

La Maddukelleng and Civil War in South Sulawesi

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Introduction

Understanding local or village warfare in Southeast Asia requires the examination of numerous case studies, the more detailed the better. A drawn-out conflict fought in the Bugis land of Wajoq in South Sulawesi, Indonesia (see Figure 2.1) and culminating in the so-called Pénéki War of 1762 provides an exceptionally rich and well-documented case study. Through it, we can begin to discern not only what warfare was like on the ground for the participants but also its use and usefulness as a political tool. The conflict also provides insights into the nature of Bugis statecraft.

The Bugis are the largest ethnic group in the province of South Sulawesi, located on the southwestern peninsula of the spider-shaped island between Borneo and the Moluccas. Bugis society is divided into a plethora of small communities. Extremely hierarchical, these communities are formed on the basis chains of loyalty between individuals. Bugis communities have coalesced into numerous polities, the largest of which include Luwuq, Boné, Wajoq, Soppéng, Ajjatapparang, and Sidénréng. Each of these have their own customs and legal systems but the societies are closely related and have often cooperated for political and military aims. Traditionally, the majority of the Bugis population has been rice agriculturalists but highly-visible minorities have worked as mercenaries and traders. The people of Wajoq in particular are known for their overseas commerce which was facilitated not only by the navigability of the Cenrana River to the south of Wajoq but also by Wajorese legal and

social systems.¹ Indeed, Wajorese commerce was so outstanding that one nineteenth century observer commented: “Distant enterprise is almost confined to the people of Wajo, and they have a saying amongst them, that a Boni or Sopping trader must have Wajo blood in his veins.”²

Traditional Bugis statecraft was characterized by a complex system of loyalties. This system permitted smaller communities to change their allegiance from one overlord to another according to where they perceived their best interests to lie. This flexibility, in turn, permitted intricate, personality-based conflicts. These conflicts are exemplified by the manner in which the conduct of a father and son, as described in both Bugis and Dutch sources, resulted in nearly three decades of civil strife in Wajoq, a Bugis polity in South Sulawesi. The story of the father, La Maddukelleng, is well known in Indonesia and beyond. His colorful career has been the subject of academic works by Zainal Abidin and J. Noorduyn and he was made a national hero in Indonesia in 1998.³ The fact that he was expelled by Wajoq, the very land he ostensibly sought to liberate, is conveniently overlooked; as is the fact that his son was a horse thief and the source of more political strife. La Maddukelleng’s conduct and that of his son La Pakka does not matter as much for national hero status as the facts that he represents an underrepresented area of Indonesia and that he fought against the Dutch. This historiography aside, their stories shed light on the nature of warfare among the Bugis, the influence of politics on warfare, and the efficacy of warfare as a political tool.

The stories of La Maddukelleng and La Pakka are presented in two sets of sources. The first is the rich and varied corpus of Bugis historical sources written in the Bugis language with an Indic-based syllabary on European paper. Known as *lontaraq*, these include *adat* (customary

1. Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014): Chapter 4.
2. James Brooke, *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes down to the Occupation of Labuan* (London: John Murray, 1848): 1.89.
3. J. Noorduyn, “Een Boeginees geschriftje over Arung Singkang”, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 109.2 (1953): 144–52; J. Noorduyn, “Arung Singkang (1700–1765): How the Victory of Wadjo’ Began.” *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 61–68; Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah”, *Bingkisan* 1.9 (1967): 25–31; 1.10 (1968): 28–31; 1.11 (1968): 28–32; 1.12 (1968): 27–31; 1.13 (1968): 27–31; 1.14 (1968): 31–36; 1.15 (1968): 32–36; Nur Asiah, *Ensiklopedia Pahlawan Nasional Indonesia* (Jakarta: Mediantara, 2009): 65.

law) registers, treaties, diaries and chronicles. While not all Bugis lands have their own chronicle, Wajoq has several different versions. The most extensive of these is the *Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq* (*Complete Chronicle of Wajoq*, hereafter *LSW*). This lengthy document exhibits the typically Bugis preoccupation with objectivity and an exceptional attention to detail. It must be remembered, however, that it is a post-facto historical source designed to portray Wajoq in a favorable light. While much of the information contained within the *LSW* is unavailable anywhere else, it is perhaps less reliable than shorter Bugis documents describing individual historical episodes. The second set of sources is the archives of the United (Dutch) East India Company. During its two-century-presence in Indonesia it made copious notes about local political and economic conditions and collected the letters it exchanged with local rulers. While written from a particular viewpoint in the case of Dutch reports, or translated from the indigenous language in the case of local rulers' letters, these sources have the advantage of having been written shortly after the events that they describe. Both sets of sources are authoritative in their own way and together they provide a view of highly localized indigenous practices of warfare in early modern South Sulawesi.

Both the indigenous and European sources pertaining to the Pénéki War are very concerned with the balance of power on the peninsula. They do not always specify the means by which attacks were made, but the overall picture is of limited warfare with a heavy reliance on arson. Ships, cannon and muskets may have been decisive in individual battles but the war only came to a conclusion when all of the involved parties were exasperated. Endurance and respect for *adat* seem to have played just as critical a role as technology.

Wajorese political structure

Writing in 1669, the Dutch Admiral Cornelis Speelman described Wajoq as “a number of small kingdoms or lands, bound to each other ... but with their own freedoms since time immemorial”.⁴ This statement points to the confederative nature of the Wajorese polity that continued in practical terms until colonization in 1906. It consisted of three main districts or

4. The National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague (hereafter NA), VOC 1276, Report of Cornelis Speelman in Makassar to the High Government in Batavia, 16 February 1670, fol. 873.



Figure 2.1: Map of Wajoq (by the author and Ian Caldwell)

limpo, namely Talotenreng, Tua and Béttémpola. These are the original heart of Wajoq known as the *Tellukkajurué*. Each of these *limpo* had their own sub-districts or vassals known as *lili* that were smaller communities that either chose to align themselves with the main districts or were conquered. Each sub-district had its own leader who was loyal to the leader of the main district who was in turn loyal to the paramount ruler of Wajoq, the *Arung Matoa*. The chain of loyalties ran from the leader of a village to the leader of a *lili* to the leader of the *limpo* to the leader of Wajoq. These chains of loyalties could also be extended overseas. In terms of warfare this meant that the strength of the diaspora could be harnessed for the acquisition of weapons, gunpowder and ammunition.⁵

5. Wellen, *The Open Door*, 76.

When accompanied by a ruler who encouraged target practice, as was the case with La Saléwangeng (r. 1715–1736), the presence of firearms might have actually facilitated political centralization within Wajoq.

While this sort of chain of loyalties was typical among Bugis kingdoms, in Wajoq it was enshrined within an especially complex governmental structure that reflected Wajoq's confederative nature. Wajoq was formally run by a council of officials numbering forty lords, hence the numerical name *Arung Patampulu* that only met on special occasions. Its core consisted of the *Arung Matoa* and the *Petta Ennengng*, meaning "Six Lords", who together formed Wajoq's highest ruling council known as the *Petta Wajoq*. The *Petta Ennengng* consisted of two officers for each *limpo*: a regent known as a *ranreng*, and an army chief called *Pabbaté Lompo* or *Baté Lompo* or simply *Baté*, which literally means banner. With army chiefs holding such key positions in the government, it is immediately apparent that the military played an important role in statecraft. The titles of the army chiefs originated from the color of the banner that they carry: *Pilla* (scarlet), *Patola* (multi-colored) and *Cakkoridi* (yellow). In theory, the rulers of the three divisions had the same rank, but it appears that in practice the *Petta Pilla* was the chief commander during war, and the *Petta Béttémpola* was the highest ranking during peace time. In addition to the *Petta Ennengng*, there were other officials belonging to each *limpo*: a courier known as a *suro* for conveying messages; four *Arung Mabbicara* or deliberating judges, charged with solving problems relating to *adat*; and six *Arung Paddokki-rokki*, or deliberators. The *Arung Patampulu* met to discuss and debate politics and *adat* and through this sort of meeting they guided the course of Wajorese politics. Other Bugis lands had similar councils and there were also interstate councils. These councils and their deliberative process were a very important aspect of Bugis statecraft.

Outside of this political structure there were other lands that were sometimes considered part of Wajoq. For example, the lands to the north known as Pitumpanua ("The Seven Lands") were periodically loyal to Wajoq but not formally represented in the *Arung Patampulu*. Other constituents were only indirectly represented, such as Paria, which had its own government and own *arung* or ruler underneath the jurisdiction of the *Ranreng Béttémpola*.⁶

6. Christian Pelras, "Hiérarchie et pouvoir traditionnels en pays Wadjo", *Archipel* 3 (1972): 218–23.

Whereas such a representative system had the potential to promote unity, the federative nature of Wajoq could also be a source of strife. The issue of which *lili* belonged to which *limpo* was not only a source of contention but also the cause of numerous civil wars. This is because traditional Bugis politics were deeply concerned with the balance of power in which both followers and rice lands played a role.

Bugis Politics

Wajoq was but one of numerous countries forming the political kaleidoscope of South Sulawesi. The peninsula's most renowned countries, Gowa, Luwuq, and Boné, are known collectively as *Cappagalaé* or the Big Three. Most of these countries are, in terms of multi-linear cultural evolution, complex chiefdoms, the exception being the twin Makassarese polities of Gowa-Talloq that formed a state from the beginning of the seventeenth century until it was taken over by the Dutch in 1667.⁷

The main thread running through the peninsula's political history as presented in the kaleidoscope of Bugis sources is the struggle of the various polities to improve their position in a hierarchy of polities. One reflection of this is the frequent mention of communities switching sides in anticipation of, during, or in the aftermath of wars. The political allegiance of even small communities is noted in detail. Chronicles mention an attack or a maneuver in one sentence and then the subsequent section will list the communities that defect. Then the narrative will do the same with the following attack or maneuver. As this makes for very dry reading, it is unlikely to be a literary device used to maintain tempo. Rather, these lists appear to be statements of belonging, reflections of the process through which warfare built communities and dissolved others. Because they attest to a polity's size and strength, they are also indicative of the relative position of any given polity within the hierarchy of polities. This is important in the context of South Sulawesi because the societies on this peninsula were and are very status conscious. The importance of status is reflected not only in personal relationships be-

7. Francis David Bulbeck, "A Tale of Two Kingdoms: The Historical Archaeology of Gowa and Tallok, South Sulawesi, Indonesia" (Ph.D. diss., Australian National University, 1988): 469–72 and Francis David Bulbeck, "Review of *A Chain of Kings: The Makassarese Chronicles of Gowa and Talloq* by William P. Cummings, ed. and trans.," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 42.1 (2008): 207–20.

tween individuals but also in political relationships between the various polities on the peninsula.⁸

An important means of establishing relationships between polities was the conclusion of treaties. These could result from warfare or deliberation. They were very explicit, establishing both the precise relationship between the signatories and their mutual responsibilities.⁹ Treaties were concluded in official ceremonies and were considered to obligate not only the concluding parties but also their descendants. As such, treaties were an enduring means of determining the participating polities' position within the balance of power.¹⁰ Rather than being invalidated, treaties just waned in importance according to new political situations.¹¹ This sometimes meant that political actors had more than one treaty to choose from as they struggled over their position within the hierarchy of polities. Indeed, the profusion of treaties and alliances could even create pretexts for personality-based conflicts and localized forms of warfare that likely had their roots in a pre-Islamic past.

There were two main treaties that resurfaced during the Wajorese political strife of the mid-eighteenth century. The first was the Treaty of Timurung concluded in 1582 that established the *Tellumpocco* or "three peaks" referring to Boné, Soppéng and Wajoq. Basically, a defensive alliance against Gowa it also regulated the balance of power between the three lands. Territory was actually given to Soppéng so that it would be strong enough to conclude the treaty on equal terms with Boné and Wajoq. This treaty was so important that it was still invoked centuries later. Even so, however, it did not supersede the previous arrangements

8. The classic works on status in South Sulawesi are H. J. Friedericy, "De standen bij de Boeginezen en Makassaren", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 90 (1933): 447–602, and H. Th. Chabot, *Kinship, Status and Gender in South Celebes* (Leiden: KITLV, 1996). More recent works include Susan Bolyard Millar, *Bugis Weddings: Rituals of Social Location in Modern Indonesia* (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Lucie van Mens, *De Statusschepers: Sociale Mobiliteit in Wajo, 1905–1950* (Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1989).
9. Leonard Y. Andaya, "Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions: A Case Study from South Sulawesi", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 134 (1978): 280–81.
10. Here it must be noted that David Bulbeck's research on the Makassar twin kingdoms of Gowa and Talloq has revealed that marriage was a more enduring way to form a political alliance. (Bulbeck, "A Tale of Two Kingdoms": 121.
11. Andaya, "Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions": 284.

with Gowa through which Wajoq had become a vassal of Gowa. The second treaty was the Bungaya Treaty. This was concluded in 1667 during the Makassar War in which the combined forces of Boné and the Dutch conquered Gowa. It essentially undermined the government of Gowa and paved the way for Boné to assume a paramount position in the peninsula.¹² A subsequent treaty concluded between the Dutch and the Wajorese in 1670 disadvantaged Wajoq and may have indirectly contributed to Boné's rise during the last third of the seventeenth century.¹³ In addition to these larger-scale treaties, there were smaller-scale treaties and other political arrangements between the kaleidoscope of Bugis polities. Examples include the treaty of mutual respect that Sawitto made with Boné and the oral agreement about property rights that Sawitto reached with Makassar.¹⁴

It was around the start of the eighteenth century that a charismatic Wajorese young man named La Maddukelleng left Sulawesi. According to the LSW, La Maddukelleng was attending a cockfight when an argument arose. A Boneán threw the head of a cock and it hit the Wajorese *arung matoa*. La Maddukelleng was so insulted that he stabbed the offending Boneán, thereby starting a brawl in which 34 people were killed. When the *arumponé*, as the paramount leader of Boné is known, requested that La Maddukelleng be sent to Boné for judgement, the *arung matoa* said that he had not returned to Wajoq, and that according to the Treaty of Timurung, Boné had to believe Wajoq on this matter. Nevertheless La Maddukelleng feared that Boné would attack Wajoq because of him, so he decided to flee and seek his fortune elsewhere.¹⁵

During the early eighteenth century Wajoq's fortunes also started to change. Through a combination of efforts in Wajoq and elsewhere, Wajorese commerce grew to such an extent that Wajoq was able to

12. Boné assumed its paramount position under the charismatic leadership of Arung Palakka La Tenritatta and held it for decades. Upon his death in 1696, however, no Boneán leader could match his ability. By the 1710s, Boné was plagued by political instability. See Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka*: 114–16 and 305–07.

13. Wellen, *The Open Door*: 35.

14. Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: A History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009): 84–85.

15. *Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq* (hereafter *LSW*). Proyek Naskah Unhas No.01/MKH/1/Unhas UP Rol 73, No. 1–12, 230–31.

refortify.¹⁶ Eventually it overtook Boné in the hierarchy of states. This is evidenced in statements made in 1737 by the Dutch Governor Johan Sautijn to the effect that Boné had declined into a weak state during the past 25–30 years, while Wajoq was on the rise.¹⁷ It is during this prosperous period, however, that an intense period of civil and military conflict began in Wajoq. This period started with the return of La Maddukelleng to Wajoq in 1735, and lasted until his death three decades later.

La Maddukelleng and the Dutch

Whether he was recalled by Wajoq or returned on his own volition,¹⁸ La Maddukelleng came back to South Sulawesi in the early 1730s. According to Dutch reports, he married in Mandar on the west coast of Sulawesi and established a base there. From this base he then launched attacks on West Torajan communities such as Kaili in 1730, 1731 and 1732.¹⁹ Bugis sources have slightly different versions of his arrival in Sulawesi. One mentions a fleet of 40 ships enabling La Maddukelleng's victory; another recounts a 75-day siege.²⁰ In 1735, he also made his presence felt off the coast of Makassar, burning houses on the islands near the coast.²¹ Setting communities on fire appears from Bugis manuscripts to have been one of La Maddukelleng's favorite techniques²² and he quickly earned a reputation for violence. In March 1736, the Dutch ordered an attack against La Maddukelleng and his companion ToAssa but it was unsuccessful and the two leaders were able to escape under the cover of darkness.²³

From Makassar, La Maddukelleng proceeded up the east coast of the peninsula to the coast of Boné. When he tried to go ashore, he was

16. Wellen, *The Open Door*: 67–87.

17. NA, VOC 2409, Memorandum of Johan Sautijn to his successor Adriaan Smout, Makassar, 14 October 1737, especially fols. 178 and 244.

18. Sources are contradictory, even self-contradictory.

19. NA, VOC 2285, Memorandum of Josua van Arrewijne to his successor Johan Sautijn, Makassar, 21 May 1733, fol. 137.

20. J. Noorduyn, *Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo': Buginese Historiografie*, ('s-Gravenage: H. L. Smits, 1955): 128.

21. Memorandum of Sautijn to Smout: 192.

22. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, (Leiden University Library, Leiden) for example, mentions this technique repeatedly.

23. Memorandum of Sautijn to Smout: 194.

forbidden from doing so. The *arumponé*, as the paramount leader of Boné is known, and the Seven Lords of Boné convened to discuss the situation. They considered it senseless to engage him in battle at sea.²⁴ Presumably this was because La Maddukelleng was better equipped for naval warfare than the agricultural kingdoms from which he originated. According to one Bugis source, his fleet included 37 ships of outstanding quality.²⁵ Therefore, instead of being attacked at sea, La Maddukelleng was made to wait for 40 days off the coast of Doping after which he was permitted to go ashore on the condition that he submitted himself to trial by the *Tellumpocco*. He agreed and proceeded to Tosora where he was tried and acquitted by the *Tellumpocco*.²⁶

From Tosora, La Maddukelleng proceeded to Pénéki where he was inaugurated as *Arung Pénéki* or ruler of Pénéki and asked the Bonéans to leave. This precipitated a war with Boné. The Bonéans' first response was to invade Pénéki, and their second was to burn other places in Wajoq. Described in the *lontaraq* as Bonéan aggression, these retaliatory acts proved to be a strategic mistake. As a result, many Wajorese joined forces with La Maddukelleng and Boné was no longer fighting just La Maddukelleng but rather the Wajorese population. One Bugis text provides particular details about this phase of the conflict. It mentions the burning of villages, decapitations, the death of La Maddukelleng's son to Sibengngareng, and the seizure of the flag of Témpe, a place in Wajoq.²⁷

The following year, La Maddukelleng assumed leadership of Wajoq. It is unclear exactly how he did this. Letters from Arung Timurung and Datu Baringeng to the Dutch say that his predecessor La Saléwangeng was dethroned.²⁸ Usurpation would certainly not be out of line with La Maddukelleng's character and previous activities. However, Wajorese sources say that he resigned. According to the Wajorese Chronicles (*LSW*), La Saléwangeng suggested that La Maddukelleng would be a

24. J. Noorduyn, "Arung Singkang (1700–1765) How the Victory of Wadjo' began", *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 68.

25. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, fol. 10.

26. The details of the trial are available in Noorduyn, "Arung Singkang", and J. Noorduyn, "Een Boeginees geschriftje over Arung Singkang", 144–52.

27. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, fols. 10–14.

28. NA, VOC 2409, Letter from Datu Baringeng to Johan Sautijn, Wednesday 8 Saban 1736, fols. 748–49.

more appropriate leader to help Wajoq with wars. This is unusual because ostensibly Wajorese leaders were chosen for their fairness, sociability, eloquence and wisdom. The chronicle continues to relate that the Wajorese population objected to La Saléwangeng's resignation saying that it was only during his reign that Wajoq prospered, and they asked him to designate a grandchild who would be appropriate to replace him. He chose La Maddukelleng. La Maddukelleng agreed and La Saléwangeng continued in an advisory position until he died eight years later²⁹ at which point he was given the posthumous name *Lesoé ripaatujunna*, meaning "he who abdicated during his duties". The discrepancy between the contemporary Bugis sources preserved in archives of the VOC and the post-facto account contained in the *LSW* may reflect hesitation on behalf of the chronicler to portray La Maddukelleng in a negative light.

As *arung matoa*, La Maddukelleng sought to liberate Wajoq from all oppressors.³⁰ He encouraged the populace to take up arms against Wajoq's enemies, launched attacks on northern Boné and sought reimbursement of the money, people and goods seized by Boné in 1670. Presumably, in light of these military attacks, in mid-1737 an agreement was reached for Boné and Soppéng to compensate Wajoq in installments for the losses that Wajoq had incurred at the hands of Arung Palakka (and Arung Belo) after the Makassar War. The *LSW* records that Boné not only approved this arrangement, but also said it was God's will that Wajoq lead the *Tellumpocco*.³¹ Wajoq assumed an unprecedented position of power and part of northern Boné became Wajorese, attesting to the increase in Wajorese influence on the peninsula.

La Maddukelleng also wanted to expel the Dutch from South Sulawesi. After two years of planning, he set out for Makassar. When his companions doubted their chances for success, La Maddukelleng replied: "It is alright if you the *Tellumpocco* return to your village because you do not want to go and wage war. The Dutch in Ujung Pandang only number 500 soldiers and we number 500 as well. Just let me go attack them. Hopefully I can expel them from Ujung Pandang."³² While some

29. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*, Vol. III (Ujung Pandang: Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, 1980): 381–82.

30. *Ibid.*: 383.

31. *Ibid.*: 391.

32. *Ibid.*: 399.

of his forces retreated, La Maddukelleng finally launched his attack on Makassar in May 1739. This campaign lasted for several weeks. Without sufficient Bonéan and Gowan support, however, he ultimately failed. A year and a half later the Dutch launched a counter attack which was a tiresome campaign resulting in a Pyrrhic victory for the Dutch. Whereas Wajorese records state that the Dutch walked away from negotiations, Dutch sources record that a verbal agreement was reached in March 1741. Among other things, it stipulated that the Bungaya Treaty was renewed and that Wajoq would leave Timurung to the Bonéans. Since the Wajorese refused to sign it, however, the agreement was essentially an honorable retreat for the Dutch. Wajoq's position remained largely the same.³³

La Maddukelleng and the Wajorese

The withdrawal of the Dutch was not, however, the end of violence in Wajoq. On the contrary, La Maddukelleng initiated a period of civil conflict that lasted for decades. A mere three days after the Dutch left Tosora, he sent his guards to punish the communities that had abandoned Wajoq during its conflict with the Dutch.³⁴ He fined some communities and denigrated others to the status of "children" of Wajoq. Such punishments likely exacerbated tensions and internal dissent in Wajoq.

A major conflict during this contentious period pertained to the relationship between Wajoq and its vassals Pammana and Sidénréng. Pammana was located in western Cenrana valley in the southern part of Wajoq. Sidénréng lay to the northwest of Wajoq and it was also part of the Ajattappareng confederation on the western side of the peninsula. The conflict between Wajoq and these vassals is portrayed as very personal in the Bugis sources. It was personified in a dispute between La Maddukelleng and the Datu Pammana by the name of La Gau who also held the office of *pilla* of Wajoq. Whereas La Gau had displayed exceptional bravery in La Maddukelleng's attack against the Dutch in 1739, in the 1740s he incited Sidénréng against Wajoq. His brother-in-law, La Wawo, was the ruler or *addatuang* of Sidénréng and La Gau wanted to ensure that his relatives maintained their influential positions. Flexing

33. Noorduyin, *Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo'*, 138.

34. Unfortunately, the sources are not specific as to how this was done.

his muscles to emphasize his strength, La Gau insisted that nobody outside his family would rule Sidénréng as long as he lived. Arung Bénténg³⁵ urged La Gau not to create problems in Wajoq, but it was too late. La Maddukelleng was angered and refused to accept Sidénréng's surrender or its attempts to make amends. Instead he insisted that someone other than La Wawo be appointed as the ruler of Sidénréng on that very day, or otherwise La Maddukelleng would attack Sidénréng the next day.

Sidénréng's next move was especially interesting. When the situation was deliberated, not enough council members to make a decision were available on such short notice. Those that were present decided to try to abide by La Maddukelleng's wishes but the *addatuang* insisted that deciding without a quorum was against custom. Thus, Sidénréng preferred battle to the abandonment of its *adat*.

The armed conflict between Sidénréng and Wajoq lasted for more than eight months. Eventually, however, Sidénréng and Pammana sought reconciliation, at which point the relative gravity of La Maddukelleng's and La Gau's crimes were debated. La Gau was accused of undermining the *arung matoa*, which as other Bugis sources confirm, was considered improper.³⁶ In this case, however, La Gau was not considered totally unjustified because La Maddukelleng was accused of arbitrary behavior. At this moment, however, La Maddukelleng was still *arung matoa* and held the upper hand. He insisted that La Gau's crimes could not be exonerated through the payment of a fine and that he must be executed or exiled. The opinions of the Wajorese population were split, with some people believing that La Gau should be fined ten *kati* and other people agreeing with La Maddukelleng. While this was still being debated, La Maddukelleng shot at La Gau who fled to Sekkanasu, probably to the south of Wajoq. Thereafter not only Sidénréng but also Sekkanasu became the object of La Maddukelleng's rage. Then, when Sekkanasu tried to ally with Pammana, and when La Gau stabbed the representative of the Cakkuridi who was also La Maddukelleng's wife in Pammana, Wajoq also attacked Pammana. Wajoq enforced a blockade "as tight as a

35. Bénténg was the former palace center of Rappang that was another part of Ajattappareng north of Sidénréng.

36. NBG-Boeg 125, (Dutch Bible Society Collection, Leiden University Library, Leiden) fols. 108-25.

ring circles a finger”³⁷ and for six months the people of Pammana were unable to procure provisions.

Despite La Maddukelleng’s hostility towards Sidenreng, Sekkanasu and Pammana, La Gau did not want to capitulate. Instead of continuing the armed conflict, however, La Gau and his wife Datu Watu opted for another tactic. They tried to make peace with La Maddukelleng by proposing a marriage between their relative and the sister of Arung Benteng who was an ally of La Maddukelleng. Arung Benteng agreed to the request and the marriage occurred a month later, but even such a family bond was not enough to end the dispute between La Gau and La Maddukelleng. Thereafter Arung Benteng encouraged La Gau to ask La Maddukelleng’s pardon one more time, promising that if forgiveness were still not granted, then they would launch a joint attack against La Maddukelleng. La Gau followed this advice and this time La Maddukelleng accepted his apology.³⁸

Another dispute during this period pertained to Mojong, a community north of Lake Sidénréng that had traditionally been part of both Belawa and Sidénréng. People from both Belawa and Sidénréng wanted the right to plant gardens in this area, and they repeatedly fought over this right until someone was wounded or killed. Thereafter the victor would tend the land and his or her opponent would retreat. This scenario was repeated until it came to be considered a tradition. Nevertheless, at a certain point the rivals from Belawa and Sidénréng considered the possibility that they should fight less and they agreed to seek arbitration. According to Wajorese sources, the rivals first sought arbitration in Lima Ajattappareng but Lima Ajattappareng referred them to Wajoq. In Wajoq the deliberations were the subject of considerable public interest and both sides of the story were heard repeatedly. Thereafter it was decided to consult the *lontaraq*. In the middle of this process, however, La Maddukelleng decided unilaterally that Mojong was part of Belawa and he granted compensation to Belawa thereby engendering envy among the people of Sidénréng. The population was infuriated because La Maddukelleng showed such disregard for the deliberation process

37. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*, 426.

38. *Ibid.*: 436–37 and 442–43. For an alternate version in which peace is concluded after a month of negotiations, see Noorduyn, *Een Achtiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo'*: 306–09.

and, by extension, for Wajorese *adat*.³⁹ It demonstrates not only the population's respect for *adat* but also their preference for deliberation over warfare.

The dispute over Mojong is also significant because it was a turning point in La Maddukelleng's career. After angering the Wajorese population with his autarchic decision, La Maddukelleng gradually lost their support. When he tried to attack Sidénréng again and failed for lack of followers, he relinquished his title in 1754 in the middle of a military campaign. One *lontaraq* records him as saying: "You appointed me on the battlefield to be *arung matoa* but if you don't want me to lead wars, then take Wajoq back on the field."⁴⁰ He was replaced by La Maddanaca (r. 1754–1755), who, like La Maddukelleng, was selected for his military abilities. Thus even despite the population's preference for deliberation, the importance of military skills for leadership in this period is clear.

La Maddukelleng as Arung Pénéki

Even after leaving the office of *arung matoa*, La Maddukelleng still retained the office of *arung Pénéki*. As such he tried to influence Wajorese politics and wrote a letter to the Wajorese council. He promised that he would never harm Wajoq as long as he lived and argued that punishing him for breaking Wajorese customs was paramount to ruining Wajoq. He also warned the Wajorese against Pilla La Gau and his outside influences. Because opinion among its members was split,⁴¹ the Wajorese council responded with apparent difficulty. In their reply they declared their desire for Wajoq's prosperity and their allegiance to Wajorese *adat*. They emphasized that decisions regarding Wajoq are not made unilaterally and urged La Maddukelleng to abide by Wajorese agreements. The debate created tremendous anxiety within the Wajorese government. Eventually La Pasawung stepped down as *arung matoa* because Wajoq was losing vassals including Marioriawe and Maiwa.⁴² Pammana remained technically loyal but harbored its own expansionist plans. Pilla

39. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*, 448–49.

40. *Bunga Rampai Lontaraq*, Proyek Naskah Unhas, No. 01/MKH/27/Unhas/UP Rol 34, No. 27, 124–25.

41. Patola, Cakkuridi and Ranreng Tellotenreng sided with La Maddukelleng; and Arung Benteng, Ranreng Tua and Pilla sided with Arung Matoa La Passawung.

42. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*: 455.

La Gau was making plans to expand Pammana's government by having three divisions, each with three subordinates. He met resistance, however, from the council of Pammana which feared such a modification would be inappropriate because Pammana was subordinate to Wajoq.⁴³

The Dutch were also growing anxious. Similar to indigenous political leaders, the Dutch were concerned with the balance of power in South Sulawesi and in particular the relative influence of Boné. They wanted to maintain the position of authority in Makassar that they had obtained during the late 1660s with the help of Boné. Since they considered themselves to have had no other trustworthy ally in the peninsula, any perceived decline in Boné's power made them nervous. They believed that La Maddukelleng and his band of robbers, as well as disturbances from the Wajorese constituents, except Pammana, were the main causes of Bonéan poverty and troubles. The Dutch were also very concerned about Wajorese attempts at renewing their alliance with the Makassarese and Wajorese demands for Timurung.⁴⁴

During this contentious period, La Maddukelleng's son La Pakka stole the horse of the *arumponé*⁴⁵ La Temmassongé Arung Baringeng (r. 1749–1775). La Pakka also pillaged parts of Boné. Just as had been done decades earlier when La Maddukelleng started a brawl, Boné requested that the person responsible, in this case La Pakka, be handed over to the *arumponé*. When La Maddukelleng refused, Boné retaliated by attacking Pénéki. This escalated into the Pénéki War.

Boné attacked Pénéki for more than a year, at which point there was an attempt at negotiation. When this failed, the war continued for two more years. Unable to conclude peace within the *Tellumpocco*, the *arumponé* sought help from the Dutch. He visited Governor Cornelis Sinkelaar and said that the Dutch were obliged to spring in and mediate and help the Bonéans bring the Wajorese to reason. When Sinkelaar replied that this was not the VOC's responsibility, the *arumponé* chastised him for his unfriendliness.⁴⁶ Ultimately, the Dutch lent assistance

43. Ibid.: 456.

44. R. Blok, *History of the Island of Celebes* (Calcutta: Calcutta Gazette Press, 1817): 3–7.

45. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*: 457.

46. NA, VOC 3216, Memorandum of C. Sinkelaar to his successor D. Boelen, 28 February 1767, fol. 39.

in the form of supplies and loans. While the Dutch were not combatants themselves, they were sufficiently interested in the proceedings of the war between Boné and Pénéki to record details, which two and a half centuries later offer insights into early modern Bugis warfare as well as the concerns of their allies the Bonéans.

The Pénéki War

The Dutch in Makassar were very concerned about the Pénéki War because it appeared that the longer the war continued on, the weaker Boné got. However, the Dutch grew frustrated with the Bonéans for not fighting wholeheartedly. They believed that Pénéki could be conquered if only the Bonéans were daring enough but that instead the Bonéans “wanted to fetch water without getting wet”.⁴⁷ Bonéan unwillingness to fight is exemplified by their argument that they could not attack Pénéki because they had not received the straw they had been promised, whereas there was straw readily available on the ground.⁴⁸

From the perspective of the *arumponé*, however, the war was not so simple. Straw for setting fires may have been there for the taking but he had difficulty raising funds for other sorts of offensives. He repeatedly told the Dutch that he did not have any provisions and that he must borrow from the Company.⁴⁹ Another complication was political dissent within Boné. While some of the dissent related to the war, with the *arumponé*'s own children not understanding why he was so committed to it, there were also other rifts.

One dispute related to the succession to the position of *arumponé*. Arumponé La Temmassongé wanted his son, Arung Ta, to succeed him as the ruler of Boné but Arung Mampu was considered to be a more capable, cleverer ruler. This rivalry resulted in Arung Ta deserting Arung Mampu on the battlefield. They had agreed to make an attack

47. The National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta (hereafter ANRI), Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter from the captain of the Malays Abdul Cadier to Cornelis Sinkelaar, 2 March 1762, unpaginated.

48. ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter from the *Arumponé* received 2 April 1762, unpaginated.

49. ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Report of the Captain of the Malays regarding what he saw and heard during his stay with the Bonéan army, undated, unpaginated.

together but when the fighting became intense, Arung Ta abandoned Arung Mampu to the enemy. Aware of this treachery, Arung Mampu exerted extra caution and he and his forces did not succumb. He and his followers resolved that, even though they were allies, they should not put themselves in danger for each other.⁵⁰ The fact that leaders such as Arung Ta and Arung Mampu each had their own followers, complete with their own forces, made it very difficult for the *arumponé* to wage a coordinated war effort. This difficulty was also apparent in the desire of certain leaders to use the battlefield as a platform for demonstrating their bravery. At one point the *arumponé* chastised Arung Mampu for making an unauthorized attack.

Politics aside, the *arumponé* also had financial difficulties. According to one report, Boné's military supplies consisted of 13 cannon, 1,000 handguns and 2,000 men. Limited in terms of supplies, the Bonéans employed low-resource tactics. One such tactic was trying to starve the enemy out, a common practice in Bugis warfare. Yet here again, dissent posed problems. Two Bonéan messengers provided the Pénékians with rice. Not having caught the traitors in the act, the Bonéans could not prevent this.⁵¹ Furthermore, the Bonéans were usually powerless to prevent the Wajorese from receiving reinforcements from their diasporic communities in Sumbawa, Timor and Pasir. From the moment La Maddukelleng had returned to Sulawesi, the Bonéans had been concerned about the strength of his ships and troops, which – according to the Bonéan emissary – were not Wajorese.⁵² How this emissary defined Wajorese is not recorded in the sources, but it is clear that the Wajorese received reinforcements from their compatriots overseas on numerous occasions during the eighteenth century.⁵³

In at least one instance, however, the Bonéans might have been able to prevent the Pénékians from obtaining reinforcements but they chose not to. This was when a wife of Arung Pénéki led a group of women

50. Report of the Captain of the Malays, unpaginated.

51. ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter to Cornelis Sinkelaar, 28 February 1762, unpaginated.

52. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, fol. 10.

53. NA, VOC 2409, Letter from Arung Timuring to Governor Johan Sautijn, 9 May 1736, f. 771; Leid Cod Or 1923 VI: 15; ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter from Brugman to Gov. Sinkelaar, 4 March 1762, unpaginated.

on an expedition to fetch gunpowder from Wajoq. When they returned to Pénéki at dusk, a group of combatants accompanied them, shooting to the right and the left. The Bonéans dared not fire back for fear of escalating violence.⁵⁴ Preventing a convoy of women from transporting gunpowder overland is different from preventing mariners from importing weapons from overseas. Furthermore, the relative strength of the forces is not clear from the sources. The Wajorese had an unparalleled overseas network that provided them with munitions and manpower, but the Bonéans received help from the Dutch. Nevertheless the incident exemplifies the Bonéan reluctance to use force which frustrated the Dutch.

Despite the help they received from the Dutch, the Bonéans employed inexpensive techniques. In addition to trying to starve out the enemy, the Bonéans also set fires. This tactic was not always successful. One report describes how the Bonéans stacked dry grass around Pénéki with the intention of setting it aflame as soon as there was a favorable wind that would facilitate burning Pénéki down. Yet the Wajorese beat them at their own game and lit this grass when the wind was blowing in a way that the fire and smoke went towards the Bonéans. While the Bonéans choked in the smoke, the Wajorese climbed up on the top of their palisades and mocked them.⁵⁵ Literally teasing the enemy was possible because of the proximity in which Bugis forces sometimes built their fortifications. In this case it appears that the Wajorese mocked the Bonéans from an elevated vantage point but in other instances movable stockades were built so close to enemy forts that the adversaries could even touch each other.⁵⁶

The Dutch grew increasingly impatient to put an end to this war and they corresponded extensively with Boné about the best way to do so. They wanted to reinstate the Bungaya Treaty and were even willing to exclude several clauses, especially those that restricted freedom of navigation and Wajorese alliances with Gowa. They seemed to think that they could convince Wajoq to accept these conditions but Wajoq

54. Report of the Captain of the Malays, unpaginated.

55. Ibid.

56. G. Vermeulen, *De gedenkwaardige voyagie van Gerret Vermeulen naar Oost-Indien, in 't jaar 1668, aangevangen, en it 't jaar 1674 voltrokken*, Amsterdam: Jan Claesz, 1677: 66.

was more interested the renewal of the *Tellumpocco*. Despite the Dutch providing the Bonéans with material support, the Dutch were not able to contain this conflict as they hoped.

In Pénéki La Maddukelleng exhibited his usual tenacity. The *LSW* relates that, when a messenger tried to convince La Maddukelleng to give up, he refused to surrender. Instead he replied that he did not care if the *Tellumpocco* drove him to a state of desperation.⁵⁷ This corresponds with Dutch sources that report that the Pénékians would rather die than leave and that La Maddukelleng refused to leave his house.⁵⁸ After numerous attacks and limited success, the Bonéans finally launched a devastating attack on Pénéki. La Maddukelleng's son La Tobo died, Pénéki was desperate and asked help from Wajoq. Wajoq complied. Wajoq also asked Pénéki to surrender La Pakka and La Maddukelleng agreed in word but then never delivered his son. This unfulfilled promise caused people to rebel against La Maddukelleng. Before this rebellion escalated, however, La Pakka died during another attack on Pénéki.⁵⁹

Sources relate two different resolutions to the Pénéki war. The *LSW* records that La Maddukelleng surrendered upon the death of his son La Pakka. La Maddukelleng is generally characterized as being exceptionally loathe to surrender, but in the mid-1760s he would have been an old man by contemporary standards. It is easy to imagine that he was tired, less resilient and more inclined to admit defeat. In any case, the *LSW* further relates that Boné was incredulous. Unconvinced that La Maddukelleng's surrender was sincere, Boné suggested testing his sincerity by asking him to return everything he stole. Wajoq considered this a breach of sovereignty and objected, saying that Pénéki was a vassal of Wajoq. The *Tellumpocco* acquiesced. This version spares Wajoq and La Maddukelleng further humiliation.⁶⁰

Contemporary sources relate a different story, however. In a letter to the VOC, the *arumponé* reports that La Maddukelleng wreaked such havoc that fishermen and traders did not dare to venture out on the

57. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*: 457.

58. ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter from captain of the Malays Abdul Cadier to Cornelis Sinkelaar, 04 March 1762, unpaginated.

59. Muhammad Salim (ed.), *Lontarak Wajo*: 457–59.

60. *Ibid.*, 460–61.

water. It continues to relate that Wajoq sent a large force that included some of the *Arung Patampulu* to Pénéki. This force killed two of La Maddukelleng's sons and set fire to Pénéki. The participation of some of the 40 lords is not surprising given that this council included three army chiefs. It is easy to imagine that this expedition was very well armed, but the text does not mention their use of firearms. Thereafter Boné succeeded in capturing La Maddukelleng. Wajoq then sent a messenger to Boné requesting the release of La Maddukelleng, and Boné complied. The Bonéans were not, however, as charitable with the population of Pénéki as they were with La Maddukelleng and they sold part of the people into slavery to repay their debt to the Dutch.⁶¹

Despite the significant differences in these stories, both versions agree about a crucial feature. That is that La Maddukelleng was eventually returned to Wajorese custody. This suggests a tremendous respect for the sovereignty of the constituents of the *Tellumpocco*, a respect that was maintained even during the aftermath of military conflicts.

Questions of justice

Leaders from Boné, Soppéng and Wajoq met in Timurung to discuss La Maddukelleng's manifold crimes and debate possibilities for punishment. A Bugis manuscript in Leiden University library⁶² provides a detailed, day-by-day account of this meeting. It is dated 1763 but the contents suggest that the meeting might have been later. Wrongdoings dating back almost three decades were discussed and there were so many that the participants in the meeting found it all but impossible to summarize them. Wajoq said that it had originally agreed with some of La Maddukelleng's offensives but not all. Boné then pointed out that previous rulers had also played a role in the conflicts in which La Maddukelleng became involved. It was agreed that Arung Palakka had failed to maintain the *Tellumpocco* alliance and that nobody had dared to remind him of the Treaty of Timurung because he aroused so much fear. The representatives adjourned and then reconvened to share the information contained in their *lontaraq*. The various parties had different recollections but eventually Wajoq declared that La Maddukelleng

61. ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, Letter from the Ruler of Boné, October 1766, unpaginated.

62. NBG-Boeg 125.

had been a destructive force, having pillaged on land and sea and having been unwilling to compromise. Wajoq then offered to compensate for the damage La Maddukelleng had wreaked, but Boné retorted that remuneration was impossible. If La Maddukelleng had done nothing worse than steal, then Wajoq could pay back half of the value in jewels, but La Maddukelleng had committed a graver offense by breaking the *Tellumpocco* alliance. When Soppéng suggested that La Maddukelleng should be crushed with stones for treason, Boné questioned whether the pertinent customs of the three respective lands were the same. Boné continued that according to its own *adat*, rulers could not be contradicted, not even if they declared the polar opposite of the truth and called white black. Soppéng and Wajoq both responded that they had this same custom at which point the meeting was adjourned. At the concluding meeting Wajoq shared a message from the *arung matoa* to the *arumponé*. He suggested that it would be better to try to reach an agreement another day. Boné countered that if they adjourned, then Wajoq would have to take all of the blame for Pénéki upon itself. Wajoq did not object, however, and it was agreed to adjourn.

Although an agreement was never reached, the meeting may have been important for its reinforcement of a custom held in common by Boné, Soppéng and Wajoq: that the ruler was above the law and could not be prosecuted, not even for disregarding *adat* or pillaging. The record of the meeting also conclusively shattered the image of La Maddukelleng as a proto-nationalist who selflessly and tirelessly fought the Dutch. The text portrays him as war monger who may have killed many more Indonesians than Dutch. Opinions may have been split in Wajoq as to whose crimes were worse, La Maddukelleng's or La Gau's, but there was no disagreement as to the devastating effect that La Maddukelleng had had on Wajoq and the *Tellumpocco*.

At this point, the so-called Pénéki War was over. Peace was re-established in Boné and Wajoq relinquished its claim on Timurung. However, the debate about La Maddukelleng continued for several years. In 1764 or 1765, the *Tellumpocco* met again to discuss La Maddukelleng's wrongdoings and even his emotional state when he requested pardon. It was agreed that the issue was complex because of the office that he held. According to Wajoq, he asked for pardon and was therefore absolved. The *Tellumpocco* had a split opinion about this and the debate

raged on, including discussions about the proper ways of dealing with stolen property and statements about the value of the *Tellumpocco*. Five months after this inconclusive meeting La Maddukelleng died.⁶³

Conclusion

The Pénéki War raises a number of interesting issues about statecraft and sovereignty. First was the position of the paramount ruler. At the meeting of the *Tellumpocco* around 1763, all parties agreed that once a ruler was appointed, he or she could not be questioned: if the ruler called white black, then it was black. The effective corollary of this is that the paramount rulers are above justice. Thus La Maddukelleng was never punished, not with a fine, not with exile, and not with death. Possible punishments were discussed within Wajoq and the *Tellumpocco* for years but there is no record of La Maddukelleng ever being punished.

The second issue was the relationship between the constituent parts of Wajoq. Pénéki was a part of Wajoq. It was located about 18 kilometers from the Wajorese capital and there was a system of messengers built into the government. Nevertheless Pénéki acted independently. It attacked Boné and got help from Luwuq to do so while Wajoq stayed out of the conflict for two years. Then, when Wajoq did come to Pénéki's aid, it did so on a grand scale. The way in which Pénéki conducted itself doubtlessly had much to do with La Maddukelleng's personality but there was also a federative system in place that allowed constituent polities to act individually. Pénéki was part of Wajoq but it was independent as well.

The relationship between Pénéki and Wajoq exemplifies the layers and liaisons typical of indigenous statecraft in South Sulawesi. Wajoq was a vassal of Gowa, and an ally of Boné and Soppéng. Meanwhile Wajoq had three constituent parts and each had their own vassals. Furthermore there were other tributary relationships with neighboring polities and some of those neighboring polities were in mutual relationships as well.

This multi-faceted, multi-layered political landscape could facilitate prolonged periods of civil unrest, as it did in eighteenth century Wajoq. Not only did this system lend itself to very complicated civil wars, but also it enabled constituents of Wajoq to choose in which conflicts they

63. *LSW*: 327–28.

wanted to be involved, and even on which side. This possibility was further entrenched by the enduring nature of Bugis treaties which theoretically never expired but only receded into the political background, to be recalled as needed or desired. In such a political system, one sub-polity or another always had a conflict with its neighbor or could find an excuse to launch an attack. Such conflicts could influence broader politics, thereby resulting in escalating political turmoil such as the Pénéki War. Arguably, this multi-faceted, multi-layered system also created a very complex playing field on which personal conflicts, vendettas, and aggressive personalities were played out in the extreme. La Maddukelleng is one example, but there are others, for instance Arung Tanété La Odang a.k.a. the Mad Duke who waged war across the peninsula and reportedly ate the livers of his defeated enemies with salt.⁶⁴

This style of warfare is not unique to South Sulawesi. On the contrary, personal conflicts and small-scale warfare were widespread in Southeast Asia and beyond. What is unusual in the case of the Pénéki War, however, is the extent of details in the available evidence. The *LSW* is the most detailed of Bugis state chronicles and it deals extensively with local conflicts and the personalities involved. Meanwhile VOC archives contain not only Dutch intelligence reports but also letters from Bugis participants in the Pénéki War. Thus, despite the fact that the Pénéki War has hitherto largely escaped the attention of historians, the available documentation constitutes a historiographical treasure trove.

This very historiographical richness, however, may be misleading. The inclusion of small-scale conflicts in the *LSW*, an extremely detailed source, lends them an importance not accorded to the countless similar conflicts that presumably occurred on the same peninsula at the same time but so far have escaped the attention of chroniclers. Meanwhile, the creation of an archive dedicated to the Pénéki War encourages viewing this long period of civil unrest as a war when it could easily be viewed as a string of conflicts instead. In turn, such strings of conflicts might be viewed as cycles or as episodes in an age-old style of warfare. Often ritual, this warfare was of cultural significance. It could serve not only to assert claims on resources or to enhance a community's status, but also to affirm an individual's prestige or to ensure a successful harvest.

64. Johan Splinter Stavorinus, *Voyages to the East-Indies* (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1798): 2: 221.

With such important roles, ritual warfare did not simply disappear with the advent of states and world religions. Such a lingering doubtlessly occurred elsewhere in the early modern world but is perhaps more visible in South Sulawesi due to historiographical accidents. Whether or not South Sulawesi's complex, multi-layered political landscape also facilitated the continuation of an indigenous style of warfare that pre-dated the advent of states awaits further research.

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