lesser chiefs in diaspora. A wide range of local and regional relations converged in such large polities. The diverse patchwork of political, economic and cultural relations is similar to what Warren refers to as a zone, but broader, because it includes areas that acknowledged Bone’s overlordship and were influenced by Bugis customs, culture and language, but where trade did not benefit Bone or other South Sulawesi polities in any direct way. These spheres of influence were created and maintained through a diffuse, decentralised process of diaspora that was at best only partially controlled by the main centre. Characteristic of the centre of the smaller polities in both local and Dutch sources was that within such a dynamic and flexible system, they were able to harness external resources of trade, military allies and prestige to raise their status and power over that of their local rivals.

Crucial to understanding the dynamics of this flexible and multi-layered system is the notion of heterarchy or sequential hierarchy, that emphasised horizontal integration and flexible hierarchies, which is implicit in concepts of the ‘segmented state’ or ‘galactic polity’. While regional centres constituted the largest ‘nodes’ in the political landscape and had considerable economic and political resources, they did not control their wider sphere of influence, and were dependent on good relations with the closest powerful vassals. Nor were such ‘spheres’ homogenous, continuous spaces, but rather consisted of interconnected and overlapping local spheres of influence. Within such a wider sphere, small-scale polities also formed a ‘node’ on the political landscape where different relationships converged, but the pattern of these relations were in regional terms a mirror image of regional centres. These relations fall into four categories. Starting at the local
level and expanding outwards these relations included: those within the polity, those between local polities, economic and military alliances with local migrant groups who often were associated with a regional centre, and finally tributary relations with regional centres. While centres such as Bone and Ternate were undoubtedly more powerful than Banggai, Tobungku and Buton, the power of regional centres within the local spheres was limited. Relations with external allies, whether they be locally settled migrants or a regional centre, were shaped by the interests and needs of small-scale polities as well as by demands from a regional centre. The weight that relations with local allies and external centres carried depended on the local context of rivalry within and between polities.

As the history of these centuries shows, local and regional conflict and competition were interrelated. Polities in eastern Sulawesi competed with each other and each had their own local spheres of influence. At the same time, the influence of regional centres extended into eastern Sulawesi; indirectly through independent chiefs and traders, or directly through envoys and punitive expeditions. The situation in Banggai between 1680-1700, as discussed in chapter three, when the boundaries of regional spheres of influence were still in flux, clearly illustrates some of these ambiguities. Local conflict and the blurring of regional and local elements complicate the question of what constitutes a local polity. By 1700, the situation in Banggai had stabilised. The conflict between Banggai and Mendono had been resolved, and regional spheres of influences were defined in such a way that Banggai maintained close economic and political relations with Bugis traders and with Bone, as well as maintaining irregular tributary relations with Ternate and the VOC.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century as described in chapter four, the regional political constellation changed as raiding and trading diasporas expanded across the archipelago and the VOC declined. Tobungku was integrated both into the wider network of Tobelo diaspora, and into the Magindanao network centred on Toli-toli. At the same time, Bugis and Makassarese traders dominated the external trade of Tobungku. Although
there were new external centres and allies, the extant evidence suggests that the pattern of local conflict remained strikingly similar to that of a century earlier with the important difference that there was no apparent conflict between the two regional centres.

Tobungku’s Tobelo allies now assisted in the conflict with Banggai, while Tobungku itself participated in a siege on Kalengsusu with its Magindanao and Tobelo allies. Just as was the case in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the question of overlordship in this period remained ambiguous far into the nineteenth century. After 1825, a Ternaten official was placed in Tobungku, but when Bone’s dominance was truly challenged by the Dutch in the 1840s and 1850s, its ruler refused to relinquish his claims on the east coast of Sulawesi, which included both Banggai and Tobungku.

The return of the Dutch to the area in 1816 signalled the beginning of colonial expansion and the establishment of a centralised bureaucratic state. This colonial state would eventually undermine some of the fundamental mechanisms of the regional political system as it had been functioning up to then: especially the military and economic dimensions of diaspora as a means of creating and maintaining political spheres of influence. The ‘rebellions’ in Tobungku and Banggai in this period were a reaction of local factions supported by Bugis against the expansion of Ternate. Despite its official policy of non-intervention, the colonial state expanded its maritime influence and intervened in indigenous polities, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century onward. In eastern Sulawesi, the influence of the colonial state was mediated by the sultanate of Ternate and through the effects of anti-piracy campaigns. Underlying colonial policies was a strong bias against uncontrolled mobility and diasporas, aimed both raiders and Bugis active outside their ‘homelands’ in South Sulawesi.

In a number of important aspects, the ‘rebellions’ in the 1840s resembled the conflict in Banggai in 1680-1700. First, in both cases there were local conflicts that were intertwined with a regional conflict about the boundaries of Bone’s sphere of influence,
and second, the conflicts were driven more by external than by local dynamics. Both the late seventeenth century and mid-nineteenth century conflicts were characterised by the familiar pattern of alliances between local factions and external allies. In the nineteenth century case, Bone’s overlordship was challenged by the Dutch government in south Sulawesi and in eastern Sulawesi by Ternaten claims and the first, short-lived colonial outpost in Kendari Bay. In Banggai and Tobungku, resistance against Ternaten officials was backed by Bugis and was retrospectively supported by Bone.

The defeat of Bone and the forced denouncement of its claims to the east coast of Sulawesi still did not in fact achieve the intended goal of undermining the influence of Bugis in eastern Sulawesi. In formal, political terms, the east coast may have been lost to Bone after 1860, but the continuing diaspora of Bugis to eastern Sulawesi maintained communications with South Sulawesi and facilitated even tributary relationships with Bugis and Bajo in the Gulf of Tomini and the east coast. Despite the defeat of Bone, Bugis economic networks and migration continued to expand.

The growing maritime influence of the Dutch did not put an end to migration and diaspora. The continuance of widespread raiding became one of the main legitimisations for Dutch intervention in the eastern archipelago (see chapter 6). Initial attempts to incorporate raiders into the colonial state, and transform them into peasants and fishers failed. The anti-piracy campaigns combined with expanded patrolling of remote areas eventually succeeded in breaking the alliance between local rulers and raiding groups. However, in the initial stages of these campaigns in the late 1840s and early 1850s they led to the formation of new alliances between elites of Tobungku and Banggai with raiding groups who migrated to the east coast to flee the impact of anti-piracy campaigns. Ironically, these Tobelo raiders intentionally sought to be (indirectly) incorporated into the colonial state through their alliances with Ternaten tributaries so as to be free of Dutch attacks. Such alliances between land-based elites of small-scale polities and maritime
raiders which had been common from at least the late seventeenth century onward, continued to be widespread until ca. 1880. After this date, the dominance of the colonial state made such alliances a liability rather than an advantage. The greater safety on the seas caused new waves of diaspora to reach eastern Sulawesi, encouraged by new economic possibilities of exploiting forest products. While the political dimension of such diasporas was weakened, the economic and social-cultural aspects continued to play an important role in the development of eastern Sulawesi.

The introduction of direct rule on land in 1905 is where this study ends. It was a logical extension of the gradual expansion of colonial power over the sea. The ‘second Dutch empire’ starting in the nineteenth century culminated in a centralised colonial state that incorporated small-scale polities as administrative units at the lowest rung of an archipelago-wide bureaucracy. The growing power of Batavia, and subsequently Jakarta, increasingly placed eastern Sulawesi in a marginalised position, as it was dependent on a remote centre to which it was of little importance. This peripheral position of eastern Sulawesi contrasts with the period of 1680-1905, when polities in eastern Sulawesi were positioned within two major spheres of influence and had a variety of local allies to draw upon. During the New Order period, the centralised, bureaucratic state structures were elaborated upon, increasing the power of the centre, and placing the east coast of Sulawesi among the least developed parts of the country.

The implementation of local autonomy will add a new chapter to the history of how local political and economic organisation relates to external, now national and international, centres of power. The stories of the golden throne taken by the Dutch and the tree of cloth that had fallen, draining wealth from eastern Sulawesi were in a sense an attempt to explain the continuing marginalisation that started with the advent of the colonial state, an event in local terms remembered to coincide with a loss of local power.
and history. Local autonomy will certainly restore local history to the centre of the political stage, whether it will restore ‘the golden throne’ to its population remains to be seen.

It is interesting to note that the former polity of Tobungku has been resurrected as kabupaten Morowali, and that its economic strength once again is based on the export of maritime products.
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