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Trade, court and company
Makassar in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries

Introduction

Early Asian courts drew wealth from trade, both through privileged access to goods, obtained as tribute or gifts, and, because of their power over ports, through tax farms, duties and fees. Unlike the Portuguese or the Dutch, they seldom, if ever, aspired to control the open seas. However, despite conventional emphases on European institutional strength, even the VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Dutch East Indies Company) was very limited in its ability to manage commercial flows. Regional and long-haul connections were deeply rooted, and usually maintained by socially and culturally embedded personal ties. Networks of trust, both personal and communal, transcended locality.

For northern newcomers, such relationships were difficult to penetrate. Moreover, although the established momentum of supply and demand ensured that links between markets and production zones tended to be enduring, the dominance of any particular transit port or polity was likely to be ephemeral. Narrow choke points, where straits and inescapable sailing patterns enabled a ruler to exploit passing traffic, were few and far in between. Trade, like power, was a fluid resource, which could only be captured and held with difficulty. If a region were devastated by war, or a harbour became too insecure or expensive, there were always other coasts and chiefs able to offer alternatives. Similar geo-political and social constraints limited efforts to control the production and marketing of commercial crops.

In the early to mid-1660s, however, the Dutch took ruthless advantage of the unusually restricted production areas of cloves, nutmeg and mace and gained control of spice supplies from Maluku (the Moluccas). This created an anomaly within the world of Asian trade, which was to have far-reaching consequences. As a rule, however, the Europeans’ mercantilist assumptions,
need to obtain permission to establish trading posts, interest in luxury commodities and sheer inability to compete effectively ensured that they could best enter Asian commerce by combining diplomatic and military means. Their consequent focus on the political elite, and their obsession with pepper, textiles and the fine spices, meant that they largely ignored the foundation of the trading system: the regional, coastal and land traffic in foodstuffs, metals and local manufactures.

In this essay I will consider the relationship between the VOC and the dominant local powers in east Indonesian Makassar, comparing the situation before and after its conquest by the Company (1666-1669). This dramatic event seemed to mark the end of the port’s pivotal role, but I suggest that this is a misinterpretation. If we consider Makassar’s place within the Asian commercial arena in the period 1625-1720, then we will see that although 1669 was a very important turning point, it was by no means fatal. Makassar’s trade revived, driven by Asian economic forces, as had always been the case. Located on the southwest peninsula of Sulawesi (Celebes), Makassar was a favoured port of call for traders. They were drawn to the eastern seas of Southeast Asia by rich supplies of pepper from Kalimantan (Borneo), cloves from Ambon and nutmeg and mace from Banda. Makassar’s own hinterland offered few valuable products, but ships could ride safely in her island-sheltered roads while restocking with good local rice and foodstuffs. Here also they could rendezvous with other vessels, selling their own commodities and loading spices and pepper, as well as wax and tortoiseshell, slaves, sandalwood and gold.

The Gowa-Talloq court, the VOC and Asian commerce before the conquest

Archaeological evidence from eastern Southeast Asia shows that long distance trade, particularly with China, pre-dated the emergence of states. For the decentralized confederate polities of South Sulawesi the relative significance of trade actually seems to have declined after 1400, as wet rice agriculture became more significant. The rise of the Gowa-Talloq twin kingdom in the sixteenth century combined the resources of sea-oriented Talloq with access to a rice producing hinterland. Gowa’s walled settlement of Somba Opu in the south and the fort-protected Talloq estuary in the north guarded the harbour of Makassar. Of the two rulers, it was the kings of the smaller Talloq, who also held high office in Gowa, who were most instrumental in the kingdom’s commercial success. Three generations were crucial: Karaeng

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1 Barbara Watson Andaya 1993; Vos 1993; Jacobs 2000.
Matoaya,\(^3\) the seventh king of Talloq (reigned 1593-1623, also, like his son and grandson, *tumabicarabutta* or chancellor of Gowa), his son, the ninth ruler, Karaeng Pattingalloang (reigned 1641-1654) and then his son Karaeng Karunrung (1631-1685), brother to the tenth king. No one, including the ruler of the more powerful Gowa, Sultan Hasanuddin (reigned 1652-1669), could equal Karunrung’s prominence in Dutch accounts, where he assumed almost demonic proportions. Another powerful figure, and rival of Karunrung, was Karaeng Summanq, *tumabicarabutta* until Karunrung was appointed in 1667. Summanq was regarded as relatively pro-Dutch, but was replaced during crucial negotiations because of Karunrung’s sophistication with foreigners and grasp of Portuguese.\(^4\)

These three generations spanned first the rise of Gowa-Talloq to its impressive peak, and then its dramatic defeat at Dutch hands. This trajectory was shaped by geo-political circumstances. After the courts Islamization in 1605 Gowa extended its hegemony over most of the peninsular, much of east Borneo, and an arc of southern islands from Lombok to Aru. Such expansion was anathema to the VOC, which was aggressively extending its own power in eastern Indonesia. The capture of Ambon from the Portuguese in 1605, and the bloody conquest of Banda in 1621, clearly showed that these northerners were willing to do whatever they deemed necessary to establish absolute control of spice production and trade. So Gowa was justifiably suspicious of the Dutch. Although it had been a regular visitor since 1601, the Company was not permitted to build a trading post or ‘factory’ at Makassar, but was restricted to visiting in season.\(^5\)

In the short term Makassar benefited greatly from the VOC’s attempts to seal off the Spice Islands, enjoying a commercial boom from the 1620s to the early 1650s. Dutch policy, combined with Mataram’s closure of the east Javanese ports after 1625, ensured a new centrality for Makassar in the spice trade. This was reflected in closer ties with the English. Since its establishment in 1614 their Makassar factory had been primarily a supply station, but by 1624 the emphasis had switched to trade in high value commodities, as they shipped in textiles and, increasingly, war supplies in order to obtain spices, silks and dyewoods. Connections with Spain’s Manila and clove-exporting bases in Maluku (Gam Lamo, Tidore) also intensified. In exchange for Manila’s New World silver and Philippine gold, Makassar re-exported cloth and lead, gunpowder and saltpetre from India.

\(^3\) Karaeng was a very high title; for full names and titles of Gowa and Talloq rulers see Cummings 2002; for their careers see L.Y. Andaya 1981 and Stapel 1922.


\(^5\) Knaap 1987; Bassett 1958; Stapel 1922.
Of all the Europeans, it was the Portuguese who played the most crucial role in the growth of Makassar’s trade. Since 1511 they had controlled Melaka, the central rendezvous for Indian and East Asian merchants. Moreover, private skippers from Portuguese Macao visited Makassar regularly, importing textiles, porcelain, gold, copper and other goods while exporting exotic woods, wax, ivory and Borneo pepper. They also used the port to stockpile sandalwood and sappanwood from Timor and Bima. Even the Dutch destruction of the western end of this open trading system, with the capture of Melaka in 1641, temporarily reinforced Makassar’s role as Malays, Portuguese and Indian Muslims moved to the Sulawesi hub. These included such significant figures as the Portuguese Francisco Viera de Figueiredo, and Indian Muslims like Mapule and the Mir Jumlah’s agent, all of whom will be described briefly below. There was also a Spanish agent, Pedro de la Matta, who brought with him a capital of 70,000 Rials to invest in the expanding traffic with Manila.6

Makassar’s integration into wider political and cultural networks was reinforced by her partial assumption of Melaka’s pivotal role. Islamization had already sharpened interest in news from the Muslim world. The rule of the great Safavid king, Shah Abbas (1588-1629), had increased Irani prestige, and the Gowa court welcomed gifts of Persian provenance. Iranian networks and allied English commerce had been central to the rapid growth of Coromandel’s Masulipatnam from the late 1500s.7 This port, a key textile source, was also the main outlet for the Indo-Persian court of Golconda. The famous Mir Jumlah or chief minister (since 1643) of Golconda was a major investor in the Makassar trade. When he entered Mughal service in 1656, moved to Bengal (1660) or died (1663), the entire cloth supply to the Gowan kingdom registered the impact.8 Since Indian textile sales were central to the commercial strategies of both the English and the Dutch, exchanges with Coromandel are documented, at least to some extent.

Details of the Chinese interest in Makassar are more obscure, as this was either indirectly expressed through the Portuguese and Spanish, or ultimately concentrated on pepper ports like Banjarmasin. In any case, during the

7 Generale Missiven II:295, 313 notes ‘foreigners’ bringing Coromandel textiles to Makassar in the mid seventeenth century.
mid-seventeenth century traffic with China was disrupted for several decades. The turbulence attendant upon the fall of the Ming (1644) had led to a total ban on all sea traffic in 1656. Rebel Taiwan (Formosa) was highly active in trade, but stability was only recovered after the Qing conquest of Fujian in 1671 and Taiwan in 1683. Nevertheless, the rich pepper trade between Banjarmasin and Macao continued to flow, often through Makassar.

Such distant politics in Europe, China and India all influenced the regional context of Makassar. However, they were refracted through local prisms of variable identities and shifting priorities, as men weighed the relative claims of homeland and current residence, of commercial and communal advantage. Makassar’s mid-seventeenth-century overseas trade was largely in the hands of foreign-born merchants, some of whom were temporary residents, very much the agents of distant masters, whereas others came to see Makassar as their home. Writing of Southeast Asia as a whole, Anthony Reid has described mercantile elites as comprising three main groups. These were visiting ‘foreign merchants’, who came and went, ‘foreign or foreign-descended partly assimilated merchant officials, mediating between the court and traders’, and ‘the indigenous aristocracy, drawn into trade by their position of wealth’ (Reid 1993b:114-23). Each of these categories could be found in Makassar, where they fused into a small, inter-dependent group that outfitted ships and invested in cargoes.

VOC sources indicate that the three most prominent foreign traders in Makassar were the Portuguese Francisco Viera de Figueiredo, Mapule, and the Mir Jumlah’s factor, Mamet Saphy. Francisco Viera has been the subject of an excellent biography by Charles Boxer (1967), which describes how in the 1640s Viera came to Makassar, already a centre of Portuguese commerce and influence, and soon became a trusted advisor of the court. He traded in partnership with the rulers and nobles of Gowa and Talloq, with the chief minister of Golconda, the Jesuits of Macao, with Englishmen and Muslims at Banten, Makassar and Madras, as well as with the VOC.

Mapule and Mamet Saphy were both Coromandel Muslims who are first mentioned by the Company in the 1650s, but had also arrived in the 1640s. Mapule was by far the most important Asian partner of the VOC, and continued to send cargoes from Makassar until his death in 1675. He became a specialist in the Manila traffic, where he worked closely with the court, buying many of his textiles from the Company and the English; after the conquest, of course, he drew his supplies exclusively from the Dutch.
The VOC regarded Mamet Saphy more as a competitor, as he could obtain Coromandel textiles very cheaply, and successfully cultivated the Gowa court’s favour. However, by the mid-1650s he was having trouble finding export cargoes, as the exchange of textiles for spices collapsed. The last reference to him in Company sources (1659) records that he was sending ships to Aru, probably in an attempt to obtain tortoiseshell. He presumably left Makassar soon after. His departure weakened commercial connections to Siam as well as to India, as Makassar was excluded from the Mir Jumlah’s commercial network.\textsuperscript{12}

The fortunes of these men were closely intertwined, by financial obligations, and by personal ties. Among the Asian merchants the granting of merchandise on credit was essential in guaranteeing access to both goods and markets, and as a reflection of a mutual on-going commitment. Although the English and Dutch representatives were handicapped by their superiors’ reluctance to countenance such relationships, they were probably more flexible in (personal) practice.\textsuperscript{13} A shared desire for profit ensured a healthy opportunism. If, for example, a Coromandel merchant was committed to providing textiles, but his shipment from India failed to arrive, he would buy from the Europeans. The ‘great men’ of Makassar also commonly accessed Portuguese capital to obtain cargoes for their vessels, and neither side lost money, as ships under royal protection were free of tolls and duties.

Although the court was dedicated to the propagation of Islam, maintaining close ties with Malays and Moors (Indian Muslims), nonetheless the Portuguese Francisco Viera was a trusted adviser, and a Christian Armenian was one of King Hasanuddin’s close friends. In 1656 the Dutch reckoned that there were only three Asian merchants in Makassar with the capacity to mount trading ventures: the Moor Mapule, the Mir Jumlah’s factor and the Malay Ince Assam. Two years later the Dutch merchant Reyniers observed that Viera was ‘the author of, and driving force behind, the rulers’ strong involvement in trade’.\textsuperscript{14} The Makassarese themselves do not seem to have been involved in shipping. Malays and Portuguese were regarded by the


\textsuperscript{13} Bassett 1958:34; Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, II:113; the 1638 report by the Dutch representative in Makassar Hendrik Kerkeringh, in NA, VOC 1127, 1639:576-7. Such arrangements are sparsely documented, but Jur van Goor’s study (1991) of the Siamese career of the Greek adventurer Constant Phaulkon (1647-1688) is an excellent example of how a biographical approach can clarify this complex interplay of trade and politics. See Barbara Watson Andaya 1993:83-5 on attitudes to credit.

\textsuperscript{14} On Viera, see below; on the Armenian Generale Missiven III:7, 8; NA, VOC 1225, 1659:479.
English as the ‘two pillars’ of Makassar’s trade, while refugee Bandanese were also active. In 1668 the Dutch repeated ‘the Makassarese themselves are no merchants’: ‘Makassar’ traders were in fact Bandanese, Malays and Moors. So although Southeast Asians, including Javanese, played an important part in developing Makassar’s commerce, few came from local societies.

The court itself, however, did have a real interest in trade. In 1621 the English Captain Fitzherbert had complained ‘the people of these parts are no wise to be dealt with but by bribes; nor will these kings have any commerce with us without presents’ (Villiers 1990:171). More important than these gifts were the partnerships between nobles and foreign merchants. Court protection enabled shippers to claim compensation if the vessel were seized; royal flags or passes also legalized voyages, protecting Portuguese and others from Dutch predation. In the mid-1640s the VOC reported that ‘the Macao Portuguese that are residing in Makassar tried to ensure their trade with Timor in a very crafty way through the King Sultan of Makassar (and) Prince Pattingalloang’, by claiming that they (the Portuguese) were only agents. The most lucrative route, that to Manila, was largely reserved for such ‘royal ships’.

The primary exchange with Manila centred upon the re-export of Indian textiles from Makassar, and the importing of silver Spanish Rial coins, and to a much lesser extent gold, Chinese and Japanese merchandise. Access to this trade was restricted in order to ensure elite profits. In 1668, in the lull between the wars, the Dutch representative in Makassar (probably Admiral Speelman himself) explained that in the time of Karaeng Pattingalloang (that is, the 1640s and early 1650s) shipping between Makassar and Manila was limited to two junks. One of these belonged to the Moor Mapule who traded ‘in the name of the king or the great men of Makassar’. It was estimated that no less than 100,000 Rijksdaalders in textiles was exported. The king himself sent the other junk, containing a lesser capital (worth 3-4,000 Mas, circa 1,800 to 2,400 Rijksdaalders) in local textiles: white Madurese, Bimanese and Selayarese cloths, as well as the painted local stuff known as ‘Ujung Pandang sarassa’. In Makassar this royal trade was organized by the Portuguese Joan Gomez de

16 Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, II:393; Souza 1986:100-1; Noorduyn 1983.
18 Much the same text occurs in the memorandum he wrote after his victory in 1669, and is given in Noorduyn 1983:106-7. Speelman led the campaigns against Makassar, see L.Y. Andaya 1981.
19 An approximate rule of thumb would be that one Rijksdaalder was worth 2.5 Guilders, a Spanish Real or Dollar or ‘Piece of eight’ was equal to three Guilders or between 1.10 and 1.20 Rijksdaalder, while a Mas (a gold coin minted in Makassar) was calculated at being equivalent to 1.5 Guilders in 1668.
Peirera, and, after he moved to Manila, by ‘Lole Chiabba Makassar’.\textsuperscript{20}

Since Malay and Javanese shippers were excluded from this route, further profit came from the high freight charges they had to pay to send their cargoes on court-sanctioned vessels. Such was the involvement of the merchant community that ‘the whole town of Makassar’ had, in varying degrees, an interest in these junks. This, noted the Dutch, was not surprising, as the profits were ‘tasty’, being circa 60-70\% in the 1660s. But in the time of Pattingalloang they had been even higher, gaining 1,800 Rials for an investment of 700 Rijksdaalders (circa 610 Rials), or almost 300\%. The Spanish resident Pedro de la Matta was also active in shipping to Manila, both on his own behalf and in alliance with the king. After Pattingalloang’s death in 1654 (local) Malays or their representatives were allowed, as ‘Makassarese’, to trade with Manila, which increased traffic but lowered prices.\textsuperscript{21}

The court was also privileged in the less rarified, but still remunerative, trade with Kalimantan’s Pasir and Kutei, as well as that serving the rice rich northern districts (Noorduyn 1983:113-6), but these offered nothing like the profits of Manila. Nobles also required that merchants provide shipping space free of cost, that commodities be sold to them at prices they specified, and that they be given special access to cargoes and, of course, receive gifts in addition to taxes. The extent to which traders could negotiate such demands depended on their own status and patrons.

\textit{Economic vulnerability, 1650-1669}

The extended supply lines and relatively small market for Indian textiles (which could be saturated by the unexpected arrival of one well-laden vessel), combined with the Dutch advances in the spice producing islands, meant that these sectors of Makassar’s long range network were vulnerable. The high risks involved, and need for capital outlays seems to have restricted participation to a handful of merchants linked to the elite. This is not to say that they were necessarily the only importers of such goods: small traders carrying limited amounts in shorter circuits along chains of transit ports could operate with lower risks and less investment. But this would depend on the existence of such a linked infrastructure, which may be inferred, but operated largely beyond the purview of the Europeans, and hence of our sources.

\textsuperscript{20} Identified in Noorduyn 1983: note 61 as probably being Lole’ Tjaba’, a Makassarese. Sarassas were Indian cloths; Ujung Pandang sarassas would have been local copies.

\textsuperscript{21} NA, VOC 1276, 1671:930; Noorduyn 1983:106-7. After the conquest the VOC was uncertain as to the status of Asian trade to Manila, as in the Dutch-Spanish Treaty of Munster of 1648 the Spanish had agreed not to expand their trade in Asia, while the VOC undertook not to visit Spanish ports in Asia.
Makassar’s claims and sphere of influence, circa 1666
By the 1650s Makassar’s economic vulnerability was all too obvious, and the court was in a very difficult position. Tension increased as a result of VOC actions against Makassar shipping, and Gowa’s friendly reception of the refugee Maluku rebel Majira in 1652. The Dutch imposed a blockade in 1654-1655. The loss of significant spice supplies to Makassar became irrevocable after the VOC, in alliance with the unpopular Ternate sultan, finally crushed the Maluku rebellions, and hence also the independent Muslim spice trade. More than a decade of painful commercial reorientation followed, as merchants sought replacement cargoes. Routine commodities became more attractive; the English, for example, hoped to exchange their Indian textiles for Japanese copper, Siamese lead, ebony wood, wax and ivory. Regional products such as sandalwood, sappanwood and tortoiseshell were also heavily traded, but there was less reason to concentrate transactions in Makassar once the spice supply had collapsed. Consequently, the Gowa elite was faced simultaneously with a loss of key imports and a greater need for political and military expenditure. Their demands on the merchant community increased.

In November 1656, soon after Pattingalloang’s death, the VOC agents in Makassar sent a familiar litany of complaint to Batavia. They claimed that elite avarice made private trade impossible. Manipulation and debasing of the currency was also a major and increasing problem; acceptance of the local Mas was imposed, but the ‘gold coins’ often turned out to be copper. Moreover, access to merchandise was limited, and they could only make slim profits on textiles. Prices of wax and sandalwood were too high, as was that of tortoiseshell, which in any case could only be obtained from the Chinese. Even the Company’s main rivals – the Portuguese, the Golconda Mir Jumlah’s agent, and the English – had to rely on the Chinese. Political uncertainty also increased risk, as those who provided credit, setting out large sums from year to year in order to guarantee spice supplies, lost their invested capital when trade was disrupted. Early in 1660 the English factors lamented: ‘the trade of this place is not as it formerly was’, ‘these kings by their avarice in business are degenerating from their ancestors’ by forcing the factory to sell (presumably textiles and, particularly, military supplies) at fixed prices (Villiers 1990:169-70). Such demands were not new, but their extent and intensity probably increased as VOC pressure mounted. The crisis then further intensified, and war broke out in 1660. In the subsequent treaty the Dutch succeeded in forcing Makassar to agree to expel the Portuguese, something the elite later bitterly resisted, claiming it would end their prosperity.

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23 Bassett 1858:26-8; Generale Missiven II:20-1, 139-40, 288, 844; Souza 1986.
24 NA, VOC 1217, 1657:247.
25 NA, VOC 1236, 1663:524; Boxer 1967; Stapel 1922.
According to the Dutch, who disliked him, Karaeng Karunrung’s trading practices had made him hated by Makassar’s merchants; when he was exiled (albeit temporarily) by the ruler in May 1664 the Dutch hoped for a general upturn in trade. L.Y. Andaya (1981:61-2, 117) notes that all shipping leaving Makassar had to surrender a third of its hold to him; this presumably means that they had to provide (free or discounted) space for his merchandise. He also required traders to sell goods to him for less than their purchase price, and even to cover his costs. But businessmen always complain about hard times and political victimization. Traders did stay on in Makassar, and the English continued to hope that Gowa would successfully resist the Dutch. However, a massive and successful Dutch attack began in late 1666, and culminated in the Treaty of Bungaya in November 1667. This decreed that Europeans, other than the Dutch Company, were no longer to be admitted to Makassar; trade in Indian textiles, Chinese commodities and spices was reserved for the VOC. The waters open to Makassar’s traders were sharply restricted. But a final round of fighting in 1668-1669 was needed to ensure the
victory of the allied forces of the VOC and the Bugis Prince Arung Palakka, and hence the definitive humiliation of Gowa-Talloq.

The fall of Somba Opu to the VOC ended Gowa’s long struggle against Dutch hegemony. The devastated Makassarese faced the final dismantling of their commercial world, and the aggressive retribution of the triumphant Bugis under Arung Palakka. The Dutch rebuilt one of Gowa’s forts as ‘Castle Rotterdam’, which became the nucleus of a new Makassar. A system of passes, port-controls and maritime policing enforced the Bungaya restrictions, which were gradually extended to recalcitrant neighbours such as Wajoq (1670) and Mandar (1674). Envoys were sent from Makassar to possible alternative ports like Banjarmasin, Pasir, Kaili, Mandar, Buton, the Gulf of Bone and Bima, where the numbers of visiting ships were anxiously recorded, and local rulers warned to toe the VOC line. Makassar was hit hard by the closing of Manila and Melaka, and the reluctance of the Company to issue passes for Straits ports such as Jambi and Palembang.26 Within zones defined by the VOC an anodyne exchange of rice, cloth, tobacco, salt and coconuts replaced

26 L.Y. Andaya 1981; Stapel 1922; Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming).
the old trading system. Makassar seemed to have become a mere loss-making outpost, subsidiary to the Company’s prized Spice Islands. Anthony Reid has commented (1993b:281) that after the conquest Makassar became an ‘embittered backwater’. This was no doubt true of the Gowa-Talloq court, and certainly the pre-conquest trading community became much less diverse. However, such pessimism ignores the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century emergence of new, dynamic Bugis and Chinese networks within which Makassar played an important role.

Origins of the Chinese role

Descriptions of the Chinese presence in pre-conquest Makassar are intriguingly vague. The Chinese received relatively little attention in Company sources before 1669 because they were not regarded as a political or economic threat. While they did trade in spices, they were specialists in pepper and tortoiseshell, commodities the Dutch no longer aspired to control. Also, until the late seventeenth century much of China’s traffic with Makassar was mediated by other ports, such as Macao, Banjarmasin, or Manila, and VOC wariness was focused more on their regimes than on the Chinese themselves. Before 1728 the Company’s own China trade was either channelled through Batavia or (until 1662) Formosa, and it showed little interest in dominating seas north of Sulawesi. Consequently there was no need for court protection of Portuguese or other shipping in these waters, which removed a major source of conflict. Moreover, most Chinese were religiously neutral, and not supported by an ambitious state. On the contrary, the Ming government was hostile to private overseas trade, although individual officials in the southern provinces were closely involved in commerce. This does much to explain the relative lack of tension in Company-Chinese contacts in Makassar, and hence the sparse documentation. This is not to say that the Chinese role was minor. Indeed, one of the problems in assessing continuities and disruptions in Makassar’s trade, and thus also the consequent impact of VOC rule, lies in the partial nature of the sources.

However, the Company did note the strong Chinese grip on the tortoiseshell trade, as it was impossible to ignore. In 1657 the Dutch factory in Makassar admitted they could only obtain tortoiseshell ‘through the help of our Chinese creatures’, and this alliance was still hindering the English in the early 1660s (Villiers 1990:173). The Captain of the Chinese Loquo (or

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27 I am grateful to George Souza for clarification on this point.
29 NA, VOC 1221, 1658:353.
Looquin) was probably involved in this trade as he was a significant partner of the Company.\(^{30}\) But the Chinese also had the respect of the Gowa ruler: when in 1663 he was in conflict with the VOC, ‘Mongols’ were members of the council formed to advise him (Stapel 1922:76). In September 1664 Chinese featured in the list of those owing money or goods to the VOC: ‘the Malabar Moyete, Aly Bapa Moor, Miera Ditto, Khoja Jumat, the Chinese Casanko and Sunco, and the Portuguese priest Anthonio Fernandez’\(^{31}\). A Chinese-Dutch front seems to have emerged, as in May 1665 the Makassar English complained that the VOC was employing Chinese agents on five per cent commission to obtain cargoes by providing credit, so people were unwilling to trade with the English who would only pay cash (Villiers 1990:173). In 1665, the second biggest Company debtor after Mapule was the Chinese Tamco (f 21,405). Three other considerable sums were owed by Chinese: Jurow (f 3,330), Cohanco (f 3,120) and the late Chinese Captain Loquo (f 1,058), who had died in poverty.\(^{32}\)

When the VOC merchant Abraham Verspreet arrived in Makassar from Ambon in 1662 he was accompanied by a commercial entourage. This included Tamco, who did not settle in the Chinese quarter, but lived in the Company’s palisaded settlement, along with Inco and Ince Ambon, a Muslim Chinese. When Verspreet fled in 1665, so too did those who feared reprisals because they were so closely associated with the VOC: Tamco, Ince Ambon, and the Hindu Muti Kappa; this last left his affairs in the hands of Mapule. Tamco then proceeded to Melaka where he died, although according to his ship’s clerk most of his merchandise remained in Makassar. He still owed the Company f 12,537 in 1667. Tamco and Muti Kappa had also provided the VOC with ‘special reports’, as did the Chinese Muslim Ince Kecil, who seems to have stayed on in Makassar.\(^{33}\) This is a revealing sketch of what was probably common enough – an alliance between a Dutch official and Asian traders, offering political and personal advantages to all concerned. But the heyday of the Chinese traders was still to come.

**Dutch Makassar, the Bone court and regional trade**

Jur van Goor (1998) has characterized the VOC as a ‘hybrid state’, in that it was a trading company that evolved into a ‘state-like’ organization. But Dutch Makassar was barely hybrid: its *raison d’être* was more military than

\(^{30}\) NA, VOC 1220, 1658:833.

\(^{31}\) NA, VOC 1248, 1665:173.

\(^{32}\) NA, VOC 1267, 1669:350-1.

\(^{33}\) NA, VOC 1267, 1669:350-1.
economic. It was intended to support the Dutch domination of the Spice Islands by cruising the sea-lanes, manipulating the local balance of power, and by supplying provisions collected as tribute from the rice fields which once sustained Gowa. Makassar produced few exports, apart from rice and slaves, which were largely absorbed by the Company itself; the VOC also made little profit on imports.

Makassar’s commerce was provincial during the first decades of VOC control. Burgher country traders, who were former VOC men or locally born mestizos, and Chinese from Batavia or the small Makassar community, sailed between Maluku and Java, crossed the Makassar Straits to Pasir, or rode the monsoons down to Nusa Tenggara. They brought Indian cloth from Batavia, salt and Javanese tobacco from Semarang, rattan from Pasir, coconuts and oil from Kaili (further north on the Sulawesi coast), and rice from Bima. In exchange they carried rice to Kaili, salt and rice to Ambon and Banda. Slaves were also an important commodity, both as imports and exports (Knaap and Sutherland, forthcoming). The ‘royal ship’, combining investment and patronage by nobles and foreign traders, was no more. In its place came the occasional visit by one of the Company’s great spiegelschepen, sailing from the capital Batavia to this peripheral outpost, often en route to the much more important Maluku.

The destruction of the Makassarese kingdom was indeed dramatic, as were VOC trade restrictions, but broader political and economic relationships retained their logic. Makassar remained embedded in its Asian environment. The Dutch shared Southwest Sulawesi with their ambitious ally, the Bugis Prince Arung Palakka, who accumulated unprecedented power both before and after he became king of the east coast kingdom of Bone in 1672. Company intervention in such allied states was very limited, and he exploited this freedom, while mobilizing Dutch support as required. In addition to successful military campaigns, Arung Palakka also expanded his economic resources, giving early priority to restoring rice production. He then targeted the entrepreneurial kingdom of Wajoq, about a hundred miles northeast of Makassar, and conquered it in 1670. In 1677 he seized the mouth of the east coast Cenrana River, cutting off Wajoq’s access to the sea, and built a small fortress there with a commanding position over regional sea-lanes. This was, felt the Dutch, part of a deliberate strategy to control and tax trade. His attempts to get permission to issue passes from his Cenrana capital were consequently dismissed. In 1682 he asked the Company to decree that no Bugis or Makassarese be allowed to sell slaves in Maluku except himself, but was again refused. However, he had managed to establish his own, Bugis market in Makassar itself: a ‘smugglers’ nest’, according to the VOC. His formidable wife, Daeng Talele, who ended up well respected by the Dutch, was also
active in commerce. Arung Palakka himself spent several months a year at his palace in Bontualaq, close to Makassar. His influence was strong in the Dutch settlement’s Bugis market and kampung, where trade flourished, also in commodities theoretically reserved for the VOC, and with regions that were officially off-limits. The Company, unable to eliminate such ‘illicit’ commerce even in Dutch-dominated Makassar, played a negligible role in much of Southwest Sulawesi, let alone in the more distant archipelagos and shallow waters of eastern Indonesia.

Frequent Dutch complaints of ‘smuggling’ do not reveal whether or not these activities were sporadic and individual, or elements of an extensive economic system beyond their reach. The latter seems more likely. Makassar’s official exclusion from circuits dealing in spices, Indian textiles and Chinese goods had destroyed the port’s participation in that upper commercial tier which had flourished between the mid-1620s and mid-1650s, but local and regional trade continued. This fed into networks outside Dutch control. Moreover, it seems safe to assume that Arung Palakka and his successors would have done everything possible to reconstitute, create or strengthen independent shipping networks. These simply by-passed the Dutch centre, and frequented more friendly harbours. The Company had hoped to confine the Bugis to the eastern archipelago, but in fact their trade increased markedly, including links to the north and west. They were active along both coasts of the Makassar Straits, and came to dominate the strategic Riau-Lingga Archipelago, the western end of an axis stretching east to Sulawesi and beyond. When, over a century later, Singapore was founded, the Bugis immediately became the main Indonesian traders there.

While the Company regarded such commerce as inimical to its interests, local communities in Makassar were more flexible. VOC officials, hoping for private wealth, also took what advantage they could, although because of its limited exports Makassar offered few chances for ‘corruption’. Moreover, since Makassar was peripheral in the Company hierarchy, and most postings were relatively short, profitable alliances had to be forged quickly. This would have favoured the development of local brokers.

In the 1720s the main trading groups were the Bugis Wajorese (24%), the burghers (23%) and Chinese (20%). The only significant imports were the

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35 Noorduyn 2000; Sutherland 2001a; L.Y. Andaya 1981.
36 ‘Bugis’ came to apply to anyone from South Sulawesi, including Mandarese and Makassarese.
Indian textiles brought in in bulk in the VOC’s own ships, or by the private traders. The Dutch complained that they could make no money in Makassar, demand for their textiles was so low.\textsuperscript{38} In 1695 the Makassar officials defensively explained that they could only suggest two reasons for poor sales. The first was that the Bone court had remained in Cenrana for the whole year, without spending the customary months in Makassar, so fewer fine fabrics had been purchased. The second was that smuggling was rife, and local cloth production was increasing, so textiles were actually cheaper in Makassar’s Bugis market than they were in Batavia itself.\textsuperscript{39}

As we have seen, Chinese had worked closely with the Dutch in Gowan Makassar. In 1699 Speelman commented that they ‘are, and will always be, the most useful inhabitants’, though he seemed unduly influenced by the way they kept his table stocked in these ‘most evil times’.\textsuperscript{40} He listed some twenty Chinese residents, some of whom had been established in Makassar when the Bungaya Treaty was signed, while others arrived later. But the community remained small: in 1725 there were still less than forty Chinese living in Makassar.\textsuperscript{41} However, they were strengthened by links to other settlements, particularly Batavia; as the Qing stabilized junk traffic to the VOC’s Asian capital resumed, reaching a peak in the period 1690-1740 (Blussé 1986). The Makassar Chinese were incorporated into Company-run society through the standard system of officers and tax-farmers. During the first decades after the conquest it is only Mapule and the Captains of the Chinese who emerge as individual merchants in the Dutch sources. The former can be seen as a remnant of a vanished order, but the Captains not only continued past practice, but were also signs of things to come.

In 1674 the VOC decided to give the (Muslim) Captain ‘Ince Couko’ a monopoly of arak distilling.\textsuperscript{42} Eleven years later the Captain was Ongwatko, who played a dominant role in private trade. The influence of his clan extended over six decades; in 1701 his son Ongieko succeeded him, and was in turn replaced by Ongkingsai in 1732. Ongwatko traded to Mindanao and

\textsuperscript{38} See Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming) on patterns of participation in trade and for Dutch complaints NA,VOC 1311, 1676:190; NA, VOC 1312, 1676:6.

\textsuperscript{39} NA, VOC 1568, 1696:144-5.

\textsuperscript{40} Speelman, p. 744. This is a typescript version of Speelman’s memorandum held by the KITLV in Leiden; for information on the various manuscripts see Noorduyn 1983:99-101, and also versions in NA, VOC 1267, 1669, and as submitted by his successor Jan van Oppijnen in NA, VOC 1276, 1670:1-1031.

\textsuperscript{41} Generale Missiven VII:755. The Dutch were suspicious of the Chinese and hoped by cutting off their access to places east of Makassar the communities there would die away, Generale Missiven VIII:100, 111, 129; L.Y. Andaya 1991.

\textsuperscript{42} NA, VOC 1319, 1677:674.
Sulu (and sometimes was ‘blown off course’ to Manila), Buton, Maluku, Timor, Banggai and Tobunko. Although he was active in the slave trade, he seems to have been well attuned to the market, making profits on diverse cargoes. When a ship of his was looted by the people of Keffing (off Seram, in Maluku) he gave an inventory of the contents, a mix of textiles, jewellery, rice, local Luwu iron goods, cheap copper rings and bells, Japanese axes and Siamese pots. The total value, including that of the small onboard boat, was 1,585 Rijksdaalders. Ongwatko also managed to build a virtual monopoly in the lucrative tortoiseshell and birds’ nest business. In the 1690s local VOC officials, piously reflecting their new responsibilities, complained that he had shut small traders out of the market by cornering supplies through credit. The Company, now politically strong in Makassar, was also naturally interested in lowering purchase prices by supporting competing tortoiseshell traders. But their commercial position was still weak; despairing of acquiring tortoiseshell on their own, they ended up giving Ongwatko advances so he could obtain it on their behalf. In 1703 a Chinese trader from Makassar called Tjatko reported that he had encountered a Buginese settlement of about sixty people in Banggai, and another twenty to thirty vessels cruising the Gulf of Tomini and Gorontalo. All were searching for tortoiseshell for Makassar, and all ‘belonged’ to the Captain. This doubtless meant they were obliged to sell him the shell, in exchange for credit. Strength fed strength: by 1718 his son Ongieko had a monopoly of pepper buying in Banjarmasin (Generale Missiven VII:340).

Ongwatko also, inevitably, did business with the local princes. In 1685 the VOC and the ruler of Bone became involved in a dispute after a noble from Soppeng visited Ongwatko in his house, bought some small items, and paid for them in coins which turned out to have been clipped. The Dutch legal official was informed, but proved less efficient than Arung Palakka. When Ongwatko went to his palace in Bontualaq and showed him the evidence, the ruler summoned all gold and silver smiths. The whole group was threatened with torture and death, a confession was obtained and the guilty parties, including the noble, were surrendered to the VOC. But the questioning of a man of such high birth caused a great outcry, so that the Dutch quickly handed him back to Arung Palakka, so respectful local justice could take its course.
The Captains’ combination of political authority and economic prominence was intentional and ubiquitous. Similarly, those Wajores who had settled in Makassar after Wajoq itself fell to Bone were led by a matoa, whose political responsibilities were matched by commercial privileges. It was stipulated that no one could outbid the matoa for commodities; he could always join group purchases; he could claim preferential treatment in freighting; his merchandise on commission would be accepted, and he received a symbolic fee from vessels entering port. The most famous of these matoa was Amanna Gappa (in office 1697–1723), who is credited with compiling a handbook of commercial law. In 1698 the matoa signed an agreement with I Wakko (sic) Captain of the Chinese, and Ince Cuka, the Malay Captain, in order to establish a procedure for solving trade disputes. But the matoa also had to reckon with a greater power, that of Arung Palakka, to whom the community owed respect and services. Over the years this proved a fraught relationship, as rulers encroached on the authority of the matoa.48

For the VOC the Wajores were a problem, as they were held to be responsible for the bulk of competing textile imports, both legal (primarily from Batavia) and illegal (mainly from the Straits of Melaka). They were efficient traders, and in 1683 the Makassar officials complained that they were bringing so much cloth from the Straits to Bone ‘that the trade of the Company and of the Chinese merchants who live here is at a still-stand’.49 Similar charges were made against the Makassar Malays, who were particularly distrusted as they had been such bitter enemies of the Dutch in the war. But whereas the Malays gradually came to terms with the Company system, and reclaimed a formidable commercial role by the mid-eighteenth century, the Wajores challenged it. Indeed, they seemed to vanish from the scene in the 1730s and 1740s, probably as a result of political conflict.50 But their ‘illicit’ trade must have continued, supported by Bugis settlements scattered through maritime Southeast Asia, particularly in Riau, at the foot of the Straits, and the smaller, independent ports of Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and Sulu. These Bugis networks51 are relevant here, because they provided a free, and potentially anti-Dutch, environment that continued to influence post-conquest Makassar.

For at least two decades before Bungaya the Makassar commercial sys-


49 NA, VOC 1385, 1683:455.

50 Sutherland 2001a; Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming). It is possible that the Wajores prolonged their Makassar career under the label of company subjects, although Knaap and Sutherland note that the company subject shipping was less efficient than that of the pre-1730 Wajores.

tem had been under severe pressure – cargoes such as sandalwood and tortoiseshell were hardly sufficient to support the factories or to draw in new traders from the west (Villiers 1994). The final conquest of Makassar completed this fundamental disruption, so late seventeenth century trade was either very regional, or a tentative extension of pre-war patterns. This could be seen in the royal trade which Arung Palakka was trying to develop, in the Chinese activity personified in Ongwatko, and in the small scale shipping of the Wajoese and other traders, earlier dismissed in Dutch accounts as ‘coast-hugging creepers’. Before the conquest this feeder and coastal traffic is virtually invisible; systematic documentation begins with the creation of the harbourmaster’s registers in 1713. Changes in the nature of trade are difficult to establish, but clearly Makassar no longer had investors, merchants and shippers on the scale of Pattingalloang or Viera. By the 1720s, however, there were signs that a commercial revolution was beginning, based on the exchange of eastern Southeast Asian sea-products for the China market. This was to transcend the modest, if valuable, trade in tortoiseshell once dominated by Ongwatko, although it was organized in much the same way, and he himself probably played an important role in its initial development.

In the late seventeenth century there was a growing market in China for trepang (bêche de mer, sea cucumber, sea-slug, the holuthurian of the biologists). These medicinal and culinary delicacies were initially imported from Japan, but by the very early eighteenth century imports from Southeast Asia had begun. Makassar’s link with the trepang markets originally ran through Batavia, or harbours outside VOC control, but after 1746 there was a direct, if at times irregular, connection with Amoy (Xiamen). Capital, shipping and marketing know-how were all drawn from these Chinese networks. While these developments fall outside the scope of this essay, the roots of the trepang trade lay in the earlier patterns of the Chinese-run traffic in sea-products. Trepang gave the merchants and shippers of Makassar what they needed: a transit product to replace spices. The economic landscape of the region was transformed within a few decades.

**Conclusion**

The VOC dismantled the Makassar-centred political and economic constellation, and the subsequent adjustments were more than a mere reversal of the post-1620 spice smuggling boom. The isolation of Maluku from the wider

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52 NA, VOC 1224, 1659:433; Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming).
53 Sutherland 2000, 2004; Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming), Sutherland 1988.
Asian trading world ended the bustling traffic that had previously gone by way of Makassar, once the hub of a series of delicate webs of personal relationships. Macao Portuguese had linked Borneo pepper traders and mestizo sandalwood dealers; Castilian officials sent Mexican silver to exchange for Indian saltpetre and cotton textiles, Indo-Persians, Moors and Malays linked Gowa to Southeast Asian harbours from Burma to Banjarmasin. The sum of these and similar activities channelled commodity flows throughout Asia. But after the conquest there was no Dutch equivalent of Francisco Viera or Mamet Saphy, bringing Persian coats of mail from Coromandel kings. As far as Makassar was concerned, these long-range connections, taken over by the VOC, were moved to Batavia.

Makassar seemed isolated not only from India and the Middle East, but also from the Malay heartland around the Straits of Melaka. However, even there growing Bugis and Chinese penetration indicates yet again that European-imposed divisions had limited impact on maritime connections. Despite Company disapproval, shipping to the north, west and south increased as the eighteenth century advanced. The decline of Banten in the 1680s consolidated the Dutch grip on Indonesian waters, but other ports remained open. The Sulu archipelago, the further reaches of the Banda, Flores and Timor Seas, the coastal waters of Kalimantan, Riau and the myriad islands of the Melaka Straits all provided possibilities. These were, however, often under the control of tributary chiefdoms or petty Sultanates who lacked access to the impressive loans the old courts could mobilize through their Indian, Portuguese or Chinese partners. However, it is possible that the sum of credit available in the 1700s was actually greater, but distributed through a higher number of smaller transactions, as Chinese and country traders expanded their networks. Even if these smaller centres managed less wealth, trade participation and profits may have been dispersed more widely.

In itself Makassar was of little intrinsic interest to Batavia, and the VOC presence there was shallow. Bungaya might have dramatically curtailed the port’s reach, but Dutch officials there were dependent on Asians for communal control, regional trade and potential personal wealth. Intervention was also inhibited by political and social distance. Perhaps the Company was consequently less predatory than the Gowa court, and so may have helped foster capitalist development by increasing security for personal property. Chinese, for example, could turn to VOC courts, so escaping their own community’s social hierarchy. Generally speaking, Bone’s authority on land, stability

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54 Knaap 1987:266 notes that despite the VOC monopoly the volume of external trade in Maluku continued to grow, but was no longer a Javanese and Makassarese affair, but the business of the VOC and the inhabitants of Kota Ambon and Batavia.


56 Sutherland 2001b; on capitalism Kathirithamby-Wells 1993; Reid 1993a.
in VOC controlled zones, and – most importantly – the dramatic growth of trade under the Qing, all combined to create a more favourable environment for commerce than that of the conflict-ridden later seventeenth century. By 1720 Makassar was re-emerging as a key port in eastern Southeast Asia, equal to busy Banjarmasin, with about 300 vessels visiting each year (Knaap and Sutherland, forthcoming).

During the 1700s trepang exports enabled Makassar to tap the economic synergy generated by Chinese economic expansion, the related growth of private shipping out of India and in northern Borneo and the Southern Philippines. Demand for imports of consumer goods also grew. Makassar’s commerce was thus increasingly driven by the Chinese-managed link between Amoy and the trepang-rich southeastern seas. Initially a subsidiary feeder port in this traffic, by the mid-eighteenth century Makassar developed into the main entrepôt. The Company was essentially irrelevant to these exchanges, and hence unable to manipulate the market.

Makassar’s trading world was always multi-levelled. Formerly the royal ships and foreign merchants were at the apex of the system, later it was the Company; both used political power to ensure their privileges, and both drew upon flotillas of small traders to collect their commodities and distribute their imports. But our understanding of the relationship between these tiers is extremely limited, given the very uneven source material. After 1669 the great merchants, so well documented as rivals of the Company, were expelled, and significant long-haul trade was (or should have been) concentrated in VOC hands. This seemed a reversion to pre-fourteenth century practice, when individual ships made the hazardous journey between China and the Arabian Sea, creating a narrow and fragile conduit for valuable goods. This was gradually replaced by a less risky and accelerated flow of merchandise through overlapping sectors, with products passing from ship to ship in transit ports (Chauduri 1985).

This segmentation of trade depended on an on-going ramification of commercial networks, and this process continued. Colonial historians and company archives may have focused on European long-distance trade, but Asian patterns of production, finance and marketing continued to evolve in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Smaller polities and ports gained increasing access to international transactions, spearheaded, in eastern Southeast

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57 The well-known trajectory for Southeast Asian trade described by Reid (1993a, 1993b) shows rapid growth from circa 1550, peaking in the years 1600-1630, to be followed by a mid-century crisis. Makassar’s more locally generated crisis lasted from circa 1650 to the early 18th century; subsequently it seems that the port recovered to pre-crisis levels, Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming). The Makassar case supports suggestions of a later ‘Chinese Century’; Reid 1997; Blussé 1999.

58 Knaap and Sutherland (forthcoming); Sutherland 1988; Marshall 1987:285.
Asia, by Bugis and Chinese networks. Makassar remained one of the most significant emporia where these circuits interlocked. Gowa’s rising trajectory had been brutally cut short by the VOC, and her cosmopolitan court forcibly removed from the currents of international trade and diplomacy. But the underlying momentum of exchange remained. Dutch Makassar and Bugis Bone uneasily shared power on the peninsula, each claiming dominance of specific territories and economic resources. Local merchants ignored such boundaries, as regional networks thrived beyond the limited reach of the VOC, and continued to underpin Asia-wide systems of exchange.

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